To: The Philosopher who wrote (2172 ) 4/6/1999 6:57:00 PM From: Paul Merriwether Respond to of 17770
How could Kosovo be partitioned? Serbia could keep a narrow swath of land along the province's northern, eastern and southern edges. That would allow Belgrade to retain sovereignty over most important Serb monasteries, churches, and other historic sites. Because it is located in central Kosovo, the famous Field of the Blackbirds, scene of the mythologized 1389 battle in which Serbian forces were defeated by invading Turks, would probably remain in ethnic Albanian hands. But Serbia can't have everything. The whole point of this intervention would be to drive Serbian forces out of the bulk of Kosovo and reclaim it for the ethnic Albanians. The Clinton administration objects to the idea of Kosovar independence, worrying about a secessionist domino effect that could hit Macedonia, Turkey, Hungary and other countries. But Serbia's extreme brutality toward the ethnic Albanians has deprived Belgrade of its legitimate claim to rule them. Moreover, it is a little late to worry about the precedent of allowing partition. The former Yugoslav republics of Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia have already gone their separate ways, and Bosnia has both gained independence and been partitioned all but in name. In fact, the administration could go even further, offering to revise the Dayton accords to allow the Serbian part of Bosnia to secede--provided that Mr. Milosevic lets the Kosovars, and if they so choose the Montenegrins, do the same. This operation would not require 200,000 NATO troops; 100,000 to 125,000 should suffice. That is roughly the number of military personnel that Serbia deploys. (Likewise, the U.S.-led coalition had rough numerical equality with Iraqi forces in Desert Storm.) A NATO force of that size would have superiority over Serbian units now in Kosovo, who now number 50,000 to 60,000. Serbia might reinforce them if NATO invaded, but it would probably keep some troops up north as a hedge against a NATO ground attack on Belgrade. All told, the U.S. would have to send only 50,000 to 75,000 troops to Kosovo. This approach may be too muscular for some and too soft for others. But it stands the best chance of ending the ethnic cleansing and saving Kosovar Albanian lives, without provoking staunch Serbian resistance on the battlefield or forcing NATO to keep large numbers of soldiers in an independent Kosovo for years. (Excerpted from the WSJ)