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To: Gerald R. Lampton who wrote (22901)3/4/1999 12:57:00 PM
From: Charles Hughes  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 24154
 
The one bit I find humorous in this summary is where the competitors calling for a breakup say there is no difference in attractiveness between the 'baby bills' proposal and a breakup into focused companies.

The truth is the 'baby bills' proposal is indeed a death penalty, where Windows and Office get commoditized down into the level of a free resource for everyone to use, and the spinoffs end up with almost no income and die.

On the other hand, focused spinoff companies will each have specialties and a good income stream that leaves them alive to potentially become fierce competitors.

This is hardly a Hobson's choice. The breakup into 'baby bills' is a genuine wet dream for Sun, Netscape, and the rest. No doubt some of what we are reading on the Internet now in support of this 'clone companies' idea is spin coming from these companies. How cynical. The 'baby bills' proposal is just a proposal for an execution.

I'm not crazy about MSFT, but it will be bad for the consumer and general business to break them up the wrong way. We have data investments of hundreds of billions of dollars or more held in Excel files and Word files. We can't throw the baby out with the bath water here. The employees would lose their money as well.

I think the MSFT management should start working on these issues publicly, because they have basically lost the court case. The country, inasmuch as it consists of thinking people who understand the news, has turned against them.

Chaz



To: Gerald R. Lampton who wrote (22901)3/4/1999 5:20:00 PM
From: Daniel Schuh  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 24154
 
Microsoft in the dock economist.com./editorial/freeforall/6-3-99/wb9857.html

Bill's former favorite magazine weighs in, and their reading is somewhat less sanguine than the other wrapups I've posted. The Economist is a little flaky in what they keep on line, so I'm posting this in full for posterity, with a few highlights in bold. Note that they're not particularly impressed by some of the 'softies we thought got off easy, either.

Cheers, Dan.

The world's biggest software company has had a bad trial

TO MOST of the Microsoft team camped in Washington, DC, for the duration of their company's landmark antitrust trial, the past few weeks have been depressing, even shocking. As one of them admitted: “If this was a jury trial, we'd have run the white flag up already.”

The absence of a jury may be enough to provide a glimmer of hope for the software company.
[ds: ?????] What is more, even if the judge hearing the case, Thomas Penfield Jackson, finds against Microsoft, there remains the possibility of rather more sympathetic treatment in the Washington appeal court. And there is always the Supreme Court.

Even so, both sides understand the importance of what has happened in Judge Jackson's courtroom during 62 days of testimony by 24 witnesses; and both think that Microsoft's defence is in disarray. Last week the court adjourned until April 12th, when each side will call three witnesses to rebut its opponent's evidence. There is speculation that Bill Gates himself might testify in an effort to counter the awful effect of his videotaped deposition, which showed the brilliant strategist rocking in his chair, clutching his knees and apparently ignorant of every big development within his company.

But nobody should count even on that. David Boies, the formidable trial lawyer working for the government, has eviscerated a string of top Microsoft executives on the stand. The prospect of his being let loose on Mr Gates in open court hardly bears thinking about.

After rebuttals, both sides will present their closing arguments. Judge Jackson will then retire to consider his verdict. Although he can take as long as he wants to make up his mind, a decision is expected in June or July. If the government has prevailed, demonstrating that Microsoft is a monopoly that has abused market power through a pattern of predatory and exclusionary practices, as most antitrust experts now expect, it will ask the judge for a hearing to determine remedies. Only then will Microsoft be able to lodge an appeal.

In that event, Microsoft will argue that, despite all the courtroom fireworks, most of the written testimony of its witnesses has entered the court record unchallenged by Mr Boies. Furthermore, the company's lawyers will claim that the government has failed to demonstrate any actual harm to consumers as a result of its actions. Although competitors, such as Netscape, may have been roughed up, there is no evidence that Microsoft illegally used monopoly power (which it still denies having) to foreclose markets to potential rivals.

Whether this cuts much ice will depend heavily on the composition of the three-judge appeal-court panel. Most of the 11 judges eligible for selection were appointed by presidents Reagan or Bush and at least six are thought to have laisser-faire views on antitrust typical of the Chicago School of economics.

Last summer, a different panel gave Microsoft an interim legal victory by a majority of two to one. It found that Microsoft's tying of its Internet Explorer browser to the Windows operating system—the original complaint made by the Department of Justice (DoJ)—was legal so long as consumers stood to benefit. Had the DoJ not been about to prosecute on a much wider series of charges, it would have appealed.

