U.S. Iraq Strategy Apparently Working, Despite Incoherent Policy
Summary:
Shiite forces in southern Iraq have reportedly begun substantial
attacks, following the reported killing of a top Iraqi commander
and the creeping U.S. bombing campaign. The potential outcome
remains debatable.
Analysis:
Iraqi Shiite opposition forces have reportedly launched a major
military operation in the southeastern Iraqi provinces of Maysan
and Basrah, according to a statement issued March 10 by the Iran-
based Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).
SCIRI claimed that the operation, launched in retaliation for the
February 19 assassination of Iraqi Shiite cleric Ayatollah
Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr, has resulted in heavy losses among Iraqi
troops. The Shiite forces reportedly pummeled a tank battalion
between Talha and Uzair with rockets and mortar fire, and
destroyed an additional eight tanks along a road from Hamayon to
Suwayb.
The reported offensive, for which there has been no independent
confirmation, comes only a day after the also unconfirmed report
of the assassination of Saddam Hussein's commander for southern
Iraq. The Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Watan on March 8 cited Iraqi
opposition Al-Intifadah Television, broadcasting from the Iranian
border, as reporting that Iraqi Southern Region commander General
Ali Hasan al-Majid had been killed by his aides in the southern
city of Nasiriyah. Al-Watan added that the same story was being
reported by SCIRI leader Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim's Voice of
Rebellious Iraq radio, as well as by Iraqis in the south. Al-
Majid was reportedly traveling to Qurnah District, near the Shatt
al-Arab in northern Basrah province, when he was attacked.
According to sources at Al-Hayat, SCIRI's London office has
categorically denied that Baqir al-Hakim had made such a claim,
and Stratfor has been unable to otherwise confirm the death of
al-Majid.
If, in fact, al-Majid has been either executed or assassinated,
it would be a highly significant development. Al-Majid, known as
"Ali Chemical" for his use of chemical warfare agents against the
Kurds, was Saddam Hussein's cousin and one of his closest and
most trusted commanders. Al-Majid was made governor of Kuwait
during the Iraqi occupation. He was placed in charge of southern
Iraq last December 16, during the reorganization of Iraq's armed
forces that took place immediately preceding Operation Desert Fox
and which, we believe, was in reaction to a foiled coup plot
[http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/010699.asp].
In fact, Al-Majid reportedly personally ordered the executions of
General Ali Maaruf al-Saidi and Lieutenant Colonel Sabah Dhiyab
al-Khalidi, from the Iraqi 3rd Corps, during Desert Fox. The 3rd
Corps appears to have been central to the failed coup plot. Al-
Majid also commanded the reportedly brutal suppression of Shiite
uprisings that swept southern Iraq in the days following the
murder of Ayatollah Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr and his two sons in
Najaf. The crackdown reportedly resulted in the deaths of 25 to
300 Shiites, depending on the source, as well as the execution of
eight Iraqi officers.
Interestingly, Al-Majid's aide and deputy commander for the
Southern Region, Lieutenant General Kamel Sachet al-Janabi, was
reportedly among those killed for involvement in yet another
failed coup plot. The plot was allegedly foiled in late January,
when two Iraqi generals reported to Saddam Hussein that they had
been contacted by exiled officers. The Iraqi generals were to
have built support among divisional commanders and to have moved
to take control of key installations under cover of a future
confrontation with the U.S. and Britain. Multiple Iraqi
opposition sources reported on February 25 and 26 that Sachet,
eight of his aides, and Lieutenant General Namiq Hassan,
commander of the Iraqi 3rd Corps, were arrested on January 26 and
executed shortly thereafter on charges of treason.
SCIRI reported on March 9 that a total of 24 officers, including
Sachet, Hassan, and former Baghdad air defense commander Major
General Ghadaban Abed al-Ghriri, whose clan controls the highway
south of Baghdad, were executed on February 8 for involvement in
the coup plot. Sachet's reported execution does raise the
question of whether al-Majid, if killed, was assassinated by his
anti-Saddam aides, or was executed by his pro-Saddam aides for
his own involvement in the coup plot. Either possibility
suggests serious security breaches in Saddam's inner circle.
Events in southern Iraq point to the inadvertent success of U.S.
military strategy in Iraq, despite the apparent chaos paralyzing
U.S. policy toward the country. U.S. policy makers, while
agreeing on the need to remove Saddam from power, apparently
remain divided over how exactly to effect his overthrow, with
whose assistance, and with what outcome. Top U.S. commander in
the Persian Gulf, Marine General Anthony Zinni, last month told a
Senate committee, "I don't see an opposition group that has the
viability to overthrow Saddam at this point." Despite generating
a list of eligible recipient opposition groups, the Clinton
administration has yet to distribute any of the $97 million
approved by Congress last year for use in funding the overthrow
of Saddam Hussein. This has drawn the ire of Congressional hawks
who argue that the Clinton administration is moving too slowly in
Iraq.
