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Pastimes : Kosovo -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: goldsnow who wrote (5638)4/27/1999 7:29:00 PM
From: George Papadopoulos  Respond to of 17770
 
Yaacov this is especially for you, you will probably masturbate over something like this...

The Guardian(London)

Consigning their future to death George Monbiot warns that bombing
Belgrade's chemical plants will poison the unborn

Thursday April 22, 1999

The Nato commanders trying to explain what happened to the refugee convoy
they bombed sounded rather like the police at the Stephen Lawrence enquiry.
They did their utmost to appear contrite, without actually apologising.
Sorry, for the guardians of law and order, always seems to be the hardest
word.

But even as the alliance tied itself in circumlocutory knots, it continued
to engage in the slaughter of non-combatants. Slowly, largely silently, it
is killing thousands of civilians. They are being neither bombed nor shot:
the people of the former Yugoslavia are being poisoned.

Nato's immediate war aim is to destroy the Serb economy, in order to
restrict Milosevic's capacity either to attack the Kosovan Albanians or to
retaliate against Nato troops. This may or may not be working. But whatever
its impact on the Yugoslav Republic's economy might be, Nato is succeeding
in wiping out its ecology.

The Nato press office claims that it has 'no idea' how many chemical plants
and oil installations its bombers have hit. But it concedes that there have
been multiple raids on a vast oil refinery and chemicals complex in the
suburbs of Belgrade, on another chemicals facility close to the capital and
on an oil refinery at Novi Sad, in the north of the country.

Britain's Ministry of Defence told me yesterday that the bombers are
'keeping the risks of pollution to a minimum', but it was unable to explain
how, while blowing chemicals plants to pieces, they have achieved this
commendable feat. Nato informed me that 'the smoke from these fires is
barely comparable to the smoke caused by the Yugoslav attacks on several
hundred villages'.

It's clear that neither agency has the faintest idea what it's talking
about. The chemical tanks ruptured by Nato bombers on the outskirts of
Belgrade last week contained a number of lethal pollutants. Some held a
complex mixture of hydrocarbons called 'naphtha', others housed phosgene and
chlorine (both of which were used as chemical weapons in the first world
war), and hydrochloric acid. As the factories burnt, a poisoned rain,
containing hundreds of toxic combustion products, splattered Belgrade, its
suburbs and the surrounding countryside. Broken tanks and burst pipes poured
naphtha, chlorine, ethylene dichloride and transformer oil, all deadly
poisons, into the Danube. Oil slicks up to 12 miles long wound their way
towards Romania.

It could, it seems, have been worse. Scientists at the plant claimed that
one of the bombs 'grazed' a vast vat of liquid ammonia. If that had gone up,
it would have poisoned most of the people of Belgrade. These toxins are
unlikely to kill people immediately. But they will have soaked the soil
across hundreds of square miles and percolated into the aquifers. The people
of the former Yugoslavia, as a result, will be repeatedly exposed to them.
Many of the compounds released cause cancers, miscarriages and birth
defects. Others are associated with fatal nerve and liver diseases.

The effects of the bombing of Serbia's economy equate, in other words, to
low-intensity chemical warfare. NATO might also be waging an undeclared,
invisible nuclear war. During the Gulf war, the Allies deployed a new kind
of munition: bullets and bombs tipped with depleted uranium, or DU.

DU, being heavier than lead or steel, penetrates armour more effectively. In
lump form it is only moderately harmful, but when the munitions explode they
scatter thousands of particles, small enough to be inhaled.

The Atomic Energy Authority predicted that if 50 tonnes of DU dust were
released in Iraq, 500,000 people would die of cancer. In the event,
according to the Campaign Against Depleted Uranium in Manchester, some
700-900 tonnes of DU were deployed. The result, the investigator Felicity
Arbuthnot found, is a seven-fold increase in leukaemia and a massive rise in
the incidence of certain rare cancers in Iraq.

Thousands of Iraqi children have been born without eyes, limbs, brains and
genitalia. DU has also been associated by some scientists with Gulf War
Syndrome.

I asked the MoD whether DU is being deployed in the former Yugoslavia.
'Certainly not', the press office replied. I asked Nato. 'It's used in some
American munitions,' I was told.

This, in environmental terms at least, is perhaps the dirtiest war the West
has ever fought. Nato's scorched earth policy, which seeks to destroy
Milosevic's armed capacity by destroying everything else, places the
Alliance firmly on the wrong side of the Geneva Convention. For a war which
targets chemical factories and oil installations, which deploys radioactive
weapons in towns and cities, is a war against everyone: civilians as well as
combatants, the unborn as well as the living.

