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Strategies & Market Trends : Investment in Russia and Eastern Europe -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Real Man who wrote (1066)9/28/1999 1:06:00 PM
From: Paul Berliner  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1301
 
Some Moscow-based telco called Golden Telecom is supposed to be going public this week - lets see how it does. Personally, I'd rather play the commodity bounce with shares of Australian, Canadian or South African Miners because institutions are not going to accumulate TNT or LUKOY to play the bounce. They'll go with BHP, RTP, AU, ASA, AEM, ABX, etc.



To: Real Man who wrote (1066)10/4/1999 1:33:00 AM
From: CIMA  Respond to of 1301
 
4TH Quarter Forecast

Summary:

As we enter the final quarter of 1999, we are struck by
how much the world has changed since the year began. The virtual
disintegration of Russia's experiment in liberalization and China's
dramatic retreat from many of its internal and external openings,
coupled with its growing tensions with the United States, show the
distance we have come and the increasing velocity of the processes
we have been tracking.

Analysis:

It is our view that the major trends described in our
Annual Forecast [ stratfor.com ]
remain intact. The Asian economic bloc has not developed as quickly
as we thought it would and the Ukrainian crisis has been delayed by
events in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Moscow. While we no longer
expect these developments this year, we do very much continue to
expect them. On the other hand, our other forecasts have either
come to pass or are likely to come to pass before the end of the
year.

The fourth quarter will see a continuation and intensification of
the central global process: the realignments of domestic politics
and foreign policy in both Russia and China. We continue to see
tension, turmoil and instability throughout the Eurasian land mass,
particularly in Eurasia's two leading powers. We expect Russia,
with the support and encouragement of China, to intensify the
process of expanding its influence into the old Soviet Empire. We
expect China to continue and intensify its efforts to control
internal centrifugal forces, while intensifying its confrontation
with Taiwan and the United States. A summit meeting appears to be
set between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his Chinese
counterpart, Jiang Zemin, in November and, assuming that both
survive politically until that date, we expect that summit to be a
critical event not only for the year but for the coming decade

In China, Jiang took off his Western suit and tie, put on a Mao
suit, and stood watching while gigantic portraits of Mao and Deng
passed by and tanks and missiles deployed, in the largest military
show of force in about 15 years. His change of costume is a self-
conscious symbolization of the dramatic change China is undergoing.
Jiang is desperately trying to recreate the Communist regime that
had been permitted to fray during the country's economic boom.
While party cadre and army officers were busy making money in
lucrative deals with Westerners, Communist symbolism and even
institutions seemed to become archaic and irrelevant.

Now that the halcyon days are past, Jiang urgently needs to create
a new center of gravity for China. All he has to call on is the
Party. In dusting off his old Mao suit, Jiang hopes to lay claim to
the charisma of China's founder in order to save the regime from
the cynicism and corruption that destroyed the Soviet Union.

Jiang also seeks to save his own hide. After all, he presided over
China's reversal of economic fortune. Thus, while trying to
resurrect the authority of the Party over the country, Jiang was
trying also to make it clear that he controls the Party. Standing
on the reviewing stand, Jiang became Chairman Jiang, the heir to
Mao and Deng in everything but name. And that is what we find
fascinating. It would be much more effective to be named Chairman
Jiang than to merely look like Chairman Jiang. In fact, trying to
look like a chairman without being given the title reveals more
weakness than strength.

The reason Jiang was not named Chairman is obscure, but we think
the key to the reasons might be found flanking him on the reviewing
stand. On one side, Prime Minister Zhu Rongji, still there, still
unfireable, regardless of Jiang's best efforts. Jiang has done
absolutely everything possible to make Zhu the scapegoat for
China's economic problems. Indeed, Jiang has a case, in the sense
that Zhu was the architect and spokesman for many of China's
reformist economic policies. Nevertheless, Jiang does not seem to
have the strength to hang Zhu from the yardarms. Even more
interesting, on Jiang's other side was Li Peng, stalwart
conservative, disapproving of many of the reforms. Li, who had
apparently been eclipsed by history, has not only survived, but
seems to point the way to the future - a future filled with Mao
suits and perhaps new editions of little red books.

Jiang's dilemma was clearly revealed on the reviewing stand. He is
not chairman because he does not command a unified coalition. The
Chinese Communist Party is deeply split. The split is far from
simple and can hardly be reduced to two factions. Indeed, there is
a swirling complexity to Chinese politics that is difficult to
discern clearly from the outside. Nevertheless, this much is
clear: Jiang did not have the clout to make himself chairman before
the Oct. 1 celebrations. Instead, he could only act like one. Nor
could he depose Zhu or Li. The best he could do to hold on to power
was to use the deep split in the Party to create a space somewhere
between them. Jiang has become politically indispensable without
having the power to make himself undisputed boss.

