Iraq Accuses Iran of Colluding with the U.S.
Summary:
Iraq's Baath party newspaper, Ath-Thawra, has lashed out at Iran,
accusing the Islamic republic of colluding with the U.S. in an
attempt to "stab Iraq in the back." There have been some recent
signs of rapprochement between the U.S. and Iran, and the two
countries may have shared a tacit agreement at the beginning of
the Kosovo crisis. However, with U.S. credibility and influence
taking a battering in Kosovo, Iran's continued pressure on Iraq
may now be driven by Tehran's desire to forge a regional Iraqi
containment process without U.S. involvement.
Analysis:
The official Iraqi Baath party newspaper, Ath-Thawra, reacted on
May 10 to an accusation from Iranian Foreign Minister Kamel
Kharazi that Iraq lacked the political will for a rapprochement
with Iran, saying that Iraq "rejects opportunist behavior... and
flagrant political hypocrisy." Iraq does not "attack the Great
Satan (the U.S.) in public while reaching out to this Satan and
normalizing relations with it under the table. Iraq acts in the
same manner in public as it does in secret, and when it declares
its readiness for dialogue and to normalize relations with a
certain country, it does not then betray that country and stab it
in the back."
The newspaper accused the U.S. and its allies -- presumably
Britain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia -- of being behind the Iranian
foreign minister's comments, which included a warning that
Baghdad's behavior was "not predictable." The paper added that,
"it seems that some of them (the allies) who recently traveled to
Iran repeated such things in front of Mr. Kharazi for him to use
in his statement." The British Foreign Minister Robin Cook did
indeed hold talks with Kharazi early in the Kosovo crisis on
April 2. As well, the Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan bin
Abd al Aziz al Saud traveled to Tehran last week, for a meeting
lauded by the Tehran as a watershed in Iranian-Saudi relations.
While Washington in all probability enlisted Iranian support in
containing Iraq prior to launching the Kosovo campaign, the
future of U.S. policy toward both Iraq and Iran is very much in
question in the waning days of the Kosovo crisis. The U.S.-led
NATO military campaign against Yugoslavia has failed to achieve
its goals, and collateral damage has mounted as NATO has searched
for an effective target set. Washington has been able to keep
the NATO coalition together, though barely, and Moscow has
adroitly exploited the cracks forming in NATO, playing the
Greeks, Germans, and Italians off against their NATO allies. The
Kosovo crisis has been anything but a showcase of U.S. military
and diplomatic prowess, and its aftermath may lead to still
further U.S. foreign policy deterioration. Coming out of Kosovo,
the U.S. may either become more belligerent -- seeking a clear
victory to cover for the ambiguous Kosovo outcome -- or, with the
election campaign approaching, the U.S. could sink into political
infighting and introspection. The last thing that the Iranians
want is an unpredictable and distracted U.S. involved in the
Gulf, and so may be reconsidering collusion with the U.S. in
dealing with Iraq.
The Iranians themselves are internally divided when it comes to
the presence of the U.S. in the region. Some Iranians would
welcome a U.S. retreat, even at the cost of being more vulnerable
to Russian pressure. Others recognize that the U.S. has played a
significant, if oscillating, role in containing the Iraqis. The
current Iranian regime has been trying to moderate U.S. policies
by opening itself up slowly to European investment, thereby
creating a situation in which American businesses demand that the
U.S. government will allow them to compete for lucrative Iranian
contracts. So far, the U.S. has only eased restrictions on some
exports, whereas the Europeans seemed to have opened their
markets up almost completely. There has also been some evidence
to suggest that Iran and the U.S. have quietly, at least to a
limited extent, coordinated policies in the region. Still,
considering the legacy of U.S. policy toward Iran, and the
deterioration of U.S. political and military leadership in the
wake of the Kosovo crisis, this rapprochement effort may be
fading.
In its place, Tehran may be pursuing its own goal of emerging as
a leading player in a regional Arab-Persian politico-military
alliance. By keeping pressure on Iraq, Iran can still be in a
position to exploit U.S. gratitude, should Washington actually
turn the situation around in Kosovo. It also serves its own
longstanding security interests by keeping iraq weakened and off
balance. And finally it can exercise leadership of a nascent
anti-Iraqi coalition, and to break out of its own isolation in
the Muslim world. Iran has been hinting at the creation of a
regional Arab-Persian security mechanism, which we have discussed
in earlier GIUs. With U.S. resolve appearing to be on the wane,
this idea may gain steam.
Therefore, while Ath-Thawra is referring to an expanding Iranian-
U.S. cooperative agreement aimed at containing Iraq, instead,
what may be going on is a form of damage control by the Iranians.
Iran has relied, albeit indirectly, on the predictability of U.S.
resolve in dealing with Iraq. The tide has changed. Now, Iran
may be unilaterally pressuring Iraq in order to avert a U.S. led
rampage or a complete U.S. pullout. This strategy, if
implemented in a pragmatic fashion -- keeping the pressure on
Iraq while not totally closing itself from U.S. overtures -- may
actually serve to bolster Iran's prestige and to keep stability
in region. If it does not work, the possibility is real that the
skirmishes over the skies of Iraq between U.S. aircraft and Iraqi
air defense artillery may grow into something more.
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