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Technology Stocks : Amazon.com, Inc. (AMZN) -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: MoonBrother who wrote (37071)1/27/1999 7:43:00 AM
From: MoonBrother  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 164684
 
07:34am EST 27-Jan-99 Bear Stearns (Ehrens,Scott 212/272-9382) AMZN
AMZN: Reports Terrific Fourth Quarter:ROIC Is Key (Not Gross Margin)(Part 1 / 2

Scott Ehrens (212) 272-9382 sehrens@bear.com 1/27/99
Matthew Esh (212) 272-9043 mesh@bear.com
Matthew Adams (212) 272-6905 madams@bear.com

Subject: Analysis of Sales/Earnings
Industry: Internet / New Media

BEAR, STEARNS & CO. INC.

Amazon.com, Inc.* (AMZN- $115.09) Buy

Amazon.com Reports Terrific Fourth Quarter: ROIC Is Key (Not Gross Margin)
(Part 1 / 2)
_________________________________________________________________
*** Blowout Quarter on Top and Bottom Line. Amazon.com
reported strong fourth quarter earnings yesterday with a narrower
than expected loss of ($0.14) per share versus our estimate of
($0.19) and consensus of ($0.18) per share. Earlier in January,
the company had pre-announced fourth quarter revenues of $252.8
million (vs. $185 million estimated), an increase of 65%
sequentially and 313% from a year ago. International sales
accounted for 19% of revenues, aided by the addition of local
sites in Germany and the U.K in October. Revenue growth was
driven by the addition of 1.7 million customers in quarter,
reaching 6.2 million cumulative, as well as by a 64% repeat order
rate, which is impressive given the large number of new
subscribers.

*** ROIC Is Key (Not Gross Margin). Gross margin is typically a
good indicator of a traditional offline retailer's return on
invested capital. However, given the highly scalable nature of
the online retail model (i.e. exceptionally high revenue
potential per dollar of capital invested), it becomes gross
profit dollars, and not gross margin, that drive the online
retailer's return on invested capital. We therefore estimate
that Amazon.com's return on invested capital has the potential to
be substantially higher than that of traditional offline
retailers (see ROIC analysis).

*** 1999: The Year of Expansion. Amazon.com's strategy of
investing for long-term value creation will continue as the
company undertakes several initiatives in 1999 designed to
improve customer service and capture a significant share of the
expected growth of new online shoppers. The company will expand
its distribution capacity with a new facility in Nevada, expand
its product lines in music and videos, and hire additional
technical staff to improve its systems and increase customer
service.

*** Raising Revenue Estimates. The stronger than expected
growth in revenues leads us to raise our revenue estimates for
the first quarter to $255 million (was $200 million) and for the
full year 1999 to $1.24 billion (was $930 million.). We are
increasing our expected EPS loss for 1999 from ($0.58) to ($0.93)
reflecting the new initiatives mentioned above and the resulting
increases in product development costs. We are also establishing
our 2000 estimates of $1.7 billion in revenue and a net loss of
($0.27) per share.
_________________________________________________________________
MARKET CAPITALIZATION $17,768 (MM)

EARNINGS Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Mar Jun Sep Dec Year P/E
Current 1997 $(0.03)A $(0.06)A $(0.07)A $(0.08)A $(0.24)A NM

Current 1998 $(0.07)A $(0.12)A $(0.16)A $(0.14)A $(0.50)A NM
Previous 1998 $(0.07)A $(0.12)A $(0.16)A $(0.19)E $(0.55)E NM

Current 1999 $(0.27)E $(0.26)E $(0.22)E $(0.19)E $(0.93)E NM
Previous 1999 $(0.18)E $(0.16)E $(0.14)E $(0.11)E $(0.58)E NM

Current 2000 $(0.27)E NM
________________________________________________________________

ROIC Is Key (Not Gross Margin)

In traditional offline retail, gross margin is a very important
metric to watch. While a successful bricks and mortar retailer
can drive sales per square foot higher, there is a limitation to
the traffic (and therefore revenue) that a store can accommodate
before expansion or relocation is necessary. Therefore, gross
profit dollars are limited by the gross margin of the
merchandise. This means that gross margin is directly correlated
to the offline retailer's return on invested capital.

