Conflicting Reports Suggest Interesting Possibilities in Iraq
March 23, 1999
stratfor.com
SUMMARY
Reports of uprisings among Shiites in southern Iraq last week, following the
arrests of the alleged murderers of a top Shiite cleric, beg the question of
just how organized and planned is the Iraqi Shiite opposition. Adding to
the confusion are conflicting reports of the fate of Saddam's top lieutenant
in southern Iraq and the alleged resumption of back-channel talks between
Washington and Baghdad.
ANALYSIS
Reported Uprising in Southern Iraq
Baghdad's March 17 announcement that it has arrested four suspects in the
assassination of Iraqi Shiite cleric Ayatollah Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr
has reportedly sparked yet another uprising among southern Iraq's Shiite
population. Bayan Jabr, the Damascus representative of the Iran-backed
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), told the Iranian
news agency IRNA that the Shiite population of Basra rose up on March
18 in response to the announced arrests and seized government offices in
the Hayyaniyah, Khamsa Mayl, and Jumhuriyah districts. Bayan Jabr
claimed that the Iraqi regime responded by attacking the districts with
mortar fire, tanks, and armored vehicles on the night of the 18th-19th. He
added that the bombardment was followed by house-to-house fighting
between government forces and citizens, which resulted in large numbers
of deaths and injuries.
SCIRI and its rival Shiite organization, the Islamic Da'wah Party, both
denounced the arrests of the four suspects, all Shiites, charging that the
move is politically motivated to divide Shiites in Iraq. The suspects arrested
reportedly implicate SCIRI and Iran in Sadr's murder. The groups insist
that the Iraqi government is responsible for assassinating Sadr. Iraq's Shiite
opposition previously claimed that a widespread mass uprising following
Sadr's February 19 assassination was crushed by Iraqi security forces.
Hamad Bayati, SCIRI's representative in London, repeated the allegations
to Agence France Presse, and also claimed that Shiite opposition forces on
March 19 attacked an army unit near Amarah and an armored division
near Basra. SCIRI's Voice of Rebellious Iraq radio reported on March 20
and 21 that popular uprisings had resulted in the opposition's seizure of
control of Basra, Kut, and Amarah. The report claimed that citizens in the
three cities had captured government offices and arrested and executed
some 20 government officials, possibly including Basra's governor-general
and governor. Opposition radio claimed that Baath Party official "the
criminal Sa'dun" was among those killed or wounded in fighting around
Amarah. Sa'dun is possibly Baath Party leader in Basra and deputy
commander for the southern region, Abdul Baqi al-Sa'dun.
According to the Voice of Rebellious Iraq, resistance fighters carried out a
"sweeping attack" on the 18th Brigade of the 14th Regiment [likely the
18th Brigade of the 14th Division of the 4th Corps] in Amarah, as well as
the 202nd Armored Battalion. Opposition radio also claimed that
resistance forces had captured 15 tanks and artillery pieces in fighting in
Hayyaniyah. Also on March 21, the Jordan-based opposition Radio of the
Patriotic Solidarity of Iraq reported that the central headquarters of Iraq's
security department in Baghdad had been bombed several times in the
preceding few days. Finally, the Abu Dhabi newspaper "Al-Ittihad" on
March 20 cited an unnamed source from the command of SCIRI's Badr
Battalions as saying the city of Najaf had been surrounded and besieged
by Iraqi troops. Al- Ittihad also reported that the Islamic Da'wah Party had
confirmed SCIRI's reports.
As is usually the case, the Iraqi Shiite opposition claims can not be verified.
Nor can they be completely rejected. The opposition's claimed sweeping
gains, including the capture of three southern Iraqi cities and the rout of an
infantry brigade, are most certainly exaggerated. Yet there may be a grain
of truth here as well. Baghdad does not comment on such opposition
claims, yet on the evening of March 19, state-run television broadcast film
of peaceful streets in Basra, and Baath Party official Abdul Baqi al-Sa'dun
announced on television that Saddam Hussein had allocated more money
for Basra. The broadcast may be coincidental, or it may be an attempt to
refute reports of violence in Basra.
Additionally, on March 19, the Iraqi News Agency INA reported that nine
formations of U.S. and British combat aircraft carried out 29 sorties
against targets in regions of Basra, Nasiriyah, and Amarah. Baghdad
claimed that the aircraft struck public service installations and weapons
concentrations in southern Iraq. U.S. Central Command issued a statement
on March 19 saying that U.S. F-16 Falcons and RAF Tornados struck
radar and communications sites in Shuaybah and Muzalbah, 290 miles and
230 miles southeast of Baghdad, respectively. While there is no way of
linking SCIRI claims with these air-strikes, during and since Operation
Desert Fox, U.S. air strikes have appeared to be coordinated with, or at
least paving the way for, opposition activities on the ground.
Though the extent of last week's Shiite uprising in southern Iraq remains
unclear, circumstances surrounding it raise an important question: Just how
coordinated is the opposition? SCIRI is already reportedly at odds with
the Islamic Da'wah Party. And SCIRI reports claim both that the alleged
liberation of Basra, Kut, and Amarah occurred through the popular
uprising of citizens, driven by rage over the handling of the Sadr case, and
that opposition fighters staged coordinated attacks on Iraqi military units.
