Rising Danger of Simultaneous Crises in Iraq and Kosovo
January 25, 1999
stratfor.com
SUMMARY
Something odd is going on. The Iraqis are not allowing the latest crisis to
die down, but are challenging U.S. aircraft with missiles and are deploying
forces southward. Their newspapers are full of threats directed toward
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. At the same time, the Serbs deliberately carried
out a massacre that was intended to be detected, and then intentionally
exacerbated the crisis by trying to expel a senior diplomat. There is now
the real possibility that Baghdad and Belgrade are coordinating their
actions to simultaneously pose challenges that strain U.S. military
capabilities. At the same time, Russia has taken on a much more assertive
role, demanding that the U.S. not attack either Iraq or Serbia. The U.S.
Post-Cold War coalition has completely broken down. Russia, France
and China are all resisting the U.S. A window of opportunity has opened
here for the Iraqis and Serbs. We see signs that they are now taking
advantage of it, perhaps in concert.
FORECAST
One of the major predictions STRATFOR made in the Annual Forecast
was that Russia would become much more assertive in 1999. One of the
consequences of this new assertiveness would be an increased willingness
on the part of Russia to challenge the United States. We went on to say
that, "the first confrontation will come, we think, over Serbia, where we
expect Russia to increase direct aid to Serbia openly, thereby challenging
U.S. policy in Bosnia and Kosovo. Serbia, watching U.S. fumbling over
Iraq, and emboldened by Russian support, is clearly preparing a new
challenge to the United States over Kosovo. Serbia is calculating that the
United States will not risk a major confrontation with Russia, and France
may choose to oppose a full-scale anti-Serbian intervention. The dangers
of a new confrontation with Serbia rise as Russian nationalism intensifies.
There is particular danger if Serbia and Iraq challenge the United States
simultaneously." Barely three weeks into the new year, we are now
witnessing a crisis with Serbia over Kosovo at the same time as U.S.
warplanes are engaged in almost daily combat against surface to air missile
launch sites in Iraq. The game's afoot.
Let's first consider the old game, since there is a new one starting. The old
game was built around George Bush's New World Order doctrine.
According to this doctrine, the collapse of the Soviet Union meant that
great power conflict had been effectively abolished. The United States
was the only superpower and all other major powers (the Europeans,
Japan, China, Russia) basically shared a common interest in international
peace and prosperity. Major international conflicts were no longer
possible. There were only two types of military problems. There were
nations that would suffer internal instability, which required the
international community to intervene in order to prevent suffering. Then
there might be some nations that might seek to create regional
hegemonies. Somalia was an example of the former; Iraq, the latter.
The solution to these problems was the same. The international community
had a common interest in preventing regional conflict and national
instability and in alleviating human suffering. Therefore, when such
problems occurred, the international community, using multilateral
institutions like the United Nations or NATO, would intervene in order to
maintain the status quo. The United States would take a major role in such
interventions, as was its obligation as the only superpower, but it would
share responsibility with other nations. Most important, it would only act
where there was an international consensus that such intervention was
necessary.
This led to a series of operations including Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, and
Bosnia to name the most important. The tempo of interventions carried out
by the United States actually increased after the end of the Cold War.
More important, the geographical distribution of these interventions was,
under normal circumstances, extremely dangerous. The United States was
committing troops both simultaneously and sequentially throughout
Eurasia, Africa and the Western Hemisphere. Under the best of
circumstances, the frequency of these operations and their geographical
diversity would have strained the logistical capabilities of the United
States. Given the fact that the United States was simultaneously
decreasing resources available to the military while increasing the tempo of
operations, the strain on the U.S. military was quite intense.
The strategic reality alleviated these dangers to a great degree. Because
there was general consensus in favor of intervention, the target country
was isolated. Its military capabilities could only decrease. Second, since
there was no major power supporting them, the probability of coordinated
action was minimal. The great risk was always that two geographically
diverse powers, like Iraq, North Korea, or Serbia, would simultaneously
strike at U.S. forces. This would pose a dangerous problem for the United
States. With U.S. troops simultaneously engaged in combat in three
different theaters, it was not clear that the United States could reinforce
and resupply all theaters. However, under the strategic reality for most of
the nineties, this was a theoretical, not a real problem. The overwhelming
international consensus supporting these interventions guaranteed that
target nations would lack the resources with which to initiate intense
operations on their own, let alone coordinate their actions with nations
continents away. Thus, even though two of these interventions, Serbia and
Iraq, have turned into long-term commitments, joining Korea in dispersing
U.S. forces, the actual risks appeared small.
It is interesting that Iraq and Serbia have adopted almost identical
strategies for dealing with the U.S.-led interventions, which is reasonable
since both want to achieve similar goals: to become the dominant power in
their region. Without U.S. intervention, this goal was in the reach of both
nations. After the intervention, not only wasn't that goal attainable any
longer, but the very survival of the regimes and the territorial integrity of
their nations were in doubt. It would have appeared rational for both to
capitulate to the international coalition arrayed against them. Neither did.
Both Serbia and Iraq adopted the same view. First, both regimes felt that
capitulation would mean their destruction as well as the abandonment of
their dream of regional hegemony. Their perception was that any attempt
at conciliation with domestic minorities or enemies across their borders
would mean their utter destruction, and that continued conflict actually
protected their interests better than a genuine peace. Second, they felt that
time was on their side. The United States and its allies did not have
fundamental interests at stake. Having viewed U.S. behavior elsewhere, it
was both Iraq's and Serbia's perception that, over time, the United States
would lose interest and drift away. They simply had to wait.