This means there is a political crisis fairly near at hand in
China. First, economic deterioration requires political
realignment. China is moving backwards to older administrative
models. This will create tremendous tension between those who were
losers during the reformist regime and want to go back, and those
who fear a conservative future. Such tension could tear any country
apart and China is, after all, just another country. Jiang clearly
does not have enough power to suppress the tension. This leaves
him with two choices. He either acts quickly and decisively to gain
control of the situation, or he allows the myriad factions in
China, without a credible and strong central power, to tear the
country apart. We believe the make-or-break point is near at hand
and China's die may be cast in this coming quarter. Our best guess
is that Jiang will try, and temporarily succeed, in consolidating
his power, but that, in the long run, fragmentation will overwhelm
both him and quite possibly the central apparatus as well.

In Russia, as expected, reform has completely collapsed. There are
now those who profited from the corruption of the reform period and
want to hold on to power, and those who want to sweep away the
entire memory of the period. The latter are not part of the Russian
regime. Some are in the Duma. The most important non-regime
elements are the Russian people themselves. The masses of Russians
outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg have seen Russia go from a
poor but powerful nation to one much poorer and much less powerful.

The problem is simply this: Everyone in the current elite is
tainted with the regime's corruption. Even Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin, the former KGB man and FSB head, is intimately tied to the
oligarchs. The situation in Russia is unsustainable. No nation can
be in the condition that Russia finds itself without a cataclysmic
political readjustment. The only question now is how it will come.
The public debate in Russia today is between two factions. First,
there are the oligarchs who used reform to steal for themselves
fantastic amounts of money and who are now engaged in brutal
battles with each other and everyone else. Then there are the old
Gorbachevites, like Putin, who started the whole process. The old
KGB hands were the first to realize that the Soviet Union was
falling behind the West and that it needed Western technology and
investment to catch up. Gorbachev's policy was to encourage that
investment in the context of the Soviet regime. When the regime
collapsed, the distinction between liberals and Gorbachevites
disappeared.

That distinction has returned in Putin, whose core policies are to
rebuild the basic institutions of a centrally-planned economy and
expand the influence of Russia throughout the former Soviet Union,
without either fully doing away with the market or actually
stripping away the money and power of the oligarchs. It is a
hopeless policy, but it will dominate the next quarter.

As Putin attempts to tread water, Russia will be focused on
December's Duma elections - an event described by the Russian press
as a battle over who will control the distribution or
redistribution of property and power. The Duma elections will, in
turn, set the stage for the presidential elections next June.
Currently leading in the polls is the "Fatherland - All Russia"
electoral bloc headed by Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and former Prime
Minister Yevgeny Primakov. This bloc, which builds on the support
of many regional governors, as well as most of the now-splintered
Agrarian Party, enjoys the financial and propaganda backing of
Vladimir Gusinsky's MOST Group empire. Interestingly, the MOST
Group, primarily a media empire built around the MOST Bank, is
heavily permeated by KGB officers.

Former KGB First Deputy Chairman (under Vladimir Kryuchkov) Gen.
Filipp Bobkov heads MOST's analysis and planning office. As for
coup leader Kryuchkov himself, he reportedly works for AFK Sistema,
the Moscow city government's holding company. Fatherland-All Russia
looks increasingly like the party of the KGB, which may signify
that it has the support of Putin. Not that it matters, since the
KGB wins whether Putin or Primakov takes the presidency.

In other words, electoral politics in Russia now all lead back to
the same place: the KGB and the oligarchs to whom they are
intimately connected. The central question here is whether this
faction can survive. To put it simply, it is either this faction or
a revolution. We are increasingly of the opinion that Russia is in
a pre-revolutionary state, which might well be as cataclysmic as
1917. We simply do not see how Russia's corrupt and collapsing
institutions can sustain themselves in the face of almost universal
bitter contempt and hostility from virtually every segment of
society. The choice is between a brutal repression by the secret
police or chaos and revolution followed by brutal repression by the
revolutionaries. It seems to us that the second option is
increasingly the more likely outcome.