Even if the appeal court agrees that Microsoft is a monopoly, it might still rule that the company has done nothing wrong. If the court continues to find some consumer justification for Microsoft's actions, such as its tight control over the Windows desktop, that could take most of the sting out of any judgment. This seems to be what Microsoft is pinning its hopes on.

Judge cred

However, if Judge Jackson comes down against Microsoft, he could decide to frame his judgment in terms that restrict the appeal court's room for manoeuvre. Or he might assume that, whatever happens, the case will end up with the Supreme Court and simply follow his instincts.

In his support, the judge will have a mountain of evidence amassed by the government from Microsoft's internal e-mails and management-briefing documents. Cumulatively, they outline in detail the way in which a strategy was carefully formulated to undermine the resistance of any company, such as Netscape or Apple, that dared to intrude on the Windows platform. Netscape had to be corralled or eliminated, not so much because Microsoft wanted to own the browser market (though it did), but because the browser might one day become an alternative to Windows.

Some of the most revealing evidence surrounds the apparent willingness of Microsoft to bully not just potential rivals, but supposed partners, including Intel and the PC makers. The slightest reluctance from firms such as Compaq, Hewlett-Packard and Gateway to do Microsoft's bidding was met with the threat of taking away their Windows licence. In fact, far from being regarded as equal technology partners, the PC makers were seen by Microsoft as merely a distribution channel that occasionally needed whipping into line or encouraging with a modest reward.


If the evidence has proved even more lurid than expected, the way in which Mr Boies has managed to juxtapose it with the sworn testimony of a series of Microsoft witnesses has hugely increased the damage. Given Microsoft's earlier confidence that the government's case would fall apart when it told its side of the story, the collapse in court of successive Microsoft witnesses has been mysterious, and embarrassing.

Paul Maritz, the firm's third-highest executive, was forced into evasion and concession; James Allchin, the Windows team leader, stumbled over misleading video evidence; Dan Rosen, the man accused of offering Netscape a market-dividing non-aggression pact, was portrayed by the prosecution as a bungling liar; Joachim Kempin, the “enforcer” of Windows licence terms who terrorises the PC makers, committed one indiscretion after another.


With one or two honourable exceptions, such as the marketing chief for Windows, Brad Chase, Microsoft's executives have been unable to make their testimony square with the e-mail evidence brilliantly deployed by Mr Boies. Their credibility, in the eyes of most of those present in court, including, it seems, the judge, has been systematically shredded. When a relatively junior Microsoft lawyer attempted to salvage something of the wretched Mr Rosen's testimony, Judge Jackson offered barbed encouragement with the words: “It is always inspiring to see the young engaged in heroic endeavour.”

If Judge Jackson decides that he too has trouble in believing many of Microsoft's witnesses, not to mention the excruciating Gates video, it will have a significant bearing on the eventual outcome. No superior court can challenge this finding, because to make a judgment about a witness's veracity you have to be there when the cross-examination is conducted.

Although the government is being careful not to get on the wrong side of the judge by taking his decision for granted, there is a quiet confidence at the DoJ that things have gone well. Well enough indeed for Joel Klein, head of the antitrust division and the man responsible for bringing Microsoft to court, to have assembled a group of independent antitrust experts to start considering possible remedies.

So far, nothing has been ruled in and nothing has been ruled out. But there is a strong feeling that measures designed merely to restrain or modify Microsoft's behaviour will not go far enough. For that, Microsoft has only itself to blame. No sooner was the ink dry on its 1994-95 consent decree—an earlier attempt by the DoJ to get the software company to behave—than Mr Gates emerged to brag about how little it would affect the way he did business. Among the possibilities now being considered by the department are breaking the company up and licensing the Windows source-code to competitors.

Some may find this extreme, but if Mr Klein wins resoundingly, the Windows monopoly will be in real peril, as will the company's stranglehold over PC makers. That is still quite a sizeable “if”. Oddly, not even the remote possibility of such an outcome seems yet to have been factored into Microsoft's phenomenally strong share price. That may be another reason why the option-laden Microsofties in Washington are looking so tense.



