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To: Henry Volquardsen who wrote (1486)4/27/1999 11:31:00 AM
From: Chip McVickar  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 3536
 
Henry,

Will be interesting to see how Rubin's concerns play out...?

Rubin: Global Economic Risks Remain

By MARTIN CRUTSINGER
.c The Associated Press

WASHINGTON (AP) -- One day after the United States failed to achieve solid commitments from Europe and Japan to boost growth, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin used his bluntest language yet to warn that the world could face severe risks if major countries do not carry out their responsibilities.

Rubin noted that America's trade deficit has soared to record levels as a result of nearly two years of global turmoil while Japan's trade surplus has actually increased and Europe's trade balance has been essentially unchanged.

''The United States has borne the bulk of the burden of the global current-account adjustment in response to the Asian crisis,'' Rubin said.

''This situation cannot continue indefinitely. Japan and Europe must boost domestic demand-led growth,'' Rubin said in a speech at the opening of discussions among world finance ministers who sit on the steering committee for the 182-nation International Monetary Fund.

Noting that economic growth has flagged in Europe in recent months, Rubin said, ''It is important that Europe redouble its efforts to increase domestic demand-led growth.''

And for Japan, which is mired in its worst recession in 50 years, Rubin was even more blunt, saying that growth prospects and the threat of deflation ''remain a source for concern.''

With the United States the only region of the world exhibiting strong growth, Rubin said, ''The balance of risks for the global economy remain on the downside.''

Rubin's comments highlighted growing unease within the administration about the need for America's major allies to do much more to boost growth to serve as an alternative market for exports by crisis-stricken countries.

While the overall U.S. economy is doing well with unemployment at a three-decade low, America's trade deficit hit a record $169 billion last year, and is projected to rise even further in 1999. More than 300,000 manufacturing jobs have been lost and American farmers, who export one-third of their production, are suffering their worst times in a decade.

After several hours of closed-door discussions Monday, the world's seven richest countries -- the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Britain, Italy and Canada -- issued an eight-page statement pledging to pursue a growth strategy that will reduce growing trade imbalances.

They also pledged to bolster recoveries from recessions in countries whose economies have been leveled by the currency crisis, but they notably did not specify how they will achieve these goals of greater growth.

Canadian Finance Minister Paul Martin expressed concerns, saying that the global recovery remains too fragile to provide ''any grounds for complacency.''

But underscoring the private disagreements among the major powers, Japanese Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, a former prime minister of Japan, immediately sought to play down expectations that the G-7 statement signaled that Japan was willing to do any more than it already has to jump-start its ailing economy.

While the statement referred to Japan ''using all available tools to support strong domestic demand-led growth,'' Miyazawa said that meant only that Japan should ''do its best,'' not that Japan should ''do something new.''

The eight-page G-7 communique touched on a number of issues facing the global economy, including the need for countries devastated by a steep plunge in currency values and ensuing recessions to continue efforts to overhaul weak banking systems and deal with other economic problems, all topics that were being reviewed today in the broader IMF meetings.

The IMF on Sunday approved a major U.S. initiative to change the way the fund makes loans that will allow it to provide billions of dollars in support to countries that are pursuing sound policies before they are hit by financial turbulence.

The new contingency line of credits will allow nations to use IMF reserves to bolster their own resources to fend off attacks by currency speculators.

IMF officials were also in negotiations with Russia, one of the victims of the turmoil, and Russian Finance Minister Mikhail Zadornov told reporters Monday that he had a ''good feeling'' the IMF would soon agree to resume lending to his country. Russia has said it needs at least $4.5 billion in loans this year just to meet past commitments to the IMF.

AP-NY-04-27-99 1037EDT



To: Henry Volquardsen who wrote (1486)5/13/1999 7:48:00 AM
From: Chip McVickar  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 3536
 
Henry,

Some interesting correlations and insights into Japans continuing financial restructuring.
"The Postal Savings Fund is now insolvent...."
"The near-term trend continues to warn that the yen will rise sharply to new highs against the Euro."

