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To: Janice Shell who wrote (3287)7/27/1999 12:22:00 AM
From: Jeffrey S. Mitchell  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 3795
 
STEINHART & FALCONER LLP
ROGER R. MYERS (State Bar No. 146164)
LISA M. SITKIN State (Bar No. 194127)
333 Market Street, Suite 3200
San Francisco, California 94105
Telephone: (415) 777-3999
Facsimile: (415) 442-0856

Attorneys for Plaintiff
BUSINESS WIRE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

BUSINESS WIRE, a California corporation,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

BUSINESS WIRE, a California corporation,

Plaintiff,

V.

JEFFREY S. MITCHELL, an individual;
WILLIAM ULRICH, an individual; JANICE
SHELL, an individual,

Defendants.

Case No. C 99-1987 CAL

Date: August 20, 1999
Time: 9:30 a.m.
Judge: Charles A. Legge
Court Room: 10

Documents Submitted Herewith:

(1) Decl. of Cathy Baron Tamraz;
(2) Decl. of Neil Bardach;
(3) Decl. of Lauren Kunis;
(4) Decl. of Lisa Sitkin;
(5) Request for Judicial Notice;
(6) Evidentiary Objections

OPPOSITION OF PLAINTIFF BUSINESS WIRE TO DEFENDANTS' SPECIAL MOTION TO
STRIKE ON THE THRESHOLD ISSUE OF WHETHER CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 425.16 APPLIES TO PLAINTIFF'S CAUSES OF ACTION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE(S)

INTRODUCTION ............................................... 1

BACKGROUND ................................................. 2

I. BUSINESS WIRE'S FEDERAL TRADEMARK CLAIMS ARE NOT
SUBJECT TO A MOTION TO STRIKE UNDER CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE ' 425.16 BECAUSE FEDERAL CLAIMS BROUGHT
IN FEDERAL COURT ARE GOVERNED EXCLUSIVELY BY
FEDERAL -- NOT STATE -- LAW ................................ 4

II. BUSINESS WIRE'S CLAIMS ALSO ARE NOT SUBJECT TO CALIFORNIA
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ' 425.16 BECAUSE THEY DO NOT
ARISE OUT OF DEFENDANTS' SPEECH IN A PUBLIC FORUM
ON A PUBLIC ISSUE ......................................... 8

A. Code Of Civil Procedure ' 425.16 Does Not Apply To Fraud
Or Contract Claims Based On Misrepresentations By A Party
To The Formation Of A Contract ............................ 10

B. Code Of Civil Procedure ' 425.16 Does Not Apply To
Trademark Dilution And Related Acts That Did Not Address
A Matter Of Public Interest In A Public Forum ................... 13

1. A Privately Controlled Area Where The Public Does
Not Have General Access To Speak, Such As Defendants'
Website And Business Wire's Distribution Service,
Is Not A Public Forum .............................. 14

2. Defendants' Subsequent Speech On A Matter Of Public
Interest Cannot Be Used To Fit Trademark Infringement
And Unfair Competition Under ' 425.16 Where, As Here,
The Wrongful Acts Did Not Themselves Involve
Speech On That Subject ............................ 15

CONCLUSION ................................................ 18

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES PAGE(S)

FEDERAL CASES

Ackerman v. Western Electric Co.,
643 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Cal. 1986),
afl'd, 860 F.2d 1514 (9th Cir. 1988) ..................... 6, 8

Chicago Jt...Board v. Chicago Tribune Co.,
435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970) .................................. 14

Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663
(1991) ........................ 10, 12

Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.,
604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979) .................................. 18

Dallas CowboYs Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters. Inc.,
600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir_ 1979) ................................ 18

Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938) .............................. 6

Hanna v. Plumcr, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) ........................... 5-8

International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co.,
633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980) ................................. 1, 5-7

Loving v. Boren, 956 F. Supp. 953 (W.D. Okla. 1997),
aff'd,, 133 F.3d 771 (10th Cir. 1998) .......................... 15

Maternally Yours v. Your Maternity Shop,
234 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1956) ................................. 1, 5-7

Mendes v, New England Duplicating Co.,
94 F. Supp. 558 (D. Mass. 1950),
afl'd, 190 F.2d 415 (lst Cir. 1951) ............................. 5

Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n,
688 F.2d 1033 (Sth Cir. 1982) (eh bane) .......................... 14

Robertson v. Wegmann,
436 U.S. 584 (1978) .......................................... 8

San Antonio CommnniW Hosp. v. Southern California Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 125 F.3d 1230 (9th Cir. 1997) ................... 12

Schenck v. United States, 249 U-S- 47 (1919) ................ 2-4, 17

Solg Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co.,
317 U.S. 173 (1942) ....................................... 1, 5-7

United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.,
171 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999) ........................... 6, 7

United States v., Douglas,
579 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1978) ................................ 14

Nalt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates,
581 F_2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978) ................................... 18

STATE CASES

Bradbury.v. Superior Court,
49 Cal. App. 4th 1108 (1996) ........................ 7, 8, I0-13, 18

Braun v. Chronicle Pub. Co.,
52 Cal. App. 4th 1036 (1997) ................................. 9

Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity,
19 Cal. 4th 1106 (1999) ................................... 9, 10,12

Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicl.e....pub. Co.,
37 Cal. App. 4th 855 (1995) ............................. 4,10,13,15

Chavez v. Kea[, 34 Cal. App. 4th 1406 (1995) ..................... 8

Ericsson GE. Mobile Comm. inc. v. C.S.I. Telecomm. Eng'rs,
49 Cal. App. 4th 1591 (1996) ................................ 9

Prisoners Union v. Department of Corrections,
135 Cal. App. 3d 930 (1982) ................................... 14

Wilcox v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 809
(1994) ........................... Passim

Zhao v. Wong, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1114 (1996) ................. 10,13-15

STATUTES AND RULES

Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. 425.16 .............................. Passim
15 U.S.C.A. '' 1051-1127 ........................................ 5
28 U.S.C. '' 2071-2074 .......................................... 5, 8
42 U.S.C. ' 1988 ................................................ 8
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 1 ............................................. 5, 8

INTRODUCTION

After deliberately deceiving plaintiff Business Wire and misusing its
trademark to give credibility and visibility to their Internet invest-
ment hoax, defendants now seek to recast their unlawful acts as speech
on a matter of public interest -- even though their conduct giving
rise to this lawsuit had no reference to that subject and even though
their comments in unveiling the hoax touted their cleverness and
advertised their business, but did not discuss the matter of public
interest they now claim to be advancing. Defendants advocate this
tortured leap of logic in an attempt to bring Business Wire's causes
of action for federal and state trademark infringement, unfair compe-
tition, fraud, breach of contract and related claims under the protec-
tive scope of California's anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure
' 425.16.

California's anti-SLAPP statute was never intended to protect such
conduct. To begin with, California law cannot be applied in federal
court to Business Wire's federal causes of action for trademark in-
fringement in violation of the federal Lanham Act. Maternally Yours v.
Your Maternity Shop, 234 F.2d 538,540 n.1 (2d Cir. 1956) ("federal law
govern[s] infringement of federally-registered trade-marks .... ");
accord Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176
(1942); International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633
F.2d 912,915-17 (gth Cir. 1980) (federal law applies to Lanham Act
claim).

Moreover, "section 425.16 does not apply in every case where the
defendant may be able to raise a First Amendment defense to a cause of
action. Rather, it is limited to exposing and dismissing SLAPP suits
-- lawsuits 'brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the re-
dress of grievances' 'in connection with a public issue.'"
Wilcox....v.. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 809, 819 (1994) (quot-
ing statute). It follows that ' 425.16 does not apply to unlawful
conduct for which there is no First Amendment defense and which is not
speech on a public issue but defendants now claim was intended to
bring attention to a matter of public interest. Id. at 820-21.

Put another way, defendants cannot shout "fire" in a crowded theater
and then attempt to invoke ' 425.16 in defense to lawsuits by injured
patrons by claiming the tortious exclamation was intended to illus-
trate a matter of public interest such as the lack of adequate fire
exits. See Schenck v_ U.njted States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Yet that
is exactly what defendants are attempting. They should not be allowed
to succeed.

BACKGROUND

In March 1999, defendants planned a hoax involving a website for a
phony Interact investment opportunity in a fake company called "Web-
node." DeLl. of Defendant Ulrich, 6 3. To promote their hoax, defend-
ants contacted Business Wire to distribute a phony press release about
their bogus company. Id., 6 5. Business Wire would never have attached
its trademark to the release and distributed it in its business chan-
nels had defendants disclosed that the release was a hoax. DeLl. of
Cathy Baron Tamraz, ~ 4; Deal. of Nell Bardach, p 4.

Consequently, defendants deliberately misled Business Wire. They did
not inform Business Wire the press release was phony and its contents
false. Instead, defendants deceived Business Wire into believing they
were acting on behalf of a legitimate company and represented that the
contents of the release were accurate. Decl. of Lauren Kunis, 6 3 &
Exh. 1. Only on assurances from defendants that Webnode was an actual
company did Business Wire agree to distribute their press release.
Id., 6 3; Tamraz Decl.,p 4.

When the press release was distributed on April 1, 1999, it became
apparent that defendants had deceived Business Wire for a simple
reason: Distributing defendants' press release under Business Wire's
trademark gave their Webnode scheme credibility.

For more than 30 years, Business Wire has distributed press releases
to news organizations, informational databases, and businesses. Tamraz
Decl., 6 2. Subscribers to its services throughout the world rely on
the company's reputation, credibility and goodwill as assurance that
releases Business Wire distributes accurately reflect what actual
companies are saying. Id. Thus when skeptical Internet investors began
questioning the legitimacy of Webnode, defendants traded on the repu-
tation and goodwill of Business Wire's trademark to convince these
investors that the company and investment opportunity were real. I Due
to

Y See, e.g., Decl. of Lisa Sitkin, Exh. 2 WebNode puts out BizWire
press releases. Why do you think WebNode is not, as you say, 'real'?")
(April 1~ 1999 e,mail from defendant
(continued...)

defendants' use of Business Wire's trademark, Internet users and news
organizations were tricked into believing that Webnode was an actual
company. See__~e Ulrich Decl., ~ 7 & Exh. G.

The press release that defendants deceived Business Wire into dissemi-
nating under the Business Wire trademark promoted phony investment
opportunities in Webnode. Comp., Exh. B. Defendants' release falsely
asserted that Webnode had obtained a government contract to raise
money to improve the Internet. id. The release was designed to create
the impression that Webnode was a real company offering a legitimate
investment opportunity and included references to such publicly traded
companies as AT&T and Microsoft. Id. To further hype their hoax,
defendants posted their bogus press release, with the Business Wire
trademark attached, to their fictitious World Wide Website at
www.webnode.com. Ulrich Decl., 6 5. More than 1 ~000 investors viewed
the phony press release posted to the Webnode website, contacted
defendants and/or registered to invest. See id~., 6 7_

Defendants' press release, and their Webnode website, did not indicate
that the press release and company were part of a joke or parody. Nor
did they mention or discuss the subject of internet investment scums
and contained no warning against such schemes.

