New Turkish Government Less Radical than it Sounds
February 2, 1999
stratfor.com
SUMMARY
On the surface, anti- U.S. remarks made by new Turkish Prime Minister
Bulent Ecevit threaten the continued allied operations at Incirlik airbase
and, secondarily, fueled the rhetoric of a few Turkish pro-Islamic parties
against the U.S. However, further analysis of Ecevit's comments
suggests that the new Turkish position may differ only in tone from that
of the previous administration. It is likely that his remarks were
prompted, not by a fundamentally anti-U.S./Pro-Iraq shift in Turkish
politics, but by Turkish fears that the current U.S. efforts to unite the
Iraqi opposition against Saddam Hussein will eventually result in the
breakup of Iraq and independence for the Kurdish minority.
ANALYSIS
On January 28, the Anatolia news agency reported that the deputy
leader of the pro-Islamic Turkish Virtue Party (FP) Lutfu Esengun,
called for the Turkish government to seize control of Incirlik Airbase in
southern Turkey. Incirlik is the key base from which U.S. and British
planes enforce the no-fly zone over northern Iraq. Esengun was quoted
as saying, Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit "is talking of mediation,
while the first thing that must be done is to seize control of Incirlik." At a
news conference in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA),
Esengun charged that the Turkish government now regards Operation
Northern Watch, which has Allied planes taking off from Incirlik to
bomb northern Iraq, as now constituting an "attack force." He further
cautioned that, because of this development, Turkey itself is in danger of
being dragged into a war with Iraq.
Esengun's statement seconds those made by the new Turkish Prime
Minister Bulent Ecevit who denounced the use of Incirlik airbase by
U.S. and British planes in a bombing campaign against Iraq, and
condemned the lack of a coherent U.S. policy toward Iraq. A few hours
after presenting his new government's overall agenda to parliament on
January 13, Ecevit was quoted as saying that the United States "lacks a
policy and strategy" regarding Iraq, and that he was "worried that air
raids will increase after the end of Ramadan." "I don't understand what
the U.S. wants to do," he said. "According to me, it has tactics, but
lacks a policy and strategy" in dealing with the Iraqi question. "While I
hope Iraq will be more in accordance with the world, I also hope that
the U.S. will produce peaceful solutions," he added.
Since then, Ecevit has attacked other U.S. policies regarding Iraq, such
as the U.S. plan to unify the Kurdish and Shiite minorities in Iraq into an
effective opposition to Saddam's regime. In response to speculation that
an organization of the opposition would be coordinated from a base in
Turkey, Ecevit said on January 22 that "It is out of the question to set up
a center to attack Iraq or assist the opposition against Saddam Hussein
in Turkey." On January 26, after four days of clashes between U.S. and
Iraqi forces, Ecevit renewed his criticism of U.S. policy. He once again
expressed concern over the escalation in the conflict and the use of
Turkish bases by U.S. planes in their attacks on surface-to-air missile
(SAM) sites in northern Iraq.
His criticisms have continued unabated. On January 29, 1999, in an
interview with the Turkish newspaper "Milliyet," Ecevit questioned the
legitimacy of the U.S. attacks on SAM sites. "They (the patrols over the
no-fly zone) seem to have gone too far. I don't know how it is possible
to verify the claims of pilots that they had been targeted," Ecevit said,
adding that he found the situation "worrying."
On the surface, the Prime Minister's statements seem to call into
question two geostrategic features of the Middle East -- the relationship
between NATO allies Turkey and the United States, and the role of
Turkey in containing Iraq. The new Ecevit government is somewhat less
accommodating in its rhetoric than was Turkey's former Prime Minister,
Mesut Yilmaz. The reason for this shift in tone has to do with domestic
politics in Turkey. Ecevit came to power with support from the
center-left and therefore cannot appear to be as accommodating as was
his predecessor. Ecevit's comments may have paved the way for more
radical groups like the FP to attack the U.S. military presence in
Turkey. However, Esengun's comments have little significance for
Ecevit's position, which is a continuation of a long-held Turkish policy
regarding Iraq.
Briefly, Turkey is not suddenly becoming pro-Iraq or anti-U.S., rather,
its own strategic concerns regarding the Kurds outweigh Ankara's
commitment to the vague, fluid, and at times apparently ill-considered
Iraqi containment policy of the United States. Turkey, as a member of
NATO and a key ally of the U.S. in the Middle East, remains both a
proponent of U.S. engagement in the area and an opponent of
Saddam's ambition to make Iraq a hegemonic power in the region.
Neither the U.S. nor Turkey has abandoned this common goal. Where
the interests of Turkey and the U.S. diverge is over the means of
achieving it, with the U.S. aiding and abetting rebellion among the Kurds
in northern Iraq in their effort to one day topple the Iraqi regime.
Turkey, while also eager for a change in the regime in Baghdad, is not
keen on U.S. support to the Kurds as a means to achieve this end.
Turkey's remains concerned that U.S. encouragement of greater
autonomy for northern Iraq's Kurds could spill across the border into
Turkey's own territory by prompting its own restive Kurdish minority to
advance vigorously a similar agenda. Turkey's policy makers recognize
that Saddam's regime, as dangerous as it is to the neighboring states,
nevertheless reduces the chance of a Kurdish state being set up in
northern Iraq. Should Saddam Hussein be removed from power by a
movement of dissident Iraqi minorities, Iraq might well break up --
which in turn would fan unrest among the Kurds residing in southeastern
region of Turkey. Obviously, an independent Kurdistan, carved from the
territory of Iraq, would readily serve as a base area for rebels affiliated
with the Kurdistan Worker's Party, with which Turkey has been battling
since 1984.
Ecevit's statements must therefore be regarded as a case of Turkish
national security concerns coming into conflict with a specific U.S.
strategy directed against Saddam Hussein, not necessarily reflecting a
shift in Turkish allegiance. Ecevit, has signaled a desire to work more
closely with the U.S. over Iraq, but by raising the dust over U.S. air
strikes, he is reminding the U.S. that Turkish interests must be taken into
account. The installation of a Patriot missile battery at Incirlik later this
week may alleviate well-grounded Turkish fears that an overly
adventurous Iraqi commander may attack Turkey with Scud missiles.
Providing these defensive weapons does not, however, change the fact
that Turkey is opposed to direct U.S. aid to the Kurds or to any aerial
bombardment of northern Iraq that provides air cover for a Kurdish
uprising. U.S. and British planes are unlikely to be forced to leave
Incirlik. But when the U.S. formulates its policies toward Iraq, it can no
longer take for granted that the new Turkish government will be a silent
and willing partner.
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