Amazon.com's revenue potential, however, is not limited by the
same factors. Think of Amazon.com as a store with unlimited
shelf space and an unlimited customers base. Amazon.com can
generate significantly higher revenue per dollar of capital
invested, as we discuss in the next section. This means that
Amazon.com's ROIC is a function of gross profit (in absolute
dollars) and not gross margin (a percent of sales), and therefore
a higher mix of lower margin sales would increase the companies
ROIC as total gross profit dollars increase.

Amazon.com Vs. Bricks and Mortar

In the fourth quarter Amazon.com generated $250 million in
revenue, an annual run-rate of $1 billion, on total invested
capital since inception of $10 million ($37 million in total
fixed asset expenditures since inception and $27 million in cash
generated from operations since inception). Amazon.com's
management offered the following comparison. A traditional
bricks and mortar book company would have had to build 200
superstore outlets, each generating $5 million in annual sales,
to match Amazon.com's $1 billion annual run rate of revenue. The
capital expenditure required to build those stores and supply
them with inventory and working capital would run approximately
$650 million, even assuming they were leased. In other words,
Amazon.com was able to generate the same amount of sales on
1/65th the investment of a traditional retailer. This means that
at current revenue levels, Amazon.com could achieve a ROIC
comparable to that of a traditional offline book retailer by
generating an operating margin that is 1/65th that of the
traditional retailer. (Likewise, if Amazon.com could achieve a
similar operating margin, it would achieve a ROIC that is 65x
that of the traditional retailer.)

This disparity will widen as Amazon.com generates incremental
sales. Since the traditional retailer must open additional
stores to generate more revenue, it must continue to invest its
capital. Amazon.com, considering its shelf space is essentially
unlimited and it already has global distribution, does not
require (to the same degree as the offline retailer) additional
capital spending. It does require investment on the back-end in
technology infrastructure and fulfillment infrastructure (e.g.
warehouses). However, as demonstrated in the fourth quarter,
Amazon.com already has the infrastructure to run revenues at a $1
billion annual rate with only $37 billion invested to-date in
fixed assets. Therefore, Amazon.com's ROIC could continue to
expand efficiently while the offline retailer remains constrained
by the cost of its bricks and mortar.

But Can Amazon.com Achieve a Positive Operating Margin?

Books Already Profitable. The scale of the core businesses is
starting to pay off. The company stated that in December, the
books business was profitable. This shows that the revenue base
in the core business is becoming large enough to overcome large
spending on marketing while Amazon.com continues to heavily
market the newer businesses. As these newer businesses
(amazon.co.uk, amazon.de, PlanetAll, Junglee, shoptheweb, and
Internet Movie Database) grow and reach profitability, other
businesses will be created that will require a heavy marketing
spend that will continue to mask the company's ability to
generate profits. Then, as the newer businesses become a smaller
portion of the total business (once several of the currently new
businesses reach maturity), Amazom.com will begin to show a
profit. We expect this to occur in the 2001 to 2002 time frame.

1999: The Year of Expansion

Instead of striving for short term profitability, Amazon.com will
continue to plow its revenues back into several strategic
initiatives in order to improve customer service and build
operating leverage within the business model. First the company
will begin leasing a highly mechanized 322,000 sq. foot
distribution center in Fernley, Nevada in the first half of 1999.
This new facility will not only expand capacity for additional
product lines, but will also cut shipping times to Western cities
by a day and increase the automation of fulfillment. The company
also expects to announce the addition of one or more centers in
the coming months. Amazon.com will undergo a company-wide systems
upgrade which includes the hiring of additional technical
personnel and the purchase of additional servers and telecom
connections. The company plans to add more user features and
increase the functionality of its Website in the anticipation of
strong growth in new Internet shoppers that, according to Jupiter
Communications, will drive online commerce revenues up by 55% in
1999 to an estimated $12.1 billion. Due to these initiatives we
expect product development costs to increase sequentially by 50%
in the first quarter of 1999 before resuming more normal growth
in the second half.

Strong Customer Growth During Holidays

Customer additions of 1.7 million during the fourth quarter
demonstrates the continued ability of Amazon.com to draw
customers despite growing competitive presence. The new additions
represent 65% sequential growth in total customers. To put this
in perspective, Amazon.com acquired 13% more customers this
quarter than the size of its TOTAL customer base of a year ago
(1,510,000). Orders from repeat customers as a percent of total
orders increased to more than 64%, impressive given the strong
growth in new customers.