To: Gerald R. Lampton who wrote (22901)3/6/1999 3:12:00 PM
From: Daniel Schuh  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 24154
 
Lessons from Microsoft economist.com./editorial/freeforall/microsoft_case/ld5337.html

Nobody wants software that sucks less? This is the editorial that goes with the article previously posted. The Thatcherite Tory Economist hasn't quite gotten with the correct liberal/libertarian postition on antitrust matters, it seems. Maybe they missed Bill's lectures on postmodern economics. Free software is communist, except in air supply operations, and all that. Note the last two paragraphs, where Bill's former favorite magazine pulls no punches. Quoted in full.

Cheers, Dan.

Dominant high-tech firms may not look like traditional monopolies. But they should still be subject to antitrust rules

TIMING can be cruel. Just as the Microsoft antitrust trial starts to wind down, the federal government's case against Intel, the chip maker that is the other half of the “Wintel” duopoly, is getting under way. If nothing else, the coincidence shows a welcome determination by the government to give antitrust enforcement its proper place in the high-tech industries. Yet the arguments that high-tech is somehow “different”, and should be treated with a lighter hand, or exempted, have proved surprisingly resilient.

Most of these boil down to the claim that traditional antitrust principles, which were developed for smokestack industries, have no relevance to the new high-tech world. Anything that might undermine incentives to invest in such a dynamic part of the economy would, it is said, be highly damaging. In any case the industry's extraordinary pace of innovation acts to ensure that any dominance in high-tech markets is transitory—and that even temporary monopolists will forgo the rents they might have extracted in an earlier age. It is argued that the law cannot keep up with the industry's rate of change, so that any antitrust action is likely to be misconceived, late or both. Furthermore, intellectual-property laws that award a kind of monopoly through patents are not easily reconciled with the whole notion of antitrust suits.

The opponents of high-tech antitrust cases also assert that successful prosecution is nowadays harder than it was. Many judges of the “Chicago school”, who were appointed in the Reagan/Bush period, now require incontestable evidence of consumer harm resulting from monopoly abuse before they will even consider upholding a violation. Relentless product improvement by computer firms, accompanied by stable or even falling prices, has made it much harder to demonstrate any such harm.

These arguments, plausible as they may seem, are wrong. “Network” effects, in which the value of a product depends on the number of users, occur in many high-tech markets—just as they did in earlier industries such as railways and telephones. These effects hugely increase the risk that one firm may dominate a particular market, probably not for ever but certainly for a significant time. True, the products may change, often substantially. But such are the barriers to entry, arising from large installed bases that are locked into a particular technology and from control over distribution, that a dominant firm can still remain entrenched.

What worries competition authorities most is the ability of firms such as Microsoft and Intel to exploit their power to co-opt the technologies of other companies, thereby limiting competition and stifling innovation. If that happens, consumers are indeed likely to suffer harm. As for intellectual property, it should be possible to respect properly drawn patent rights while ensuring that they are not unlawfully exploited for anti-competitive ends. That is an especially important consideration for Microsoft and Intel.

Windows into the future

In the Microsoft case, the government has set out to prove, among other things, that the company withheld crucial information about the Windows operating system from such rivals as Netscape, Apple and (ironically) Intel. Microsoft thought they might be building competing platforms, instead of non-competing applications. In the Intel case, the claim is that the company held back information from three companies that had filed intellectual-property cases against it. In both cases, the government asserts that, to the companies, competing on merit seemed no longer to be enough: monopoly power was abused to maintain market dominance.

In fairness to Intel, the scope of the complaint is much narrower than it is against Microsoft. Now that the evidence in the Microsoft case has been presented and the witnesses on both sides cross-examined, the Department of Justice seems to have been largely vindicated in its action (see article). What has been most striking is that the pattern of “exclusionary and predatory” business practices that the government set out to expose was established as much by Microsoft as by the government's witnesses. An amazing trail of e-mails and management papers has depicted a company ready, it seems, to do almost anything to protect its Windows monopoly and lacking any sense of that “special lens” through which the law examines the actions of a monopolist. Even more damning has been the evasiveness and lack of credibility under questioning of one Microsoft executive after another, from Bill Gates downwards.

When, as in the Microsoft case, a monopolist's conduct seems to be chilling innovation in markets in which the competition is largely defined by innovation, the argument for antitrust intervention is compelling. Indeed, antitrust enforcement will be needed to stop such practices even before any demonstrable consumer harm has occurred. This is not easy for the courts to deal with; devising appropriate remedies will no doubt prove just as hard. In the face of these difficulties, “hands off” undoubtedly has an appealing simplicity—but thus far, the Microsoft case has shown convincingly that it is not the right option.