Iran's Conservatives Shift Tactics in Internal Political Debate
Summary:
Iran's conservatives, apparently losing ground in their domestic
political struggle with moderates on economic and ideological
grounds, are now framing opposition to normalizing relations with
the West in strategic terms.
Analysis:
On March 11, the conservative Iranian newspaper Kayhan
International warned Azerbaijan against its efforts to strengthen
its ties with the West. "It is not in Baku's interests to annoy
its giant southern neighbor," the newspaper said. "Azerbaijan's
security and progress cannot be guaranteed only through flirting
with the West," it added. Regarding Baku's avowed interest in
basing NATO, U.S., or Turkish troops in the Azerbaijan, the
newspaper commented that, "Iran is not willing to see a foreign
power stationed along its borders." The comments were
particularly pointed, as they came on the eve of a planned visit
to Tehran by Azerbaijan's Foreign Minister, Tofik Zulfugarov.
The fact that Iranian conservatives have criticized Azerbaijan's
effort to improve its politico-military relations with the West -
- particularly with the U.S. and NATO -- is not surprising,
though it does suggest an important shift in Iran's internal
political struggle between President Khatami's moderates and
Ayatollah Khameini's conservatives. While moderate forces in
Iran seem to be winning, on economic and ideological grounds, the
argument over the necessity to moderate Iranian politics and
boost Iran's cooperation with the West, the conservatives appear
now to be developing a new approach to opposing that opening.
Specifically, they are framing evolving Iranian relations with
the West in security terms.
The moderate political forces led by President Mohammad Khatami
have recently made significant advances in Iran's internal power
struggle. In the municipal elections held in Iran on February
26, the first since the revolution of 1979, Khatami's reformers
achieved sweeping victories. Naturally, the elections results
are being questioned by Iranian conservatives. They have argued
that reformists won due to the nonparticipation of the
conservative's supporters and have since called for resignation
of the interior minister over his alleged mishandling of the
polls. Nevertheless, Khatami's reforms have garnered strong
popular support at the polls. In Tehran itself, reformers won
all 15 seats in the Tehran city council.
President Khatami is currently making tremendous efforts in
opening his country's economy to the West. As the first top
Iranian official to visit Western Europe since the overthrow of
the Shah, Khatami has just completed a three-day visit to Italy.
While there, Khatami met with Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini, who
said that Italian business sphere was "greatly interested" in
cooperating with Iran. Despite U.S. opposition, Italian state
oil company ENI and France's Elf-Acquitaine on March 1 signed a
deal with Iran to develop its Dorood oil field, a project worth
$1 billion. There is no doubt that Khatami's policy of fostering
economic projects with the Western powers is successfully moving
forward.
In the meantime, Iran's northern neighbor, Azerbaijan, is
stepping up its military cooperation with the West. On February
9, Azerbaijan's top foreign policy presidential advisor declared
that his country would not renew its membership in the
Commonwealth of Independent States' Collective Security Treaty.
This stance is no doubt prompted in part by Azerbaijan's growing
concern over the intensified military relationship between Russia
and Armenia. To counterbalance the alignment between Moscow and
Yerevan, Azerbaijan expressed in January its interest in closer
military cooperation with NATO, in particular the U.S. and
Turkey. Moreover, Azerbaijan's officials indicated their
willingness to have an American military base located on their
territory. Azerbaijan made it clear that it would change its
position on the matter only if all Russian bases were withdrawn
from Armenia and Georgia, and if Russia quit supplying Armenia
with arms. Although it is highly unlikely that NATO will commit
troops to Azerbaijan, other less provocative steps (such as arms
sales or the training of its military officers) might occur.
In addition to approaching the West over military issues,
Azerbaijan is backing U.S. economic interests in Central Asia in
what amounts to a "New Great Game" regarding who will develop and
transport the energy riches of the Caspian Sea. Washington has
Baku's support in a long-running dispute over which proposed
route the main oil pipeline will eventually take. The U.S. wants
this pipeline to be built from Azerbaijan through Turkey, ending
at the Mediterranean Sea. Tehran would like to see Caspian oil
transported through its own territory, and is opposed to the U.S.
led initiative. In addition, Tehran also strenuously opposes a
U.S.-sponsored plan to construct a pipeline that would transport
natural gas from Turkmenistan via the Caspian Sea, through
Azerbaijan and Georgia. Like the planned main oil pipeline, the
gas pipeline would also bypass the Iranian territory.
Washington openly justifies both pipelines on political grounds.
Washington's point is simple: the newly independent former
Soviet republics in Central Asia should not be dominated by
either of the two regional powers -- Russia or Iran. Although
political considerations will be a critical factor in determining
which routes are utilized for these proposed pipelines, the cost
of building them will remain an important factor in their
construction and location.
Given the pace at which Iran's neighbor Azerbaijan is stepping up
its military and economic cooperation with the West, it is not
surprising that Iranian conservatives are alarmed. But
Azerbaijan's appeal to NATO may offer Iranian conservatives a new
lever in their domestic political feud. While Khatami touts the
economic promise carried by improved relations with the West, not
to mention the social and cultural benefits of moderation,
conservatives can easily not that the West also presents a
distinct and growing military threat. To the south and west of
Iran, the U.S. has built up a shaky, but still coherent coalition
under its policy -- directed at both Iran and Iraq -- of dual
containment. U.S. military forces are active in and across the
Persian Gulf, and NATO member and close U.S. ally Turkey lies to
the west of Iran. Azerbaijan's appeal to NATO smacks of the
encirclement of Iran. So, while the Iranian public may be
rejecting the strict social code and political isolation of the
"good old days" of Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran's conservatives can
now raise a less ideological argument against opening to the West
-- national security.
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