By Jonathan Eyal
The confrontation between
Yugoslavia and Nato is entering its
third week. Ostensibly, nothing has
changed: the Alliance will continue
the air campaign until President
Milosevic accepts its conditions.
In practice, however, the aims of the
war have been in a constant state of
flux and soon the West will witness
the biggest battle so far, at least on
the diplomatic front.
Nato claims that its strategy is working, and that
Milosevic's war machine is bleeding under its repeated
blows.
There is considerable evidence that
the Yugoslav military is now running
short of fuel because most of the
refineries have been damaged.
The destruction of four bridges over
the Danube has also created a
logistical nightmare for the government in Belgrade.
But almost all the other
indications suggest that
Yugoslavia will be able to
withstand air strikes for quite
some time yet, and the
weather above the Balkans
will get worse in the days to
come.
In short, Nato's military
strategy cannot be translated
into a political outcome. And Mr Milosevic, always the
resourceful leader, has muddied the waters even more in
recent days.
Assumptions proved wrong
It is now clear that Nato went into the war hobbled by
three major assumptions, all of which have been proven
wrong:
The Alliance believed that the Yugoslav military
will never risk a confrontation with the West and
that Milosevic will back down at the very last
moment. The result of this assumption was that
Nato hyped-up its threats but curiously did not
undertake the necessary preparations for carrying
them through.
Secondly, there was the vaguely racist belief that
the "little people" in the Balkans are no match for
Nato air power: drop a few bombs on these
"natives" in Yugoslavia and they will sue for
peace. The idea that Milosevic would simply
refuse to compromise and absorb the air strikes
was not seriously considered.
Finally, Nato was addressing two audiences at
the same time. While threatening Milosevic with a
military Armageddon, the same Alliance
commanders were reassuring public opinion in
the West that their operation would be "surgical"
and limited in scope.
The outcome was that the Yugoslav dictator knew
from the start the risks he was undertaking and
concluded that they were worth taking.
The story of the last two weeks is, essentially, one of
Nato trying to disentangle the knots which were of its
own making.
Air campaign 'phases' merged
The Alliance planned on
three distinct phases in the
air campaigns, gingerly
tailored to the political
circumstances. The first
phase entailed the
destruction of Yugoslavia's
air defences, to be followed
by strikes on Serb forces in
Kosovo and, finally, by a
more generalised
bombardment of military
targets throughout the
country.
The plan looked good on
paper but was basically irrelevant. Contrary to the
calculations of Western planners Milosevic did not
activate his air defence systems, thereby depriving Nato
of its ability to target radar and missile installations.
Meanwhile Milosevic not only
refused to negotiate, but
actually unleashed his
biggest offensive in Kosovo.
As a consequence, the three
phases of the air campaign
were quickly merged; a
strategy which was meant to
allow for a careful escalation of pressure on Yugoslavia
in order to produce a peace settlement became an aim
in itself.
In the process, the list of targets was progressively
enlarged and the distinction between civilian and military
objectives increasingly blurred.
Bridges and oil refineries joined airports and ammunition
dumps. And the temptation to enlarge the military
objectives even further grows every day, as the recent
dispute over the possible destruction of the Yugoslav
television stations indicates.
Shifting objectives
Meanwhile, Western politicians scrambled to adjust their
political aims to these shifting targets.
The operation was originally
justified as an attempt to
prevent a humanitarian
disaster in Europe.
When precisely this disaster
took place Nato feigned
surprise (despite the fact that
all the military intelligence
agencies predicted this
outcome months ago), and
committed itself to the return of the Albanian refugees.
In other words, the purpose of the operation shifted from
one of preventing a disaster to one of reversing its
consequences.
The Alliance remained committed to the original peace
plan offered earlier this year, which promised the
Albanians a mere autonomy within Yugoslavia.
It knew that once the fighting started this plan was dead,
but Nato still cannot commit itself to outright
independence for Kosovo, since this will annoy other
Balkan countries.
So the West is stuck somewhere in the middle: Kosovo
will not necessarily be independent, but it will have
something more than just an autonomy.
Furthermore, it quickly became clear that air power
alone will not dislodge the Yugoslav forces from Kosovo.
But no Western government is yet willing to commit
forces for a ground offensive.
Yet again, the Alliance fudged the issue: it is now
bolstering its ground forces under the guise of protecting
refugees in the neighbouring states.
Two weeks after the "precise" and "surgical" air
operation began we are witnessing a war which is partly
on the ground and partly in the air, conducted by an
alliance which is complaining when Mr Milosevic evicts
his people but is also uneasy when he prevents the
departure of refugees.
What Nato wants
Nevertheless, the fog of war will be dispelled soon, for
the confrontation is now switching yet again to the
diplomatic front.