This does not, however, affect our forecast for Russia in the
Fourth Quarter. We expect Russia to be absorbed in the elections.
However, in being absorbed, Putin and Yeltsin will both be
motivated to demonstrate their mastery of the state and their will
to return Russia to greatness. This is already observable in the
Caucasus, as Russia maneuvers to impose its power in Chechnya as a
prelude for regaining control over the strategic Caucasus. In
general, we will see a growing Russian assertiveness within the old
borders of the Soviet Union, partly motivated by domestic politics
and partly by strategic considerations.

We are seeing, therefore, a general political crisis gripping
Eurasia as a whole. As part of this crisis, both Russia and China
can be expected to be more self-absorbed. However, in their self-
absorption, both will find it expedient to be not only indifferent
to the West and the United States, but to be generally hostile in
order to demonstrate domestically the assertive power of their
regimes. Since both the Russian and Chinese leaderships are limited
in what they can do domestically, they will need to appear decisive
in foreign policy. Neither can solve the serious (and very
different) economic problems confronting them. Each can appear to
be dealing effectively with foreign policy issues. Thus, self-
absorption creates foreign policy initiatives whose prime audience
will be domestic, and in which strategic issues become a subset of
broader considerations. This creates opportunities for strategic
risk taking.

We have already seen this in China's confrontation with Taiwan and
Russia's behavior in Dagestan and Chechnya. However, there are
severe limitations on the two countries' abilities to act
definitively in either region. China may well initiate some sort of
military action against Taiwan, but we don't think it has the naval
capacity to invade and occupy the island. Russia will try to subdue
Chechnya, but it lacks the military power to impose order in the
Caucasus. In many ways, these military adventures reveal weakness
more than they serve their true purpose - to showcase the authority
and power of the regime.

Given all of this, it appears both the Chinese and Russian
leaderships are seeking some sort of triumph. Since they can't
achieve it in economic policy or military adventure, we think they
will seek it in an arena they can control and define: diplomacy.
Specifically, we see the November summit between Jiang and Yeltsin
to be a strategic opportunity for both to deliver a triumph that
shows their mastery. The result will be, we think, a formal
alliance between Russia and China, fairly explicitly directed
against the United States.

Since neither can expect economic help from the West, they have
nothing to lose economically. More important, anti-Americanism
sells in both countries, where resentment of American power is huge
and many hold the United States responsible for their economic
problems. We therefore think that, given domestic politics and
economic realities, the November summit will bring dramatic changes
to the international system. That assumes, of course, that internal
political crises in Russia and China don't impede their current
leaders' ability to act.

This means that as Russia and China move toward internal crises
with extremely uncertain outcomes, U.S. foreign policy is
increasingly rudderless as the end of Clinton's presidency
approaches. In one sense this is a safety valve, preventing
unfortunate initiatives by the United States. In another sense, it
leaves the global system without leadership in its most powerful
state. This affects not only Russia and China, who are essentially
beyond U.S. influence. Its greatest effect will be elsewhere, in
non-Chinese East and Southeast Asia.

We see a new politico-economic dynamic being established in this
region. We see the current economic recovery as having two aspects.
First, it is an upturn in a general, long-term down cycle and is
therefore of limited long-term importance. Second, it is
bifurcating Asia between countries that may have stopped declining
and those, like Japan, that will continue to decline. Alongside
this process, we are seeing the political consequences of economic
dysfunction beginning to show. These consequences have taken their
most extreme form in Indonesia, but the consequences are visible in
the rest of Asia as well. In country after country, the old regimes
struggle to contain the destabilizing forces that have been
unleashed by economic decline. All of them will not succeed in
containing these forces. In Japan in particular, a political day
of reckoning, if not at hand, cannot be permanently postponed.

These processes have created centrifugal forces in Asia. But at
the same time, the World Bank's reversal on short-term capital
controls means that the international financial community will now
tolerate the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund to administer
controlled capital markets in Asia. We expect a number of regional
states to see this as an attractive opportunity to counteract the
centrifugal forces. If the recovery does run out of steam, Asia in
general and Japan in particular will be drawn in this direction.

We also see political forces pushing Asia together. The Australian
action in East Timor, followed by Australia's statement of its
"deputy" role in Asian affairs, did not go over well in much of
Asia. There is a growing realization in ASEAN that Asian nations
must develop more control over Asian affairs. This sense will
intensify if China and Russia simultaneously move closer and
experience serious political crises while the United States becomes
more inert. Non-Chinese East and Southeast Asia will be moved by
economics and politics to overcome centrifugal forces and create
some Asian entities.

