I will post the gist of the Policy Review article here:
There are five broad planks in the conservative case for preserving an American-led NATO and adapting its capabilities to the specific circumstances of the early 21st century.
NATO is at the center of all U.S. military strategies. Critics have read far too much into the current absence of a serious rival to U.S. interests on the world stage. This happy circumstance will surely change. If, for example, a threat were to emerge from a resurgent Russia (and given the events of the past six months in Russia, that is at least conceivable), there would not be time in which to reconstitute a NATO-like alliance on the front line.
In the event of concerted aggression by militant Islamic states, perhaps in possession of weapons of mass destruction, NATO will protect our flank and secure our supply lines. And, finally, if the security interests of the West are drawn to the containment of Chinese expansion, NATO will guard the strategic rear of the alliance and make the forward deployment of U.S. forces possible. In all cases, NATO is the common denominator in the grand strategy of the West. The imperative of consolidating the center is axiomatic in military strategy, and NATO stands at the center of our alliance structure.
If the centrality of NATO were not enough, there is also the appeal of the plasticity of the alliance, particularly our ability to refocus its strategic concept. Conservatives, especially, who have a proud tradition as realists, must conclude that the new threats to transatlantic security come from out-of-area, and that NATO can be adapted to counter these threats to our interests.
NATO reflects the American way of war. Politically untidy though they may be, our arrangements with Europe reflect a national consensus on the part of Americans that we intend to prosecute our objectives in war not unilaterally but in coalition with our allies. Having made this decision, mechanisms like NATO become a fact of life. In order to fight effectively as a coalition, an alliance has to plan and train together as well as exchange views on the concept of joint operations. Without the mechanisms of coordination developed within NATO, the success of ad hoc coalitions, like Desert Storm, would be doubtful.
Obviously, there is concern about the inevitable compromises that keep coalition partners in the fold and that may impinge to some degree on U.S. sovereignty. But conservatives should recognize that these modest measures are necessary in the conduct of foreign affairs. Moreover, conservatives, in particular, should tend to favor coalition mechanisms because they limit the potential overseas ambitions of governments — even our own — and they provide the means to share the financial burdens of defense with our European allies.
NATO remains "the military expression of a community of shared values." It is often said that NATO is more than just a military alliance; it has served as the political foundation on which Europe has been rebuilt over the past 50 years. NATO played and still plays a decisive role in consolidating the victory of the West in the Cold War. It is also the only institution that appears capable of countering the crimes against humanity being committed in the Balkans.
It is not unreasonable to foresee that NATO as a political vehicle will continue to broaden the Euro-Atlantic community to include democracies as distant as Estonia or Finland in Northern Europe and Romania and Bulgaria in Southeast Europe. Over time, non-NATO allies of the United States in our hemisphere, such as Argentina and Chile, may seek a closer political relationship with NATO. In the future, and in the context of new missions, NATO might also institutionalize coordination with Israel, which maintains an historical relationship with the United States and has recently concluded a strategic arrangement with Turkey, NATO’s easternmost member. It would not be unreasonable to suggest that a reformed alliance focused on a new set of missions might welcome a more formal relationship with a country that shares our values and could contribute materially to the security and strategic depth of the Euro-Atlantic region. Regardless of how NATO’s political role is manifested in the next decade, conservatives will tend to support institutions of invested values dedicated to their protection. It should not come as a surprise to conservatives that Judeo-Christian values over the past millennium and democratic ideals over the past 350 years have required protection by force of arms. For the past 50 years, NATO has provided that protection with a very light hand.
NATO’s mission in Europe is unfinished. Even if one concedes that America’s interests will eventually diverge from those of our European allies, it is still far too soon for the United States to disengage from Europe. The most obvious reason for this is that the Europeans do not want us to leave in the foreseeable future.
We have seen a number of instances in which other institutions have been unable to cope with serious European problems. NATO’s effectiveness compares favorably to the performance of UNPROFOR at Sebrenica and throughout Bosnia. And with the failure of the October 1998 Kosovo agreement — which called for peace monitors from the OSCE — Europeans and Americans agreed that only a NATO mission could keep the peace. While critics have argued that U.S. vital interests are not at stake in Bosnia or Kosovo, the persistent pattern of political and military failure at the periphery of our power (by coalitions other than NATO) should produce renewed respect for NATO’s singular role in protecting the Atlantic democracies.