To: MoonBrother who wrote (37071)1/27/1999 7:44:00 AM
From: MoonBrother  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 164684
 
07:33am EST 27-Jan-99 Bear Stearns (Ehrens,Scott 212/272-9382) AMZN
AMZN: Reports Terrific Fourth Quarter:ROIC Is Key (Not Gross Margin)(Part 2 / 2

(Part 2 / 2)
Outstanding Quarterly Results

Amazon.com had pre-released revenue numbers earlier this month so
while the total figure was not in doubt, the revenue segmentation
provided additional positive results. Total revenue reached
$252.8 million in the fourth quarter, up by a whopping 65%
sequentially and by 313% year over year, well ahead of our
estimate of $185 million. International sales accounted for 19%
of total revenues or $48 million, fueled by the expansion of
Amazon.com into Germany (amazon.de) and the U.K. (amazon.co.uk).
For the first time consumers in these two countries have access
to local Amazon branded web sites and are now serviced from
distribution centers within their own borders. Although building
off small numbers, the two new local editions increased their
revenues nearly 4x over the combined third quarter sales,
establishing both as the number one online booksellers in their
respective countries. Additionally, Amazon.com noted that music
sales represented $33.1 million, an increase of 130% over third
quarter sales. Revenues from all new expansion areas which have
been in operation for only a few months (music, video, Germany,
and U.K.) accounted for 25% of total revenues, highlighting the
increasing diversity among the company's revenue sources.

Gross margins decreased to 21.1%, down from 22.7% last quarter,
due to several reasons. While some may pint to this statistic as
an indication of weakness in the business model, we believe
otherwise and would point to our ROIC analysis. Amazon.com
explained the sequential decline by noting the shift in product
mix from higher margin books to lower margin music, video, and
European sales. The company also noted that holiday shoppers
purchased more hard-covers which carry deeper discounts than soft-
cover counterparts. Gift certificates for product delays and
aggressive pricing in the video sector also contributed to the
gross margin decline.

Amazon.com made significant improvement in operating expenses
which fell as a percentage of sales to 28.2% from 36.2% in the
third quarter. Marketing & Sales expense was roughly $2 million
higher than we had anticipated and accounted for 19.2% of sales,
down from 24.4.% last quarter, marking the first time this number
has been below the 20% level. Included in Marketing & Sales
expense are fulfillment costs, customer service and advertising.
The company stated that the increase in marketing and sales was
mostly due to increases in fulfillment costs. Therefore we
estimate that fulfillment and customer service increased to $27.8
million or 11.0% of revenues. This implies advertising expense
of $20 million, or 8% of sales, which means that the average cost
to acquire a new customer declined by 15% to $12.17 from $14.34
in the third quarter.

Product and Development expense was $17.3 million, about $2.3
higher than our estimate due to new technological initiatives and
investments. However as a percent of sales, product development
expense fell to 6.8%, down from 130 basis points from both the
third quarter and our estimate. General & Administrative expense
was almost $0.5 million ahead of our estimate, at $5.5 million,
and was 2.2.% of sales, down from 3.2% of sales last quarter and
below our 2.8% estimate. Amazon.com achieved this low level
despite the added costs of overtime and temporary workers to
fulfill the abundance of orders during the holiday season. On a
pro forma basis (i.e. before the effect of goodwill associated
with recent acquisitions) Amazon.com lost $17.8 million on the
operating line. The operating loss represented 7.0% of sales,
narrower than last quarter's 13.7% loss, and narrower than our
estimate of a 13.3% loss.

EPS and Balance Sheet Looking Good

On a pro-forma basis Amazon.com had an EPS of $(0.14), beating
our estimate of a loss of $(0.19) per share and First Call
consensus of ($0.18) per share. On a GAAP basis including $24.3
million in one-time merger expenses and goodwill, the EPS loss
was ($0.30). Amazon.com continues to state that it would plow any
revenue greater than its internal estimates back into the
business. They also stated that they will only do so if
appropriate investments present themselves. Amazon.com's strong
balance sheet allows the company to pursue this aggressive
strategy due to its total cash and marketable securities balance
of $373 million.

