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To: yard_man who wrote (21098)	2/23/1999 2:12:00 PM
From: John Pitera	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 86076

Tippet, that speech should be archived at this site bog.frb.fed.us

To: yard_man who wrote (21098)	2/23/1999 2:21:00 PM
From: IceShark	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 86076

GREENSPAN: "If you go back to the text of that 1996 speech, which was a very turgid speech that put an awful lot of people to sleep through most of it, what I was trying to raise was that ..... Jeez, who writes this stuff! I first thought he was doing a blatent double-entendre on how Andrea was reacting to his Viagra pills, then I looked up turgid in Websters. It's a triple-entendre! -g- No wonder no one can understand this loon.

To: yard_man who wrote (21098)	2/23/1999 2:45:00 PM
From: bill meehan	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 86076

Tippet: John got the site right, here's the appropriate paragraph: Clearly, sustained low inflation implies less uncertainty about the future, and lower risk premiums imply higher prices of stocks and other earning assets. We can see that in the inverse relationship exhibited by price/earnings ratios and the rate of inflation in the past. But how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the past decade? And how do we factor that assessment into monetary policy? We as central bankers need not be concerned if a collapsing financial asset bubble does not threaten to impair the real economy, its production, jobs, and price stability. Indeed, the sharp stock market break of 1987 had few negative consequences for the economy. But we should not underestimate or become complacent about the complexity of the interactions of asset markets and the economy. Thus, evaluating shifts in balance sheets generally, and in asset prices particularly, must be an integral part of the development of monetary policy. full text: bog.frb.fed.us