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Technology Stocks : Amazon.com, Inc. (AMZN) -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: tonyt who wrote (59762)6/1/1999 10:58:00 PM
From: MoonBrother  Respond to of 164684
 
01:48am EDT 1-Jun-99 BancBoston Robertson Stephens (Levitan, Lauren 415-693-3
AMZN: Barron's Arguments Weak, in Our View; Reiterate Strong Buy.

June 1, 1999

A M A Z O N . C O M , I N C .

Barron's Arguments Weak, in Our View; Reiterate Strong Buy.

Lauren Cooks Levitan (415) 693-3309 lauren_cooks_levitan@rsco.com
Keith E. Benjamin, CFA (415) 693-3285 keith_benjamin@rsco.com

BancBoston Robertson Stephens BancBoston Robertson Stephens
AMAZON.COM, Inc. AMZN $118 3/4 6/1/99
Industry: E-Tailing
CHANGE IN... YES/NO WAS IS Lauren Cooks Levitan 415 693 3309
Rating: No SBUY Keith E. Benjamin, CFA 415 693 3285
EPS 1998A: $(0.50)
EPS 1999E: No $(1.73) FY Dec 1998A 1999E 2000E
EPS 2000E: No $(1.05) EPS*: 1Q$(0.07) $(0.23) A
52-Week Range: $221-13 2Q$(0.12) $(0.51)
Shares Outstanding(MM) 175.1 3Q$(0.16) $(0.52)
Market Cap ($MM) $20,791 4Q$(0.14) $(0.46)
Avg Daily Trading Vol (000) 4337 Year$(0.50) $(1.73) $(1.05)
3/99 Bk Value/Sh, pf $0.44 P/E NM NM NM
3/99 Tot Debt/Tot Cap, pf 95% Cal Yr$(0.50) $(1.73) $(1.05)
C1999E ROAE NM CalYr P/E NM NM NM
Price/Book Value: 268.1x Revs ($M) 1998A 1999E 2000E
Net Cash/Sh ($0.52) 1Q $87.4 $293.6 A
Div/Yld: NA 2Q $116.0 $310.0
3-Yr Sec Growth Rate: 50% 3Q $153.7 $330.0
* 1998/1999/2000 EPS exclude amortizati 4Q $252.9 $400.0
adjusted for 3-for-1 split effective 1/ Year $610.0$1,333.6 $2,000.0
Net cash includes $1,443 MM in cash andMkt Cap/Rev 34.1x 15.6x 10.4x

Key Points:

** Barron's wrote a scathing review of AMZN's prospects. We respectfully
disagree.

** We see AMZN evolving from that of a pure-play eTailer of books, etc. to a
future shopping portal.

** We believe this leverage and scalability will drive a superior business
model with multiple high-margin revenue opportunities.

** We stand by our view that Amazon.com has a great strategy and see every
reason to give the management the benefit of the doubt as it executes on
that strategy.

** Reiterate Strong Buy.

SUMMARY

Barron's wrote a scathing review of Amazon.com's prospects that seems longer on
personal insults than original or insightful content. To review the few points
that the author attempts to make, the tone is set by noting the large
valuation, suggesting that was a fault in and of itself, followed by a focus on
competitive risks. The first step is to talk about the annualized growth in
book sales slowing from 825% to about the 90% level. This is the law of large
numbers and not bad, in our view. The next big threat proposed are digital
books downloaded into unreadable and expensive devices. We do not expect that
will be big soon. Next, authors and publishers may start their own web sites.
We believe multi-title aggregation will remain convenient to the average book
buyer. Then there is the old line about existing retailers coming on stronger,
with Barnes & Noble just raising more money, etc. Quotes are included to
counter the beliefs that there is a first-to-market advantage on the Web and
that Wal-Mart will take over when it decides. Of course, Amazon.com will
always face execution risk, but this article would not even have been written
if the leadership position was not the company's to lose. Price competition
clearly exists in the book business, but Amazon's repeat buyer percentages are
so high as to suggest its not the critical factor in the company's success.
Service remains key, in our view. This explains why the company is investing
aggressively in building distribution infrastructure. Unlike companies also
burdened with stores, it should be able to manage inventory far more
efficiently and profitably. The author does not seem to appreciate the need to
differentiate between gross margins and marketing investments to build the
brand. It mentions the new products brought into the site through partial
acquisitions as a defensive strategy, without noting the incremental high
margins from rent to other stores. Some people seem to relish in looking at
stocks as half full. For reference, many in the media challenged AOL on every
possible level, seeming to miss the point at every turn. We stand by our view
that Amazon.com has a great strategy and see every reason to give the
management the benefit of the doubt as it executes on that strategy.

