SI
SI
discoversearch

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor.  We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community.  If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.
Politics : Formerly About Advanced Micro Devices -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Joseph S. Lione who wrote (48751)2/5/1999 4:04:00 PM
From: RDM  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1572208
 
For those interested in reading more about anti-trust:

econ.umn.edu

The following is a summary of causes of action that have
been utilized:

Naked vs. Ancillary price fixing

United States v. Addyson Pipe & Steel Company (1898)
United States v. Trenton Potteries (1927)
Appalachian Coals v. United States (1933)
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Company (1940)
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar (1975)
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society (1982)
NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma (1984)

Exchange of price information

United States v. Container Corporation of America (1969)
United States v. United States Gypsum Company (1978)

Conscious Parallelism and Shared Monopoly

Interstate Circuit v. United States (1939)
Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount Film Distribution Corporation (1954)
Du Pont v. FTC and Ethyl Corporation v. FTC (1984)

Horizontal Restriction on Distribution

United States v. Sealy (1967)
United States v. Topco Associates (1972)
Jay Palmer, et al. v. BRG of Georgia (1990)

Mergers of Competitors: Actual and Potential

Northern Securities Company v. United States (1904)
Standard Oil of New Jersey v. United States (1911)
United States v. United States Steel Corporation (1920)
Brown Shoe v. United States (1962)
United States v. Von's Grocery (1966)
FTC v. Proctor and Gamble (1967)
Tasty Baking and Tastykake v. Ralston Purina and Continental Baking (1987)

Monopolization and the Dominant Firm

United States v. ALCOA (1945)
United States v. United Shoe Machinery (1953)
United States v. Du Pont (1956)
Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak (1979)

Vertical Integration

United States v. Du Pont (1957)
Brown Shoe v. United States (1962)
Ford Motor v. United States (1972)

Exclusive Dealing

Standard Fashion v. Magrane-Houston Company (1922)
Tampa Electric Company v. Nashfield Coal (1961)

Tied Sales

Henry v. A. B. Dick (1912)
International Salt v. United States (1947)
Northern Pacific Railway v. United States (1958)
United States v. Loew's (1962)
Siegel v. Chicken Delight (1971)
Jefferson Parish Hospital District #2 v. Hyde (1984)

Boycotts and refusals to deal

Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC (1941)
Lorain Journal Company v. United States (1951)
Klor's v. Broadway-Hale (1959)
Aspen Skiing Company v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corporation (1985)
FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists (1986)

Predatory Pricing and price discrimination

Northeastern Telephone v. AT&T (1981)
Barry Wright Corporation v. ITT Grinnell (1983)
Matsushita Electric v. Zenith Radio (1986)
Utah Pie v. Continental Baking (1967)
FTC v. Morton Salt (1948)

Special defenses for buyers and sellers

Standard Oil Company v. FTC (1951)
United States v. Borden Company (1962)
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea v. FTC (1979)

Vertical price fixing and market division

Dr. Miles Medical Company v. John D. Park and Sons (1911)
United States v. Colgate & Company (1919)
United States v. Park, Davis & Company (1960)
Kiefer-Stuart Company v. Seagrams (1951)
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Company (1967)
Continental TV v. GTE Sylvania (1977)
Montsanto v. Spray-Rite Service Co. (1984)

Conglomerate mergers

FTC v. Consolidated Foods (1965)
United States v. International Telephone and Telegraph (1969)

Monopolization through abuse of government procedures

Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight (1961)
California Motor Transportation v. Trucking Unlimited (1972)
Otter Tail Power v. United States (1973)



To: Joseph S. Lione who wrote (48751)2/5/1999 6:20:00 PM
From: Scumbria  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 1572208
 
Joseph,

Intel has recognized that their market segmentation strategy is starting to wear thin. (There really isn't much difference between a Celeron and a PIII.)

The very aggressive Celeron moves that Intel has taken the last few weeks, are a clear indicator of what Intel is trying to do. They want to choke off AMD R&D, and give themselves some breathing room to raise prices across the board.

Scumbria