You hit on a key point here:
First off, we permitted a government to come to power in the RVN that was widely considered corrupt, illegitimate, and ineffective
That is the fundamental reason insurgencies win, even when they abuse their own people, at least those not fully on board with their agenda.
Unfortunately, we never corrected that problem in Vietnam, so the insurgents won. We cannot correct the problem in Iraq because the various parties don't want to themselves for their various reasons.
Now ask yourself some Neolib... If the Mahdi army is primarily an Iraqi extension of the Iranian Qud's force, do you really believe they won't attempt to fully exploit the retreat of the US forces from Iraq? And once we're gone and Iran sees its opportunity to turn Shi'a dominated Iraq into a puppet state, what motivation will we possess to re-enter a conflict that has grown in proportion far beyond what previously existed?
That is a question which should have been asked before the war, not now. I have always pointed out Algeria in 1994 as the example that those in high places ignored.
The more important question is what can staying accomplish? What is going to change that has not changed in the previous 4 years? When will it happen and why? If nothing much changes, are we willing to keep this up for how long?
I don't think the Shia are ever going to share power with the Sunni in any meaningful way. We can expend blood & $ trying to keep the wheels on, but we can't stop the vehicle. |
