Daniel, you have asked a number of large questions, and I would be happy to address them, but first let me address questions about Kosovo by posting some of my stuff off of the Kosovo thread:
1.)a.Nobody gave NATO a "mandate". Whatever a consensus of the signatory nations says is
within NATO's purview is, ipso facto, part of its mandate.
b.The refugee flows occasioned by earlier troubles in the region were largely absorbed by
Austria and Germany, and were directly related to the rise in neo- Nazi activity. The
refugee flows from Kosovo were likely to be absorbed by Albania and Macedonia, as has
happened, with potentially destabilizing effects on those countries. Two long- standing
NATO countries, Greece and Turkey, who are hostile anyway, could easily be drawn into
a wider Balkan war.
c.There are numerous hotspots where adjustments through "ethnic cleansing" might be
found attractive, and the Western powers wanted to take a stand against this crime against
humanity in their own back- yard.
d.The Muslim "street" frequently perceives the West to be anti- Muslim, and thus it is
useful to demonstrate a willingness to take sides on behalf of Muslims when the situation
warrants.
e.If we concede that Serbia is within the Russian "sphere of influence", it will be that much
harder to face them down when they make bids for hegemony elsewhere in the former
Eastern bloc.
f.Muslim terrorists would be happy to use the Balkans to gain a foothold in Europe, and it
prudent to deny them the opportunity.
g.The issues that were temporarily resolved in the former Yugoslavia might easily reignite
if Serbia is permitted resurgence, and broaden further as traditional sympathies are stoked.
These are reasons for intervention, whether or not you think that they "rise to the level" of
direct military involvement....
2.)a. The point remains that NATO derives its mandate from the signatory nations, and
therefore they are in a position to broaden it if they so choose.
b. The Serbs were massing troops for a spring offensive. It is unlikely that we have done
more than provide some cover for the cleansing campaign, and perhaps given them a freer
hand because the "shoe already dropped". Having said that, I believe that the primary
mission was botched, by not concentrating on the offensive in the first place.
c. The Turkish treatment of the Kurds is reprehensible. However, we have diplomatic
options to put pressure on the Turks that are unavailable in the case of Serbia. In any
event, the fact that we have not acted in one instance does not mean we cannot act in
another, depending upon impending disaster and chances of success.
d. I am not concerned with convinced fanatics, but potential recruits, who may be moved
by the fact that we cared to risk American lives trying to defend Muslims.
e. Actually, you missed the point. We want to discourage similar behavior in the future,
and therefore have to show that we will act within he limits of prudence in order to avoid
miscalculation or give the diplomatic advantage to aggressors.
f. The idea, at least, was to preempt the KLA.
g. Given the Macedonian fear of its own Albanian minority, the proximity and ambition of
Albania, the smoldering tensions in Bosnia, the resurgence of pan- Slavism in Russia,
Belarus, and Ukraine, and other numerous factors, the speculation was not wild...
3.)Now, you have brought up the gravest difficulty, which is how many casualties should we
be prepared to sustain or, for that matter, inflict. Since we lost less than 60,000 during
nearly a decade of fighting in Vietnam, I am however not too worried that we will have a
high mortality rate, nor, by extension, a high casualty rate. As for inflicted harm, I should
say that heavy damage to men under arms, say a casualty rate of 50% and a fatality rate of
25-33%, and light collateral damage may be acceptable, although I would prefer to avoid
it. As I have said before, I think we should back off from Rambouillet, get the Russians
heavily involved, call a cease- fire, and try, try again...
4.)I have said what I would do: cease bombing and renegotiate, with the Russians at the table
and a willingness to deal with Milosevic. Take the war crimes trials off of the table; insist
on repatriation; broker a force split between NATO countries and Russia, with perhaps the
additional involvement of Ukraine and Belarus; commit to disarming the KLA; pledge to
respect Serbian sovereignty; allow the Serbs to have a constabulary in the province, and a
limited number of troops, and pledge to maintain light arms for the peacekeepers---- is
that enough? I can discuss in more detail if need be...
5.)I don't support Kosovo Albanian nationalism. I don't support NATO's position at
Rambouillet. Nor is the first time I have tried to make this clear. I do support Kosovar
autonomy, and deplore Serbian oppression, and I thought that NATO would have to
intervene in some manner to check Serbian oppression. But I did not contemplate their
starting position to be one that so heavily favored the KLA, nor have I approved of the
way this operation has been conducted. |
