To: Yaacov who wrote (11194 ) 6/6/1999 5:32:00 PM From: goldsnow Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 17770
Yaacov forget about Milo, (won or lost) think Bolshaya Igra... Things seem to have gotten a bit complex. In spite of NATO's bombastic assertions that no negotiations are taking place, but only the presentation of non-negotiable demands, there are clearly negotiations going on. To be more precise, Belgrade is clearly not, at this moment, prepared to simply accept NATO's terms for ending the conflict. After two days of discussions, talks adjourned again without a conclusive settlement emerging. It is not clear what is holding up the agreement. NATO has hinted that it is simply a matter of timetables. We suspect that there are deeper issues involved. First, there is a question of what Milosevic agreed to. Milosevic agreed to the G-8 agreements. The G-8 agreements required that NATO be subordinated to the UN. NATO is representing Milosevic's acceptance of the G-8 compromise as a capitulation by Milosevic to NATO. Milosevic may have been unprepared for the "spin" that NATO put on his acceptance of G-8. In practical terms, he was expecting a UN peace keeping force and found he had brought a NATO occupation. It is possible that Milosevic is genuinely surprised by NATO's interpretation of his acceptance. Under some political attack at home, we must be opened to the possibility that Milosevic is in the process of reconsidering his acceptance. Second, there is a potential political crisis brewing in Moscow. Chernomyrdin has come under attack from the Duma for his handling of the negotiations and Yeltsin himself is said to be extremely unhappy that the bombing is continuing. The perception inside of Russia appears to be that Yeltsin caved in to the West. Yeltsin, who sacrifices politicians as a hobby, is quite capable of turning on Chernomyrdin and along with that, on NATO and the agreement. It has been very important for NATO to represent Milosevic's acceptance of the G-8 agreement as surrender by Serbia. Otherwise, if the G-8 agreement were viewed as it originally was—as a compromise between NATO and Russia—then the question would be whether anything was actually gained by the two month bombing campaign. NATO's public gloating over Serb capitulation may have gone too far, humiliating both Milosevic and Yeltsin, and undercutting the credibility of Chernomyrdin. NATO's spun Belgrade's acceptance for domestic political purposes. The issue on the table now is whether that spin has made it impossible for Milosevic and even the Russians to go through with the deal. It is possible that the only delays are technical in nature. It is also possible that NATO's public presentation of the agreement has caused second thoughts in Belgrade. The most important question, of course, is whether NATO gloating has caused second thoughts in Moscow.stratfor.com