BUSINESS IMPACT

In our opinion, Amazon is the dominant online brand with a book share that we
estimate at over 80%. We continue to favor Amazon's strategy of building out
its infrastructure and sourcing a greater percentage of its books from
publishers, which should help the company sustain healthy product margins in
this pricing environment. Longer term, we believe Amazon should be able to
maintain healthy overall margins as the company's business model shifts to a
larger mix of higher-margin fee-based revenues. We feel Amazon's business model
is evolving from that of a pure-play eTailer of books, etc.. to a future
shopping portal, where we believe leverage and scalability really starts to
drive a superior business model with multiple high-margin revenue
opportunities. Thus, we are maintaining our current estimates and believe our
current revenue estimates of $1,334 million in 1999 and $2,000 million in 2000
could hold considerable upside.

INVESTMENT IMPACT

We ask ourselves where will people shop in five years and which brands will
survive the feverish competition. We believe Amazon is the best positioned
eTailer to compete in today's unpredictable competitive conditions. With the
stock trading off more than 40% from recent highs, we strongly recommend
purchase of Amazon's shares during this period of market weakness and in
advance of potential announcements, such as additional product offerings,
equity investments in other e-tailers, and strategic acquisitions, that we
believe will point to Amazon's growing presence as a true eTailing portal. We
continue to rate the shares of Amazon.com a Strong Buy.

ACTION NOW: The shares of Amazon.com are rated a Strong Buy.

THE COMPANY: Amazon.com, Inc. is a leading on-line provider of books and music
CDs via its Web site, Amazon.com. Amazon.com has established itself as a well-
known Internet brand. The company currently offers more than 4.7 million books,
music CDs, videos, DVDs, computer games, and other titles at competitive
prices. Amazon.com's marketing focuses on its ability to allow browsing and
buying of a much greater quantity of books and other media than could be shown
in the largest book and related retail stores. Amazon.com's growing popularity
seems more a function of the convenience of on-line shopping, in our view. We
believe Amazon.com will try to exploit its growing base of loyal buyers through
expansion of its Web site and product offerings.

INVESTMENT THESIS: WE BELIEVE AMAZON.COM IS WELL POSITIONED TO TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF THE INTERNET AS A NEW MEDIUM FOR MARKETING AND COMMERCE.
WE BELIEVE THE COMPANY HAS ALREADY ESTABLISHED ITSELF AS ONE OF THE FIRST,
LEADING ON-LINE MERCHANTS.

INVESTMENT RISKS: Among the risks are (1) the rapidly emerging market with no
earnings validation of the Internet as an effective commerce medium; (2) an
extremely competitive landscape, including other on-line bookstores and new
entrants and on-line service companies; (3) competitive price pressure; (4)
inventory risks associated with new strategy of buying directly from publishers
and maintaining increased physical inventory in warehouses; (5) significant
payments for placement leading Web networks; and (6) probability of significant
losses for at least the next few years.



To: tonyt who wrote (59762)6/1/1999 10:58:00 PM
From: MoonBrother  Respond to of 164684
 
12:47pm EDT 1-Jun-99 Thomas Weisel Partners LLC (Chris Vroom 415-364-2625) AMZ
AMZN:(TWP) Barron's Misses the Point

June 1, 1999 Thomas Weisel Partners LLC

Christopher E. Vroom, CFA AMAZON.COM, INC. - BUY
415-364-2625 BARRON'S MISSES THE POINT
cvroom@tweisel.com

Andrea Dunlevy Internet Retail NASD: AMZN - $112-1/4
415-364-2631
adunlevy@tweisel.com

John Byun
415-364-2749
jbyun@tweisel.com

Company Update

Executive Summary
* Barron's published a highly critical article over the weekend regarding the
viability of Amazon.com's business model.

* In our opinion, e*tailers will continue to take share because they have
articulated a superior value proposition.

* Overall we believe that Amazon will effectively leverage its relationship with
8.0 million + customers to transcend both geographic and category boundaries,
in the process building a very large and highly profitable business.

* We would use any weakness in the stock today to establish or enlarge existing
positions.