The question is what
precisely Nato wants, and
what offer from Milosevic will
be considered genuine and
substantial enough in order
to warrant even a temporary
cessation of hostilities.
The simple answer is that
Nato does not have an
answer; much will depend on when the offer for a
settlement comes, but also how it is packaged.
The Alliance has to take into account a whole host of
political and strategic constraints. The horrific pictures
from Kosovo have increased public demands to identify
Milosevic as a suspected war criminal.
Governments have resisted this temptation partly
because they have doubts about the legal basis for
identifying a head of state which is still a member of the
United Nations as a war criminal, and partly because
they suspect that they may yet have to deal with
Milosevic across a negotiating table.
However, if the violence continues the pressure to indict
the Yugoslav leader may become irresistible.
Just as importantly, the
Alliance has to bear in mind
the fact that, the moment air
strikes are suspended, even
on a temporary basis, it
would be very difficult to
restart them.
The doubts about the
efficiency of air strikes will
intensify and Nato will not be
able to avoid a debate in the
UN Security Council about
the mandate for the operation.
In presentational terms, therefore, the Alliance must be
sure that when it does consent to sit down for talks with
Milosevic these talks will result in a settlement which
can be safely presented as a Western triumph, and
which can offer reasonable guarantees that air strikes
will no longer be needed.
Original demands 'irrelevant'
But, even assuming that these political hurdles are met,
what precisely will the Alliance demand from
Yugoslavia?
Officially, the conditions for a settlement have not
changed:
Milosevic must accept a complete withdrawal of
his forces from the province
The return of all refugees
An autonomy for the province of Kosovo and the
presence of an international force designed to
police the deal for a number of years.
In practice, however, all Nato military planners know that
these claims are basically irrelevant. There is no chance
that Milosevic will simply accept all these conditions at
the same time; this is tantamount to asking him to
commit suicide.
And the idea that the Kosovo Albanians would ever
consent to return home in exchange for a promise of
autonomy within the country whose government has tried
to murder them wholesale is plainly idiotic.
But the Alliance is stuck with this package mainly
because it cannot admit openly that the final outcome is
an independent Kosovo, since this could upset most of
the other countries in the Balkans.
Nato's new negotiating tactics
In order to avoid a stalemate, Nato is now tilting towards
a new negotiating stance.
It is based on what may be
called "front-loading":
demanding from Milosevic
acceptance of enough
conditions even before the
serious peace negotiations
begin, in order to make sure
that, whatever happens, the
Alliance will gain a foothold
with its ground troops in
Kosovo, and therefore retain
the initiative.
The shift in Brussels is unmistakable. The return of
refugees under the protection of Western forces is now
the minimum precondition. According to Alliance
spokesmen this can take place irrespective of whether a
peace treaty has been signed.
The essential element is that this return of refugees will
take place under Western military supervision, a nicer
way of saying that Milosevic has to agree to the
introduction of Nato troops on his territory even before
the negotiations begin.
If Yugoslavia agrees, the air strikes will stop the moment
the first convoys of Western forces cross the frontier. If
not, almost anything else Milosevic may offer will be
rejected as mere window-dressing.
Milosevic's strategy
Milosevic also has a strategy which he has started to
unveil. The Yugoslav ruler has basically achieved his
most immediate aims.
The Kosovo Liberation Army is destroyed, and at least a
quarter of the local Albanian population has been
ejected.
His tactic now is to remove
the justification for continuing
air attacks without having to
attend any peace
conference. The closure of
the frontiers, coupled with the
unilateral ceasefire and the
offer to return the captured
US soldiers are all part of
this charm offensive.
Milosevic knows that if Nato
stops the air strikes these
will not be restarted.
For the moment, Nato is continuing its operations
unabated. But Western governments know that this is
not a long-term solution either, because Milosevic still
has a few tricks up his sleeve.
The hundreds of thousands of internally displaced
Albanians, currently trapped in Kosovo, require food and
assistance. Public pressure will soon mount to introduce
aid workers into the province in order to render this
assistance.
Milosevic will be very happy to accept these
humanitarian workers, in the sure knowledge that the
West will be faced with a horrible dilemma of either
ignoring the plight of the Albanians, or stopping the
bombing, probably permanently.
There is still the remote possibility that Milosevic's
regime will collapse from within. But, one way or
another, the next week will witness the start of a very
different situation, one in which Nato either moves to an
all-out war against the Yugoslav state, or tacitly accepts
that it was check-mated, yet again, by the Balkan
arch-manipulator.
All wars begin with clear intentions, carefully-planned
strategies and widespread public support. And all end
with quite different outcomes.
Jonathan Eyal is Director of Studies at the Royal United
Services Institute in London
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