When defendants' subsequently announced that their press release and
website had been a hoax, they did not at that time claim that the hoax
had been perpetrated in order to educate the public about the menace
of Internet investment seams. Instead, defendants at the time touted
their clever "3rd annual April Hoax" and used their phony website for
the commercial purpose of advertising Magnetic Diary Studios, which is
the Website Design firm of defendant Bill Ulrich. See Ulrich Decl.,
Exh- F.2

~-~(...continued)
Shell), Exh. 3 CI think it's on the level. Did you see the release:
[linking to press release with Business Wire trademark]") (April 1,
1999 e-mail from defendant Ulrich).

2_~ This is not the first time that defendant Ulrich has used defend-
ants' phony websites that he has designed to promote his business. See
Sitkin Decl., Exh. 1. And defendant Shell ~s currently a defendant in
at least one other lawsuit, which alleges that her self-proclaimed
efforts to "expose" Internet investment seams are a part of a scheme
to profit off of shortselling stocks that defendants criticize on the
Internet_ Se~e Request for Judicial Notice, Exh_ 1.

When Business Wire discovered it had been deceived by defendants, it
removed the press release from its website and demanded that defend-
ants remove the Business Wire trademark from the release posted to
their Webnode website. Tamraz Decl., 4 6. Defendants refused, opting
instead to change the trademark on the press release from BUSINESS
WIRE to BIDNESS WIRE, which is confusingly similar to Business Wire's
registered trademarks. Id.; Ulrich DeLl., 4 12. Unapologetic, defend-
ants then accused Business Wire. of knowingly allowing fraudulent
activities to be conducted via its wire service. Id.; Comp., 44 29,
67. Unable to obtain meaningful relief from defendants, Business Wire
was left with no choice but to file this lawsuit for violation of the
federal Lanham Act, state trademark dilution, breach of contract,
fraud, defamation, unfair competition and civil conspiracy. Tamraz
Decl., 6 7.

In response, defendants filed a special motion to strike Business
Wire's federal and state law causes of action under California's anti-
SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure ' 425.16. Business Wire then
filed an expedited ex parte application to bifurcate the proceedings
on the special motion to strike so that the threshold issue of whether
defendants have carried their burden of showing ' 425.16 actually
applies to any of these causes of action )before Business Wire is put
to the burden of making the showing of a probability of success on he
merits required of any causes of action to which ' 425.16 applies.
Defendants opposed Business Wire's application to bifurcate, but in an
Order dated July 7, 1999, this Court granted Business Wire's applica-
tion and bifurcated the proceedings.



To: Janice Shell who wrote (3287)7/27/1999 12:26:00 AM
From: Jeffrey S. Mitchell  Respond to of 3795
 
I.

BUSINESS WIRE'S FEDERAL TRADEMARK CLAIMS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO A MOTION
TO STRIKE UNDER CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ' 425,16 BECAUSE
FEDERAL CLAIMS BROUGHT IN FEDERAL COURT
ARE GOVERNED EXCLUSIVELY BY FEDERAL -- NOT STATE -- LAW

Business Wire's first three causes of action are for misuse of a
federally registered trademark under the federal Lanham Act. Defend-
ants' attempt to apply the state "procedural remedy" of California
Code of Civil Procedure ' 425.16, Lafayette Morehou~ Inc. v. Chronicle
Pub. Co., 37 Cal. App. 4th 855,858 (1995), to these federal claims in
federal court is plainly improper. With respect to federal trademark
claims, it has been clear for nearly 50 years that federal procedural
and substantive law applies:

The law governing the issues in this case is federal law .... [l]ssues
arising under the head ling] of infringement of a federally registered
trade-mark are governed by federal rather than state law .... The
present trade-mark statute, known as the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. ''
1051-1127, does not appear to deal specifically with this conflicts
question, but both the Act itself in 15 U.S.C.A. ' 1127, and the.
Senate Committee Report on the Act, 1946, U.S. Code Cong. Serv., pp.
1276, 1277, manifest an intent to regulate trade-marks used in inter-
state commerce along uniform national lines, thereby avoiding the
chaotic interference of diverse state laws.

Mendes v. New England Duplicating Co_., 94 F. Supp. 558,560 (D. Mass.
1950), aff'd, 190 F,2d 415 (lst Cir. 1951);3 accord, ~.g.., Interna-
tional Order of Job's Daur_bters v. Lindebura & Co., 633 F.2d 912,
915-17 (9th Cir. 1980) (determining that federal law applied to claim
under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. ' 1125(a)); Maternally Yours v. Your
Maternity Shop, 234 F.2d 538,540 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1956) ("The prevailing
view subsequent to Eri~e has been that federal law governed infringe-
ment of federally-registered trade-marks .... ").

This well-established rule that federal trademark claims brought in
federal court are governed exclusively by federal law is compelled by
the equally settled general rule that all federal causes of action
adjudicated in federal court are governed by federal -- not state --
law. Se~e Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 1 ("These rules govern the procedure in
the United States district courts in all suits of a civil
nature ...."); 28 U.S.C. '' 2071-74 ("Rules Enabling Act") (giving
Supreme Court authority to prescribe rules of procedure for federal
courts in civil actions).

"One of the shaping purposes of the Federal Rules is to bring about
uniformity in the federal courts by getting away from local rules."
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965); se...~e Hart & Wechsler,
The Federal Courts and The Federal System 664 (4th Ed. 1996). Applying
a state statute -- such as Code of Civil Procedure ' 425.16, which
defendants seek to apply here -- to federal claims in federal court
would offend this policy by subjecting litigants who are'properly
before a federal court on a federal cause of action to the vagaries of
disparate state law rules and procedures that could have the effect of
negating substantive protections afforded by federal law. See Sola
Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S_ 173, 176 (1942) ("The
federal courts have been consistent in holding that local rules of
estoppel will not

~-' All emphases are added unless otherwise noted.

be permitted to thwart the purposes of statutes of the United States.
").

While the "Erie doctrine" recognizes an exception to the rule that
federal law governs the adjudication of claims brought in federal
court, this exception applies only to state causes of action in feder-
al court -- not to federal claims such as Business Wire's three Lanham
Act claims. Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts must apply state
substantive law to state claims brought in federal courts. Erie R. CO-
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see United States ex rel. Newsham
v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co_, 171 F.3d 1208, 1217-18 (9th Cir.
1999) (applying "the Erie doctrine" to find that California's Code of
Civil Procedure ' 425.16 applied to state law counterclaints brought
in federal court).

However, it has been "familiar doctrine" since at least 1942 "that the
prohibition of a federal statute may not be set at naught, or its
benefits denied, by State statute or state common law rules_ In such a
case our decision is not controlled by Erie R_ Co. v_ To~.Bpkins."
Sola Electric, 317 U.S. at 176. In other words, "the source of the
right sued upon ... determines whether federal or state law applies."
International Order of Job's Daughters, 633 F.2d at 915 (citing Mater-
nally Yours, 234 F.2d at 540-41 n. 1). Consequently, "the Erie doc-
trine is inapplicable to claims or issues created and gover, ed by
federal law," such as Business Wire's three claims under the federal
Lanham Act. Maternally...Yours, 234 F.2d at 541 n. 1 (citing Sola
Electric, 317 U_S_ at 176).

Beyond being compelled by clear precedent, the result that a state
statute such as Code of Civil Procedure ' 425.16 cannot apply to a
federal claim brought in federal court is the only result that makes
sense. The general rule under Erie is that state substantive law
applies to state causes of action in federal court, but that federal
procedural rules apply to all causes of action -- state and federal --
in federal court. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465 ("The broad command of
Erie ... [and] the [Rules] Enabling Act [was that] federal courts are
to apply I state substantive law and federal procedural law. ").. As
Judge Schwarzer once noted, where Erie applies, the basic question
"s [whether] the [rule at issue is] substantive, so that state law
applies, or procedural, so that federal law applies .... " Ackerman
v. Western Electric Co.. 643 F. Supp. 836, 858 (N.D. Cal. 1986),
afl'd, 860 F.2d 1514 (gth Cir. 1988). Thus, where a cause of action
brought in federal court is based on federal substantive law -- such
as the Lanham Act -- there is no possible basis for applying state law
since state substantive law cannot apply to federal causes of action
and state procedures never apply in a federal forum,4

It is not surprising, then, that defendants have not cited a single
case in which a federal court hearing federal Lanham Act claims ap-
plied state law -- and have cited no case applying California Code of
Civil Procedure ' 425.16 to federal causes of action brought in feder-
al court. In Newsham, which defendants cited in their opposition to
Business Wire's motion to bifurcate, the Ninth Circuit applied "the
Erie doctrine" in holding that ' 425.16 applied to state law counter-
claitns in federal court. 171 F.3d at 1218 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965)). Since "the Erie doctrine is inapplicable to
claims or issues created and governed by federal law," Maternally
Yours, 234 F.2d at 541 n. l, Newsham is inapplicable to Business
Wire's three federal Lanham Act claims. Id.; Sola Electric, 317 U.S.
at 176; International Order of Job's Daughters, 633 F.2d at 915-17.

Equally inapplicable is Bradbur% v. Superior Court.. 49 Cai. App. 4th
1108 (1996), in which California's Code of Civil Procedure ' 425.16
was applied to federal civil rights claims brought in a California
state court. The Bradbury court was merely applying the "general
rule ... that where an action founded on a federal statute is brought
in a state court, the law of the state controls in matters of practice
and procedure unless the federal statute

4~ Contrary to defendants' position, then, the concerns about forum
shopping that animate the Erie doctrine -- and that were noted by the
Ninth Circuit when it applied the Erie doctrine to hold Code of Civil
Procedure ' 425.16 applicable to state law claims brought in federal
court, Newsham, 171 F.3d at 1218 -- are simply not implicated where,
as here, federal causes of action are at issue, if the mere specter of
forum shopping were to control the rule applied in every federal case,
then federal courts would always be required to apply state )practices
and procedures to claims over which federal and state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction. However, Congress and the Supreme Court
rejected such a regime when they authorized and approved the Federal
Rules of Civil.Procedure Se.e. Haan~a, 380 U.S. at 472; Hart & Wech-
sler, The Federal Courts and The Federal System at 664. Inherent in
the Federal Rules is the acknowledgment that application of federal
procedures in diversity and pendent jurisdiction cases would occasion-
ally result in different results than if the case had been tried in
state court under state procedures, but the Supreme Court expressly
held that the fact that forum shopping thus might occur was not suffi-
cient to invalidate the requirement that federal law applies in feder-
al court. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473. provides otherwise." Chavez v. Keat,
34 Cal. App. 4th 1406, 1413-14 (1995) (analyzing whether state law
rule regarding punitive damages evidence should apply in civil rights
action under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983); see Bradbury, 49 Cai, App. 4th at
1118. Such a rule has no bearing on federal claims brought in federal
court, where federal procedural rules control. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro.
1; 28 U.S.C. '' 2071-74; Hanna, 380 U_S. at 465; Ackerman, 643 F.
Supp. at 858.s

II.

