To: DMaA who wrote (41184 ) 4/1/1999 10:32:00 AM From: Les H Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 67261
Kosovo Will Have One Winner: Either Clinton or Milosevic By Morton M. Kondracke rollcall.com For President Clinton, a dangerous and decisive situation has developed over Kosovo: either he wins or Slobodan Milosevic does. The middle ground is disappearing. This state of affairs is different from any other foreign policy confrontation Clinton has faced. In Iraq, Bosnia, Somalia, North Korea and Haiti, inconclusive endgames have been acceptable. In Kosovo now, they aren't. For Clinton, the Kosovo situation resembles then-President George Bush's Persian Gulf confrontation with Saddam Hussein, when the U.S.-led allies had to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait or be humiliated and suffer dire strategic consequences. In 1991, failure to win against Saddam would have rendered the United States an unreliable superpower, especially in the eyes of the oil states of the Middle East. In 1999, failure to stop Milosevic's mass murder in Kosovo will render NATO a toothless tiger and raise doubts about its ability to maintain peace and stability in Europe, especially if Russia becomes aggressive again. Clinton stumbled into this do-or-die confrontation with Serbia. He evidently thought that the mere threat of NATO bombing would scare Milosevic into accepting the Paris peace deal that involved allowing NATO peacekeepers on Serbian territory. Milosevic called the bluff. And why wouldn't he, after Clinton repeatedly issued ultimatums without consequence? And after Milosevic had seen Clinton respond so mildly, so often, to Iraqi misbehavior? Moreover, Milosevic had to be encouraged by the U.S. record in Bosnia, where Serbs engaged in barbaric ethnic cleansing without serious consequence -- in fact, saw its results ratified in the Dayton peace agreement. When Clinton began bombing Serbian targets last week, he evidently hoped again that Milosevic would cave quickly, but the dictator did the opposite: He stepped up his campaign of ethnic eradication in Kosovo. Milosevic apparently anticipates that he can survive whatever damage NATO bombs cause -- indeed, he's getting stronger as Serbs unify in anger at the bombings -- and can use the time to butcher and burn Kosovo clean of ethnic Albanians. If Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) is right and Clinton intends to keep bombing for "many weeks," that might give Milosevic the opportunity to decimate or drive out much of the Albanian population. Military experts almost unanimously agree that air power can't stop the atrocities in Kosovo except, conceivably, by causing so much pain in Serbia that Milosevic fears his country -- or, at least, his military -- will be reduced to cinders. But, as Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) pointed out last week in an interview, "We are not bombing the bejesus out of Serbia. They held a rock concert in downtown Belgrade the other day to show how unscared they are." NATO has stepped up bombing and ordered in more planes, but McCain says the allies need to attack Serbian bridges and power grids, as well as government offices and military headquarters -- risking the civilian casualties that Clinton wants to avoid. Without yet recommending introduction of ground forces in Kosovo, McCain argues that Clinton "should make it a credible threat" and stop ruling out use of U.S. forces. I hope Clinton's posture on ground troops is calculated: that he understands they may be needed to win but wants brutal events on the ground to make that need clear to a nervous American public. It's all too likely, though, that Clinton is resolute in his determination not to put U.S. ground forces into a Kosovo "quagmire" -- in which case he just may lose his confrontation with Milosevic. Two of the country's most esteemed foreign policy strategists, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, contend Clinton has no viable choice but to win his contest with Milosevic. "I don't think Clinton will be flaky on this," Brzezinski said this week. "He's put his presidency on the line. And this has become a test case of the international system the U.S. presumes to lead." Brzezinski favors low-level air strikes in Kosovo, risking pilot losses; arming Albanian guerrillas; and probably using ground forces to occupy Kosovo. Kissinger wrote in Newsweek that "when American forces are engaged in combat, victory is the only exit strategy." He thinks that ground forces may be necessary to win and "to maintain NATO credibility." Of course, there is an alternative to victory and undisguised defeat -- a disguised defeat. If Clinton decides he can't win and won't commit ground troops, he might agree to a cease-fire or "peace settlement" that leaves the Albanian population devastated and Milosevic in charge. So far, Clinton has rejected such a deal -- as he did when Russia's pro-Serb prime minister, Yevgeny Primakov, suggested a bombing halt as a prerequisite for talks. But Clinton might conceivably get desperate if prolonged bombing doesn't produce results and if public support for his military campaign -- currently about 55 percent positive in most polls -- begins to flag. Capitulation to Milosevic, however, would permanently disgrace Clinton anew. Not only is he the second U.S. president to be impeached, but he would also be the president who made the world safe for ethnic cleansing.