More important, they read the U.S. coalition as inherently unstable. If only
one major power were to break away from the coalition, then both Iraq's
and Serbia's isolation would be done away with. Moreover, at that point,
the ability of the United States to act under the cover of the international
community would dissolve, leaving Baghdad and Belgrade with room for
diplomatic maneuver, trade opportunities, and even access to arms. The
key for both Iraq and Serbia, therefore, was simply to survive without
capitulating. This meant maintaining the state of belligerence without
conceding anything substantial and without triggering an overwhelming
military action.
Both Iraq and Serbia adopted the same strategy. They would press
forward continually until challenged. On being challenged, they would
make a concession that would forestall military action. After a while, they
would break whatever promises they made and continue to press
forward. At times they miscalculated, triggering an easily endurable series
of air strikes, which actually helped perpetuate the regime by creating a
sense of embattlement and victimization among the populace and
increasing support for the regime. This strategy was facilitated by the
inability of the United States to put forward any meaningful demands
beyond that Iraq and Serbia stop doing some particular thing. This
allowed them to stop doing whatever was demanded, causing the U.S. to
stand down its forces. When the carriers and planes went home, they
resumed their actions in an endless series of challenges designed to
exhaust the United States. All the while they waited for the coalition to
break.
The coalition has broken. This is a very different situation than before.
Russia is no longer part of the U.S. led coalition, but is now crafting its
own independent foreign policy, one strongly opposed to military actions
against both Iraq and Serbia. China is supporting the Russian position.
France, although it has backed off somewhat in the case of the Serbs,
following the recent massacre, is also opposed. Following the
unsanctioned bombing of Iraq in December 1998, the United States lost
the cover of its coalition. More important, it moved into a period of grave
danger. Madeleine Albright is heading to Moscow on January 24 to repair
the damage. There will undoubtedly be toasts and a warm communique.
But Albright has nothing to offer the Russians. Nothing will come of the
meetings.
The hidden nightmare of U.S. strategy has been the possibility of
coordinated action between Iraq and Serbia. Imagine the havoc if Iraq
moved south into Kuwait at the same moment that Serbia launched an
offensive against Bosnia. In both cases, U.S. troops would be immediately
involved. Which would receive priority for reinforcements? Could the
U.S. fight two high-intensity conflicts simultaneously without allied support
and with the active opposition of Russia, perhaps with it even shipping
weapons to both Iraqis and Serbs?
It is not clear to us that the Iraqis are explicitly coordinating with the
Serbs, although these two pariahs would be foolish not to begin some sort
of secret coordination. We have no direct evidence of such coordination,
but it if this is all mere coincidence, it is inspired coincidence from the Iraqi
and Serbian point of view. Our guess, for what it is worth, is that this is
not coincidence and that we are seeing skillful coordination between
Baghdad and Belgrade.
Something is going on. The Iraqi crisis did not end as such crises normally
do, with Iraq standing down. Rather, Iraqi SAMs are locking on to U.S.
aircraft daily, while reports persist of Iraqi troop concentrations along the
Kuwaiti border. The Iraqi press is filled with claims against Kuwait and
condemnation of Saudi Arabia. Thus, rather than ending the last crisis, the
Iraqis have deliberately prolonged the crisis. They are behaving very
differently than before. At the same time, the Serbs have decided to
challenge the United States in Kosovo. The perpetrated a massacre that
was clearly intended to be detected. They threatened to expel a diplomat,
deliberately infuriating the United States. They have gone out of their way
to make it clear that they intend to do everything necessary to keep
Kosovo inside Serbia, whether the United States likes it or not. Suddenly
and simultaneously, Iraq and Serbia are doing everything possible to
provoke the United States. What has happened?
Time has run out on U.S. post-Cold War policy. The coalition has
shattered and both Serbia and Iraq see a window of opportunity. The
outcry against the December bombing of Iraq was not only intense, but
seems to have broken the coalition permanently. Most important, Russia is
now taking a much more active role, demanding that the United States not
repeat its bombing of Iraq or Serbia. While working publicly to calm the
crisis, there are continual reports coming from the region of Russian
weaponry flowing into Serbia. In effect, the Russians, committed to
working with China and France to limit U.S. global power, see an
opportunity to block U.S. power in two critical regions.
If the simultaneous Iraqi and Serbian crises are not pure coincidence, then
there is a tremendous danger emerging. Iraqi military behavior over the
past few weeks is extremely hard to explain. They are clearly both more
confident and more aggressive. Their apparent deployment of forces
seems to indicate some sort of aggressive intention. The Serbs have
deliberately provoked a crisis with the United States at the same time.
Both situations could explode at any minute. Both countries have a reason
to want the situation to explode, since this is very much the situation they
have been waiting for since their confrontation with the United States
began. Neither country is in a position to confront the United States alone.
They stand a much better chance of achieving their goals if they challenge
the United States simultaneously. With overt and covert Russian support,
they have the ability to pose a tremendous challenge to American military
capabilities.
The Iraqis and Serbs are clearly up to something. What has changed? The
Russians are no longer passive. We are now passing out of the post-Cold
War world into a new, longer-lasting era in which the United States is no
longer leading a passive, subservient international coalition in crusades
against isolated rogue nations. A coordinated resistance to U.S. power
has begun to emerge and function. U.S. military deployment is based on
the assumption that there will be no geographically dispersed, coordinated
resistance to U.S. military actions. The U.S. is even less prepared for
coordinated initiatives by its enemies that places the U.S. on the defensive
and in which military action takes place at the time and choosing of
Washington's opponents. It appears to us that we are moving into such a
period. If there is Serbo-Iraqi coordination going on, or if this is mere
coincidence, the U.S. may find itself in a two-theater confrontation which
could strain its military resources to the limits. The problem: whether this
happens is not up to Washington but to planners in Baghdad and
Belgrade. This is a very new game that's afoot. |