BUSINESS WIRE'S CLAIMS ALSO ARE NOT SUBJECT TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE ' 425.16 BECAUSE THEY DO NOT ARISE OUT OF DEFENDANTS'
SPEECH IN A PUBLIC FORUM ON A PUBLIC ISSUE

Beyond the well-settled rule that only federal law applies to' Busi-
ness Wire's federal Lanham Act claims, there is another independent
reason why California Code of Civil Procedure ' 425.16 does not apply
to these federal claims -- nor to Business Wire's state law claims for
trademark dilution, breach of contract, fraud, defamation, unfair
competition and

-----

-~ Even further afield is defendants' bizarre assertion that federal
civil rights law somehow "mandates" application of California Code of
Civil Procedure ' 425.16 to federal trademark claims brought in feder-
al court. See Def's Opp. to Bifurcation at 7 (citing 42 U.S.C. '
1988). By its plain terms, ' 1988 is expressly limited to cases in
which jurisdiction is conferred on the district courts by federal
civil rights statutes. Entitled "Proceedings in vindication of civil
rights," ' 1988(a) provides in pertinent part:

The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the dis-
trict courts by the provisions of titles 13, 24, and 70 of the Revised
Statutes for the protection of all persons in the United States in
their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and
enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as
such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases
where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the
provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses
against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitu-
tion and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction
of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States,
shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and
disposition of the cause ....

Titles 13, 24 & 70 of the Revised Statutes, to which ' 1988 refers,
confer jurisdiction in civil rights cases. Thus by its plain terms, '
1988 is limited to "'the context of a federal civil rights action,'"
as even the case cited by defendants recognizes. Robertson v. Wegmann,
436 U.S. 584, 588 (1978) (quoting Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S.
693,703 (1973)). Business Wire did not bring a federal civil rights
action and therefore ' 1988 simply does not apply.

-----

civil conspiracy. Simply stated, none of these causes of action arise
out of defendants' First Amendment speech on a public issue and hence
are not within the scope of the statue.

Section 425.16 only applies to causes of action arising from defend-
ants' acts "in furtherance of the [defendants'] right of petition or
free speech under the United States or California Constitution in
connection with a public issue." Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. '
425.16(b)(1). To determine whether defendants acts meet this require-
ment, courts must look to subdivision (e) of the statute, which de-
fines the above-quoted phrase to mean the following:

(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legisla-
tive, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official pro-
ceeding authorized by law; (2) any written or oral statement or writ-
ing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by
a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official
proceeding authorized by law; (3) any written or oral statement or
writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in con-
nection with an issue of public interest; (4) or any other conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or
the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public
issue or an issue of public interest.

It is defendants' burden to establish that each cause of action arises
out of speech activity that falls within one of these categories.
Braun v. Chronicle Pub. Co., 52 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 1042-43 (1997);
Wilcox v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 809,819-20 (1994). Any
cause of action for which defendants fail to carry this burden is not
subject to an anti-SLAPP motion under ' 425.16. Wilcox, 27 Cal_ App.
4th at 819; accord Ericsson GE Mobile Comm., Inc. v. C.S.I. Telecomm.
Eng'rs, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1591, 1603 (1996).6 Defendants have utterly
failed to carry this burden as to any of the causes of action in the
complaint. They do not contend Business Wire's causes of action are
within categories 1, 2 or 4 of ' 425.16(e). Rather, defendants' sole
argument is that Business Wire's claims are within category 3 because,
they assert, each claim arises out of statements made by defend-
ants on their website or in a press release distributed by Business
Wire, and [ii] such statements were thus made in a public forum on a
matter of public interest. Defs' MPA at 7.

Defendants are wrong on both counts. First, Business Wire's causes of
action for fraud and breach of contract are not based on what defend-
ants said on their website or in

_6~ Ericsson GE Mobile was disapproved on other grounds in Briggs v.
Eden Council for H~Hope and Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 1123 n.10
(1999).

the press release. To the contrary, these claims are based on misrep-
resentations defendants made only to Business Wire in a private com-
mercial transaction when the parties entered into a contractual rela-
tionship. As one appellate court has explained, "it would be an ab-
surdity to suggest" that such claims "seeking damages based upon
theories of breach of contract or misrepresentation" would be within
the scope of ' 425.16. Ericsson GE Mobile. 49 Cal. App, 4th at 1601;
see Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U,S. 663, 671 (1991) (cause of
action "for breach of a promise" by newspaper does not arise out of
First Amendment protected speech).

Second, even those causes of action based on statements on the website
or in the Dress release do not meet either criteria for invoking '
425.16(e)(3). Like statements in a newspaper, statements on a website
or in a press release do not constitute statements made in a >public
forum_ Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Pub. Co., 37 Cal. App.
4th 855, 863 n,5 (1995) (newspaper is not a public forum); accord Zhao
v. Wong, 48 Cal. App, 4th 1114, 1125 (1996).7 Nor do these statements
constitute speech on a public issue. The statements at issue in the
website and press release never once mention investment seams, the
purported matter of public interest to which defendants now claim
their statements were connected.

A. Code-Of Civil Procedure ' 425.16 Does Not Apply To Fraud Or Con-
tract Claims Based On Misrepresentations By A Party To The Formation
Of A Contract Business Wire's breach of contract and fraud claims are
based on defendants' false representations and material omissions in
private communications to Business Wire on which the company relied in
entering into a private commercial transaction with defendants. When
defendants contacted Business Wire, they knew but did not disclose
that the company they claimed to be representing did not exist, that
the investment opportunity they claimed to be offering was a sham, and
that neither they nor their purported company bad been granted govern-
ment contracts for improvements to the Internet -- yet they made all
these false representations (and more) to Business Wire in order to
deceive Business Wire into entering into a contract with defendants.
See Kunis Decl., ~ 2-3 & Exh. 1; Bardach Decl,, Exh. 1. Aware that
their representations about their "company" were false, defendants
nonetheless

Zt Zhao was disapproved on other grounds in Briggs, 19 Cal_ 4th at
1123 n. 10.

entered into a contract that promised, inter alia, that their repre-
sentations were accurate.

None of defendants' false representations and material omissions to
Business Wire were made in a website or press release, let alone in a
"public forum." To the contrary, they were made in private e-mail and
telephone calls between defendants and Business Wire and in the con-
tract defendants executed with Business Wire. Such private misrepre-
sentations are not within the scope of ' 425.16. Ericsson GE Mobile,
49 Cal. App. 4th at 1601.

In Ericsson, the lawsuit was based on defendant CSI's allegedly false
representations to Orange County pursuant to CSI's contract with
Orange County. Id. at 159496; CSI moved to strike Ericsson's lawsuit
under ' 425.16. The trial court granted the motion, but the Court of
Appeal reversed on the ground, inter alia, that causes of action
arising out.t of representations by a party to a contract are not
within the scope of ' 425.16:

Here, the acts upon which Ericsson is relying in contending that
defendants interfered with its prospective economic advantage are the
same acts which could form the basis for an action by the County,
against CSI, for breach of contract. If the County rather than Erics-
son had brought a suit seeking damages based upon theories of breach
of contract or n, misrepresentation, it would be an absurdity to sug-
gest the County's action would be barred by the defense of free
speech. To do so would open the door to the applicability of section
425.16 to breach of contract or fraud actions where the act of the
party relates to the formation or performance of contractual obliga-
tions and not with respect to the exercise of the right of free
speech.

Id. at 1601-02. As Ericsson makes clear, ' 425.16 does not apply to
Business Wire's causes If action for "breach of contract or fraud"
because they are based on statements made in "the 'formation ... of
contractual obligations." Id.

Ericsson also illustrates that defendants cannot invoke ' 425.16 by
claiming, after the fact, that their misrepresentations were motivated
by some public issue. Id. at 1603 (rejecting argument that because
"the expenditure of public funds" was a matter of public interest that
CSi's representations pursuant to its contractual relationship con-
cerning a communication system's compliance with county specifications
was "in connection with" that matter of public interest). Rather, the
act giving rise to the cause of action must involve some facial
"exercise ... of free speech" in order to invoke ' 425.16. Id. at 1602
(distinguishing causes of action based on statements made in "the
formation or performance of contractual

obligations" from those based on statements made in "the exercise ...
of free speech").8

The seminal case in California interpreting ' 425.16 also points out
this important distinction. As Wilcox v. Superior Court explains, '
425.16 applies to causes of action that arise out of acts that direct-
ly implicate First Amendment rights, but does not apply to claims that
arise out of facts that do not directly implicate such rights even if
the defendants :claim to have been motivated to advance their First
Amendment rights o~, a public issue. Wilcox, 27 Cal. App. 4th at 820-
21. On the one hand, Wilcox said, ' 425.16 would apply where defend-
ants were sued over "a lawsuit against a developer" because "the
defendant would have a prima facie First Amendment defense." Id. at
820. Similarly, "if the plaintiff's suit arises out of defendant's
constitutionally protected conduct, such as a peaceful economic boy-
cott[,] the plaintiff should be required to satisfy the statute's
requirements." Id. at 821. On the other hand, "if the defendant's act
was burning down the developer's office as a political protest the
defendant's motion to strike could be summarily denied." Id. at 820.