Outlook

In brief, we are raising our 1999 revenue numbers and increasing
our loss per share estimates while establishing our full year
2000 estimates. Our new estimates are as follows: 1Q Revenues of
$255 million (was $200 million), and FY 1999 revenues of $1.24
billion (was $930 million). Due to the expected increase in
product development costs in the first half of 1999 and flat
gross margin conditions, we are lowering our1999 EPS estimate to
($0.93) from ($0.58). For the year 2000 we are looking for $1.7
billion in revenues. As Amazon.com begins to realize the leverage
in the operating model, we expect revenue growth to outstrip
expense growth and lower the loss per share to ($0.27) for 2000.
Our per-share loss estimates are detailed on page one of this
note.



To: MoonBrother who wrote (37071)1/27/1999 7:45:00 AM
From: MoonBrother  Respond to of 164684
 
07:22am EST 27-Jan-99 Morgan Stanley\DW (Meeker, Mary (212)761-8042) AMZN
AMAZON.COM: WEEEE HAAAAVE LERNED TO FOLLO THE METRICS.../P1

Amazon.com(AMZN): Weeee Haaaave Lerned to Follo the Metrics.
Mary Meeker (212) 761-8042/mmeeker@ms.com Date: January 27, 1999
Industry: Internet Type: Sales/Earnings Analysis
______________________________________________________________________
Rating: Outperform Price: $115
52-wk Range: $199-9
______________________________________________________________________
FY Ends ----EPS----
Dec. Curr Prior P/E
97A ($0.24) -- NM
98A ($0.50)A ($0.52)E NM
99E ($0.86) ($0.46) NM
00E $0.07 $0.06 1,643
01E $0.28 $0.24 411
______________________________________________________________________
Qtrly ---- 1Q ---- ---- 2Q ---- ---- 3Q ---- ---- 4Q ----
EPS Curr Prior Curr Prior Curr Prior Curr Prior
97A ($0.03) -- ($0.06) -- ($0.07) -- ($0.08) --
98A ($0.07) -- ($0.12) -- ($0.16) -- ($0.14) ($0.16)
99E ($0.29) ($0.15) ($0.25) ($0.14) ($0.21) ($0.12) ($0.11) ($0.06)
______________________________________________________________________
Shares Outst.: 154 MM Mkt Cap.: $17.7B
______________________________________________________________________

KEY POINTS:
Pardon the title, but every day's a new day with these Internet
companies. Time's a cruisin' at warp speed...and never before have
managers of public companies been inspired to make such large
aggressive bets so quickly - we call it "rational recklessness." Look
at Mike Armstrong of AT&T, Steve Case of AOL, Tom Jermoluk of
@Home...and Jeff Bezos of Amazon.com.

AMZN just reported a quarter with outstanding growth in key metrics:
CQ4:98 revenue of $253MM (up 283% Y/Y and 65% Q/Q); customer count of
6.2MM (up a record 1.7MM Q/Q) with a steady 64% repeat buyer hit rate
and a $7 Q/Q rise in revenue per quarter-end account to $41; with new
businesses (music, videos, gifts and international, all launched in
the past six months) accounting for a hefty 25% of revenue up from 9%
in CQ3; and the company reported solid profits in its core book
selling business in December. Net, CQ4 revenue of $253MM compared
with our pre-January estimate of $192MM while customer count of 6.2MM
compared with our prior estimate of 5.9MM and the operating loss of
$18MM compared with our estimated loss of $21MM. In Bezos' words, e-
commerce hit an inflection point in CQ4.

But that's not enough, the company wants more, more, more, fast, fast,
fast -- like tens-of-millions of annuity-like customers buying tens-to-
hundreds of different products. Like tens of (compared with two)
highly automated distribution centers around the globe. And, yes, how
are they going to get there? Spend, spend, spend, fast, fast, fast.
It's a classic "spend to the opportunity" endeavor, and the metrics
and the instincts are pointed to a very large opportunity.

Operating cash flow was a very positive $39MM, reversing the previous
three quarters operating cash flow losses and leaving Amazon with a
total operating cash flow for the year of positive $31MM.

You guessed it, we are ramping up our revenue and customer forecasts
for C1999-C2001E (to still conservative levels of $1.4B/12MM;
$2.2B/23MM; and $3.0B/38MM, respectively) and increasing our operating
loss estimate for C1999E from $54MM to $116MM; maintaining C2000E
operating profit of $37MM; and increasing C2000E operating profit from
$87MM to $98MM. We know there's lots of operating leverage in this
model -- we all learned this lesson with another "networking effect
model" called America Online - it's, ah, ah, just a question of when
and how much.

