SI
SI
discoversearch

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor.  We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community.  If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.
Technology Stocks : Voice-on-the-net (VON), VoIP, Internet (IP) Telephony -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Darren DeNunzio who wrote (2661)4/28/1999 11:32:00 PM
From: Frank A. Coluccio  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 3178
 
There are some very serious problems with the use of encryption in multiple domains of trust on the Public Internet. Getting beyond the boundaries of each domain (sphere of control) is a dilemma that the folks in the IETF are now grappling with. Some have suggested that secure voice on the Internet (as we know the public Internet, anyway) is years off. But most current deployments of voice services that involve IP are not on the Internet, yet. They are on private IP backbones for the moment.

Securing voice is a more manageable prospect in the private IP backbone domains than it is on the 'net. The private IP b-b's will also be used in connection with initial Cable, DSL and other variations of ITSP offerings.

They simply use IP instead of PCM, for the most part. But the device controls are still centralized within the network, as opposed to being supported by the IP protocol itself, as would be characterized by end point control.

The current flavors of voice using IP are not true Internet Telephony architectures, they are instead Voice over IP, a.k.a., IP Telephony. There is a difference.

VoIP/IP Telphony emulates, to a great extent, the PSTN, using the IP streams to optimize bandwidth utilization on the long hauls. And in the newer short haul voice realms, such as Cable and DSL, they will be used for the same purposes: To optimize the number of voice channels that can be achieved while still allowing ample capacity for data in an integrated manner.

Internet Telephony, on the other hand, uses Internet protocols through and through. It is not intended to be ready until certain transitions are achieved through several migration stages of VoIP/IP Telephony, first. FWIW.



To: Darren DeNunzio who wrote (2661)5/2/1999 8:17:00 PM
From: Scott C. Lemon  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 3178
 
Hello Darren,

> You just go right up to the house, and clip on the phone. Well,
> first you need to get passed my dog, and then you better have a
> warrant.

Wow ... trusting soul that you are ... getting past a dog isn't difficult for someone who wants the information ... and a warrant? ;-)

> With a cable, you could do the same thing, from comfort of you own
> home, and yes legally. In fact you can read the data from any point
> along the cable segment, before and after the intended destination.
> When a packet is transmitted across the cable, it does not make a
> left turn and exit the cable at your home. The data is transmitted
> across the cable just like the television signal, and is received
> and processed by every modem in the subnet.

Yep ... fully aware of this. Been there ... done that. I've worked with a variety of vendors equipment, and "sniffed" packets on many cable systems already. I'm well aware of the possibilities ...

> If I pay my monthly subscription each month, I will have a valid
> MAC and IP. Now by running a program such as "EtherPeek", I can
> legally capture and store every packet from every computer on the
> subnet. Encryption will be the only defense, and may be adequate
> protection for the home, but a business will not rest well knowing
> that the companies conversations are being monitored by the
> competition down the street.

If this is the case, then the business better disconnect from the Internet! Obviously you are fully aware that packets can be sniffed and captured *anywhere* in the infrastructure of the Internet. If an employee at MCI wanted to, they could capture your packets 10 routers deep into the Internet.

I don't agree with you at all concerning encryption. I know a number of corporations that are already using VPN encryption technologies (128 bit here in the U.S.) to interconnect offices. Can 128-bit encryption be broken? Of course ... with a lot of hardware and resource. But with constant key changes it's tough to keep up ...

> I believe you are missing the point.

Nope ... don't think so ... but that's just my opinion ...

> The cable lacks the physical separation between stations.

If this is the requirement, then we are all in trouble. The reason for VPN technologies is so that you don't need the physical security. I have run both LAN-to-LAN and Client-to-LAN VPN technologies over cable modems, with 128 bit key encryption (IPSec), key changes set to every 1000 packets (as I recall) ... works like a charm.

> VoIP would have be delivered just like a pay per view movie

What? I'm not sure what you mean by this ...

I can easily run VoIP applications over the VPN to my secure proxy ... or to the other end. Again, there are many vendors starting to demonstrate point-to-point encryption at the application layer. There are several solutions out there ... and I'm using many of them! ;-)

> The "Phracks" will scrap their Red, Blue and Black Boxes, along
> with their 6.5536Mhz crystals, and live happily ever after in
> packet heaven.

Hmmm ... I'll have to think about this one ...

I believe that the only way they will enjoy hacking new VoIP technologies is once they are able to grab whole streams of encrypted packets, and pass them to coops of millions of machines which will attempt to decrypt and perform voice/sound recognition on the attempts. It could be done at some point in the future, but statistically it will be a long way off.

If someone wants your conversations *this* bad, they're going to hire someone to bug your house ... laser listeners pointed at your windows, etc. ;-)

Scott C. Lemon