There is no prima facie First Amendment defense to Business Wire's
breach of contract and fraud claims. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 665 ("The
question before us is whether the First Amendment prohibits a plain-
tiff from recovering damages, under state promissory estoppel law, for
a newspaper's breach o ra promise of confidentiality given to the
plaintiff in exchange for information. We hold that it does not.");
San A.ntonio Community Hosp. v. Southern California Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 125 F.3d 1230, 1239 (9th Cir. 1997) ("The First Amendment
does not protect fraud."). Moreover, the false representations giving
rise to these Claims were not made in a public forum and never mention
the purported matter of public interest defendants now claim justifies
their unlawful conduct. Business Wire is not attempting

Although Ericsson. was disapproved on another ground in Briees, its
analysis on both of these points remains good law. Brings only disap-
proved Ericsson on the narrow issue of whether a party moving to
strike under ' 425.16(e)(1) or (e)(2) must show that the statements
giving rise to the cause of action concerned "an 'issue of public
significance_'" Bri~s, 19 Cal. 4th at 1123 & n. 10_ This limitation on
Ericsson and other cases is inapplicable here, since defendants are
seeking to invoke ' 425.16 on the basis of ' 425.16(e)(3), which
requires "an issue of public interest," as the Supreme Court noted in
Bri.e. gs. Icl. at 1117-18.

to prevent defendants from creating a website to speak about Internet
investment scams, as the FTC has done. Se._~e Ulrich Decl., ~ 19 &
Exh. R. Rather, Business Wire sued defendants for lying in a private
commercial transaction that deceived Business Wire into doing business
with them -- which is something the FTC has never done and which, as
the FTC example shows, defendants did not need to do to further their
purported educational mission.

To apply ' 425.16 to Business Wire's contract and fraud claims would
allow any party to make fraudulent representations and breach a con-
tract with impunity. The anti~ SLAPP statute was never intended to
apply to such conduct. Ericsson GE Mobile, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 1601-
02; Wilco..x, 27 Cai. App. 4th at 820-21.



To: Janice Shell who wrote (3287)7/27/1999 12:27:00 AM
From: Jeffrey S. Mitchell  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 3795
 
B. Code Of Civil Procedure ' 425.16 Does Not Apply To Trademark Dilu-
tion And Related Acts That Did Not Address A Matter Of Public Interest
In A Pnblic Forum

A similar analysis defeats defendants' attempt to apply ' 425.16 to
Business Wire's remaining state trademark dilution and other state law
causes of actionfi The wrongful acts giving rise to these claims did
not occur in a "public forum" as defined by ' 425.16(e) but, as de-
fendants conceded, on a website and over a proprietary wire service,
Defs' MPA at 7, neither of which are public fora because the content
is privately controlled and members of the public cannot participate
in the discussion. See Zhao, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1125; Lafayette
Morehouse, 37 Cai. App. 4th at 863 n.5. Moreover, the acts at issue
were not speech on a matter of public interest -~ indeed, they never
even mention Internet investment scams -- but rather were intended to
deceive Business Wire so that defendants could misuse the company's
trademark in order to give credibility to their sham investment oppor-
tunity. It was not until much later -- after they first sought to
capitalize commercially from their hoax -- that defendants claimed to
be acting in the public interest. As Wilcox shows, defendants cannot
commit tortions acts and then attempt to justify application of '
425.16 by pointing to some later speech on a matter of public interest
as the motive. 27 Cal. App. 4th at 820.

~-t Even if Code of Civil Procedure ' 425.16 could apply to Business
Wire's federal Lanham Act claims -- and, as shown above, it cannot --
the following analysis would prevent defendants from carrying their
threshold burden of showing ' 425.16 applied to those claims.

1. A Privately Controlled Area Where The Public Does Not Have General
Access To Speak, Such As Defendants' Website And Business Wire's
Distribution Service, Is Not A Public Forum

"[I]n First Amendment jurisprudence" and ' 425.16 analysis, "public
forum" has "a narrow definition ... which strictly limits the scope of
phrase." Zha~o, 48 Cai. App. 4th at 1126. "'The term 'public
forum' ... refers typically to those places historically associated
with First Amendment activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and
parks.'" Id. (quoting Prisoners .Union v. Department of Corrections,
135 Cal. App. 3d 930, 934-35 (1982)).

More specifically, public fora are places "traditionally recognized as
centers for the public communication of ideas" because members of the
public have historically been allowed to meet and discuss issues
there. United States v. Douglas, 579 F.2d 545,549 (gth Cir. 1978). "A
facility is a public forum only if it is designed to provide a general
public right of access to its use, or if such public access has his-
torically existed ...."Muir v. Alabama

Educ. Television Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1042 (5th Cir. 1982) (eh banc)
("public television stations ... are not public forums" because "It]he
general invitation extended to the public is not to schedule programs,
but to watch or decline to watch what is offered").

Applying these rules, it is obvious that defendants' website and
Business Wire's proprietary wire service are not public fora, as
defendants' erroneously claim. Defendants' website (which is still
posted at www.webnode.com on the World Wide Web) has no interactive
feature -- i.e., no forum where members of the public can post their
views or discuss defendants' website or any other subject. Like tele-
vision stations, the public's role is passively to watch, not partici-
pate. Similarly, Business Wire's proprietary wire services are not
open for public discussion, but rather members of the public are
passive recipients of information distributed over its services. Like
the newspapers found not to be a public forum because "none ... has
consented to unrestricted access by the general public to its adver-
tising columns or pages," any "access [to Business Wire's services] is
a matter of private contract" and therefore it is not a public forum.
Chicago Jr. Board v. Chicago Tribune Co.. 435 F.2d 470, 475 (7th Cir.
1970) ("sidewalks and streets ... bear little analogy" to newspapers).

Defendants' website and Business Wire's services are even less open to
the public than newspapers, which allow limited public access in the
Letters to the Editor and OpEd pages. Yet newspapers are not public
fora, as Chicago Tribune illustrates and as California courts have
also recognized in ' 425.16 cases. "[P]rivate newspaper publishing
falls outside of this concept of a public forum" under ' 425.16(e)(3).
Zhao, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1126. "'No authorities have been cited to us
holding a newspaper ... is a "place open to the public or a public
forum." Newspaper editors or publishers customarily retain the final
authority on what their newspapers will publish .... resulting at
best in a controlled forum not an uninhibited "public forum."" Id.
(quoting Lafayette Morehouse, 37 Cal. App. 4th at 863 n.5).

Defendants' website allows no public input and Business Wire allows
use of its distribution services only by private contract. According-
ly, neither forum is public. Indeed, if a university's "computer and
Internet services do not constitute a public forum" because not "open
to the general public," then defendants' website and Business Wire's
proprietary press release distribution services cannot constitute
public fora. Loving v. Bore~a, 956 F. Supp. 953, 955 (W.D. Okla.
1997), aff'd, 133 F.3d 771 (10th Cir. 1998). Since, as defendants
concede, these were the locus of the acts giving rise to Business
Wires' lawsuit, its causes of action do not arise out of speech in a
public forum and are not within ' 425.16(e)(3).

2. Defendants' Subsequent Speech On A Matter of Public Interest Cannot
Be Used To Fit Trademark Infringement And Unfair Competition Under '
425.16 Where, As Here, The Wrongful Acts Did Not Themselves Involve
Speech On That Subject

As the Legislature made clear in the statute, it intended ' 425.16 to
protect "the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of
speech and petition" on a "public issue.' Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. '
425.16(a)-(b). The acts underlying Business Wire's trademark, unfair
competition and conspiracy claims do not involve speech on a public
issue, but rather involve the deceptive practices described in Section
II.A to gain access to Business Wire's trademark, and the misuse of
Business Wire's trademark without valid authorization. Comp., 46 31-
53, 75, 79. As discussed above, the-fraud and breach of contract that
constitute, in part, the unfair competition and conspiracy claims do
not involve protected speech activity or conduct for which defendants
may assert a First Amendment defense, and thus are not within the
scope of ' 425.16. As discussed in this section, the misuse of Busi-
ness Wire's trademark at issue in the Lanham Act and state dilution
claims -- and which constitute the remaining predicate acts in the
unfair competition and conspiracy claims -- involved no speech on a
matter of public interest and thus also fall far outside the ambit of
' 425.16. ~o

Defendants' argument to the contrary can be succinctly summarized.
They claim they were motivated by a desire to engage in unlawful
conduct in order to illustrate speech they would make later on a
matter of public interest (Internet investment seams) and that this
brings their prior unlawful conduct within the scope of ' 425.16 -
even though their unlawful acts giving rise to the trademark, unfair
competition and conspiracy claims involved no mention of the subject
of investment seams. See Ulrich Decl., 66 2-4.

The Business Wire mark that defendants posted to their website and had
distributed was not affixed to any discussion of investment scams, but
rather was attached to a false press release touting their phony
company, Webnode. See Comp., Exh. B. Defendants misused Business
Wire's trademark not in connection with speech warning of internet
investment scams, but to do just the opposite -- to convince skeptical
Internet users that their Internet hoax was a legitimate investment
opportunity. See, e.g., Sitkin Decl., Exh. 2 ("WebNode has a sophisti-
cated website. WebNode puts out BizWire press releases. Why do you
think WebNode is not, as you say, 'real'?") (April 1, 1999 e-mail from
defendant Janice Shell), Exh. 3 ("I think it's on the level. Did you
see the release: [linking to press release with Business Wire trade-
mark]") (April I, 1999 e-mail from defendant Bill Ulrich).

In short, defendants misused Business Wire's trademark to perpetrate a
hoax and a fraud on the public. When defendants subsequently revealed
they had deceived Business Wire and used its trademark to give cre-
dence to a bogus press release, they said nothing about engaging in
this conduct to educate the public about its susceptibility to invest-
ment seams (that

~_w The defamation claim stands on a slightly' different footing. It
is based on defendants' false accusations that Business Wire knowingly
allows or condones fraud. Comp., ~ 67. While the subject of Internet
investment seams may be a matter of public interest, these accusations
do not directly address that issue -- or even mention the Internet -
but instead insinuate that Business Wire intentionally profits off of
fraud. Moreover, defendants have not shown that these statements were
made in a public forum, as required by ' 425.16(e)(3).

came later, after they were looking for a way to avoid legal liabili-
ty). Instead, defendants at the time touted their clever "3rd annual
April Hoax" and used their phony website for the commercial purpose of
advertising Magnetic Diary Studios, which is the Website Design firm
of defendant Bill Ulrich. Se~e Ulrich Decl., Exh. F; see als~o Sitkin
DecI., Exh. 1.

However, even if defendants' original misdeeds were motivated by a
desire to bring attention to a matter of public interest, that does
not bring those acts -- which never mention the purported matter of
public interest -- within the purview of ' 425.16. As shown in Section
II.A, .Wilcox is clear on this point, 27 Cal. App. 4th at 820 ("if the
defendant's act was burning down the developer's office as a political
protest, the defendant's motion to strike could be summarily denied
[because it does not meet the requirements of ' 425.16(e)] without
putting the developer to the burden of establishing the probability of
success on the merits").

The limit on the scope of ' 425.16 recognized by Wilcox is in accord
with well established First Amendment principles. In Justice Holmes'
famous phrase, "It]he most stringent protection of free speech would
not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a
panic." Schenck v United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). That same man
cannot bring his false exclamation within the scope of ' 425.16 by
claiming he was motivated to bring attention to the fact that the
theatre did not have sufficient fire exits, even if this safety issue
is a matter of public interest. Se~e Wilcox, 27 Cal. App. 4th at 820.
In the modern world, if someone wants to bring attention to this
issue, they can post an e-mail to an Internet message board or contact
the proper authorities. What they cannot do is use ' 425.16 to shield
them from liability to injured patrons if they engage in wrongful
conduct (such as shouting "Fire" in a crowded theater) that was not
itself protected speech on the issue of public interest.