Importantly, we are expecting a modest sequential increase in sales
(up a conservative 5% Q/Q) for CQ1:99, despite the very strong CQ4
holiday sales season.

And here's a notable quotable -- on average, a Barnes & Noble
superstore generates $5MM in annualized sales and AMZN's $1B revenue
run rate is equivalent to about 200 superstores. The capex for each
superstore is about $2MM (or about $400MM all in) - it's notable that,
all in, AMZN has invested about $36MM in fixed assets since its
inception... ;) - it's all about one super, super, super store called
the Amazon.com on the Web.

We maintain our Outperform rating on these ever volatile shares - we
are hanging on to this pup for the long haul...or until the growth
metrics tell us that we are officially loopy. This evening we pulled
out a copy of a report we published in May 1997 called "The Internet
Retailing Report" and re-read a section on page 3-13 called "The Wal-
Marting of the Web?" -- check it out. And as we were finishing this
note, we were compelled to steal an out-of-context quote from venture
capital legend Arthur Rock -- "Keep the faith..." When Arthur said
this, it was 1972, and he was talking about the microprocessor
industry.

CQ4:98 FINANCIAL DETAILS:

Revenue skyrockets - Revenue grew to $253MM, up 283% Y/Y and 65% Q/Q -
well above our $192MM estimate. The upside surprise was due to strong
sales growth across all product lines, in turn driven by strong growth
in new customers and repeat orders from existing customers. (AMZN had
earlier reported on January 5th that its CQ4 revenues were
approximately $250MM.)

Key point going forward - we are expecting a sequential increase in
sales (up 5% Q/Q) for CQ1:99, despite the very strong CQ4 holiday
sales season.

Books sales through the .com site (.com books) - as opposed to through
the two new European sites, Amazon.de and Amazon.co.uk - reached
$190MM in CQ4, up 187% Y/Y and 37% Q/Q. Sales from non-.com book
categories reached $63MM, up 339% Q/Q. Non-.com book categories
include music, videos, gifts, and sales through Amazon.de and
Amazon.co.uk - combined, these reached 25% of total sales in CQ4, up
from 9% in CQ3. Note that the hard-to-quantify value of the product
editorial provided by Amazon.com and its community members provides a
key assist in sales of all these products.

Music sales were very impressive, reaching $33.1MM, up 130% Q/Q. This
was only the second full quarter of music sales for AMZN, which
formally opened its music service on June 11th. In its first full
quarter, AMZN's music store became the leading Internet music
retailer, surpassing both N2K and CDNow. In this quarter, AMZN
expanded its lead over N2K and CDNow, which experienced sequential
revenue growth of 71% and 44%, respectively.

Although specific amounts were not disclosed, AMZN reported that
combined sales through Amazon.de and Amazon.co.uk quadrupled over the
third quarter. All in, international sales (including exports)
accounted for 19% of AMZN's CQ4 revenue.

AMZN: CQ4:98 At A Glance
CQ4:98A CQ4:98E CQ4:97A
Revenue ($MM) $253 $192 $66
Q/Q Growth 65% 25% 74%
Books* ($MM) $190 $173 $66
Non-Books**($MM) $63 $19 --
Gross Margin 21.1% 22.8% 19.6%
Opex ($MM) $71 $65 $24
Net Income ($MM) ($22) ($26) ($11)
Oper. EPS ($0.14) ($0.16) ($0.08)
Shs. Out. (MM) 154 156 139
E = Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Research Estimates

*Books do not include sales from Amazon.de and Amazon.co.uk.

**Non-Books include music, videos, gifts, and sales from Amazon.de and
Amazon.co.uk.

Gross margin declines, gross profits rise - Gross margin of 21.1% was
down 160 basis points Q/Q but up from 19.6% in CQ4:97 - Gross profits
rose $18MM Q/Q to $53MM. The decline in gross margin, which the
company pre-announced on January 5th, was due to product mix shifts to
lower-margin music and videos and aggressive product pricing,
especially with DVDs and gift items. Further, holiday book sales
included larger than usual amounts of hardcover books, which are
usually more discounted. Overall book gross margins, however,
increased Q/Q. Further, the .com book segment was profitable in
December.