The creation of an Asian economic or political bloc will not happen
in 1999, but the process may move from something not discussed in
polite company to a serious, public policy debate in the region.
All of this will increase pressure on Japan to take a more
assertive leadership role in the region. But that will have to wait
until the next decade.

The Fourth Quarter of 1999 will be heavily focused on the drama
being acted out in China and Russia. It will be increasingly
difficult to understand what is going on in either country, as
politics recede behind more traditional, conspiratorial curtains.
The most interesting question will not be who controls the center,
but whether the center can hold at all. At the same time - and not
coincidentally - Russia and China will move closer to each other
and become more antagonistic to the United States. In the midst of
this, East and Southeast Asia will begin turning their attention to
geopolitical issues that haven't been dealt with in over half a
century.

The Fourth Quarter will, we think, be a fitting preface to the
coming century.

(c) 1999, Stratfor, Inc.
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To: Real Man who wrote (1066)10/4/1999 11:42:00 PM
From: CIMA  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1301
 
CIS Members Look to Each Other for Support

Summary:

Recently, Ukraine created cooperative agreements with two
other CIS members without Russian involvement. These agreements
illustrate a trend we expect to see continue, in which former
Soviet republics learn to depend on each other more and on Russia
less. Russia is busy with war, domestic politics and international
scandal and cannot find the resources to support its smaller
neighbors. While Russia is preoccupied, its dependents are
beginning to look to one another for support. When Russia finally
turns its attention back to the former Soviet states it may be too
late.

Analysis:

Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and Georgian President
Eduard Shevardnadze signed a declaration Oct. 2 in Kiev
strengthening their partnership. Most significantly, the agreement
increased cooperation on a Eurasian transportation project to ship
oil and other cargo to the West. By doing so, Ukraine and Georgia
forged another link in a slow chain of events joining the CIS
without Russia's blessing.

Russia does not encourage economic cooperation among member-states,
seeing their interdependence as a step away from its traditional
parental position. However, distracted by fighting in Chechnya, the
upcoming Duma elections, high-level scandals and an economy in
shambles, Russia does not have the resources to rescue the former
Soviet members, nor to prevent their growing cooperation. Without
the weight of a regional hegemon, CIS members are turning to each
other in order to work their way out of economic ruin.

The Ukrainian-Georgian declaration, like the Ukrainian-Kazak oil
deal ( stratfor.com ), is
evidence of a growing trend. Economically strapped nations like
Ukraine simply cannot afford to wait and hope that Russia will
supply them with oil to get through the long, cold winters. Russia
rejected Ukrainian offers of alternative payment for its gas debt
in September. Given Russia's inability or unwillingness to
cooperate, Ukraine turned to Kazakstan to secure its oil supply.
Similarly, Azerbaijan and Georgia have ignored Russia, expressing
their support for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline in September meetings
with U.S. officials.

Despite this trend, the states can not fully remove themselves from
Russia's reach. Russia has far too many historic and cultural ties
with the states to leave them totally to their own devices. More
importantly, they do not want to be out of reach. They need Russia,
especially for protection and military leadership. Mother Russia
has already demonstrated that it is willing to bring former
satellites back into it orbit in the case of real systemic
problems, as it has shown in Belarus (
stratfor.com ).

We expect Russia that will be preoccupied with its own problems
until at least next summer. For the same reasons, it will be unable
to ensure that the states stay weak and isolated. In the months
ahead we expect to see further examples of other CIS members
developing cooperative projects without Russian approval or
knowledge.

By the time Russia redirects its attention, CIS members will have
developed further cooperation amongst themselves. By then, they
will have no apparent reason to allow Russia its traditional
influence. Russia will then have the arduous task of dissolving
these alignments and reasserting its hegemony.

(c) 1999, Stratfor, Inc.
__________________________________________________

SUBSCRIBE to FREE, DAILY GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE UPDATES (GIU)
stratfor.com

or send your name, organization, position, mailing
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___________________________________________________

STRATFOR.COM
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Austin, TX 78701
Phone: 512-583-5000
Fax: 512-583-5025
Internet: stratfor.com
Email: info@stratfor.com
___________________________________________________




To: Real Man who wrote (1066)11/8/1999 1:22:00 AM
From: CIMA  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1301
 
Ten Years after the Fall: After the Celebration

Summary:

Last week saw a remarkable display of nuclear saber rattling by the
Russians. Triggered by U.S. insistence on deploying an Anti-
Ballistic Missile system despite a 1972 treaty and by Congress'
rejection of a nuclear test ban treaty, the Russians put on a
display of symbolic nuclear muscle-flexing unlike anything seen in
10 years. The real issue behind the display was that the United
States is discounting Russia in its foreign policy decisions. U.S.
meddling in Russia's sphere of influence, the former Soviet Union,
is posing real problems for the Russians. Moscow is trying to
remind the Americans of the risks it will run if it places Russia
in an untenable position. This also makes for good domestic
politics in Russia.