Even if their motive was what they claim, defendants' acts were the
functional equivalent of shouting "Fire" to illustrate the threat of
inadequate safety precautions. They did not need to mislead Business
Wire and misuse Business Wire's trademarks to get their message out.
As their own evidence reveals, defendants had no difficulty getting
publicity for their views before this hoax. See, e...,~_, Ulrich
Decl., Exhs. B & C. As defendants also admit, the FTC created its own
phony website to bring attention to the issue of Internet investment
scares, yet the FTC did not need to deceive any company or misuse its
federally registered trademarks in order to educate the public about
this subject. Id., 6 19 & Exh. R_

Like falsely shouting "Fire," trademark infringement is not speech on
a matter of public interest. "The first amendment is not a license to
trammel on legally recognized rights in intellectual property." Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc_ v. Scoreboard Posters~ inc_._~., 600 F_2d
1184, 1188 (Sth Cir. 1979). Even if "defendants' [acts] may convey a
barely discernible message[, this] does not entitle them to appropri-
ate plaintiff's trademark in the process of conveying that message."
Da las Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema~ Ltd., 604 F.2d
200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979). As the Ninth Circuit has said, "ecause
defendants here could have expressed their theme without copying
[Business Wire's] protected " the law "requires that their
First Amendment challenge be dismissed." Walt Disney Productions v.
Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751,759 (gth Cir. 1978); accord Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 206 (applying Air Pirates to reject First
Amendment defense in trademark case "ecause there are numerous ways
in which defendants may comment on [a matter of public interest]
without infringing plaintiff's trademark"). Since Code of Civil Proce-
dure ' 425.16 is predicated on the existence of a valid First Amend-
ment exercise of speech, this analysis also requires that defendants'
attempt to invoke ' 425.16 be rejected.l~

CONCLUSION

As a matter of federal law, California Code of Civil Procedure '
425.16 cannot apply to Business Wire's federal Lanham Act causes of
action_ Nor does ' 425.16 apply to its state law claims. While the
statute is interpreted broadly, defendants overlook that "[d]espite
this expansive interpretation of section 425.16, the courts have
recognized that there are limits in its application." Ericsson GE
Mobile, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 1600; a~.cord Wilcox, 27 Cal.

g~ This applies to the unfair competition and conspiracy claims, as
well as all trademark claims. Other than the fraud and breach of
contract shown in Section II.A to be outside the scope of ' 425.16,
the predicate acts underlying the unfair competition and conspiracy
claims are the misrepresentations, dilution and infringement underly-
ing the trademark claims.

App. 4th at 819. Defendants essentially advocate an unlimited applica-
tion of ' 425.16 so that it would apply to unlawful conduct that did
not occur in a public forum and did not discuss a matter of public
interest. Such conduct cannot be and is not within the scope of '
425.16. To hold otherwise would subject virtually every fraud, breach
of contract, trademark, unfair competition and defamation claim to a
motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute.

For all the foregoing reasons, defendants have not carried their
threshold burden of showing that Code of Civil Procedure ' 425.16
applies to Business Wire's causes of action and therefore their motion
should be denied without "putting the plaintiff to the burden of
establishing probability of success on the merits." Wilcox, 27 Cal.
App. 4th at 819.

DATED: July 23, 1999
STEINHART & FALCONER LLP
ROGER R. MYERS
LISA M. SITKIN



To: Janice Shell who wrote (3287)7/27/1999 12:28:00 AM
From: Jeffrey S. Mitchell  Respond to of 3795
 
PROOF OF SERVICE

l, Jenny Z. Ren, declare:

I am employed in the City and County of San Francisco; I am over the
age of 18 years and not a party to the within action; my business
address i$ 333 Market Street, Thirty-Second Floor, San Francisco,
California 94105-2150. I declare that I am employed in the office or a
member of the bar of this Court at whose direction the service was
made.

On July 23, 1999, I caused to be served the following documents:

OPPOSITION OF PLAINTIFF BUSINESS WIRE TO DEFENDANTS' SPECIAL MOTION TO
STRIKE ON THE THRESHOLD ISSUE OF WHETHER CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE '425.16 APPLIES TO PLAINTIFF'S CAUSES OF ACTION.

DECLARATION OF CATHY BARON TAMRAZ IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION OF PLAIN-
TIFF BUSINESS WIRE TO DEFENDANTS' SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE ON THE
THRESHOLD ISSUE OF WHETHER CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE '425.16
APPLIES TO PLAINTIFF'S CAUSES OF ACTION.

DECLARATION OF NEIL BARDACH IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION OF PLAINTIFF
BUSINESS WIRE TO DEFENDANTS' SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE ON THE THRESHOLD
ISSUE OF WHETHER CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE '425.16 APPLIES TO
PLAINTIFF'S CAUSES OF ACTION.

DECLARATION OF LAUREN KUNIS IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION OF PLAINTIFF
BUSINESS WIRE TO DEFENDANTS' SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE ON THE THRESHOLD
iSSUE OF WHETHER CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE '425.16 APPLIES TO
PLAiNTIFF'S CAUSES OF ACTION.

DECLARATION OF LIS A M. SITKIN iN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION OF PLAINTIFF
BUSINESS WIRE TO DEFENDANTS' SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE ON THETHRESHOLD
ISSUE OF WHETHER CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE {}425.16 APPLIES
TO PLAINTIFF'S CAUSES OF ACTION.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTION IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION OF PLAINTIFF
BUSINESS WIRE TO DEFENDANTS' SPECIAL MOTION TO STBIKE ON THE TI-IRESH-
OLD ISSUE OF WHETHER CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE {}425.16
APPLIES TO PLAINTIFF'S CAUSES OF ACTION.

7_ PLAINTIFF BUSINESS WIRE'S OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANTS' EVIDENCE iN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE UNDER CALIFORNIA CODE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE '425.16 CAUSES OF ACTION.

MAIL: by placing a tree copy(les) thereof in a sealed envelope(s) in
the outgoing mail tray located in my office for deposit in the United
States mail, with postage fully prepaid, addressed as shown below. I
am readily familiar with'the business practice at my place of business
for collection and processing of outgoing mail with the U_S. Postal
Service. Mail so collected and processed is deposited with the U_S.
Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of business.

BY MESSENGER: A true and correct copy of the above entitled document
in a sealed envelope was placed into the care of an agent of Special-
ized Legal Services for delivery to the party below on this date.

PERSONAL SERVICE: by personally serving by hand-delivery the same in
an envelope(s) addressed as shown below_

OVERNIGHT DELIVERY: by enclosing a tree copy(ies) in a sealed Federal
Express envelope(s), fully prepaid, addressed as shown below.

BY FACSIMILE: by transmitting by telefax to the number(s) shown below.

Said document(s) was/were served on:

METHVEN & ASSOCIATES BRUCE E. METHVEN (SBN 095486) .OUISE M, QUINTAP.
D (SBN 106230) ERIC K. FERItARO (SBN 172699) 2232 Sixth Street,
Berkeley, CA 94710
Telephone: (510) 649-4019
Fax: (510) 649-4024

Attorneys for Defendants
JEFFREY S. MITCHELL, WILLIAM ULI~ICH
and JANICE SI-IELL

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of
California that the foregoing is true and correct and that this decla-
ration was executed on July 23, 1999, at San Francisco, Cali#omia.

STEINHART & FALCONER LLP ROGER R. MYERS (State Bar NO. 146164) LISA M.
SITKIN State (Bar No. 194127) 333 Market Street, Suite 3200
San Francisco, California 94105 Telephone: (415) 777-3999
Facsimile: (415) ~,42-0856

Attorneys for Plaintiff BUSINESS WIRE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

3USINESS WIRE, a California corporation, Plaintiff,

V.

IEFFREY S. MITCHELL, an individual;
WILLIAM ULRICH, an individual; JANiCE
SHELL, an individual,

Defendants.

Case No. C 99-1987 CAL

DECLARATION OF CATHY BARON TAMRAZ IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION OF PLAIN-
TIFF BUSINESS WIRE TO DEFENDANTS' SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE ON THE TI-
IRESHOLD ISSUE OF WHlgTttlgR CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
'425.16 APPLIES TO PLAINTIFF'S CAUSES OF ACTION

I, Cathy Baron Tararaz, declare:

I. I am the Executive Vice President of Business Wire, plaintiffin the
above-referenced action. I make this declaration in support of Busi-
ness Wire's Opposition to defendants' special motion to strike filed
herewith. I can testify competently and of my own )ersonal knowledge
to the matters set forth herein.

2. For more than 30 years, Business Wire has distributed corporate
press releases news organizations, informational databases and busi-
nesses. Business Wire currently distributes such releases to subscrib-
ers throughout the world. These subscribers rely on Business Wire's
reputation, credibility and goodwill as assurance that press releases
that Business Wire distributes accurately reflect what actual compa-
nies are saying.

3. Business Wire is a proprietary service that is not open to the
general public.

Business Wire limits access to its press release services to members
who must register by completing a membership application and agreement
before submitting press releases for distribution. Business Wire only
distributes press releases for members in good standing, and has a
firm policy against knowingly distributing any press release put out
by a phony company or that contains false information about the exist-
ence or activities of a company. Business Wire does not allow members
to use its services for April Fools jokes or other hoaxes. A tree and
correct copy of Business Wire's March 1999 newsletter, published
before defendants submitted their phony press release Business Wire,
containing notice of Business Wire's policy against April Fools hoaxes
is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.

4. In late March 1999, defendants registered for Business Wire's press
release distribution services and submitted a press release for dis-
tribution by Business Wire. In their registration agreement and in
discussions with Business Wire employees, defendants made false state-
ments and gave false assurances to Business Wire concerning, among
other things, the existence of their company and accuracy of any press
release submitted by them to Business Wire for distribution. Notwith-
standing these statements and assurances, defendants submitted a press
release to Business Wire about a non-existent company called
Webnode.com that advertised a sham Internet investment opportunity.
The press release purported to provide tree information. Defendants
never informed Business Wire that the press release was actually
completely phony, and that none of the material representations in the
release were true. But for defendants assurances and omissions regard-
ing their company and the accuracy of the press release, Business Wire
would not have distributed the release.

