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Pastimes : Kosovo -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: robnhood who wrote (5257)4/23/1999 8:04:00 PM
From: George Papadopoulos  Respond to of 17770
 
(House of Representatives - April 15, 1999)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman
from California (Mr. Cunningham) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. Duke Cunningham Mr. Speaker, I want to give some perspective on an issue
that is, I think, very near and dear to every American's heart, as it is in
Kosovo today also.

I would like to give the Speaker a little perspective. First of all,
according to Henry Kissinger, and I agree, Rambouillet was a very poor
foreign policy. It was an agreement only between Albania and the United
States in which the United States knew, in no uncertain terms, that Serbia
would never give up Kosovo itself. Any history student would know that.

We have spent $16 billion in Bosnia to date; Somalia cost us billions of
dollars; Haiti cost us billions; $4 billion times the four strikes in Iraq,
the Sudan, Afghanistan. Our troops are deploying 300 percent above the
highest level in Vietnam but yet we are doing it with about half the force.
Enlisted retention in our own military is below 23 percent; pilots, 30
percent.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff said we are $150 billion short. We cannot buy
spare parts. We do not even have basic bullets. Top gun, 14 of 23 aircraft
are down; 18 for engines; 137, parts.

Kosovo, and this is according to General Clark, I was with General Clark
just days ago and I said I want to know how many sorties the United States
is flying. Mr. Speaker, General Clark said, and this is accurate to the
sortie, 75 percent of all strikes in Kosovo are being flown by the United
States. That does not include the B-2s, the tankers, the support aircraft
like C-17s and C-130s. That brings it up to 82 percent.

We are dropping 90 percent of all the weapons, so we are paying for over 90
percent. That does not even include our ships. That does not include our
manpower over there. My point is that it should be the other way around.

The reason given by General Clark is that other nations do not have the
stand-off capability that we do so we are having to fly 90 percent of this
stuff, 82 percent of it and 90 percent of the ordnance.

My point is that the supplemental that we are going to ask for, if NATO is a
fair share organization,

then NATO ought to pay the United States between $10 and $20 billion for our
supplemental and not come out of our taxpayers' dollars.

Let me give you another perspective. Before the bombing in Kosovo, there
were only 2,000 deaths. Each death is important, but in perspective there
were only 2,000 deaths attributed in Kosovo that whole year. One-third were
Serbs and other nationalities besides the Albanians, but after the bombing
look at the number of deaths. We have just killed 70 Albanians in a convoy
trying to get out of Kosovo. NATO has killed 70 Albanians in an air strike.
Look at the million refugees that these air strikes have caused that would
not be there unless we had bombed Kosovo.

The Croatians executed 10,000 Serbs in 1995 in Croatia. They deported and
fled over 250,000 Serbs as refugees. Indonesia has killed millions; Turkey,
thousands; India with the Sikhs; China, thousands with Tibet. Yet, we are in
a mass war where there is less than 2,000 deaths, and over a third of those
by the people we are claiming to bomb.

The Pentagon, confirmed by Secretary Cohen, that the Pentagon did not want
to execute just air strikes. The Pentagon told the President that they would
not work alone, that they would exacerbate the problems, cause refugees,
kill a lot of people. The United States would have to pay for a lot of it
and unless we put ground troops in there the goals were not attainable. Yet,
the President says no ground troops, which I am opposed to also.

Why is he opposed to it? Because the Germans balked, the Italians balked. In
World War II, Germany had 700,000 troops in Kosovo. The Chechens, with one
half the force that Milosevic has, killed those Germans. General Shelton
just 2 days ago said that this is the easiest place to defend and the most
difficult to attack in the world.

We do not belong there, Mr. Speaker. This is Clinton's war. Clinton ought to
get out of it.




To: robnhood who wrote (5257)4/23/1999 8:09:00 PM
From: George Papadopoulos  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 17770
 
Just passing along something about my favourite sadistic war criminal
---------------

NATO's Wesley Clark is not the Iron Duke, nor is he Stormin' Norman. Unlike
Wellington and Schwarzkopf, Clark's not a muddy boots soldier. He's a
military politician, without the right stuff to produce victory over Serbia.

Known by those who've served with him as the "Ultimate Perfumed Prince,"
he's far more comfortable in a drawing room discussing political theories
than hunkering down in the trenches where bullets fly and soldiers die. An
intellectual in warrior's gear.

A saying attributed to General George Patton was that it took 10 years with
troops alone before an officer knew how to empty a bucket of spit. As a
serving soldier with 33 years of active duty under his pistol belt, Clark's
commanded combat units -- rifle platoon to tank division -- for only seven
years. The rest of his career's been spent as an aide, an executive, a
student, a teacher and a staff weenie.

Very much like generals Maxwell Taylor and William Westmoreland, the
architect and carpenter of the Vietnam disaster, Clark was earmarked and
then groomed early in his career for big things. At West Point he graduated
No. 1 in his class, and even though the Vietnam War was raging and chewing
up lieutenants faster than a machine gun can spit death, he was seconded to
Oxford for two years of contemplating instead of to the trenches to lead a
platoon.

A year after graduating Oxford, he was sent to Vietnam, where, as a combat
leader for several months, he was bloodied and muddied. Unlike most of his
classmates, who did multiple combat tours in the killing fields of Southeast
Asia, he spent the rest of the war sheltered in the ivy towers of West Point
or learning power games first hand as a White House fellow.

The war with Serbia has been going full tilt for almost a month and Clark's
NATO is like a giant standing on a concrete pad wielding a sledgehammer
crushing Serbian ants. Yet, with all its awesome might, NATO hasn't won a
round. Instead, Milosevic is still calling all the shots from his Belgrade
bunker, and all that's left for Clark is to react.

Milosevic plays the fiddle and Clark dances the jig. 'Stormin' Norman or any
good infantry sergeant major would have told Clark that conventional air
power alone could never win a war -- it must be accompanied by boots on the
ground.

German air power didn't beat Britain. Allied air power didn't beat Germany.
More air power than was used against the Japanese and Germans combined
didn't win in Vietnam. Forty-three days of pummeling in the open desert
where there was no place to hide didn't KO Saddam. That fight ended only
when Schwarzkopf unleashed the steel ground fist he'd carefully positioned
before the first bomb fell.

Doing military things exactly backwards, the scholar general is now,
according to a high ranking Pentagon source, in "total panic mode" as he
tries to mass the air and ground forces he finally figured out he needs to
win the initiative. Mass is a principle of war. Clark has violated this rule
along with the other eight vital principles. Any mud soldier will tell you
if you don't follow the principles of war you lose.

One of the salient reasons Wellington whipped Napoleon in 1815 at Waterloo
was that the Corsican piecemealed his forces. Clark's done the same thing
with his air power. He started with leisurely pinpricks and now is
attempting to increase the pain against an opponent with an almost unlimited
threshold. Similar gradualism was one of the reasons for defeat in Vietnam.

Another mistake Clark's made is not knowing his enemy. Taylor and
Westmoreland made this same error in Vietnam. Like the Vietnamese, the Serbs
are fanatic warriors who know better than to fight conventionally in open
formations. They'll use the rugged terrain and bomber bad weather to conduct
the guerrilla operations they've been preparing for over 50 years. And
they're damn good at partisan warfare. Just ask any German 70 years or older
if a fight in Serbia will be another Desert Storm.

It's the smart general who knows when to retreat. If Clark lets pride stand
in the way of military judgment, expect a long and bloody war.