It's also scoundrel fatigue.
U.S. Iraq Coordinator's Comments Exclude Shiites and Kurds
stratfor.com
March 2, 1999
SUMMARY
The newly appointed U.S. special representative for transition in Iraq,
Frank Ricciardone, was quoted in the Turkish newspaper "Milliyet" on
March 1 as saying that Saddam Hussein will be toppled through a military
coup. "Most probably, there will be a military coup... All I can say is that
it will be very sudden and without warning," said Ricciardone. At first
glance, Ricciardone's statements seem like nothing is new; after all, the
U.S. has stated explicitly that it is actively seeking to support the
overthrow of the current regime in Baghdad. What is interesting about this
statement is that it included an apparent snub to Shiite and Kurdish
opposition groups in Iraq, coming as it did within a few days of a
significant policy change by the Shiite Supreme Council of the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Their new policy amounted to a call for an
explicit U.S. involvement in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the
creation of autonomous regions in Iraq. While Ricciardone's statement,
which appeared in a Turkish newspaper, was probably meant to alleviate
Turkish fears of a Kurdish state created out of northern Iraq, it may serve
to undermine efforts to overthrow Saddam Hussein.
ANALYSIS
In an interview published on March 1 in Turkey's Milliyet newspaper,
newly appointed U.S. special representative for transition in Iraq, Frank
Ricciardone, said that he expected Saddam Hussein to be overthrown in a
military coup. "Most probably, there will be a military coup," said
Ricciardone, adding, "It will be very sudden and without warning." Then,
after warning of the coup that will come without warning, Ricciardone
admitted that "The United States does not have a candidate [to replace
Saddam]... A military regime will be in power for some time after the
coup." So Saddam won't get a warning, except this one, and the U.S. has
no candidate, except for a military junta.
This alone should have been enough to irritate the Shiites and Kurds, who
Washington has been attempting to recruit to a coordinated effort against
Saddam, but Ricciardone had a few more abrasive remarks. Specifically,
when asked if the U.S. effort in Iraq would lead to a division of the
country, Ricciardone said, "The chances that Iraq will be divided are
almost zero." Apparently recognizing that the Shiites and Kurds would not
be entirely satisfied with another Sunni military officer taking control of all
of Iraq, Ricciardone acknowledged, "Of course, there will be a power
struggle for some time. But it is much more risky not to do anything."
The U.S. has been trying for some time to cobble together a coalition of
Iraqi opposition groups, including multiple Shiite and Kurdish factions,
with the aim of overthrowing the current Baghdad regime. The U.S.
Congress has allocated $97 million to be distributed to qualifying
opposition groups for that purpose. Thus far, none of the major Kurdish
or Shiite groups have accepted U.S. aid, likely in part because of
conflicting agendas and in part because the U.S. has already left the Kurds
and Shiites to fend for themselves in the wake of previous attempted
uprisings. The situation has changed in recent weeks, for two reasons.
First, the Turkish government's arrest of the leader of the Kurdistan
Worker's Party (PKK),and its ensuing military campaign against the
remnants of the PKK in northern Iraq, has not only allowed Iraq to
concentrate on defending against the other Kurdish groups, but it has
raised questions about Turkey's continued cooperation with the Kurdish
Democratic Party (KDP). Second, following the murder of the outspoken
Shiite cleric Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad al-Sadr in the city of Najaf, and
the subsequent riots that ensued in over twenty cities, the Iraqi army
deployed heavy weapons to Shiite areas and cracked down on dissent.
After these riots were quelled, the chairman of SCIRI Hojjat ol-Eslam
Muhammad Baqir al Hakim announced SCIRI's intention to engage in a
coordinated effort with U.S. to overthrow Saddam.
Hakim was quoted in the Italian newspaper "La Repubblica" on February
24 as saying, "We are willing to negotiate with the United States to
guarantee our people international protection and to overthrow the
Baghdad regime." In that interview, Hakim also called on the U.S. to
extend the no-fly zones to include all of Iraqi airspace. When asked about
SCIRI's past unwillingness to cooperate with the U.S., Hakim stated, "We
have reservations about this act of Congress, because it does not make
explicit reference to Saddam's repressive regime. But we do call for
international protection for our people... We ask that that which is being
planned for Kosovo be applied to Iraq."
What is being planned for Kosovo is what already happened in Bosnia.
That is, NATO has tentatively drawn up occupation zones in order to
monitor the peace agreement. The similarities between Bosnia and
Kosovo would probably go further than that. It is important to note that
the current Implementation Force (IFOR) deployment in Bosnia is along
ethnic boundaries. If a similar plan should be implemented in Iraq -- as
Hakim has requested -- what would result is essentially the creation of
semi-autonomous states, guaranteed by international monitors. In addition
to the creation of a semi-autonomous Shiite area in southern Iraq, Hakim's
vision could potentially be extended to include a Kurdish state in the north.
