Primakov Tightens Grip on Strategic Enterprises and Media
January 26, 1999
stratfor.com
SUMMARY
Anticipating parliamentary and presidential election campaigns, Russian
Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov is strengthening, at an accelerating
pace, the regime's control over the media and strategic industries.
Primakov headed Russia's intelligence service from 1991-1996, and since
he took office as Prime Minister in September 1998, he has appointed
former KGB colleagues to key positions throughout the country. Former
Soviet spymasters have now been installed as head of the government
administration, the Presidential Chief of Staff, the director of the
Department for Special Programs, and the chief of the Main Control
Directorate. On January 25, the former public relations boss of the
Russian Federal Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), successor to the
KGB's international directorate, was appointed First Deputy Director of
the Russian press agency ITAR-TASS. To increase the state control over
the strategic enterprises, Primakov named a former KGB colleague as
chief of the state weapons company Rosvooruzheniye, and launched a
major restructuring of the Russian oil and gas industry that included
personnel changes in the administration of many major companies.
Primakov's appointment of loyal Soviet-era cadres to strategic posts is not
merely building a strong political faction that is loyal primarily to him, but
one that controls the commanding heights of the communications and
large-scale industries.
ANALYSIS
Since becoming the Russian Prime Minister five months ago, Yevgeny
Primakov has assumed the vast majority of powers from the ailing
President Boris Yeltsin. During this time, Primakov has systematically
appointed "his" people to key positions in Russia -- "his" people being
former officers of the KGB and its successor agencies. In September
1998, former SVR official Yury Zubakov was appointed head of
government administration. Later last year, Primakov succeeded in
installing Grigory Rapota, who has no experience in weapons trade, as the
new head of the arms exports monopoly Rosvooruzheniye. Rapota, who
had worked for the KGB since 1966 as an agent in Western Europe and
the U.S., was named by Primakov in 1993 as the number three man of the
Russian intelligence service. Primakov had to face serious obstacles to win
the Rosvooruzheniye post for Rapota and was able to succeed in this
effort only due to his post as a chief of the state military-cooperation
committee.
A number of other former Soviet spymasters were recently named into
key positions. Former high KGB and border guard officer Nikolai
Bordyuzha was named as President's Chief of Staff in December 1998.
According to the Russian magazine Obshchaya Gazeta, Bordyuzha, as
well as Zubakov, and the head of the president's secretariat Robert
Makaryan, were appointed to their posts late last year on advice from
Primakov. Other posts currently occupied by former KGB agents and
bureaucrats include head of the Department of Special Programs, held by
former FSB deputy chief Viktor Zorin, and head of the main Control
Directorate, held by Nikolai Patrushev, also former FSB official. Former
KGB agent in Germany, Vladimir Putin, is now acting as first deputy chief
of the president, responsible for the administration's relations with Russian
regions.
Most recently, Primakov was involved in promoting the SVR's public
relations department chief, Yury Kobaladze, into a high position in the
Russian media. Last week, Russian newspapers reported that Kobaladze
would soon be named director of the state-owned management company
VGTRK, which owns the RTR and Kultura TV channels, Radio Russia,
and a number of regional radio and TV stations and transmission systems.
Kobaladze confirmed he was offered the position and announced that he
was retiring from the Foreign Intelligence Service on January 22.
However, on January 25, Kobaladze was not placed at the helm of
VGTRK, but rather was named First Deputy Director of Russia's leading
news agency ITAR-TASS. The move is further evidence of Primakov's
serious, possibly long-term political ambitions.
Following the abject failure of neoliberal economic reforms in Russia, the
state has been gradually increasing its control over the industrial sector.
The main contributor to the state budget in Russia is the oil and gas sector,
which had been partially liberalized during the last couple of years. Foreign
investors have been allowed to make major investments in the sector, and
a number of joint ventures with foreign partners were established.
Foreigners mainly contributed financial investment and technical
know-how to the Russian oil and gas sector. However, it is becoming
clear that the Russian government is now moving away from liberalization
and towards renewed dominance over this industry. The Russian Ministry
of Fuel and Energy has recently designed a plan for founding a national oil
company by merging such oil companies as Rosneft, ONAKO, and
Russia-Belorussian Slavneft. Also, the government plans a major
restructuring of the gas giant Gazprom, including all-encompassing
personnel changes.
We have predicted and subsequently tracked Russia's increasing
assertiveness in its foreign policy and Russia's rebuilding of its empire. As
Moscow, with the old Soviet crew back in charge, reverts to familiar
foreign policy patterns, the same clearly holds true in domestic policy.
Primakov, backed by his Gorbachev-era supporters and colleagues
among the security apparatus, is now asserting control over the institutions
of government, the media and the military and extractive industries. Those
Primakov has placed in charge are quickly and systematically reasserting
familiar patterns of heavy-handed control over Russia's internal politics.
After briefly flirting with economic and political liberalization, the Russian
polity is quickly reverting to a familiar form. |