We continue to believe that as AMZN's buying power increases, it will
be able to reach a long-term target of 23%-27% gross margins.
Remember that traditional book sellers like Barnes & Noble support
gross margins near 36% -- due to purchasing power and, in part, due to
their ability to charge higher prices in their retail locations.

Operating expenses were up 194% Y/Y and 28% Q/Q, but were lower than
expected as a percentage of revenues due to the strong revenue growth
-- Operating expenses for the quarter reached $71MM. (Operating
expenses in the quarter were increased by $1MM-$5MM in last
minute/rush-to-get-out-the-door holiday order
taking/packaging/shipping expenses.)



To: MoonBrother who wrote (37071)1/27/1999 7:46:00 AM
From: MoonBrother  Respond to of 164684
 
07:19am EST 27-Jan-99 Morgan Stanley\DW (Meeker, Mary (212)761-8042) AMZN
AMAZON.COM: WEEEE HAAAAVE LERNED TO FOLLO THE METRICS.../P3

RECENT HIGHLIGHTS:

January 7, 1999 - Amazon.com opens a new, highly-mechanized, 323,000
square-foot, distribution facility in Fernley, Nevada. The facility
should reduce standard shipping times to key markets in the western
U.S. by a full day.

December 3, 1998 - Amazon.com joins the Starbright Foundation to raise
money for seriously ill children.

November 19, 1998 - Amazon.com announces that its board of directors
has approved a three-for-one split of its common stock, effective
January 5, 1999.

November 17, 1998 - Amazon.com opens its holiday gift and video stores
to complement their on line bookstore. The Amazon.com video store
will offer more than 60,000 theatrical and general-interest videos and
more than 2,000 DVDs.

November 5, 1998 - Amazon.com launches a new program, Advantage for
music, geared to the distribution of CDs by independent artists, bands
and labels.

September 9, 1998 - Amazon.com adds classical CDs to online music
store offering.

September 2, 1998 - Amazon.com and Yahoo! announce a global merchant
agreement.

August 4, 1998 - Amazon.com announces the acquisition of PlanetAll and
Junglee.



To: MoonBrother who wrote (37071)1/27/1999 7:47:00 AM
From: MoonBrother  Respond to of 164684
 
07:19am EST 27-Jan-99 Morgan Stanley\DW (Meeker, Mary (212)761-8042) AMZN
AMAZON.COM: WEEEE HAAAAVE LERNED TO FOLLO THE METRICS.../P2

Sales and marketing rose $11MM Q/Q to $49MM or 19% of revenue (down
from 24% of revenue in CQ3). Although it did not provide details, the
company stated that customer acquisition costs declined during the
quarter. By our math, marketing spending per new customer added
declined from $31 in CQ3 to $29 in CQ4. Product development rose $4MM
Q/Q to $17MM or 7% of revenue (down from 9% in CQ3). And G&A
increased $0.5MM Q/Q to $5.5MM or 2% of revenue (down from 3% in CQ3).

Operating loss significantly better than expectations - Operating loss
of $17.8MM was significantly better than our expectation of $21.5MM.
As a percentage of revenues, operating loss declined from 14% in CQ3
to 7% in CQ4.

Headcount during the quarter rose from 1,600 to 2,100. Personnel
additions came from recent acquisitions and from staff expansions in
the Germany and UK sites.

Merger and acquisition costs totaled $24MM in CQ4. These costs
include amortization of goodwill and other purchased intangibles
associated with the April 1998 acquisitions of Bookpages, Telebook,
and Internet Movie Database, and the August 1998 acquisitions of
Junglee and PlanetAll. We are treating these non-cash expenses as non-
operating costs, and accordingly, they will have no impact on
operating net income or operating EPS. The company anticipates these
expenses to total approximately $90MM in 1999, $67MM in 2000, and
$33MM in 2001.

Balance sheet fundamentals healthy - Cash and cash equivalents rose
from $337MM in CQ3 to $373MM in CQ4 - operating cash flow was a
positive $39MM, reversing the previous three quarters operating cash
flow losses and leaving Amazon with a total operating cash flow for
the year of positive $31MM. Long-term debt ended the quarter at
$348MM.