5. In reliance on defendants' assurances find on the apparent authen-
ticity of the press release itself, Business Wire distributed the
release over its wire service under the BUSINESS WIRE. mark. In addi-
tion, defendants posted the press release, with the BUSINESS WIRE.
mark prominently displayed, on their Webnode.com website. As a result,
the press release, with

EXHIBIT I

N E W S L E T T E R

=====

STEINHART & FALCONER LLP ROGER R. MYERS (State Bar No. 146164) LiSA M.
SITKIN State (Bar No. 194127) 333 Market Street, Suite 3200
San Francisco, California 94105 Telephone: (415) 777-3999
Facsimile: (415) 442-0856

Attorneys for Plaintiff BUSINESS WIRE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

BUSINESS WIRE, a California corporation.

Plaintiff,

V.

JEFFREY S. MITCHELL, an individual;
WILLIAM ULRICH, an individual; JANICE
SHELL, an individual,

Defendants.

Case No. C 99-1987 CAL

DECLARATION OF LISA M. SITKIN IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION OF PLAINTIFF
BUSINESS WIRE TO DEFENDANTS' SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE ON THE THRESHOLD
ISSUE OF WHETHER CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE '425.16 APPLIES TO
PLAINTIFF'S CAUSES OF ACTION

I, Lisa M. Sitkin, declare:

1. I am an attorney with Steinhart & Falconer LLP, counsel for plain-
tiff Business Wire in the above-referenced action. I make this decla-
ration in support of Business Wire's Opposition to defendants' special
motion to strike filed herewith. 1 can testify competently and of my
own personal knowledge to the matters set forth herein.

2. Attached here as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct printout from the
website for defendant William Ulrich's web design business, magnetic-
diary.com showing defendant's affiliation with magneticdiary.com and
promoting his services using past website designs for websites used in
defendants' previous April Fools hoaxes.

3. Attached here as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct printout of a
message posted by defendant Janice Shell to an online discussion group
on the Silicon Investor website on April 1, 1999.

4. Attached here as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct printout of a
message posted by defendant Bill Ulrich to an online discussion group
on the Silicon Investor website ~>n April 1, 1999.

5. Attached here as Exhibit 4 are a true and correct printouts from
the Webnode.com website where defendants' press release was posted
with a mark confusingly similar mark to the BUSINESS WIRE trademark.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of
California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Lisa M. Sitkin

=====

Exhibit 1

Marketing 101
Display your
assets with
appeal.

web design
digital media
contact us

Bill Ulrich
Michal Daniel

Exhibit 2

Pictures of Magnetic Diary site

Exhibit 3

Post 24608 from Janice Shell to Johnlag on the Anthony@Equity thread

Exhibit 4

Post 15 from Bill Ulrich to T. Pierce Baker on the Webnode thread

Exhibit 5

Picture of the BW PR as it appeared on Webnode.com

=====

STEINHART & FALCONER LLP
ROGER R. MYERS (State Bar No. 146164)
LISA M. SITKIN State (Bar No. 194127)
333 Market Street, Suite 3200
San Francisco, California 94105
Telephone: (415) 777-3999
Facsimile: (415) 442-0856

Attorneys for Plaintiff
BUSINESS WIRE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

BUSINESS WIRE, a California corporation,

Plaintiff,

V.

JEFFREY S. MITCHELL, an individual;
WILLIAM ULRICH, an individual;
JANICE SHELL, an individual,
Defendants.

Case No. C 99-1987 CAL

DECLARATION OF LAUREN
KUNIS IN SUPPORT OF
OPPOSITION OF PLAINTIFF TO
DEFENDANTS' SPECIAL
MOTION TO STRIKE ON THE
THRESHOLD ISSUE OF
WHETHER CALIFORNIA
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
'425.16 APPLIES TO
PLAINTIFF'S CAUSES OF
ACTION

I, Lauren Kunis, declare:

1. I am a client services representative with Business Wire, plaintiff
in the above-referenced action. I make this declaration in support of
Business Wire's Opposition to defendants' special motion to strike
filed herewith. I can testify competently and of my own personal
knowledge to the matters set forth herein.

2. In late March 1999, defendants contacted Business Wire by telephone
to register as members of Business Wire and become eligible to have
Business Wire distribute press releases for them. Following the tele-
phone conversation, they submitted a membership application and agree-
ment to Business Wire by facsimile. Defendants' membership application
and agreement form listed Morgan Laurel Communications as their compa-
ny name and gave the e-mail address "info@webnode.com" as their e-mail
address. A true and correct copy of defendants' membership application
and agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.

3. Because defendants answered the question "number of years in busi-
ness" on the membership application and agreement form by describing
the company as "new," I contacted them at the telephone number listed
on the form to inquire about the company. I spoke with the defendant
Jeff Mitchell, who told me that the company's start date "was compli-
cated" but led me to believe that the company did exist and had been
operating for a month. I therefore added the words "1 month" to the
membership application form. Mr. Mitchell did not disclose that Morgan
Laurel Communications and Webnode.com were not legitimate business
entities.

4. All communications between Business Wire and defendants concerning
defendants' registration for a membership with Business Wire took
place either by telephone or facsimile, over private telephone lines.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of
California that the foregoing is true and correct.

DATED: July 23,1999
Lauren Kunis

Copy of Business Wire Membership Agreement

STEINHART & FALCONER LLP
ROGER R. MYERS (State Bar No. 146164)
LISA M. SITKIN State (Bar No. 194127)
333 Market Street, Suite 3200
San Francisco, California 94105
Telephone: (415) 777-3999
Facsimile: (415) 442-0856

Attorneys for Plaintiff
BUSINESS WIRE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

BUSINESS WIRE, a California corporation,

Plaintiff,

V.

JEFFREY S. MITCHELL, an individual;
WILLIAM ULRICH, an individual;
JANICE SHELL, an individual,
Defendants.

Case No. C 99-1987 CAL

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL
NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF
OPPOSITION OF PLAINTIFF
BUSINESS WIRE TO
DEFENDANTS' SPECIAL
MOTION TO STRIKE ON THE
THRESHOLD ISSUE OF
WHETHER CALIFORNIA
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
'425.16 APPLIES TO
PLAINTIFF'S CAUSES OF
ACTION

Date: August 20, 1999
Time: 9:30 a.m.
Judge: Charles A. Legge
Court Room: 10

Plaintiff Business Wire hereby requests that the Court take judicial
notice of the following document pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence
201:

Complaint filed in Hitsgalore.com, Inc. v. Shell, et al.., No. 99-1397
CIV-T26C on June 14, 1999 in the District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of Florida (Tampa Division). A true and correct copy of relevant
excerpts from the Complaint is attached here as Exhibit 1.

DATED: July 23, 1999

STEINHART & FALCONER LLP
ROGER R. MYERS
LISA M. SITKIN

Lisa M. Sitkin
Attorneys for Plaintiff
BUSINESS WIRE



To: Janice Shell who wrote (3287)7/27/1999 12:29:00 AM
From: Jeffrey S. Mitchell  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 3795
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for the
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
[Tampa Division]

HITSGALORE.COM, INC., a Florida Corporation

Plaintiff,

JANICE SHELL,
JOHN DOE No. 1 a/k/a "PAUL KERSEY",
JOHN DOE No. 2 a/k/a "MAYOR",
JOHN DOE No. 3 a/k/a "MR. PINK",
JOHN DOE No. 4 a/k/a "MSHATER", and
JOHN DOE Nos. 5-100,

Defendants.

Case No.

COMPLAINT FOR MONETARY
DAMAGES, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.,
AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff HITSGALORE.COM, INC. ("HITSGALORE", the"Company" or the
"Plaintiff"), a Florida Corporation, by and through the undersigned
counsel, sues Defendants Janice Shell ("SHELL"), John Doe No. I a/k/a
"Paul Kersey" ("KERSEY"), John Doe No. 2 a/k/a "Mayor" ("MAYOR"), John
Doe No. 3 a/k/a "Mr. Pink" ("MR. PINK"), John Doe No. 4 a/k/a "mshat-
er" ("MSHATER"), and John Does Nos. 5-100 ("John Does 5-100") (collec-
tively the "Defendants"), and alleges:

INTRODUCTION

1. Between in or about May 1, 1999 and continuing through to the
present, Defendants SHELL, KERSEY, MAYOR, MR. PINK, MSHATER, and John
Doe Nos. 5-100, intentionally and maliciously published and repub-
lished a variety of unprivileged and unprotected false and defamatory
statements concerning HITSGALORE in a nationwide CYBERSMEAR campaign
on electronic bulletin boards maintained by Raging Bull, Inc. ("Raging
Bull") and Silicon Investor, Inc. , ("Silicon Investor'') on the
Internet which explicitly state and/or have the general import, ef-
fect, and meaning that HITSGALORE was engaging in illegitimate, ille-
gal, dishonest, fraudulent, and criminal business operations, when, in
truth and fact, the Defendants knew, should have known, and/or were
reckless in not knowing, that such statements were false and libelous
per se. Such defamatory publications include statements that are
libelous per se, such as HITSGALORE is being run by "criminals," the
Company is operating a "scum," and "Ask the institutional investors if
they i are buying HITT- You will get a resounding NO! You know why?
FRAUD FRAUD FRAUD." Such statements were not merely expressions of the
authors' opinions but, rather, were expressed as statements of fact.
Indeed, MR. PINK dared HITSGALORE to sue him when he published the
following statement: "These crooks belong in Jail! *** No disclaimer,
this is not opinion but a fact and if company doesn't like it, please
sue Him [MR. PINK]; discovery will be a treat!" Collectively, the
Defendants published and republished hundreds of postings, many of
which are false and defamatory, on the Internet to injure HITSGALORE,
discredit the business methods of HITSGALORE, destroy/he business
reputation and goodwill of HITSGALORE, negatively affect public confi-
dence in HITSGALORE, deter third persons, including customers, share-
holders, and others, from dealing with HITSGALORE, and/or to unlawful-
ly drive the price of HITSGALORE common stock into a downward spiral
to enable the Defendants and those acting in concert with or under the
direction of one or more of them, to illegally profit by selling
HITSGALORE common stock short. Upon information and belief, some or
all of the Defendants are being paid, in cash or securities, to post
false and defamatory messages on the Interact about HITSGALORE, and
receive ~onuses for driving the price of the Company's common stock by
short sellers. Upon information and belief, the Defendants operate
their "cybersmear" campaign systematically until a desired target
~rice is reached, and then they move on like a "wolf pack" to the next
victim. Indeed, some or all of the Defendants have participated in
defaming others on the Interact in the same manner as HITSGALORE, such
as American Benefits Group, Inc. [OTC BB: "ABFG"], millionaire.com
[OTC BB: "MLRE"], ZiaSun Technologies, Inc. [OTC BB: "ZSUN"], Amazon
Natural [OTC BB: "AZNT"], and Liviakis Financial Communications, Inc.
The problem with defamation on the Interact by anonymous tortfeasors
has become so severe that it has prompted the Washington State Senate
to propose legislation to address the abusive practice. Indeed, to
conceal, camouflage, and otherwise disguise their true identities, the
Defendants posted their false and defamatory messages about HITSGALORE
on the Raging Bull and Silicon Investor Message Boards under ficti-
tious names, aliases, and pseudonyms. As a direct, intended, and
proximate result of the libelous and tortious actions of the Defend-
ants, HITSGALORE has, inter alia, suffered irreparable damage in the
form of lost good will and professional standing, status and reputa-
tion with customers, and third)attics, and has incurred monetary
damages in excess of TWENTY MILLION DOLLARS ($20,000~000.00). Specifi-
cally, the Defendants tortious conduct has, directly and/or indirect-
ly, caused the market value for HITSGALORE common stock to drop by
nearly 75% (i.e., approximately $750 million), which, in turn, has,
inter alia, resulted in lost economic expectancies from various advan-
tageous business and contractual relationships with third-parties,
including, but not limited to, a loss of $20 million from Company's
contract with The Life Foundation Trust ("The Life Foundation"), and
exposed the Company to potential liability in two shareholder class
action lawsuits. In this action, HITSGALORE seeks to hold each Defend-
ant fully responsible for all damages and irreparable injuries they
have caused through monetary relief in excess of Twenty Million Dol-
lars ($20,000,000.00), and injunctive relief in the form of temporary,
preliminary, and permanent injunctions restraining and enjoining each
of the Defendants from publishing any further false and defamatory
messages about HITSGALORE on the interact.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. {}1332 in that the Plaintiff, a Florida corporation,
and one identified Defendant, SHELL, are citizens of different States,
and the mount in controversy for each of the Plaintiff's claims
against each of the Defendants exceeds the sum of Seventy Five Thou-
sand Dollars ($75,000.00), exclusive of interest and costs. As de-
scribed below, the identity and citizenship of the John Doe Defend-
ants, KERSEY, MAYOR, MR. PINK, MSHATER, and John Does 5-100, are not
known at this time. Thus, the Plaintiffs will amend the Complaint
after it ascertains the true identities of such Defendants provided
that an appropriate basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction
exists with respect to each such John Doe Defendant.

3. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant SHELL through
Florida's long-arm jurisdiction statute, Fla. Stat. Ann. ' 48.193,
which provides, in relevant part, that any person, whether or not a
resident of Florida, who personally or through an agent, commits a
tortious act within Florida submits to the personal jurisdiction of
the courts of Florida for any cause of action arising out of the
tortious act committed in Florida. In this action, each Defendant,
including, but not limited to, SHELL, caused false and defamatory
statements about HITSGALORE to be published, distributed, and circu-
lated within Florida and elsewhere, and, therefore, committed the
torts of libel and tortious interference in Florida, and thus subject-
ed themselves to the long-arm jurisdiction of Florida courts. Fla_
Stat. ' 48.193(1)(b). Moreover, given the fact that the Defendants,
upon information and belief, conspired to defame and damage HITSGA-
LORE, and that at least one Defendant/member of the conspiracy, SHELL,
caused tortious acts to be committed in Florida in furtherance of the
conspiracy, then all of the co-conspirators are subject to the juris-
diction of the state of Florida through its long-arm statute, even if
a co-conspirator was not physically present in Florida at the time the
tort was committed. Upon information and belief, SHELL has sufficient
minimum contacts with Florida, the forum State, to satisfy the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so that "maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.'" This Court, upon information and belief, has specific
personal jurisdiction over Defendant SHELL insofar as her contacts
with the forum state are related to the cause of action. Specifically,
the action of Defendant SHELL in posting false and defamatory postings
on the Interact was purposefully directed at a citizen of Florida and
she must have anticipated being haled into court in Florida to answer
for her actions, because Defendant SHELL knew and could reasonably
foresee that the brunt and most devastating economic effects of her
statements would primarily be felt in Florida where HITSGALORE was
based.

4. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1391 in that
a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim
occurred in this District and the acts complained of were perpetrated
in this District.

5. All conditions precedent to commencing this action have occurred,
been satisfied, or have been waived.

PARTIES

6. HITSGALORE, a Florida corporation, formerly Systems Communications,
Inc. ("Systems Communications"), was incorporated as Florida One
Capital Corporation in 1987 and made an initial public offering of its
common stock in 1988 as a blank check company for the purpose of
acquiring other companies. Systems Communications underwent several
corporate name changes from its inception until 1991 when it changed
its name to "Systems Communications, Inc." Effective March 19, 1999,
Systems Communications and Hitsgalore.com ("Old Hitsgalore';), a
Nevada corporation, completed a reorganization and merger (the "Reor-
ganization and Merger Agreement"). Pursuant to the Reorganization and
Merger Agreement: (a) Systems Communications transferred its existing
business, properties and assets to International Healthcare Solutions,
Inc. ("IHSI'), a Florida corporation, and caused IHSI to assume the
obligations, debts and liabilities of Systems Communications; and,
then (b) Old Hitsgalore was merged into the Systems Communications and
Systems Communications changed its name to "Hitsgalore.com, Inc."
HITSGALORE maintains a mailing and registered address in Florida, and
its principal executive office in Rancho Cucamonga, California. HITS-
GALORE is currently engaged in the business of an lnternet, business-
to-business search engine, and provides a searchable database for
businesses bringing people ("hits") to their Interact websites. Sig-
nificantly, HITSGALORE strives to provide "porn-free" searching capa-
bilities, and does not accept or encourage any porn or adult content
listings on its website. The Company derives revenues from, interalia,
the sale of sponsorships, keyword bid and rank rights, audio banners,
advertising and local city editions. The Company's common stock is
quoted under the ticker symbol "HITT" on the OTC Bulletin Board. (OTC
BB: HITT). On May 10, 1999, the price for the Company's common stock
reached a 52 week high of approximately $20.6875 per share. Following
the publication of the false and defamatory statements by the Defend-
ants on the Internet, the price for the Company's common stock has
plummeted by nearly 75% to approximately $5.5000 per share as of the
last trade on June 4, 1999. As of March 31, 1999, the Company had
approximately 550 shareholders of record.

7. SHELL, upon information and belief, resides in Angleton or Clute,
Texas, and is sui juris. At all material times hereto, SHELL was a
subscriber to both the Silicon Investor and Raging Bull electronic
bulletin boards on the Internet, and posts messages on the message
boards for HITSGALORE on Silicon Investor and Raging Bull under the
screen name: "Janice Shell."

8. KERSEY is sued under a fictitious name, because the true identity
and capacity of this Defendant is unknown to the Plaintiff, except by
the fictitious name, alias, and pseudonym "Paul Kersey" used as a
screen name to post messages on the message boards for HITSGALORE on
Raging Bull_ Upon information and belief, KERSEY is responsible in
some manner for the occurrences alleged herein, and the Plaintiffs
damages as alleged herein were proximately caused by the conduct of
KERSEY. At all material times hereto, upon information and belief,
KERSEY was the agent, servant, employee, representative, and/or co-
conspirator of the co-Defendants, and acted within the course and
scope of his/her/its authority as an agent, servant, employee, repre-
sentative, and/or co-conspirator with the permission, consent and/or
approval of the codefendant during the existence of the relationship
and/or during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. The
Plaintiff will amend the Complaint after it ascertains the true iden-
tity of KERSEY provided that an appropriate basis for federal subject-
matter jurisdiction exists with respect to such John Doe Defendant.

9. MAYOR is sued under a fictitious name, because the true identity
and capacity of this Defendant is unknown to the Plaintiff, except by
the fictitious name, alias, and pseudonym "mayor" used as a screen
name to post messages on the message boards for HITSGALORE on Raging
Bull. Upon information and belief, MAYOR is responsible in some manner
for the occurrences alleged herein, and the Plaintiff's damages as
alleged herein were proximately caused by the conduct of MAYOR. At all
material times hereto, upon information and belief, MAYOR was the
agent, servant, employee representative, and/or co-conspirator of the
co-Defendants, and acted within the course and scope of his/her/its
authority as an agent, servant, employee, representative, and/o~
coconspirator with the permission, consent and/or approval of the co-
Defendants during the existence of the relationship and/or during the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. The Plaintiff will amend
the Complaint after it ascertains the true identity of MAYOR provided
that an appropriate basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction
exists with respect to such John Doe Defendant.

10. MR. PINK is sued under a fictitious name, because the true identi-
ty and capacity of this Defendant is unknown to the Plaintiff, except
by the fictitious name, alias, and pseudonym "Mr. Pink" used as a
screen name to post messages on the message board for HITSGALORE on
Silicon Investor. Upon information and belief, MR. PINK is responsible
in some manner for the occurrences alleged herein, and the Plaintiff's
damages as alleged herein were proximately caused by the conduct of
MR. PINK. At all material times hereto, upon information and belief,
MR. PINK was the agent, servant, employee, representative, and/or co-
conspirator of the co-Defendant~, and acted within the course and
scope of hi,her/its authority as an agent, servant, employee, repre-
sentative, and/or co-conspirator with the permission, consent and/or
approval of the co Defendants during the existence of the relationship
and/or during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. The
Plaintiff will amend the Complaint after it ascertains the tree iden-
tityt of MR. PINK provided that an appropriate basis for federal
subject-matter jurisdiction exists with respect to such John Doe
Defendant.

11. MSHATER is sued under a fictitious name, because the true identity
and capacity of this Defendant is unknown to the Plaintiff, except by
the fictitious name, alias, and pseudonym "mshater" used as a screen
name to post messages on the message boards for HITSGALORE on Silicon
Investor. Upon information and belie[ MSHATER is responsible in some
manner for the occurrences alleged herein, and the Plaintiff's damages
as alleged herein were proximately caused by the conduct of MSHATER.
At all material times hereto, upon information and belief, MSHATER was
the agent, servant, employee, representative, and/or co-conspirator of
the codefendants~, and acted within the course and scope of Ms/her/its
authority as an agent, servant, employee, representative, and/or co-
conspirator with the permission, consent and/or approval of the co-
Defendants during the existence of the relationship and/or during the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. The Plaintiff will amend
the Complaint after it ascertains the mm identity of MSHATER. provided
that an appropriate basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction
exists with respect to such John Doe Defendant.

