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Microcap & Penny Stocks : Globalstar Telecommunications Limited GSAT -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: djane who wrote (4718)5/19/1999 11:30:00 AM
From: mmeggs  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 29987
 
CSFB report from meeting:

AM CALL: GSTRF: Globalstar Holds Investor Meeting-Pt 1- CREDIT SUISSE FIRST BOSTON CORPORATION
Equity Research
U.S./Wireless Telecommunications Services

BUY
MID CAP
Globalstar (GSTRF)

A Tale of Two Companies-Globalstar is not Iridium.

Summary

Loral and Globalstar held their annual investor meeting on
May 18, 1999. Overall, Globalstar is making progress
Loral and Globalstar held their annual investor meeting on
May 18, 1999. Overall, Globalstar is making progress with
marketing, network testing, gateways, launch schedule, and
handset availability.

Globalstar is expected to turn EPS positive by the fourth
quarter of 2000, and have 94% EBITDA margins by 2002.

Although they always have concerns, management is very
pleased with Globalstar's progress. However, the Iridium
situation may affect the cost at which they raise the $600
million they need this summer.

We believe Globalstar has a very different model, and is in a
very different position than Iridium. Although it is natural
to have concerns about the industry in light of situation, we believe investors should differentiate between
Globalstar and Iridium, because we believe Globalstar's
chances of success are significantly higher.

Price Target Mkt.Value 52-Week
5/18/991 (12mo.) Div. Yield (MM) Price Range
$19.56 $33 NA NA $4,557.5 $32.31-8.31
Annual Prev. Abs. Rel. EV/ EBITDA/
EPS EPS P/E P/E EBITDA Share
12/99E $(1.81) NA NA NM $(0.64)
12/98A (0.68) NA NA NM $(0.65)
12/97A (0.43) NA NA NM $(0.43)

March June Sept. Dec. FY End
1999E $(0.19)A $(0.15)$(0.67) $(0.79)
1998A (0.15) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17)
1997A (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10 ROIC (12/98) NM
Total Debt (3/99) $1.73 bil.
Book Value/Share (3/99) $3.86
WACC (12/98) 11.7%
Debt/Total Capital (3/99) 65.8%
Common Shares* 233 mil.
EP Trend2 Negative
Est. 5-Yr. EPS Growth NA
Est. 5-Yr. Div. Growth NA

1On 5/18/99 DJIA closed at 10836.9 and S&P 500 at 1333.3.
2Economic profit trend. *Common Stock
Equivalents NASDAQ
NM = Not meaningful.

Globalstar is a satellite-based wireless company that expects to launch commercial service in the
third quarter of 1999. The system will initially utilize 32
low-earth-orbiting satellites and numerous gateway stations.
Globalstar expects to provide mobile and fixed
communications services worldwide.

Investment Summary

Loral and Globalstar held their annual shareholder meetings
on May 18 at the Essex House in New York City, and then held
an investor meeting to talk about the different business
segments and progress each is making. Although there were
four main topics including: Satellite Manufacturing, Fixed
Satellite Services, Data/Broadband Services, and Mobile
Satellite Services (Globalstar), in this note, we will focus
on the area that relates to our recommended stock, Globalstar
, which we rate a Buy with a $33 twelve month target price Overall, we were very pleased with what we heard during the
meeting. Chairman and CEO, Bernard Schwartz, Vice Chairman,
Gregory Clark, and acting President, Anthony Navarra provided
comments on the progress Globalstar has made with regard to
its marketing program, its network testing, gateway
operations and testing, launch schedule, and handset
availability. Further, Navarra reviewed some of the
company's expectations for subscribers, EBITDA, and earnings
in the period through 2002. Overall, while they are being
conservative with 1999 forecasts and are considerably below
original expectations in terms of subscriber and revenue
growth in 1999, they expect to exceed our earnings in all years,
and all of our forecasts in 2000 and beyond.

A Tale of Two Companies: Globalstar is Not Although the main topic of the day was the progress of the
segments, when it came time for Navarra to make his
presentation on Globalstar, he wasted no time in getting
right to the main point; his first slide was entitled "How
Globalstar differs from Iridium."

Iridium Snapshot

Much has been written about Iridium's recent woes, and this
review is certainly not meant to pile more on top of
Iridium's already challenging situation-we think the troubles
that have befallen the company are very unfortunate. Some of
the problems probably could have been avoided; some of them
probably could have been mitigated by simply being the second
or third player out of the gate (versus the first player who
encounters all of the hard issues, from which every successor
thereafter learns lessons); and many of them, are simply a function of the more difficult model with which
Iridium must work (i.e., the costly nature of the network
given the intelligent satellites that only last five years).
However, we believe to truly appreciate what Navarra said,
one should be familiar with some of the issues that have
challenged Iridium over the past few months.