The Japan Contraction
By Martin A. Armstrong
Princeton Economic Institute
© Copyright April 15th, 1999

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Fiscal year-end has now come and gone and the dark clouds that have plagued Japan are also refusing to go away. April 1st has marked yet another milestone in the ongoing process of Japanese Big Bang and the impact upon the global economy is still silently pressing forward. The most significant factor that has now entered the scene comes in the form of "consolidated" accounting requirements ahead of next year's mark-to-mark. The consolidated reporting is already starting to make its presence felt as institutions and corporates in Japan must now reveal all entities on one balance sheet. The hidden losses in offshore subsidiaries, like that of Yamaichi, will soon be on a mark-to-market basis. This is causing some pressure to liquidate overseas assets to simplify the accounting. Nonetheless, the coming mark-to-market system is also having an impact upon institutions that have taken sizable losses in overseas bond markets due to recent foreign exchange fluctuations.

Some of the Japanese big life insurance companies will substantially decrease new investments in foreign bonds. For the current fiscal year, the life companies have put their top priority on "safety" admitting their inability to manage foreign exchange risk. The Japanese big life insurance companies are planning to decrease new investment in foreign bonds include Nippon Life, Daiichi Life, Sumitomo Life, Meiji Life and Asahi Life. According to their press announcements, the total amount of increase in their investment into foreign bonds will be only about JPY90 billion (US$7.5 billion), which is HALF of the new investment program set up at the beginning of fiscal 1998 term.

The inability to offer professional global funds management by the life companies in Japan is starting to impact the own ability to attract funds in Japan, to some extent, thanks to Big Bang. Raising the white flag, the life companies will shift the weight of fund management into products such as domestic bonds, where there is no foreign exchange risk while accepting a lower credit rating. Of the big five life insurance companies, their budget for foreign bond investment during the previous fiscal year was established at JPY1,800 billion (US$15 billion). Thanks to the Russian Crisis and the hedge fund panic liquidation of the dollar that drove the yen sharply higher, the actual amount of intended investment fell short of that budget coming in at only JPY1,500 billion for foreign bonds. Those markets most likely to come under the most pressure are Euro, Canada and Australia. The collapse in the Euro has marked this new currency as the worst performing bond from the Japanese perspective. Of the foreign bond investments, the US dollar will still remain as the bulk of overseas investment for most Japanese institutions.

While the net effect of this change in policy on the part of the Japanese Life Companies does NOT constitute a capital repatriation, it does warn that the volatility in general is now starting to introduce huge risk even for basic bond markets. A continued rise in overall volatility will raise the risk SUBSTANTIALLY for a MAJOR capital investment contraction over the next two years. This is starting to provide a precursor of warning that despite optimists on Wall Street, it is simply impossible to expect that there will be no recession whatsoever for the next three years. The warning signs are starting to appear on the horizon and they are not tidings of utopia forever. There is NO WAY we can avoid a recession as capital begins to pause and take notice of the increasing volatility.

Recent pressure downward on the dollar via the yen is also being caused to some degree by the liquidation of overseas assets by Japanese brokerage houses. Rumors prevail that Nomura is about to dump ALL its British Real Estate holdings to Buffett in a deal that could be in the amount of US$6 billion. This rumor alone has had some negative impact upon sterling. Japanese banks continue to remain in a contracting mode as the close down overseas operations because BIS (Bank International Settlements) requirements call for 8% reserves compared to 4% for domestic assets. The insane and stupid regulations from the BIS are also causing a natural contraction in global economic activity – another precursor to a recession.

The Japanese brokers are under SEVERE pressure also due to changes in Big Bang that introduced the "segregated account" system as of April 1st, 1999. Previously, client's money in Japan was commingled and brokers could borrow from those funds if they chose. However, the adoption of the segregated account system may on the surface appear to be an excellent reform, it still has the mad touch of bureaucratic bumbling.

