Paul Milne's response to De Jager paragraph by paragraph
Doomsday Avoided
> by Peter de Jager
>
> "We've finally broken the back of the Y2K problem." I've been making that
> statement now for about 6 months. Naturally, it has generated some interest
> and a handful of e-mail. The comments range from polite requests for me to
> state, in my own words, what exactly I mean by 'broken the back of Y2K' to
> the outraged rants from folks intent on selling the world panic, gold coins
> and plots of otherwise worthless real estate. Naturally, any good news about
> Y2K spoils the fun and intentions of those trying to incite panic and runs
> on the bank.
(This one line absolutely trashes anyone who thinks there will be real and
objective problems. It lumps them all into the category of thsoe who merely
'want' there to be problems. And he calls that 'fun' for these people. de
Jager is a sickening idiot.)
> So? What do I mean when I state confidently we've broken the back of Y2K? In
> short, I mean we've overcome the largest Y2K hurdle. The Y2K problem was
> never the actual act of fixing the code (or the embedded systems… more on
> that later), it was the inaction and denial regarding a problem so easily
> demonstrated as real and pressing, and possessing consequences far exceeding
> it's humble beginnings. Overcoming denial was always a larger, more
> complicated, difficult and frustrating task, than actually fixing broken
> code.
>
( And here we have it. His PATHETICALLY distorted understanding in a
nutshell. It was NEVER a problem of remediation. Oh no!. It was ONLY
overcoming denial. It matters not that the actual job was left too late to
actually be accomplished. Nope nope nope. It was overcoming denial. And who
was it that was making a mint doing so? Yup Peter de Jager. Is that wrong?
Not in the least. What IS wrong is to say that because absolute denial is
gone that REMEDIATION has occurred.)
> To support this perspective we have to step backwards in time a bit. It must
> also become very much a personal perspective and commentary.
>
> I find it curious in the extreme that, for a long time, I was labeled with
> the slurs of doomsayer, fear mongerer, dread merchant and chicken little.
(Irrelevant)
I
> was labeled as an idiot, someone who didn't understand how systems were
> maintained and, on several occasions, my mental health was questioned. My
> message was always a simple one. The code is broken, I can prove it.
(Wait a minute. Just a minute ago you said that the broken code WAS NOT the
problem, merely RECOGNIZING that it was broken was the issue.)
If we
> don't fix it, then we face unpleasant consequences.
>
> The key phrase here, the whole reason for my involvement with Y2K, was "IF
> we don't fix it."
>
(Yes, and it is NOT fixed. But, you are too stupid to understand that.)
> If you actually read my articles and listen to my presentations (There are
> several transcripts available on the internet and on tapes both audio and
> video, so we do have a reliable record of my statements), rather than rely
> on the sometimes incredibly inaccurate quotes of the media, then you will
> hear that message repeated time and time again. It was repeated ad nauseum
> over a period of 8 years. The core message never changed. Fix this or face
> consequences.
>
(And it has NOT been fixed, but YOU will not face the consequences.)
> The reporters who did attempt some investigative reporting in these early
> days were stonewalled. They asked banks if such a problem existed and were
> told it was either a result of a fevered imagination or was a trivial
> problem not worth discussing.
>
> Was it an unnecessary message as some have suggested? Did we, myself and
> many many others, really have to make so much noise about Y2K? Or would
> people have taken care of this anyway? Good question. In a perfect
> experiment, we'd roll the clock back 8 years and watch what happens as
> myself and others say and do nothing to raise the alarm. We can't do that…
> but we can open our eyes a bit and examine our current situation.
>
> The most widely recognized best practice on Y2K projects is 'Triage', a
> concept I introduced to the Y2K lexicon in an early article published in
> 'The American Programmer' magazine.
>
> Consider, with no attempt at saving face, what exactly 'triage' is… it's an
> admission we were so incompetent as an industry and we started a project so
> late that we didn't leave ourselves enough time to fix all the applications
> we were responsible for maintaining. The practice of triage is an
> embarrassment. It's the ultimate proof, for me at least, that raising the
> warning was necessary. Without our warning, the IT industry would still be
> asleep at the wheel.
