To: flatsville who wrote (4909 ) 3/21/1999 11:28:00 AM From: John Mansfield Respond to of 9818
' o I spoke with Jared Wermiel of the NRC in the corridor about some of the basic physics of nuclear power plants and on site waste storage. Nuclear power requires off site power to cool the core and the stored spent fuel should the plant go black. If the grid is lost, the plant is required to shut down. Jared gave me a few basic facts about the operation of nuclear power plants. The core of a typical megawatt capacity power plant releases in the neighborhood of 6 megawatts of heat during normal operation. In the event of a failure, the plant SCRAMs, which means that the control rods fall (by gravity) into the core, among a number of other actions. The heat production drops exponentially, such that the thermal output within a few hours. Within a day or two, the residual heat production is on par with that required to keep the spent fuel cool, tenths of a megawatt, that is, one hundred, or so, thousand watts of heat to dissipate. To remove this waste heat, recirculation pumps are required. Since it is an open system (with the spent fuel) evaporation losses must be replenished. The power to run these pumps is a fraction of the residual losses. These pumps draw on the order of 2000 gallons per minute; let me call that 8000 liters in 60 seconds or 133 l/s. If I raise that 133 kg of water 50 meters (against gravity, g = 9.8 m/s^2) we have about 6,500 watts to operate a perfectly efficient pump. So call that 10,000 watts. That is in the realm of ordinary generators. You could buy three and use one for backup and one for maintenance. Say you lose all three, the water temperature slowly will rise and boil. (It will boil off in the case of the fuel - taking heat by vaporization and transport.) It will take time. Wermiel indicated it was the order of days. (If we knew the size of the storage vessel, we could estimate it.) The net result is that I am much less concerned about calls for shutting down the nuclear reactors in summer, to allow them time to cool down, just in case. It's not that much of a 'hair trigger.' I think that for reasons of public policy, communication and confidence and for contingency planning, we should audit the plants now (real audits, not paper audits) and have a clear policy by the summer. Since IV&V can take 40 % or more of a Y2k effort, I've just asked to increase the size of the work substantially and I've asked for this late in the game. If the resources simply are not there, we need to tell the public that, as Senator Bennett has said on several occasions, the we are 'flying blind' in this important area, and to describe the contingency plans that we are taking. It will be interesting to see whether there is public debate on this point. Jared also described the NRC Operations Center in Rockville, MD. The NRC has the ability to monitor plant data (they are tied into all of the plant monitoring systems of the nuclear generating stations around the country) remotely. I wish that I had thought to ask him why the Peach Bottom incident on 1 March 1999 was not picked up by the NRC with no monitoring going on for seven hours. I'll follow up and see what I learn. Anyway, this plant has dedicated telecommunications owned by the NRC and is capable of handling 9 disaster situations simultaneously. The drills the NRC plans for y2k are based on a scenario (not a prediction!) of two simultaneous y2k-induced events. A second command center is located in another state. ...tmn.com