The new Japanese segregated account system is perhaps the most bearish development we have ever seen for a share market. If a client opens an account, then funds are placed in a trust bank under the new segregated account system. The broker must then use his own capital for margin requirements. If the broker executes a trade through another broker, he must then place margin with the counter-party brokerage firm. In turn, the counter-party must place that margin in another segregated account and post his own capital. The net effect of the Japanese version of a segregated account is in reality making margin business extremely expensive and high risk to any broker. Combine this trend with the trouble in the banking system where credit facilities have been curtailed to all brokers, and the net effect is anything but bullish. While the Nikkei has been quite strong, the buying is coming from overseas while domestic investors are taking advantage of the liquidation opportunity.

The banking crisis continues to spread, while at the same time there is no panic – at least for now. If a panic comes in Japan over the banks, it will not materialize until late 2000 going into early 2001. The reason for such a delay remains the steadfast political guarantee attached to all deposits in a bank right down to a credit union. However, the final phase of Big Bang for April 2001 includes the introduction of a maximum guarantee of only $100,000 similar to the US system. This will have severe implications for the Japanese banks as they will have to face even massive corporate withdrawals. Can companies like Toyota continue to maintain cash deposits of $15 billion within the banking system if they are no longer insured? The same question will be faced by everyone, right down to the housewife. No matter how bad things get in the short-term, a banking panic does not appear to be likely until 2001.

The deregulation of capital investment into mutual fund type products has had less success than initially expected following December 1st of last year. At first, there was a very nice surge of capital rushing into all sorts of foreign fund products involving some of the big names here in the United States. However, the big mutual fund houses in the US have had NO experience in managing investments other than mere dollar funds. They all arrived in Japan with much fanfare but their performance has been an average loss in excess of 20% since their launch. An investor now peers at the listing of fund products in the newspaper and is immediately struck by the sizable losses for about 98% of all products. The problem has been the currency and the lack of professional management in this area. Buying stocks in the US in dollars may look good as the indexes have boomed, but they have not overcome the losses in the value of the dollar against the yen.

The prospect of the coming introduction of the 401K retirement account in Japan as yet another phase of Big Bang still leaves the opportunity for a massive outflow of investment capital in the years ahead. The start, however, has been dampened by the panic selling of dollars by the hedge funds that in turn has created FX losses in just about every sector of the Japanese economy. The strong yen merely perpetuates the deflation and blocks any recovery from taking hold on a sustainable basis. Without a dollar rally back to 130+, the outlook gets worse for Japanese earnings, which translates into rising unemployment and continued pressure upon public confidence. The introduction of the 401K plan in Japan is also likely to cause a drain in capital from the life companies, pension funds and the Postal Savings System and this implies further reductions ahead in professional fund allocations as the decision process shifts toward the individual.

The first quarter GDP numbers for Japan are also at serious risk of showing a further economic contraction. In fact, the first quarter numbers may yet spill over into the second quarter as serious damage has been caused by the government. The Japanese government placed a great deal of pressure upon the banks to write down their bad loans and to meet the BIS requirements. The banks in turn called in loans on the good clients demanding that they "zero out" their loans for March 31st. What we saw going into March was the worst credit crunch perhaps in history. The net effect was significant as corporates scrambled to pay off loans while postponing any spending as much as possible. This has had a sharp contractionary impact short-term upon the Japanese economic as a whole.

To make matters worse, the western press has done perhaps the WORST job of reporting the facts on Japan we have ever seen. The entire issue with the JGB market is a key point. The western press reported that the government was no longer going to support the JGB market and that they only later, following the crash, reversed that decision. The truth lies directly between these two stories. It was the Postal Savings Fund that was used to support the JGB market and just about everything else. Instead of the government using its own cash, it used the deposits of its citizens. The Postal Savings Fund is now insolvent and this is why it backed away from supporting the JGBs. The decision to support the JGBs again involved the Bank of Japan – not the Postal Saving Fund. The entity that supported the JGBs changed! The problem now faced is that the financial minister testified before the Diet that the government would need to come up with the shortfall of cash for next year when redemptions in the Postal Savings Fund come due. In reality, the largest single fund in the world is now insolvent thanks to a failed government policy of intervention.

