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To: Mark Fowler who wrote (38543)2/7/1999 11:10:00 AM
From: Glenn D. Rudolph  Respond to of 164685
 
8
infrastructure gets commodified and
competition between E*Trade, Schwab, Merrill
Lynch et al will revolve squarely around content
and context, which plays to content providers'
strengths. So in the near term, folks like
TheStreet.com will likely be focused on proving
to their commerce partners (like E*Trade) how
much their content can stimulate commerce
(trades, account sign-ups, etc.), while in the
long term focusing on how to develop deep,
mutually beneficial partnerships with these
partners that balances the competing demands
(in the case of TheStreet.com, advertising and
subscriptions) of their model.
Advertising In ‘99: Depth Trumps Breadth
Though we've established that certain content is
highly valuable in a commerce setting, it's
equally important to examine the state of
Internet advertising today, if we are to
understand why content will become valuable.
In 1998, it is clear that advertisers thought
mostly along only one of the two axes that
marketers usually think about (breadth and
depth). In their quest for wide dissemination,
most Internet advertisers sought to purchase
mostly on the basis of reach (breadth), or how
many Internet users a site “touched” rather than
how much time (depth) those users spent on the
site.
Faced with ever-declining click-through
statistics (some as low as 0.4%), Internet
advertisers have now started to think about user
stickiness, which is where companies like
TheStreet.com come in. The average
TheStreet.com subscriber logs on three times per
day and spends about 22 minutes on the site per
visit, this compared to the portal peer group at
roughly 2.5 minutes per visit. We often like to
repeat one of our favorite Internet first
principles; companies that change the way
people spend their either their time and money
will necessarily generate real shareholder value
in time. And though the efficiency for an
advertiser to spend on one or two sites and get a
50% share of the Internet is hard to ignore,
advertisers are increasingly looking to
specialized, highly concentrated content sites to
supplement their “breadth” buys. Sites like
TheStreet.com will benefit enormously in 1999
from this growing trend.
Company Watch
Amazon.com (AMZN)
You Thought You Already Knew What A Great
Q4 Amazon Had?…Think Again
Amazon reported a December quarter that,
despite the pre-release of the top-line, provided
as much jaw-dropping material as any quarter in
their short history. Without question, Q4:98
provided the most compelling sets of data points
yet that Amazon's commerce portal thesis is
becoming a near term reality; the question has
gone from “Can they become a commerce
portal?” to “How big can they be as a commerce
portal?” [For a more complete dissertation of
this thesis, please see our 12/18/98 Internet
Capitalist piece “A Web Retailer Does Not Equal
A Commerce Portal”.]
AMZN posted a loss of ($0.14) per share and
beat our consensus-matching ($0.18) estimate
by $0.04 on phenomenal revenue growth and
some nice, somewhat unexpected leverage in the
cost structure. All the key drivers of the model
were exceptional; revenue growth, customer
acquisition, music sales, video/international
sales, and sales and marketing expenditures,
with gross margins, the only out layer, declining
Q/Q thanks to the mix shift to music and videos.
We detail each below:
Revenue: At $253 million, total revenue beat our
$192 million estimate handily (disturbingly,
really) and represented 65% sequential top line
growth. Music sales surged 130% q/q, to $33
million (vs $14mm in Q3) to account for 13% of
total, versus our mere $21 million estimate.
Overall, videos, the gift center, the German
store, and the UK operations generated