Latvia Worried About Delay in NATO Baltic Expansion after
Yugoslav War
Summary:
Latvia's President on May 11 expressed concern about his
country's national security, particularly over likely delays in
further NATO expansion. This heightened sense of insecurity is
the result of three developments: 1) the deteriorating
relationship between NATO and Moscow; 2) the fact that some
Central European and Balkan countries may move ahead of the
Baltic nations in the queue to become NATO members; and 3) the
need for NATO to resolve a number of internal problems following
the Kosovo crisis.
Analysis:
Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis said in Prague on May 11 that
delays in NATO's expansion over the next four years would
endanger the security of the Baltic states. Ulmanis called on
NATO to accelerate its expansion plans, to complete the process
within two to three years. He stressed the next NATO summit
should explicitly address the issue of accepting new members.
The Latvian President is on a three-day official visit to the
Czech Republic to discuss the two countries' foreign policies and
economic relations. The Baltic states worry that once the Kosovo
conflict is over NATO will be so distracted by its own internal
issues, such as reforming its decision-making structure and
reassessing its re-defined mission, that the expansion process
could delayed.
The Baltic states are concerned NATO has already sent clear
signals to some Central European and Balkan prospective member
states that their support for NATO in the Kosovo crisis could
speed up their incorporation into the alliance. Moreover, the
Baltic leadership recognizes that the conflict in the Balkans has
negatively impacted NATO's relationship with Russia, leaving the
Baltic states precariously caught in the middle. The Baltic
states realize a more cautious NATO might mean pushing their
prospective membership past the original time frame, if at all.
NATO its expansion plans during NATO's 50th anniversary summit
held in Washington in April, when the alliance adopted a
Membership Action Plan. The plan was designed to intensify
military cooperation with nine aspirant states -- Romania,
Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Slovakia,
Macedonia and Albania -- in order to prepare these countries for
future membership. Although the recent summit did not formally
mention eventual modification of the accession schedule in
connection to the assistance provided by some of these countries
to NATO during the Kosovo crisis, the alliance has made numerous
statements implying that this would occur. In particular, NATO
told Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia -- the countries that have
promised to open their territories to the transportation of NATO
troops and military supplies -- that their help was greatly
appreciated and would not be forgotten in connection with NATO's
expansion.
NATO accepted Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary as new
members on March 12. STRATFOR has, in earlier GIUs, highlighted
the military and logistical difficulties associated with
including Hungary as a member, in the absence of Slovakia. The
alliance's strategy associated with the second accession wave,
has produced even more controversy. On the one hand, the
alliance has raised prospective new members' hopes by issuing
official statements about the direction of future expansion and
by involving the would-be members in the Partnership for Peace
program. On the other hand, NATO's progress has been extremely
slow in a second expansion wave to avoid further damaging its
relations with Russia, a fierce opponent of the alliance's
eastward expansion. Other difficulties associated with future
NATO expansion include the relative absence of democratic
institutions in some of the candidate countries, economies that
in some instances cannot support the military commitment required
by NATO, and the possibility that new members will result in a
further extension of the frontier NATO must defend in order to
protect the entire alliance.
The Kosovo crisis, however, will certainly exacerbate NATO's
already ambiguous policy. Following Kosovo, NATO will be hard
pressed not to honor its debts to such countries as Romania,
Bulgaria, and Slovakia. Simultaneously, disrupted relations with
Moscow -- which has been opposing the aspirations of the former
Soviet republics to join NATO -- will make the alliance's
expansion into the Baltic region more difficult. NATO-Russian
animosity will make consolidation of NATO's defensive lines
imperative, but NATO will simultaneously put a high priority on
keeping that consolidation from further negatively impacting
relations with Russia. The Baltic states have every reason to be
concerned about NATO's altered relationship with Moscow and its
impact on further expansion. But these are not the only factors
impinging on national security issues in the Baltics. NATO will
have to deal with fundamental issues such as its internal
structure, decision-making process, and reassessing its redefined
mission, once the Kosovo crisis is over. The war in the Balkans
has clearly shown that NATO's decision-making structure is
incompatible with the new mission it has laid out for itself.
NATO's new mission is another fundamental issue to be confronted
following the Kosovo crisis. The Washington summit expanded
NATO's strategic framework beyond the founding principle of
mutual defense. The new framework includes an assertion that
NATO should develop a capability to avert regional conflicts
taking place beyond NATO's borders. In the wake of the U.S.-led
intervention in Yugoslavia, it is highly likely that some NATO
members will seek to reconsider this new mission.
In fact, doubts concerning the leadership of the U.S. have
rekindled the idea of the Western European Union (WEU) becoming
the full-fledged military arm of the European Union. This is
already is on the table. On May 11, WEU foreign and defense
ministers agreed to design a European defense organization within
the next 18 months. All these issues will keep NATO busy in the
months to come and will, with all likelihood, delay the
alliance's expansion plans. The deteriorating relationship with
Moscow, the demands by some Central European and Balkan countries
to enter NATO, and the internal issues NATO must resolve once the
crisis in Kosovo ends, will all pose a serious question for the
Baltic states and their security.
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