>
(ROTFLMAO. Let's stick with his analogy a wee bit longer. Yes, the IT
industry was asleep at the wheel. And now that they have abruptly awakened,
de Jager feels that that is sufficient. It is not. Because as the IT idustry
awakens behind the wheel, it finds that the front of the 'vehicle' is already
halfway over the cliff about to plunge into the ravine. merely being 'awake'
behind the wheel as the 'driver' plunges to his death is not successful
remediation. And NOWHERE at all does BUTTHEAD de Jager give the slightest
evidence that the remdiation is successful.)
> All of the above relates to the known provable software problem. The
> embedded system problem was very different. The severity of this problem was
> a total unknown. Nobody, until fairly recently, had any real idea how big a
> problem it was. There was certainly no proof that the problem was either
> pervasive or rare, but there was sufficient evidence to suggest it was
> crucial, even a matter of life or death, to find out if it was real.
>
> The proof of its existence was sitting on millions of desktops. PCs did not,
> for the most part, automatically roll from 1999 to 2000 without incident.
> Another bit of evidence was flying above our heads. The GPS satellites had a
> known date problem, not exactly a Y2K problem, but close enough. If we had
> problems both on the ground and in the heavens then the chances were pretty
> good we'd find them elsewhere as well. It turns out we were right.
>
> The challenge? To get people to examine everything that might have a
> problem. How to do that? By creating reasonable scenarios for failure in an
> attempt to get people to examine embedded chips of all shapes and sizes. The
> result? Problems were found in medical devices, navigational aids, assembly
> equipment and retail equipment, to mention only a few. The good news? In
> some areas, very little was identified as posing problems. The bad news? The
> problem was real and we have to address it at great expense.
>
> Did everything we speculated about prove to cause problems? Nope. But until
> we checked, nobody could say it was an unnecessary activity.
>
> Here's a summary. Until we started to fix our code and examine the embedded
> system problem, then practically any doomsday scenario was a legitimate
> possibility.
>
> Here's where we are today. Most, not all companies are working on this
> issue.
(Patently FALSE. In survey after survey it has amply been revealed that the
majority of small to medium sized business has not even BEGUN yet. It has
been manifestly demonstrated that most of the countries in the world have yet
to begin either. It seems that de Jager is only 'daydreaming' that he has
awoken behind the wheel.)
They are fixing, or have fixed, their systems.
(Again, patently false. Most are not. And 'fixing' is not equated with havuing
successfully done so.)
They have examined, or
> are examining, their embedded systems problems.
(Same here. 'Examining' is not having successfully repaired such systems.)
We are, for the most part,
> no longer ignoring Y2K.
>
(Is de Jager on drugs, or what. being AWARE of a problem is NOT the same as
having successfully dealt with it.)
> Throughout all of this, my primary concern was with the Iron Triangle. The
> three industries which must operate daily, or very quickly society begins to
> unravel at the seams. They are, in no particular order; Finance,
> Telecommunications and Power companies.
>
> I stopped worrying about the finance industry in 1997. The level of activity
> was high, the regulators were beginning to wake up, and attention was
> finally being paid to the problem at all levels.
>
> None of this is meant to suggest that the finance industry is not going to
> have problems. There will be problems. Many of them. Each one will be
> handled in turn by an industry which, more than any other, understands their
> dependence on technology.
>
> For the record, my money will remain in the bank. For the record, anyone who
> is suggesting that we take all our money out of the banks is deliberately
> attempting to bring about a run on the bank and can only be classified by
> any reasonable person as an enemy of the people.
>
(What can I say? de Jager is an out and out lunatic. Can he assure people that
a bank is fine JUST because it's own internal systems are compliant? They have
a myriad of dependencies that can render their internal compliance absolutely
MOOT.)
> More to the point. The finance industry is nearing completion of their task.