The next issue of critical importance remains the unwinding of the political crossholdings of shares between banks and corporates. The root cause of the financial troubles in Japan remain the banking crisis. Americans learned this hard lesson during the Great Depression. Banks MUST be prohibited from becoming investors within the economy. The purpose of a bank is to provide credit to the economy – not compete against it. When banks are shareholders and the share market declines, banks lose money along with everyone else. As this process unfolds, banks begin to curtail lending. The more lending contracts, the greater the economic contraction causing the share market to decline even further. This process feeds upon itself and creates a vortex that spirals downward. For this reason, the true recovery will not begin until the cross-holdings have been liquidated. The good news is that everyone admits this fact and the liquidation process in now underway, but again it will take two years.

The near-term trend continues to warn that the yen will rise sharply to new highs against the Euro. Against the dollar, the major resistance stands at the 124 level and breakout above that area will spark a jump to 130. While our long-term models still point to the dollar rising against the yen reaching even 200 as the government is forced to increase the supply of yen dramatically, the contraction unleashed by the new consolidated accounting rules can cause one more dollar decline back to 112-113. The key support continues to lie in the mid 116 zone and only a break of that area would call for such a decline to 112-113 before a reversal in trend back to the upside.

There is little doubt that the long-term prospects for Japan remain very bright. The problems we see are structural in nature but largely short-term and will be resolved over the next two years. Thereafter, the 2002-2007 period appears to be a very strong economic recovery with the Nikkei most likely scoring new record highs in the process.




To: Henry Volquardsen who wrote (1486)5/13/1999 9:41:00 AM
From: Chip McVickar  Respond to of 3536
 
Henry and Thread,

Here's the latest from Mosley

THE SKEPTICAL INVESTOR
Issue No. 18 April 1999
MORECAMBE, England. 30.IV.1999

The first quarter of calendar 1999 saw confidence return to financial markets around the world. Most key stockmarket indices realized gains, some substantial, and the major indices in the USA and the UK have even gone on to all-time record highs. The junk bond market too, which collapsed after the Russian default last August, started to show signs of life, whilst the market for high grade bonds, which had benefited from the same financial chaos - the yield on the US 30-year Treasury fell to its lowest ever last year - suffered a fairly nasty bear market as yield rose off their lows.

This happened despite that fact that the fundamentals almost everywhere remain weak, and may even be deteriorating. So what is going on?

First it can be said that much of the move was initiaally nothing more than a reaction - a bounce back from temporarily extreme levels. With memories of the sequential series of financial upheavals in Asia still fresh, there were widespread expectations thaat something similar - or worse - was going to occur following the events in Russia and Latin America. But then, when nothing much further did happen, fears of a global slump receeded and markets bounced back. Such a response is a perfectly normal short-term technical response which, by itself, does not in any way demonstrate a new trend leading to economic growth and recovery. That indeed is how I interpreted it in the last Issue (when I suggested that the Toronto Stock Exchange Index might be a better surrogate for North America than Wall Street).

But it has subsequently become increasingly evident that financial markets have moved well beyond this technical rebound and are now reflecting a widespread belief that the international financial crisis is waning and recovery is underway.

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"The financial crisis that engulfed most of the world's emerging maarket economies . . . 'Seems to be over.', Michel Camdessus, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, said yesterday." (Financial Times, 26 April 1999).

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The stockmarkets of Japan and South Korea for example must be anticipating this, and most telling is the reappearance of demand for high-yield debt. We are seeing not only the recovery of the US and European junk bond markets but also renewed interest in the debt of emerging economies - an unmistakable sign of the perception that risk is fast disappearing there.
This is the most difficult global marketplace to call since The Skeptical Investor was launched in June 1997. Regular readers will know that it has been possible to predict the evolution of the crisis with a great deal of success for almost two years now, but this is the first time that I can seriously entertain the possibility that we may have seen the bottom. This is not because the financial weaknesses that caused the problem in the first plaace haave gone away - they haaave not - but they were there for a long time beforee 1997 too. Given enough BELIEVERS that it is all over, there can be a returrn of confidence, of business investment and consumer demand. The day of reckoning may be put off again.

But will it? As usual, the best I can do is to begin with the FACTS and see where they look to lead us.