The question, then, is what can southern Iraq's Shiites deliver in terms of an
organized military campaign, and how much of the opposition in southern
Iraq is merely the knee- jerk response to Baghdad's less popular
maneuvers?
Continued Uncertainty Over Ali Hassan al-Majid
Whether or not the Shiite opposition is primarily expressed through
uncoordinated uprisings, those seeking to overthrow Saddam Hussein must
look to other potential opposition forces as well. Stratfor reported on
March 11 the alleged assassination of Saddam's commander for southern
Iraq, General Ali Hassan al-Majid
[http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/031199.asp]. Majid was reportedly
responsible for exposing and executing the Iraqi Army officers plotting to
overthrow Saddam. However, his aide, Lieutenant General Kamel Sachet
al-Janabi, was reportedly implicated in a subsequent coup plot and was
brutally executed. Reports out of Baghdad claim Sachet's mutilated and
charred body was delivered to his family in a sack bearing the phrase
"traitor and coward." Sachet's execution raised the possibility that Majid
may have been killed for a presumed connection to the plot.
The fate of Majid is, at best, unclear. Though he vanished some time
around March 4, Majid reappeared in Iraqi newspapers and on television
last week. The newspaper Al-Iraq reported on March 18 that Majid met
leaders of Basra, telling them Saddam wished to reward the heroic city
with more and better services. The meeting was reportedly attended by
Abdul Baqi al-Sa'dun, General Sachet's replacement and allegedly the
victim of fighting around Amarah at roughly this time. On March 21, Iraqi
television broadcast coverage of the same meeting. While this would seem
to confirm Majid is still alive and kicking, the tape may have been stock
footage, something the Voice of Rebellious Iraq insists is the case.
On March 20, opposition radio reported that Ali al-Majid's brother,
Hashim Hasan al-Majid, led a group of his family, including a number of
Ali's sons, to Radwaniyah Palace to demand that Saddam's son Qusay
reveal the fate of the still-missing Ali. The two groups allegedly clashed,
with Hashim al-Majid and two of Ali's sons killed, Qusay wounded in the
head, and several of Qusay's followers killed. According to opposition
radio, "The regime tried to hush up this news, and showed old footage of
Ali al-Majid visiting Basra Governate."
IRNA broadcast a somewhat different version of this report on March 21,
citing Iraqi sources in Damascus as claiming that opposition forces
attacked Qusay and Ali al-Majid in Kamini in southern Iraq, and that the
two may have been killed in the attack. As we said, Majid's fate remains
very much in question, and our report can only reflect the dearth of reliable
news out of southern Iraq. At very least, however, these reports are
intriguing. At most, chaos may have reached the closest ranks of Saddam's
supporters.
Possible Resumption of Back-Channel U.S.-Iraqi Talks
Here is where things get really interesting. According to the Paris-based
newspaper Al-Watan al-Arabi, "well informed U.S. sources" confirm that
the U.S. and Iraq have resumed back-channel Turkish-mediated talks,
sporadically carried out since 1996. We reported on April 22, 1998 on
allegations that the U.S. had reopened talks with Baghdad aimed at
bringing Iraq back into the Arab community
[http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/042298.asp].
At that time, the Jordanian newspaper Al-Bilad cited Iraqi opposition
forces as reporting that U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Robert Pelletreau
had met with Qusay Hussein in Ankara. The talks were reportedly
propelled by a faction in the U.S. government that saw Iran and the Iraqi
opposition as greater threats to U.S. interests than a tame Saddam
Hussein. Pelletreau reportedly gave U.S. conditions for normalizing
relations with Iraq, including the establishment of U.S. bases in southern
Iraq and the inclusion of U.S. advisors/observers in the Iraqi military.
While U.S. demands were rejected at the time, Al-Watan al-Arabi's
March 19 report indicated that Iraq now feels its situation warrants any
concession necessary, short of regime change, to relieve Iraqi isolation.
And despite U.S. efforts to rally support for continued pressure on Iraq,
and to unite the Iraqi opposition, opinion in Washington reportedly remains
divided on the elimination of Saddam. The U.S. is still unsure of the
reliability of Iraqi opposition forces, should they take power, provided they
are even capable of taking power. And support for U.S. containment of
Iraq appears to be slipping in the Arab world. The opposition may be
picking away at Saddam's closest aides, finally posing a real threat to the
regime, but not only is support for Saddam's overthrow slipping among
U.S. allies, but the opposition looks like potentially as much trouble as
Saddam.
As we mentioned last April, the detail and history of this report make it
worth a second look. While U.S. demonization of Saddam Hussein
appears insurmountable, political spin aside, the fundamental political
interests on both sides of these alleged negotiations support the possible
existence of such talks. Interestingly, Qusay allegedly recently returned to
Iraq from Britain, where he was supposedly receiving medical care for
injuries he sustained in an assassination attempt. When this report came
out, we thought it odd to the point of impossibility, but if talks are in fact
underway, it just might have been true. Of course, if we are to believe
reports from SCIRI, Qusay may now be wounded or dead, casting doubt
on the future of already dubious talks. For all the time this Iraqi saga has
dragged on, one certainly can not call it dull.
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