If this interpretation of Hakim's statement is correct, then U.S. involvement
with SCIRI would be tantamount to an endorsement of the breakup of
Iraq albeit under international supervision. Such a maneuver would leave
Turkey the loser, as it would in all likelihood result in an independent
Kurdish state, with the Shiites and their allies in Iran the major winners.
Hence, Ricciardone's statement serves simultaneously as a direct snub to
SCIRI for having called for a semi-autonomous Shiite zone in a
post-Saddam Iraq and, as it was quoted in a Turkish newspaper,
alleviates Turkish fears regarding an independent Kurdistan.
If the U.S. has decided to squash dreams of the trifurcation of Iraq, thus
risking losing any cooperation from the Kurds or Shiites, or their
sponsors, it must have high hopes for the Iraqi military. There are regular
reports of dissent within the Iraqi army, including coup attempts, the most
recent coming just last week. The Associated Press reported on February
25 that Saddam Hussein had foiled one of the most serious attempts to
oust him since the Persian Gulf War, and in response his regime executed
at least one person. The coup attempt allegedly involved exiled Iraqi army
commanders who contacted current Iraqi generals with a plan to oust
Saddam. The plot was uncovered after two of the generals who were
contacted informed on the other leaders of the coup.
The Iraqi government did not comment on this report, but opposition
sources within Iraq indicated that this coup attempt seemed to draw on
broad support within the army. The same opposition sources also
mentioned that the coup attempt was to take place during a future military
standoff with the U.S. and Britain. Under the plan, the generals --
specifically the ones who leaked the information to Saddam -- were to
start building support among disgruntled commanders of army divisions
stationed near Baghdad. They would then have moved to control key
government installations, taking advantage of a confrontation with U.S and
British forces. The London-based "Al-Zaman" newspaper later confirmed
on February 26 that Lt. Gen. Kamel Sachet, who was contacted by the
former officers and apparently failed to inform Saddam, was executed on
January 26 after being convicted of treason.
The idea of a military coup occurring under the umbrella and confusion of
a U.S.-U.K. air attack is not new. On January 6, STRATFOR reported
on the possibility that the U.S and British air operation during Desert Fox
was in fact a cover for an attempted coup. We also reported that a
number of officers in Iraq's Republican Guard and 3rd corps were
summarily executed and Iraq's military was reorganized in what was an
apparently an attempt to defend Baghdad from the Iraqi army, just as the
aerial bombardment began. That bombardment proceeded to target the
Special Republican Guard and Air Force units Saddam relies on for his
personal defense. If this was an example of a coup attempt inspired and
supported by the United States, it obviously failed.
With Saddam repeatedly demonstrating his ability to uncover and
dismantle coup attempts from within his military and security apparatus,
Ricciardone's statement prompts us to wonder what he intended. Why
would the U.S. scuttle relations with the Kurds, the Shiites, and the
Shiites' sponsor, Iran, in favor of Sunni officers with a propensity to end
up blindfolded and against a wall? Of course the U.S. and its regional
allies would prefer a secular, Sunni dominated Iraq over a piecemeal
cluster of Iranian client state, Kurdestan, and rump Iraq, but Ricciardone
himself said, "It is much more risky not to do anything."
One possibility is that Ricciardone's statements simply represent naivete
on his part, as in doing little more than attempting to assuage Turkish
concerns, he failed to realize the impact of his comments on anti-Saddam
forces. Not only could Ricciardone's comments alienate the Shiites and
Kurds, but they could allow Saddam to focus greater attention on purging
his military. Maybe that was the goal. A second possibility is that the U.S.
is attempting to bluff Saddam -- claiming to reject the Shiites while tacitly
coordinating activity with them. But this is highly unlikely as it would mean
that the U.S. is prepared to disregard Turkish interests in having the Kurds
remain divided among the dominant powers of the region, and to jettison
some Arab support in exchange for Iranian involvement in the Shiite
cause. Therefore, the third and most likely possibility is that his assertion
represents a further "clarification" of U.S. policy.
The U.S. has continued to assert that Iraq must remain intact given the
geopolitics of the region. By the same token, due to its internal politics,
Iraq needs to have a military regime to keep the country together. This
leaves the U.S. with two options. The first is to continue with the status
quo -- Saddam remains in power. In the meantime, the U.S. strategy of
raiding Iraq's air defenses seems to be a cost-effective means for
containing his power. However, international pressure applied by the
emerging Franco-Sino-Russian bloc may ultimately erode U.S. capability
to continue that strategy, and the U.S. will find it hard to come to a
post-bombardment diplomatic settlement with the man it has demonized
for nearly a decade. The only option remaining is to provide support for a
military coup; however, the problem with this strategy is that Saddam is
quite aware of these options and has moved to quash coup attempts
before they begin. Ricciardone's statement serves only to highlight the
simple fact that, when it comes to developing a coherent policy toward
Iraq, the United States is caught between a rock and a hard place.
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