DEBT AND CREDIT
The root cause of the crisis is financial: the economic effects that we have seen are only the consequences. It is the result of too much debt. Debt that cannot, ultimately, all be paid off. (Economists prefer to talk about "excess credit" which sounds better than "too much debt" I suppose.)
Astonishingly, this underlying problem is getting worse. There are positive signs in, for example, Thailand where the banks's ratio of non-performing loans has improved, but that is not what you see when you look at the big picture. According to top credit rating agency Standard and Poor's, as reported by the Financial Times on April 2oth " More and more of the world's financial systems are weakening in the face of excessive credit growth and falling asset prices . . . Credit quality is deteriorating in 24 of 611 countries monitored since its last report on financial system stress in October."

ECONOMIES
1. ASIA
The Asian Development Bank forecasts 4.4% growth across developing Asia in 1999. In Japan, the Ministry of Finance forecasts a return to growth (0.5% p.a.) during the current fiscal year. But the track record of formal economic forecasting is dismal. I find both forecasts dubious.
In JAPAN, the stockmarket is rising. The Nikkei Dow Index has recovered from below 13000 last year to above 17000.

But there is no convincing evidence yet that the economy is starting to turn around. The most recent fiscal quarter saw a further decline in GDP, the fifth consequtive quarter of contraction.

There is one item of economic news which might turn out to be presaging the first glimmer of recovery: a small increase in domestic demand. Domestic demand growth is the essential requirement for economic recovery because Japan cannot rely on an export-led recovery during the present global slowdown, and this is thus a crucial number to watch. Unfortunately the observed blip may be nothing more than that - a blip - because it is a normal phenomenon during a long recession for a period of increased demand from consumers who have put off essential purchases for as long as they can: we must await the emergence of a trend before putting any weight on these data.

If domestic demand fails to pick up and fades again, then the outlook for the economy is bleak indeed. This is because the government has already used up its options. Let me explain. The focus of Japanese strategy has been to engineer a recovery by attempting to stimulate domestic demand by massive programmes of deficit spending (make-work projects, tax cuts, etc.) and through interest rate cuts. It is difficult to visualize any more being done along these lines. The existing massive budget deficit is already unsustainable over time and any further increase risks - with justification - panicking the markets. Interest rates are already almost at zero. This pessimisstic view appears to be supported at least in part by the usually inscutable deputy governor of the Bank of Japan, Yutaka Yamaguchi, who, in a rare recent interview was quoted as saying that with interest rates almost at zero " . . . there is a limit to what (more) monetary policy can do." Little more than a truism perhaps, but that fact that he felt the need to make the point is significant.

These fiscal and monetary measures are mostly classic Keynesian. I have argued vigorously and consistently that both reason and the lessons of history make a nonsense of this Keynesian economic theory. Therefor I do not expect to see a sustained recovery of economic demand immediately ahead.

I have also argued thaat the only cure for a deflationary recession such as Japan's is an economic clean sweep. The deadwood and bad debts must be cleared out. That means corporate failures, bankruptcies, unemployment, the disapperance of unsound financial institutions, the large-scale repudiation of debt - in short, aa hard landing with a lot of pain.

It is ironic that just at the time that the rest of the world starts to think that Asia is in recovery, there are signs that an appreciation that a hard landing may be the reality are appearing in Japan itself. In the same newspaper article that quoted Yamaguchi, the Financial Times reported that " In recent weeks some bureaucrats appear to have finally accepted that Japan cannot stave off restructuring with majic wands. Instead, they mutter, it would be better to have a hard landing and use the shock to push through structural chaange." (7th April 1999)

So, what about SOUTH KOREA? A major economy, and one that with the best performing stock market last year ought to be the one nation where we can find justification in the fundamentals for equity valuations. The government there has taken rather more credible action to clean up the mess in the financial serices sector, action that was clearly necessary. Necessary, but not sufficient though because the rest of the economy remains weak. Few corporations aand chaebol have done any significant cost cutting and rstructuring and, accordingly, many professional equity anaalysts believe thaat current valuations are out of line with the fundamentals.