AMZN's impressive cash conversion machine remained in place. Amazon's
working capital needs benefit, as always, from two factors - almost
all of its transactions are credit card based (so accounts receivable
are negligible), and the company's business model has so far required
very little inventory. As we've pointed out before, this is a company
with a negative cash conversion cycle - it gets cash from customers
before it gives cash to suppliers. Here are the details for the
quarter - at the end of CQ4, inventory days were 14, accounts payable
days were 52, and receivables days were 2. That translates into a
negative cash conversion cycle of 36 days.

Inventory turns rose to 32 in CQ4 from 26 in CQ3. We've been
predicting that as the company increases its on-hand inventory to stay
ahead of demand, its inventory turns would fall and likely settle in
the 15-40 range. We've also pointed out that this is still more than
an order of magnitude better than traditional retailers.

CQ4:98 METRIC DETAILS:

Cumulative customer accounts grew to 6.2MM, up 311% Y/Y and 38% Q/Q -
well above our 5.9MM estimate. (Amazon had announced on January 5th
that it had gained 1MM new customers during the holiday season.) The
number of new customer adds rose to 1.7MM from 1.2MM in CQ3. The
1.7MM customer add amount was AMZN's largest ever. We estimate that
Amazon's customer accounts now constitute around 8% of total worldwide
Internet users - and we believe this percentage will only get higher.
Repeat purchases constituted 64% of sales in CQ4, up from 64% in CQ3.
(Management noted that customer acquisition rates in January have been
ahead of pre-holiday levels.)

The AMZN Associates program, an effective, low-cost means of customer
acquisition, grew to over 200,000 in the quarter, up from an estimated
140,000 at the end of CQ3. Our estimate of the number of visits per
day was approximately 1.6MM during the quarter, and we estimate that
the number of books sold (at an $17 ASP) rose to over 11MM in the
quarter.

Basic Growth Metrics for AMZN, CQ1:98 - CQ4:98
CQ1:98 CQ2:98 CQ3:98 CQ4:98
Revenue ($MM) $87 $116 $154 $253
Q/Q Growth 32% 33% 32% 65%5
Customer Accounts (000s) 2,260 3,280 4,500 6,200
Q/Q Growth 50% 45% 37% 38%
Customer Adds (000s) 750 1,020 1,220 1,700
Associates (000s) 40 90 140 200

Amazon.com has become one of the most popular destinations on the
Internet and is the leading Web shopping site - According to Media
Metrix, Amazon.com was the 14th largest Web property in terms of reach
(16.1% combined home/work reach) in December - up from #17 in
September. And in the Web shopping category, Amazon ranked second,
behind BlueMoutainArts (21.7%), a free, electronic greeting card
service, but ahead of such e-tailers as eBay (9.7%),
barnesandnoble.com (8.3%), and eToys (6.8%).

1999 EXPANSION PLANS:

Management believes that 1999 will be a pivotal year for Amazon in
particular and for online retailing in general. Accordingly, Amazon
is planning significant capacity expansion and an increase in sales
and marketing and product development expenses.

Specifically, Amazon plans to increase its distribution infrastructure
during the year. On January 7th, AMZN announced that it had obtained
a highly mechanized distribution facility in Fernley, Nevada - its
third distribution center (DC). This facility, which should become
operational this summer, will more than double Amazon's existing
capacity. Management announced that it expects to open one or more
additional DCs in the next few months.

The goals of the capacity expansion are to create deeper inventory,
improved customer service, and higher gross margins in the long-term.
Gross margins should eventually benefit from Amazon's increased
ability to order direct from publishers, from mechanized operating
efficiencies, and from lower shipping costs. Customer service should
improve due to the greater shipping proximity of DCs to customers.
Management estimates that the Fernley facility will reduce standard
shipping times to key markets in the western U.S. by a full day.

Amazon is also planning to increase its product offerings in 1999
beyond books, music, video, and gifts, although it gave no further
details. And finally, AMZN is planning to significantly expand its
personnel.

Jeff Bezos states that Amazon's goal is to be "customers' first choice
in finding and discovering anything that they might want to buy
online." Amazon is aiming to be a company with multi-billion dollar
sales and tens of millions of customers.

FINANCIAL OUTLOOK:

CQ1:99 should see total revenue of $266MM, up 204% Y/Y and 5% Q/Q.
Opex should rise to $97MM, up 231% Y/Y and 36% Q/Q. Operating net
income should come in at a loss of $45MM or a loss of ($0.29) EPS. We
continue to estimate breakeven in C2000. Customer accounts at quarter
end should be 7.6MM.