12. John Does 5-100 are sued under a fictitious name, because the true
identities and capacities of these Defendants are unknown to the
Plaintiff. Upon information and belief, John Does 5400 are responsible
in some manner for the occurrences alleged herein, and the Plaintiff's
damages as alleged herein were proximately caused by the conduct of
John Does 5-100. At all material times hereto, upon information and
belief, John Does 5-100 were the agents, servants, employees, repre-
sentatives, and/or co-conspirators of the co-Defendants, and acted
within the course and scope of his/her/its authority as agents, serv-
ants, employees, representatives, and/or coconspirators with the
permission, consent and/or approval of the co-Defendants during the
existence Bloomberg Report states, suggests, and/or implies, and
confirmed the existence of the FTC Civil Action and apparent default
judgment in connection therewith against Reed. See Exhibit C.

The Cybersmear Campaign

38. Between in or about May I, 1999 and continuing through to the
present, Defendants SHELL, KERSEY, MAYOR, MR. PINK, MSHATER, and John
Does 5-100, intentionally and maliciously published and republished a
variety of unprivileged and unprotected false and defamatory state-
ments concerning HITSGALORE in a nationwide CYBERSMEAR campaign on
electronic bulletin boards maintained by Raging Bull and Silicon
Investor on the Internet which explicitly state and/or have the gener-
al import, effect, and meaning that HITSGALORE was engaging in ille-
gitimate, illegal, dishonest, fraudulent, and criminal business opera-
tions, when, in truth and fact, the Defendants knew, should have
known, and/or were reckless in not knowing, that such statements were
false and libelous per se. Such defamatory publications include state-
ments that are libelous per se, such as HITSGALORE is being run by
"criminals," the Company is operating a "seam," and "Ask the institu-
tional investors if they are buying HITT. You will get a resounding
NO! You know why? FRAUD FRAUD FRAUD." Such statements were not merely
expressions of the authors' opinions but, rather, were expressed as
statements of fact. Indeed, MR. PINK dared HITSGALORE to sue him when
he published the following statement: "These crooks belong in Jail!
*** No disclaimer, this is not opinion but a fact and if company
doesn't like it, please sue Him [MR. PINK]; discovery will be a
treat!" Collectively, the Defendants published and republished hun-
dreds of postings, many of which are false and defamatory, on the
Internet to injure HITSGALORE, discredit the business methods of
HITSGALORE, destroy the business reputation and goodwill of HITSGA-
LORE, negatively affect public confidence in HITSGALORE, deter third
persons, including customers, shareholders, and others, from dealing
with HITSGALORE, and/or to unlawfully drive the price of HITSGALORE
common stock into a downward spiral to enable the Defendants and those
acting in concert with or under the direction of one or move of them,
to illegally profit by selling HITSGALORE common stock short. Upon
information and belief, some or all of the Defendants are being paid,
in cash or securities, to post false and defamatory messages on the
Internet about HITSGALORE, and receive bonuses for driving the price
of the Company's common stock by short sellers. Upon information and
belief, the Defendants operate their "cybersmear" campaign systemati-
cally until a desired target price is reached, and then they move on
like a "wolf pack" to the next victim. To conceal, camouflage, and
otherwise disguise their tree identities under the shroud of anonymi-
ty, the Defendants posted their false and defamatory messages about
HITSGALORE on the Raging Bull and Silicon Investor Message Boards
under fictitious names, aliases, and pseudonyms.

Shell's False and Defamatory Statements

39. The false and defamatory statements published and republished by
SHELL ("SHELL's False and Defamatory Statements") concerning HITSGA-
LORE on electronic bulletin boards maintained by Raging Bull and
Silicon Investor on the Interact explicitly state and/or have the
general import, effect, and meaning that HITSGALORE was engaging in
illegitimate, illegal, dishonest, fraudulent, and criminal business
operations, and were made by SHELL when, in truth and fact, SHELL
knew, should have known, and/or was reckless in not knowing, that such
statements were false and libelous per se. For example, a compendium
of SHELL's False and Defamatory Statements is attached hereto and
incorporated herein by reference as Composite Exhibit D as if fully
set forth herein. SHELL's False and defamatory statements are of a
continuing nature and may have been and continue to be published on
bulletin boards and other media of which HITSGALORE is not yet aware.
Representative samples of some of SHELL's False. and Defamatory State-
ments include, among others, the following:

Post 6731 on Raging Bull
Post 6783 on Raging Bull
Post 7067 on Raging Bull
Post 1631 on Silicon Investor

Kersey's False and Defamatory Statements

40. The false and defamatory statements published and republished by
KERSEY ("KERSEY's False and Defamatory Statements") concerning HITSGA-
LORE on electronic bulletin boards maintained by Raging Bull and
Silicon Investor on the Interact explicitly state and/or have the
general import, effect, and meaning that HITSGALORE was engaging in
illegitimate, illegal, dishonest, fraudulent and criminal business
operations, and were made by KERSEY when, in truth and fact, KERSEY
knew, should have known, and/or was reckless in not knowing, that such
statements were false and libelous per se. For example, a compendium
of KERSEY's False and Defamatory Statements is attached hereto and
incorporated herein by reference as Composite Exhibit E as if fully
set forth herein. KERSEY's False and defamatory statements are of a
continuing nature and may have been and continue to be published on
bulletin boards and other media of which HITSGALORE is not yet aware.
Representative samples of some of KERSEY's False and Defamatory State-
ments include, among others, the following:

JURY TRIAL DEMAND

68. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b) and M.D. Fla. L.R. 1.06(a),
HITSGALORE hereby demands a trial by jury on all issues triable by a
jury as a matter of right.

Dated: June l4, 1999
Boca Raton, Florida

Respectfully Submitted,

SCHOEPPL & BURKE, P.A.
Counsel for the Plaintiff HITSGALORE_COM, Inc.
4800 North Federal Highway, Suite 210-A
Boca Raton, Florida 33431-5176
Telephone: (561) 394-8301
Facsimile: (561) 393-6541

Carl F. Schoeppl, Esq., Trial Counsel
Florida Bar No. 818518
Daniel J. Becka, Esq.
Florida Bar No. 137601




To: Janice Shell who wrote (3287)7/27/1999 12:30:00 AM
From: Jeffrey S. Mitchell  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 3795
 
STEINHART & FALCONER LLP
ROGER R. MYERS (State Bar No. 146164)
LISA M. SITKIN State (Bar No. 194127)
333 Market Street, Suite 3200
San Francisco, California 94105
Telephone: (415) 777-3999
Facsimile: (415) 442-0856

Attorneys for Plaintiff
BUSINESS WIRE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

BUSINESS WIRE, a California corporation,

Plaintiff,

V.

JEFFREY S. MITCHELL, an individual;
WILLIAM ULRICH, an individual;
JANICE SHELL, an individual,
Defendants.

Case No. C 99-1987 CAL

PLAINTIFF BUSINESS WIRE'S
OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANTS' EVIDENCE IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
UNDER CALIFORNIA CODE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE '425.16
CAUSES OF ACTION

Date: August 20, 1999
Time: 9:30 a.m.
Judge: Charles A. Legge
Court Room: 10

Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.5 of this Court, plaintiff Business
Wire hereby objects to the evidence submitted by defendants in support
of their special motion to strike Business Wire's complaint as fol-
lows:1

1 Plaintiff makes these objections only with respect to the issues
raised in Phase I of these bifurcated proceedings (i.e_, whether
California Code of Civil Procedure ' 425.16 applies to any of Business
Wire's causes of action), and without waiving the right to file fur-
ther objections to defendants' evidence on the merits of Business
Wire's causes of action should this matter proceed to Phase II as to
any of Business Wire's causes of action.

Declaration of William Ulrich

P 2 (lines 2 & 8): Objection: The allegations of this paragraph con-
cerning the "educational" purposes of defendants' prior pranks are
without foundation and inadmissible conclusions and interpretations
regarding the documents referenced therein, all of which documents
speak for itself. Civil Local Rule 7.5(b) ("declarations shall contain
only facts ... and shall avoid conclusions and argument"); National
Steel Corp. v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 496, 502 (9th Cir.
1997) (conclusory allegations, without factual support, are inadmissi-
ble); Evans v. Unkow, 38 Cal. App. 4th 1490, 1496-98 (1995) (Under
California's anti-SLAPP statute, California Code of Civil Procedure '
425.16, motion must be opposed with admissible evidence, showing
proper foundation).

P 4 (3:6-9): Objection: The allegations of this paragraph are without
foundation and inadmissable conclusions and interpretations regarding
the investment registration form on the Webnode_com website, a docu-
ment that speaks for itself.

P 6 (3:21-25): Objection: The allegations of this paragraph concerning
changes to the Webnode.com website on April 2 are without foundation
and inadmissable conclusions and interpretations regarding text posted
at the Webnode.com web site that speaks for itself.

P 9 (4:20-22; 4:24-25; 5:2-5): Objection: The allegations of this
paragraph concerning the meaning of Business Wire's membership agree-
ment are without foundation and inadmissable conclusions, including
conclusions of law. Moreover, the allegations concerning declarant's
subjective belief about the meaning of contractual language are irrel-
evant and conclusory.

P 10: Objection: The allegations of this paragraph concerning defend-
ants' misrepresentations to Business Wire are without foundation and
inadmissable conclusions.

P 11: Objection: The comments of third parties concerning the subject
matter of this action -especially those of plaintiff Business Wire's
competitor - are irrelevant to any of the 'issues before the Court.
This lawsuit concerns defendants' misconduct in connection with its
submission of a fake press release to Business Wire under false pre-
tenses and the subsequent misuse of the BUSINESS WIRE trademark in
conjunction with that fake press release.

P 12 (5:20-21; 5:26-6: 1): Objection: The statement "I am informed and
believe that Business Wire was embarrassed and decided to take action"
is without foundation and an inadmissible conclusion. Moreover, state-
ments upon information and belief are inadmissible on a motion to
strike. Evans, 38 Cal. App. 4th at 1496-98; see also Local Rule 7.5.
The allegations of this paragraph concerning the meaning of text
posted on the Webnode.com web site are without foundation and inad-
missable conclusions and interpretations regarding the meaning of text
posted at the Webnode.com web site that speaks for itself.

P 13: Objection: The alleged statement of Cathy Baron Tamraz is inad-
missible hearsay, offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.

P 14: Objection: The allegations of this paragraph concerning the
meaning of statements posted on the Webnode.com web site are without
foundation and inadmissable conclusions and interpretations regarding
statements that speak for themselves.

P 17: Objection: The allegations of this paragraph concerning litiga-
tion by Business Wire are without foundation and inadmissable conclu-
sions. Moreover, statements made upon information and belief are
inadmissible_

P 20: Objection: The self-serving statements in this paragraph are
without foundation and are inadmissible conclusions.

DATED: July 23, 1999

STEINHART & FALCONER LLP
ROGER R. MYERS
LISA M. SITKIN

Lisa M. Sitkin
Attorneys for Plaintiff
BUSINESS WIRE