American policy is not only stalled by lack of a suitable
contender for power in Iraq, particularly among the preferred
Sunni minority, but also because the most viable groups, Shiites
and Kurds, have post-Saddam goals not altogether palatable to
Iraq's neighbors. As we reported in the March 2 Global
Intelligence Update, newly appointed U.S. coordinator for
transition in Iraq, Frank Ricciardone, effectively ruled out
cooperating with Iraq's Shiites and Kurds for the overthrow of
Saddam, instead proposing a coup by Sunni military officers
[http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/030299.asp]. Ricciardone
explicitly ruled out a division of Iraq into a northern
"Kurdistan," southern Shiite entity, and Sunni central Iraqi rump
state.
Turkey opposes a Kurdish state that could stir up unrest among
eastern Turkey's Kurdish population. Persian Gulf states are
concerned about a Shiite state in southern Iraq that would
effectively be an extension of Iran. Yet according to the
Bahrain newspaper Akhbar al-Khaleej, which cited "well informed
diplomatic sources" in Doha, U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen
was attempting to drum up support for an Iraqi partition plan
during his recent tour of Gulf states. Under the alleged plan,
ongoing air strikes would intensify and cut off northern and
southern Iraq from Baghdad's control. Iraqi opposition forces,
protected by U.S. air cover, would then enter the "liberated"
territories, their governments would be recognized, an they would
begin launching attacks on Baghdad. The Akhbar al-Khaleej argued
such a plan is already being implemented. "The aim is both to
gradually destroy Iraq's defensive capabilities and try to
establish the principle that such attacks are a routine matter,
thus getting public opinion accustomed to them ahead of stage
two," the paper claimed.
While U.S. policy is clearly divided within the administration,
Congress, and the military, evidence suggests that U.S. miliatary
strategy of gradually eroding Iraq's defense capability and
tightening a noose around Baghdad through continuous air strikes
is proceeding effectively. U.S. aircraft have struck more
targets since Operation Desert Fox than were hit during the
December operation itself. The attacks have reportedly destroyed
more than 20 percent of Iraq's air defense capability. But
though specifically aimed at Iraq's air defense system, targets
have extended to coastal defense missile batteries, communication
facilities, and command and control bunkers.
The U.S. has all but acknowledged that the air strikes,
officially acts of self defense for aircraft patrolling the "no
fly" zones, are more of a creeping war of attrition. One senior
State Department official described the strikes to the Washington
Post as a "mini undeclared war." U.S. Undersecretary of Defense
Walter Slocombe was cited by the International Herald Tribune as
saying, "What we are working to do is to help create the
political and military conditions that will permit a successful
change of the regime." The International Herald tribune also
cited a senior administration official as saying, "We think we
see Mr. Saddam flailing. We are working toward a slow whittling-
down of his power, his authority, and his nerves. There are
reports of military guys perhaps not following orders."
The "mini undeclared war" last month may have just missed a major
victory. According to "travelers from Baghdad" in Jordan, cited
by the Egyptian news agency MENA, the February 24 air strike in
the suburbs of Baghdad was, in fact, targeted at Saddam Hussein.
The "command bunker" that was struck in the attack was reportedly
the Radwaniyah Palaces, near Baghdad International Airport, and
the attack allegedly occurred minutes after Saddam left the area.
According to the unidentified travelers, the U.S. had information
that Saddam was inspecting the facility. As with much news out
of Iraq, this report too is unconfirmed.
While the air campaign may have missed the big one, it still
appears to be succeeding. However, in the absence of coherent or
at least realistic U.S. policy, it is not succeeding exactly
according to plan. Repeated attempts to foster a military coup
have been thwarted by Saddam. But the Shiite opposition seems
ready to take full advantage of the destabilizing effect of the
U.S. air strikes. SCIRI claims to have moved some 20,000
fighters into southern Iraq from Iran in mid-February, and is now
claiming to have launched an offensive against Iraqi forces in
southeast Iraq. If they have also managed to decapitate the
Southern Region command, they may see some success. However, the
Shiites do not have what it takes to capture Baghdad and control
Iraq. Neither do the Kurds. So whether a U.S. policy preference
or not, the success of U.S. air war strategy combined with the
failure of the U.S. to coordinate the ground war against Saddam,
could inadvertently create a divided Iraq.
___________________________________________________
To receive free daily Global Intelligence Updates,
sign up on the web at stratfor.com,
or send your name, organization, position, mailing
address, phone number, and e-mail address to
alert@stratfor.com
___________________________________________________
STRATFOR, Inc.
504 Lavaca, Suite 1100
Austin, TX 78701
Phone: 512-583-5000
Fax: 512-583-5025
Internet: stratfor.com
Email: info@stratfor.com
|