THAILAND was of course as everyone knows the first country to go into crisis. Whilst the dynamics have changed and it cannot be expected that what happens there will continue to trigger similar events elsewhere, it can offer us a nice illustrative example of what may or can happen.

In the October 1997 Skeptical Investor I talked about Thailand's bail-out agreement with the International Monetary Fund and whether they would stick to the conditions they had accepted. My conclusion - "They won't." It took a long time. But they didn't. Last year Thailand abandoned the agreed high interest rate policy, and began to dilute other measures. All pretence of following the original terms was abandoned when on 30th March this year (1999), Thailand announced a Bt130 billion package of government spending and tax cuts. I expect these policies to work as well as similar methods have worked in Japan. Such policies do not promise a quick end to the crisis.

2. EUROPE
The major EURO-ZONE economies (Germany, which accounts for 33% of the euro-zone GDP, France - 22% - , and Italy - 18%) show weak or declining growth. There is even some price deflation in Germany: inflation is almost non-existent in the region as a whole (0.8%). Unemployment stands at 10.5%.

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" . . . growth has collapsed. Domestic demand is sickly. Across much of the European economy, business confidence and investment are terribly weak." (Financial Times, 10th April 1999).

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On 8th April, despite the weakness of the euro, the European Central Bank reduced the euro interest rate by an unexpectedly large 50 b.p. to 2.5% from 3.0%. Statements made at the time by officials made it clear that this action was taken because of weakening economic conditions in an effort to stimulate growth. Interestingly it was also made clear that lower rates, by theemselves, will not boost growth. I wholeheartedly agree! In view of the fact that the other necessary conditions aare not present, the outlook for the economy iss not rosy.
EASTERN EUROPE (including RUSSIA) is in worse shaape. Regional GDP fell by 11.3% last year, aand isss forecast to continue to shrink in 1999.

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"The Russian economic crisis is haaving a more serious effect on conditions in the former Communist bloc than was expected when the upheaval began last summer." (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Report.)

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The UNITED KINGDOM is performing much better than any other major European economy. Expectations here are for, at worst, a short mild recession, and business confidence actually rose sharply in 1Q99. GDP grew at 0.7% p.a. in the same quarter. The UK however is mirroring the US in most ways - a strong currency, an overvalued stock market, even to the extent of a deteriorating trade balance of payments - and for our purposes is best viewed analytically with the United States. In the global economic picture the UK economy is a satellite of the US economy.

3. UNITED STATES.
America ccontinues its astounding vigorous non-inflationary economic growth. GDP grew at 6.1% p.a. in 4Q98 - in the face of a global slowdown.
But the US stockmarket bubble remains, and is getting worse. According to IBES International, the S&P 500 ended February overvalued by 25%. The only previous time that it reached such a level was during the two months leading up to the 1987 crash. And the market is getting more narrowly based: as the DJIA went through 10,000 only one third of the stocks listed on the NYSE were trading above their 200-day moving average. I believe that there is no precedent for a major stock market to broaden out again once it has narrowed until there has been a significant fall in the leading stocks.

I continue to firmly believe that there is no New Era. The US market is a bubble that threatens the entire US - and the world - economy.

CONCLUSIONS.
The recovery in global financial markets is not supported by either the economic or the financial fundamentals. Nor is there much evidence, except for the special cases of the USA and the UK, that it is accompanied by a recovery in business confidence. It has so far been essentially only a recovery in investor confidence.
Hence the underpinnings remain fragile, and markets and economies ever where remain vulnerable to any new financiaal shock.

Were it not for the situation on Wall Street, I might now be leaning towards a scenario of recovery in business confidence and investment, with the ultimately inevitable "Great Reckoning" put off to some future time. But the Wall Street Sword of Damocles hangs there: and the rest of the world remains too vulneraable to withstand a market crash in America.

My favoured scenario now is that the last act of the unfolding drama will be exactly this - a Wall Street crash. Followed by the obvious effects on the rest of the world.

But, and this is important for anyone thinking about shorting the market to remember, there is no way to tell how long all this can go on before that happens.

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copyright© 1999 Max Moseley, The Skeptical Investor® All Rights Reserved.