(LOL LOL LOL LOL )
> Again, this statement does not apply to every bank. There are exceptions,
> exceptions which the regulators are getting ready to act upon. Nor are all
> countries at the same level. Those who are most dependent are further ahead;
> those who are less dependent, further behind. (An exception to this is
> Japan… a country whose actions on Y2K still astound and confound me.)
>
(Yes, I agree, de Jager is DEEPLY confused.)
> Next, the telecommunications industry. My concern began to diminish about a
> year ago. The word back from the industry is simple enough. That which they
> expected to fail, fails. That which should not have failed, doesn't. It
> means that there have been no surprises. They do have problems. Mainly in
> the administrative functions of the network. Problems they can cope with by
> implementing workarounds. Bottom line? Dial tone is secure, but don't expect
> your bills on time. Any complaints?
>
> Finally? The big bugaboo, the power industry. I wish I was as confident here
> as I am with the other two points of the triangle. The statements, reports
> and press releases from this industry are wishy washy, confusing and
> misleading.
>
(And the single most significant issue is brushed under the carpet.)
> On one hand, we have dozens of power stations already working in the Year
> 2000 by advancing their clocks. On the other hand, we have statements
> offering little assurance… e.g. from the Canadian Electrical Association…
> "Most entities report nothing which would have opened a circuit (cut off
> power)." Implying obliquely, I think, that "Some entities reported problems
> which did cut off power…?????"
>
> Which is it? Are there problems or aren't there? The answer may be hidden in
> some of the off-the-record conversations which go something like this…
> "Peter, we didn't find ANYTHING which would have cut off power… but the
> lawyers won't let us say that since it comes across as a guarantee that
> we'll have power that day! So we have to suggest we did find problems!"
>
> This obstacle of lawyers is evident in all industries. I know of banks,
> payroll companies, government agencies, insurance companies, water
> companies, etc., etc., etc. who have told me privately that they're done,
> complete, finished… but cannot announce this good news because of the
> lawyers.
>
> And then there is the media for whom (and this is an admitted
> generalization) good news is not good copy.
>
> It is this private information, more than anything which is available in the
> public press, which compels me to state "we've broken the back of Y2K."
>
(Who is 'we'? Russia? No. Germany? No. Spain? No. France? No. Japan? No.
Chuna? No. Italy? No. The Middle eastern Countries? No. Who is this elusive
'we'?)
> Of course, the Iron Triangle does not make up the sum total of our computer
> dependence. There are other industries, there are global interdependencies,
> and there are market issues, etc.
>
(And with a blithe wave of the hand the global interdependencies that are most
at risk are swept aside.)
> I haven't ignored these in my analysis.
(Coulda fooled me.)
I'd like to suggest we're a bit more
> resilient than some would have us believe.
(And here is the OBLIGATORY "We are resilient" bullshit. He says that he has
not ignored the global interdependencies, then ignores them, and resorts to
the good old. "But, I'd sure like to think that we are reslient," bullcrap.
What an amazingly pathetic rhetorical recourse.)
I'd like to suggest that
> production processes with a long lead time, like the production of
> chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and food, are little affected by isolated
> outages of a week or even a month, especially when we have ten months to go
> and are smart enough to increase production levels to take into account any
> production hiccups.
>
> In addition I'd like to point out that there is nothing which is shipped
> from overseas, which could not be stockpiled for a month, in anticipation of
> a one month shipping delay. I'd go even further, with the exception of some
> pharmaceuticals, that there is nothing shipped to any country which we could
> not do without for a month.
>
> Have we 'solved' Y2K? No, not entirely, but we have avoided the doomsday
> scenarios. The next 12 months or so are going to be fascinating to watch.
> But it will not, contrary to the ravings found in some of the media reports
> and in many places on the internet, it is not TEOTWAWKI. Through hard work
> and effort, we've broken the back of Y2K.
>
> Yours truly,
> Peter de Jager
> March 1, 1999
>
> ©1999, Peter de Jager
> |