As a review, Iridium delayed its initial launch by a few
months to November 1998. They were the very first mobile
satellite service provider up and running in the world. To
their credit, they never experienced a failed rocket launch,
and managed to get the entire 66 LEO satellite constellation
up and running by November 1998. Unfortunately, they had
difficulties obtaining enough handsets from Motorola until
early 1999, and the second vendor, Kyocera, had software
problems with its handsets until February 1999. While the
company had conducted an extensive marketing campaign ( $150 million) in mid 1998, and thought they had generated
sufficient interest in the product (at one point, inquiries
were stated to be about 1.3 million, and qualified leads were
supposedly 130,000), much of the marketing was likely wasted
by the time they had sufficient handsets in early 1999 to
satisfy demand. Additionally, because of the lack of handsets
, large corporate and government organizations could not test
the phones, and hence, could not place orders. Meanwhile,
the service providers were said not to be adequately training
sales personnel to sell the product, and all of this led to
the company not making its March covenants on subscriber
growth and revenues. Although they received an extension
until May 31on the covenants, in the meantime, the CEO, CFO,
and Chief Marketing Officer all resigned. Indications from
Motorola and other service providers regarding their long-
term commitments to the Iridium project have been mixed.
Iridium then announced it was planning to review a business
plan with Motorola and other strategic investors, and we are
still waiting to hear about progress on a new business plan.
The most recent announcement was that the company will not
make its May debt covenants and has hired a financial advisor to
restructure the debt with the banks.

Globalstar-Why is it different from Iridium?

Although the reasons noted below do not come as a surprise to
us, we liked the fact that Globalstar was up front about
addressing the market's major concern with the stock.

Globalstar has lower pricing. Globalstar's wholesale costs
will be $0.35-$0.55 per minute or $0.47 on average. The
retail price is expected to be $1.00 to $1.25 per minute,
versus the $1.89-$5.00+ per minute for the Iridium call;





To: djane who wrote (4718)5/19/1999 11:37:00 AM
From: mmeggs  Respond to of 29987
 
CSFB Part 2:

CREDIT SUISSE FIRST BOSTON CORPORATION
Equity Research
Americas

U.S./Wireless Telecommunications Services

BUY
MID CAP
Globalstar (GSTRF)

A Tale of Two Companies-Globalstar is not Iridium.

Globalstar service providers are enthusiastic, already
working on marketing, and seem to be highly committed to
selling the product. Iridium's service providers have been
said to have not done a great deal to learn about the product
working on marketing, and seem to be highly committed to
selling the product. Iridium's service providers have been
said to have not done a great deal to learn about the product,
train people or market in any way. AirTouch evidently has
20-25 people dedicated to working on marketing the Globalstar
product. Another thing which should be noted is that
Globalstar has agreements with the service providers about
providing a certain minimum number of minutes, or the service
providers do not get the rates as quoted. Further, although
it was not mentioned on Navarra's slide, the service
providers have a certain amount of time to ultimately deliver
the minutes, or they must pay Globalstar cash or give up
their exclusivity as service providers. Iridium does not (to
our knowledge) have any such stipulations in its service provider
agreements;

Handsets are much cheaper. As noted below, the handsets are likely to wholesale for $850-$1,250 versus the $3,000-$3,500
for Iridium handsets. There is a chance the
service providers may even subsidize the Globalstar phones
which means they may actually be purchased cheaper at retail;

Globalstar has a superior system design using higher capacity
CDMA technology. The bent pipe architecture that Globalstar
and ICO (and other private companies) are presently pursuing
appears to be the better choice right now, at least from a
cost standpoint. Globalstar will have about $3.9 billion in
the network when it is commercially launched, versus the $5.5
-$6.0 billion required by the Iridium network. Globalstar
can take on 10-12 billion minutes per year given its current
architecture; the Iridium network can handle about 1.5

billion minutes per year. Another issue that has continued
to concern us about Iridium is that the lives of their
satellites are only five years, as opposed to seven to years for the Globalstar satellites. This means that within
the next couple of years, Iridium will need to begin
relaunching their entire constellation; hence, this is not
the typical wireless model where if you do not get the
subscriber growth for which you hoped, you just get it later
and back-end the cashflows a bit. With Iridium, the decision
needs to be made whether or not it is worth it to commit
substantial additional capital, while there is still uncertainty
about the level of market demand;

Globalstar has a larger marketplace, has both mobile and
fixed opportunities and is focused on regional users, not the
"VIPs" or world travelers.

