STRATFOR's
Global Intelligence Update
March 24, 1999
Russian Arms Shipment Signals Deteriorating Relations with West
Summary:
A shipment of Russian jet fighters, intercepted in Azerbaijan,
may have been intended to send a final message to NATO regarding
Russia's views on the Kosovo crisis. NATO air strikes against
Yugoslavia, appearing more likely with each passing moment, will
mark a fundamental turning point in relations with Russia.
Analysis:
Events surrounding the Kosovo crisis are overtaking us, even as
this report takes shape. U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke's
11th hour mission to Belgrade failed to convince Yugoslav
President Slobodan Milosevic to accept the Kosovo peace
agreement. Belgrade has declared a state of emergency, citing an
"imminent threat of war." NATO Secretary General Javier Solana
announced he has ordered air strikes. And Russian Prime Minister
Yevgeny Primakov canceled a visit to the U.S. en route, with his
aircraft reversing course over the mid-Atlantic, after receiving
a briefing on NATO intentions by U.S. Vice President Al Gore.
Earlier in the day, before boarding his abortive flight, Primakov
reiterated Russia's firm opposition to air strikes, a position
that increasingly appears likely to be ignored.
Russia has been consistent in its opposition to the use of
military force against Yugoslavia, particularly by NATO, since
the crisis emerged. Primakov argued on March 23 that such an
attack would fundamentally change "the nature of international
order," as Yugoslavia was not an aggressor against foreign
countries. "Maybe someone would like to make an air strike
against Turkey because the Kurdish problem hasn't been solved
yet," he mused, "Or maybe against Spain because the Basque
problem has not been solved." Primakov insisted that all
diplomatic options had not been exhausted, while Russian Foreign
Ministry spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin repeated the argument that,
"One cannot use force in international relations without the
agreement of the UN Security Council."
The Kosovo crisis strikes a deep chord in Moscow, and has been
the exceptional case uniting Russia's contentious political
factions [http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/101598.asp].
Moscow not only opposes the use of force against its traditional
Slavic ally, but also sees NATO action as a dangerous precedent,
furthering the encirclement of and threat to Russia itself.
Already incensed at the geographic expansion of NATO, Russia is
fiercely opposed to the expansion of NATO's mission. In October
1998, the last time NATO aircraft prepared to carry out strikes
against Yugoslavia, Russian Defense Ministry main directorate for
international military cooperation chief Leonid Ivashov warned
that, "The operation which is being prepared against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia is a provocation by the alliance's
military forces against Russia, too. Yes, this will only create
a precedent. Other countries in Europe, the CIS and Russia
included, could find themselves the next targets of NATO action."
During last October's escalation, as Russian concerns appeared to
be having no effect on NATO decision-making, word leaked out that
Russia had supplied surface-to-air missile components and
possibly entire state of the art SAM systems to Yugoslavia, in
violation of an arms embargo. Moscow denied the rumors, though
it threatened that Russia would sever relations with NATO and
contemplate arming Belgrade if air attacks were carried out.
Allegations of Russian and Belarusian military assistance to
Belgrade have persisted, as have the threats. On March 23,
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said in an interview on
Russian television that NATO military action would jeopardize the
arms embargo against Yugoslavia. The Russian Duma's references
to arming the Serbs have been phrased as threatening certainties.
Also on March 23, Vafa Goulizade, senior foreign policy advisor
to Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev, announced that a Russian
cargo plane carrying six MiG fighters and 30 pilots and technicians had been detained at Baku's Bina airport on March 18. According to Goulizade, the Antonov An-124's crew had admitted that the plane was bound for Yugoslavia. According to Azerbaijani authorities, the crew later repeatedly changed their story, claiming to be bound alternatively for North Korea or the Czech Republic. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin denied that the MiGs were destined for Yugoslavia, claiming instead that the cargo aircraft belonged to the private Russian company Polyot, and was transporting Kazakh aircraft to Slovakia. Slovak Defense Ministry spokesmen, in turn, denied knowledge of any expected MiG shipments.
The Antonov incident is odd on several counts. First, it has
more to do with Russia's deteriorating relations with Azerbaijan
than with Russian aid to Yugoslavia. A quick look at a map will
show that Baku is not on the flight path from Russia to Belgrade,
Pyongyang, Bratislava, or Prague. Moreover, even if the Antonov
was taking a circuitous route to one of these destinations,
Azerbaijan was not a wise choice for overflight. Baku is at odds
with Moscow over Russia's support for Armenia, and recently
appealed to NATO to establish a base on Azerbaijani territory.
While the Antonov was detained on March 18, Baku withheld the
announcement until it could have maximum effect. Not only does
the announcement coincide with NATO and Russia's end game over
Yugoslavia, but it was also made the day Russian Deputy Foreign
Minister Leonid Drachevsky was due to arrive in Baku to discuss
Azerbaijan's complaints about Russian arms deliveries to Armenia.
Azerbaijan's timing was marvelous. The Antonov's route over Baku is still in question. It is possible that Russia intended the aircraft to be intercepted, to once again raise the specter of a resumption of Russian aid to Yugoslavia. If that was the case, Baku's decision to withhold announcement must have been particularly galling to Moscow. Alternatively, if Russia intended the aircraft to reach its destination, just what was that destination? Two candidates leap immediately to mind, Iran and Iraq. Iraq seems the most likely candidate, as detailed allegations surfaced last month in the British press that Russia was violating the arms embargo against Iraq.
Whichever proves to be the real story, the implications are the
same. It is important not to underestimate Moscow's resentment
of the way in which Russia has been marginalized in international
affairs. And deeper still is Russia's opposition to what it sees
as the tightening noose being drawn around it by the U.S. and
NATO. As we have argued previously, air strikes against Yugoslavia have little chance of forcing Belgrade to surrender its fundamental national interests. What they will certainly succeed in doing, however, is to mark the beginning of a new pattern of relations between Russia and the West -- relations rooted in mistrust and animosity.
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