For C1999, we are looking for $1.4B in total revenues, up 122% Y/Y and
operating expenses of $413MM, up 111% Y/Y. Operating net income
should be a loss of $136MM, with EPS of a loss of ($0.86). Customer
accounts at year end should be 12.2MM.

COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPE:

In the online book market, AMZN's most direct competitor is
barnesandnoble.com. On October 6th, Bertelsmann AG announced a $200MM
investment in barnesandnoble.com for a 50% stake. With its 30MM book
club members (primarily in Europe) and ownership of Random House,
Bantam Doubleday, and BMG Entertainment (Arista Records and RCA
Records), Bertelsmann should be able to become a significant
competitor in several markets. Bertelsmann is expected to formally
launch its online efforts in Europe shortly.

A comparison of Amazon and barnesandnoble.com's CQ4 reveals the extent
to which barnesandnoble.com is playing catch-up. Amazon's revenues
for the quarter were approximately 10x that of barnesandnoble.com and
its revenue growth was greater - 65% to 45%. Directly comparing
Amazon.com book sales to barnesandnoble.com, Amazon's book sales were
almost 8X greater, although its 37% book sales growth was lower than
that of barnesandnoble.com (what a typeful!.).

Given its strong entry into music and videos, we believe AMZN is
capable of leveraging its business model across many different product
sectors. Amazon.com's competitive challenges will no doubt increase,
but we are confident AMZN will respond effectively.

Competitive Metric Comparisons: CQ4:98
AMZN BKS.com CDNow N2K
Revenue ($MM) $253 $25 $20 $18
Q/Q Growth 65% 45% 44% 71%
Customer Accounts (000s) 6,200 1,300 983 734
Q/Q Growth 50% 86% 33% 40%

Note that results for CQ4:98 for barnesandnoble.com, CDNow, and N2K
are estimates based on company pre-releases. Barnesandnoble.com
announced on January 7th that its sales for the seven-week holiday
season ending January 2nd were $17.8MM.

In the music category, we notice that AMZN's $33.1MM music sales in
CQ4 were greater than leading music etailers CDNow and N2K, with
significantly greater sales growth (130% Q/Q) to boot. Amazon
surpassed CDNow and N2K to become the largest online music retailer in
CQ3. And it now looks like AMZN might surpass the combined sales of
CDNow and N2K at some point. A merger between CDNow and N2K is
expected to be completed prior to March 31, 1999.

As a final note, we see that Onsale announced on January 19th Onsale
atCost, an initiative to sell computer products (and potentially other
merchandise) at wholesale costs. Instead of a retail markup, Onsale
would receive a $5-$10 per item fee from the customer. We find the
business model interesting and note that other companies are
attempting to go the same route. Still, we don't believe it will have
a material impact on Amazon. For one, we've seen this movie before -
NetMarket attempted to challenge AMZN sometime back with zero gross
margins backed up membership fees. Didn't happen. Further, as Jeff
Bezos is always quick to point out, low price models need to be backed
up by reasonable service offerings. And so far, no one has been able
to match Amazon's high value service offering.



To: MoonBrother who wrote (37071)1/27/1999 8:28:00 AM
From: Glenn D. Rudolph  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 164684
 
Having been absence on this board for couple weeks, I've amazingly found out that
somehow you've managed to be wrong every step with AMZN's move!!! You shorted
AMZN when it was at $15 split-adjusted. and covered when it hit $190. You then bot
long shares at $150(?) range, only to see it dropped to as low as $92. Somewhere in $100
~ $110 range you sold your long shares, and went short again? Now that AMZN is
hitting all cylinders and beats analysts' estimates on every aspect of the business. Looks
like you're gonna lose your shorts all over again.


MB,

You almost have my positions correct but not quite. I was short at $15 and did cover the short at $190. Pretty bad I know. I bought long shares at $140 and sold them on a bounce at $146 and that same day AMZN closed around $130. The profit on that position was hardly anything compared to my losses on the short. I had also gone long last November at $320 but wrote covered calls at at strike of $340. The gain there was small. Currently I have no AMZN position. I do not agree with your analysis of AMZN's future but I wanted to set the record straight that my timing was poor but not quite as poor as you stated.

Glenn