As such, it can never be a just one.




To: goldsnow who wrote (5638)4/27/1999 7:37:00 PM
From: George Papadopoulos  Respond to of 17770
 
Fumbling for a plan in the fog of battle
=============================

25 April, 1999
The Sunday Times
the-times.co.uk

By: General Sir Michael Rose

The bland statements emerging from the 50th anniversary celebrations of Nato in Washington this weekend, emphasising the
alliance's unity and resolve to prevail against Milosevic, should not conceal the true purpose of the summit - to determine new
strategic guidelines for the next century and draw up plans for a successful end to the war in Yugoslavia.
The current strategic guidelines were produced in 1991, in the aftermath of the cold war, and foresaw neither peacekeeping nor
policing as a future role for the alliance.

Since then, Nato has changed from a defensive to an offensive alliance, and today finds itself fighting a war without rules. It is
being forced to adapt to changing operational circumstances in the absence of a coherent framework of strategic principles.

Nato's original assumptions have been abandoned in the face of Milosevic's brutal response to its air campaign, but no clear plan
has been produced on how to deliver the new political objectives that have been established.

Instead, as the extent of the failure of the air campaign has become apparent, target lists are being dangerously widened and
increasingly incredible claims are being made about its effectiveness.

On April 22, Doug Henderson, the armed forces minister, declared: "We believed at the beginning of this action that airstrikes
were the right way to weaken and disrupt the ability of [Milosevic's] machine to ethnically cleanse and commit atrocities in
Kosovo. Our actions have been effective . . . we will continue to intensify the airstrikes."

In the words of Karl von Clausewitz, a 19th-century Prussian military strategist, it is pointless fighting battles that do not
"gain the object of war".

Nowhere has Nato admitted that five weeks of airstrikes have failed to weaken Milosevic.

The newly stated objectives of Nato's war in Yugoslavia are: to stop the Serbian offensive; to force a withdrawal of Serbian
troops from Kosovo; to allow democratic self-government in the province; to allow a Nato-led international peacekeeping force into
Kosovo; and to allow a safe and peaceful return of the Kosovo Albanian refugees.

What is plain from these objectives is that the first two goals - those of stopping the Serbian offensive and forcing a withdrawal
of Serbian troops - will require a ground offensive. For unless Milosevic unexpectedly surrenders, a Nato-led peacekeeping force
will be able to deploy into Kosovo only once a sufficient level of security has been established. This cannot be done by air power
alone.

However, politicians have recently come up with a discredited military concept, that of a "permissive environment". This envisages
so severely reducing the capability of the enemy by bombardment, that an attacking force is virtually unopposed. This concept was
much favoured during the first world war when 20,000 British soldiers died in a single day on the Somme.

Unfortunately, the Gulf war gave new life to this concept, with air power taking the place of artillery. However, desert
conditions differ greatly from those prevailing in Kosovo, and an Iraqi soldier is not the same as a Serb. It will have to be
accepted that any Nato force occupying Kosovo will have to fight every inch of the way.

Furthermore, if Nato forces are going to be able to seize the initiative, air and land operations will have to be planned as a
single entity. Complete and full freedom of action will be required by military commanders. Risks will have to be taken and it
must be accepted that any ground offensive will incur casualties. At least 100,000 troops will be required.

It will also be important for every Nato nation to have combat troops in the front line, for the unity of the alliance would
suffer if only American and British troops were to bear the brunt of the fighting. In some Nato countries there is a concern that
because their armies have trained for peacekeeping, they are not capable of fighting.

Another potential problem is that technology has been substituted for manpower in many Nato armies - in the belief that a
precision-guided munition gives better value than a soldier with a bayonet.

Unfortunately, in the sort of war that will have to be fought in Kosovo, as well as in the post-conflict phase, an army of
occupation will need considerable manpower.

Already the armies of Nato are overstretched. If these considerations significantly limit Nato's operational capability, then
politicians will be forced to accept that the military means available are not able to deliver the desired political objectives.
In these conditions, Nato will be able to enter Kosovo only after a political agreement has been reached with Milosevic.

Nato has some difficult choices to make during its 50th birthday party. There will be many more unexpected changes in the
operational situation ahead. But without a coherent campaign plan, the political and military components of Nato cannot be in
harmony.