The European experiment for which NATO is the predicate is incomplete, and it would be foolish in the extreme to disassemble the security structure that has made modern Europe possible. A unified Germany is only seven years old and much remains to be decided about its direction, its purpose, and how it intends to manage its preponderant power in Europe. A European currency is a few months old, and the political affects of partial monetary union are as yet unknown. While 60 million souls in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are now formally NATO allies, the integration of these countries into NATO’s military structure and the achievement of full interoperability are at least a decade in the future. Moreover, there are another 50 million people in Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria who hope to come into Europe from the cold and who aspire to join the economic and security institutions of the Euro-Atlantic.
Finally, and most important, there is a war of aggression and genocide in the Balkans where NATO forces are engaged. To paraphrase Lady Thatcher, now is not the time to go wobbly on NATO.
If it is the end of NATO, it is the end of a lot more than NATO. Advocates of NATO expansion, and proponents of NATO in general, often ask critics to imagine the past fifty years without the alliance. Critics who argue that NATO is unnecessary must also maintain that U.S. security is defensible in the future without what has come to be regarded as the West’s insurance policy. A world without NATO would be a world with a radically changed political order — one about which we know little, and what we can imagine is troubling.
We can imagine that the United States would be without an immediate brake on Russian imperial recidivism. We would be unable to moderate and guide the rise of German power. We would lack incentives to keep Turkey engaged in Europe. The reinforcement and defense of Israel in extremis would be vastly more difficult. The boundary lines within which we now contain rogue states and pursue the containment of weapons of mass destruction would have to be abandoned and moved thousands of miles closer to the territory of the United States. The defense of the Gulf States would be problematic at best. And a credible Pacific security policy would be heavily burdened by the requirement to maintain major forces in an unsettled Atlantic region. At a minimum, the disestablishment of NATO would require military expenditures at near wartime levels.
conservative view — and I believe the correct view — is that the current international system in which NATO serves as cornerstone has been remarkably friendly to U.S. interests and has not imposed particularly onerous financial burdens on our economy. Overturning the conditions that brought about such a relatively felicitous state of affairs risks exposing the United States and our remaining allies to a much harsher international environment, one that may make far greater demands of American blood and treasure.
In the light of these strategic and prudential considerations and the comparatively light economic demands the alliance imposes, why does the burden of NATO chafe so on the French and other Europeans? Why would influential Americans, such as Sen. Hutchison, begin to toy with the idea of leaving European security to the Europeans while the United States responds to out-of-area missions unilaterally? It is unusual, to say the least, for great nations and long-time allies to pursue a path that is so clearly contrary to their long-term interests and that does away with an institution they have taken 50 years to construct.
The explanation lies in the exceptional alignment of political weakness among the major powers of the alliance. As the editors of the Economist observed recently, "It is a lonely conservative soul who peers around the horizon of European politics these days." Notwithstanding the presence of President Chirac, the Jospin government is further to the left than any French government in recent history. The election of a Red/Green coalition in Germany is without precedent. The addition of a post-Communist government in Italy moves the ratio of left-of-center governments to center or conservative governments in NATO to a remarkable 15-4. (Spain, Poland, Hungary and, arguably, the United States are what remain of the center-right leadership that 15 years ago included President Reagan, Prime Minister Thatcher, and Chancellor Kohl.) And never in 138 years has the United States been led by an impeached president who faced possible removal by the same legislative body charged with ratifying the actions of the president in foreign affairs. The conclusion is inescapable: This is a very dangerous time to attempt the wholesale restructuring of our security system.
"Monty Python’s Flying Circus" reminds us that no one expects the Spanish Inquisition. That is, history is not immune to accidents. The danger now is that the accidental, but temporary, weakness in the alliance and the disorienting effects of this weakness on public opinion may produce the conditions in which a truly grand mistake could be made. Contrary to the suggestions of the critics, it will not be the Europeans who decide that their interests lie elsewhere and withdraw from NATO. If anyone, it will be the Americans, who in response to what is little more than European posturing, might make the tragic mistake of disengaging from Europe. For better or worse, Europe cannot disengage from itself. |