Key data: 1998 1999 2000
Price $112.25 EPS
52-Week Range: $222-$13 Q1 ($0.07)A ($0.23)A NE
Market Cap.(MM): $17,612 Q2 ($0.11)A ($0.51)E NE
Shares Out.(MM): 156,897 Q3 ($0.16)A ($0.52)E NE
Avg Daily Vol.: 6,748,291 Q4 ($0.14)A ($0.44)E NE
Fiscal Year End: 31-Dec Year ($0.49)A ($1.70)E ($1.15)E
P/E NA NA NA

Debt/Total Capital: 2% Revenues in MM
Price/ TTM Sales 21.6x Q1 $87A $294A NE
Net Cash/Share $9.20 Q2 $116A $311E NE
Book Value/ Share $0.49 Q3 $154A $341E NE
Price/ Book Value 227.1x Q4 $253A $408E NE
Secular Growth Rate: NA Year $610A $1,353E $1,791E
Cap/Sales 29x 13x 10x

Company Description: Amazon.com, Inc. is the third largest book retailer in the
U.S. The Company pioneered the on-line channel of distribution for books and now
is a leading retailer of music, videos and gifts, as well as an emerging
on-line retail portal through the "shop the web" browser and an online auction
service. It is estimated that 16% of World Wide Web users (13 million) visited
Amazon.com in December 1998.

BARRON'S MISSES THE POINT
Barron's published a highly critical article over the weekend regarding the
viability of Amazon's business model, suggesting that, in the new economy,
manufacturers and/or publishers would eventually replace retailers as direct
purveyors of choice. Typical of the financial press that never seems to voice
these concerns when stocks are in an uptrend, this article will likely fuel
debate in a climate in which investors are already nervous. In our opinion,
e*tailers will continue to take share because they have articulated a superior
value proposition. It's that simple. Moreover, the combination of huge market
share growth potential and low fixed asset intensity will drive outstanding
return on invested capital for those pioneers that successfully execute on the
promise of .com. As such, we would exploit the current uncertainty to
accumulate positions in the leading e*tailers that "get it" including Amazon.com
and eToys in the consumer space and FatBrain.com in the B2B arena. Excerpts
from the Barron's article, along with our viewpoint, follow:

* "The real winners on the net will be firms that sell their own products
directly to consumers. Just look . . . at Sony, Dell and Bertlesmann." In
certain categories, we do see the potential for consumer products companies to
harness the power of the Internet to forge direct relationships with consumers.
However, in many segments including books, category dominant assortment from
many different manufacturers is a critically important aspect of the value
proposition. Category killers in the physical world offer 250,000 titles while
online participants provide better than 1 million titles from a myriad of
publishers large and small. In addition, to the importance of broad selection,
few manufactures are facile in single shipments to individuals and fewer still
have evolved the service culture needed to outperform existing e*tailers. As
such, we believe that the retail channel will remain the overwhelming choice for
consumers in the years ahead.

* "Slowing growth in Amazon's basic book business." True, from unsustainable
gains of 825% and 312% in 1997 and 1998, respectively, sales gains are expected
to moderate to 90-120% in 1999. Reach statistics suggest that Amazon's lead on
the competition remains wide.

* "New technologies . . . allowing consumers to download books via the Internet.
Books can be printed out on traditional computer printers." This is a real
reach, in our opinion. Competing technologies will prevail only when they offer
superior value to the consumer. One is hard pressed to imagine the incremental
value of printing out a hundred pages of a book at home; for that matter,
printing or downloading books will most likely still involve an intermediary
such as Amazon.

* "Adding to Amazon's woes is its decision to build warehouses. Against this
backdrop, Amazon is looking more and more like a traditional retailer." We
believe that owned distribution enables superior customer service and better
inventory control. Amazon currently operates three warehouses in Washington,
Nevada and Delaware. Sales productivity per foot exceeds $3,000. The decision
to own distribution rather that rely upon intermediaries does increase the fixed
asset intensity of the business somewhat-the average cost per warehouse is
around $10-15 million-but hardly makes Amazon look like a traditional retailer.
From a working capital and fixed asset perspective, Amazon's approach remains
far more productive, owned distribution notwithstanding.

Overall we believe that Amazon will effectively leverage its relationship with
8.0 million+ customers to transcend both geographic and category boundaries, in
the process building a very large and highly profitable business. Marketing and
other investments have obscured the underlying profit potential of the business
but we believe that these expenses will be leveraged to produce double-digit
operating margins long-term with ROI dwarfing physical world competitors. We
would use any weakness in the stock today to establish or enlarge existing
positions.