Globalstar is not Iridium

Hence, while there are obvious challenges that could still
plague Globalstar-and we continue to believe that mobile
satellite services is the most risky area of wireless services
, investors should note that Globalstar is not Iridium;
Globalstar has several advantages which are inherent in its
model and its cost structure. While it is easy to say that
because Iridium experienced certain problems, Globalstar will
necessarily face the same evils, there are several major
differences including: 1. Costs embedded in the system; 2.
The prices that must be charged based on one's embedded
capital investment; 3. Being the second player and not first (
i.e., learning from Iridium's challenges); 4. Support from
service providers which is critical in establishing
credibility in the market; and 5. Multiple vendors who are ready
with the product.

Although Globalstar has numerous hurdles to achieve over the
next few months and could fall victim to some or many of
same problems, we believe Globalstar is better positioned
right now to succeed than Iridium ever could be given its
model. We believe (as noted below) Globalstar is going to
take it very conservatively with guidance in the near term,
but we were impressed with what they hope to achieve in the
long-term. Significant detail on the investor meeting follows
below.

Financial Guidance

Although the actual results could be substantially different
from what the company is now anticipating, Globalstar
reviewed its expectations for subscriber growth, EBITDA, and
earnings. In a very rapid presentation by Navarra, it was
stated that Globalstar expects to become EBITDA positive with
220,000 customers, should cover operating expenses and
interest with 550,000 customers, and should be completely earnings positive with 1,000,000 customers. Schwartz
indicated that both Loral and Globalstar should be earnings
positive by the fourth quarter of 2000 (which would then
indicate that the company expects Globalstar to have about 1,
000,000 customers by the end of 2000). In terms of guidance for
Globalstar, Navarra posted the following:

With regard to the guidance provided above, we would note the
following:

We had expected the subscriber growth to be higher in 1999 if
the company is on track to launch in September. However, we
believe Globalstar is being conservative with guidance given
the Iridium example. Further, given the fact that they are
only likely to have 120,000 handsets available by the end of
2000, they will obviously not be able to log in our original
December 1998 estimate of around 150,000 subscribers. We have amended our forecasts accordingly for this new
information. However, Globalstar expects to exceed all of
our forecasts (about which they provided information) in
every area beginning in 2000. Globalstar exceeds our
subscriber number in 2000 by 9% (according to the one million
subscribers they should have if they expect to be EPS
positive by the end of 2000); and exceeds our subscriber number
in 2002 by 6% (our number is 3.2 million).

Given the more conservative subscriber numbers, the revenue
estimate for 1999 is considerably lower than we were
expecting at $10 million versus $27 million. However, they
expect to exceed our revenue forecasts by 28% in 2002.

Although EBITDA guidance was not provided for 1999, the
company expects to exceed our EBITDA for 2000 by 50%.
Our
estimate is for approximately $1.9 billion in operating

cashflow or just shy of 80% EBITDA margins. They expect 94%
EBITDA margins. Although we would be thrilled if this occurs,
this may be ambitious.

Given the more conservative subscriber numbers, the earnings
loss expected for 1999 is considerably less than what we were
expecting at ($1.81) per share, and consensus at ($1.95) per
share.

The 2002 earnings number is substantially higher, about 56%,
than our expectations of $5.41.


Concerns

When asked what he worries about, Schwartz correctly answered
"everything," but in all seriousness, he said that he is very
comfortable with where Globalstar is right now. However
both Schwartz and Clark did identify several items which are
all logical concerns to have at this point: 1. Coordinating
service provider experience; as noted above, not all service
providers are going to have the level of sophistication and
effort involved as a company like AirTouch; 2. Getting
gateways completed; although Schwartz mentioned that he is
not as concerned about this now that the company has six or
seven gateways operational, he still watches the progress
here as this component is integral to the operations of the
network; 3. Satellite launches; clearly, this one goes
without saying. Although Globalstar has had a perfect record
since September 1998, they still have another 12 satellites
to launch before commercial service can be up and running.
Any additional launch failures would be likely pose delays in
the service and financial targets, and would be
psychologically draining on everyone. 4. Although he believes
Globalstar will be able to raise the $600 million they need Schwartz acknowledged that in light of the recent Iridium
events, the cost to obtain these funds might be higher. He
mentioned that recent turmoil at Iridium has caused investors
to shy away somewhat from all satellite names. However, he
continues to believe that Globalstar should be differentiated
from Iridium (as do we). Schwartz mentioned that it is still
their intention to do a high-yield debt offering this summer;
they would only consider equity as a very last resort.