Analysis:

The Berlin Wall came down 10 years ago this week. This made the
events of last week all the more startling. The Russians rattled
their nuclear sabers louder than they have since Gorbachev's day,
reminding the United States that whatever else has happened, Russia
remains a great power. The United States appeared simultaneously
confused and angry at Russia's behavior. This is what made the last
week interesting. The United States still thinks it is operating in
the post-Cold War era. The Russians have moved on to a very
different place.

It all began with discussion in the United States about amending
the 1972 treaty banning the deployment of Anti-ballistic Missile
Systems. The logic behind the treaty was that peace between the
United States and the Soviet Union depended on Mutually Assured
Destruction (MAD). As long as both sides were assured of the
ability to destroy the other, neither would attempt a nuclear
attack.

Anti-ballistic missile systems had the potential of destabilizing
the situation. With such a system, one side could gain the ability
to block all or most of the other's attack. More important, was the
uncertainty surrounding the system. As neither side could be sure
the other side was able to block its attacks, each had to assume
the worst: that its own nuclear arsenal was about to become
impotent. This increased insecurity would obviously knock out the
"assured" element of MAD, increasing the likelihood of war.
Therefore, they formed a treaty banning all but a limited number of
ABM sites in each country. What was particularly nice about the
treaty was that the agreement banned a technology that didn't
really exist yet.

The United States toyed with the idea of an ABM shield during the
1980s. Called Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and nicknamed
Star Wars, it came to little, because of serious technical
difficulties in implementation and attacks by those who felt MAD
was a more secure foundation for preventing nuclear war.
Nevertheless, research and development on some sort of missile
defense went on in the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
(BMDO), and in a system called Theater High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD).

THAAD differed from Star Wars in several ways. It was not designed
to shield the United States against a massive Soviet attack.
Rather, it was intended to defend U.S. troops abroad against the
threat of smaller powers like Iraq or North Korea. THAAD's function
was to destroy a small handful of incoming missiles, not to serve
as a shield against massive attack. Therefore, from the U.S. point
of view, THAAD posed no challenge to the Russians.

From the American point of view, the 1972 treaty is now irrelevant.
The foundation of the treaty was MAD. With the United States and
Soviet Union training thousands of missiles on each other, an ABM
system would have undermined MAD. In 1999, there is no Soviet
Union, and the United States and Russia are not aiming thousands of
warheads at each other. We are not on hair trigger alerts, ready to
move to DEFCON 1 on a moment's notice. Therefore, U.S. reasoning
holds that introducing interceptor missiles would not destabilize
the balance of terror, because there is no longer a balance of
terror. What remain are threats from minor powers that can be
blocked by new ABM systems. Thus, not only is the 1972 treaty
meaningless, but the Russians cannot reasonably object to the
United States protecting its cities from destruction by dangerous,
small enemies.

The United States was wrong. The Russians did not think the treaty
was irrelevant. In fact, they went ballistic last week. Earlier,
Russian President Boris Yeltsin wrote a letter to U.S. President
Bill Clinton stating that the U.S. plan would have "extremely
dangerous consequences for the entire disarmament process." Then
things started happening:

* On Nov. 3, with a massive publicity blitz, the Russians announced
they had test-fired one of the anti-ballistic missiles they were
permitted under the 1972 treaty. Col. Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev, head
of Russia's rocket forces, was quoted by The Associated Press as
saying the test must be viewed in the context of a "possible
symmetrical and asymmetrical response" to U.S. actions. In defense
jargon, this meant Russia already has an ABM system under the 1972
treaty, and may decide to respond to new U.S. deployments by either
upgrading its ABM system or developing new, non-defensive systems.
In other words, if the United States goes ahead, all bets are off.

* The Russian publicity blitz continued to focus public attention
on the deployment of Russia's new ICBM, the Topol-M, which Moscow
made clear would be deployed and operational by the end of this
year. Russia also made clear it was considering putting multiple
warheads atop the Topol-M -- in defiance of START treaty
restrictions -- to decrease the effectiveness of the U.S. ABM
system. In short, the Russians were pointing out their willingness
to wreck the entire arms control regime created in the 1970s and
1980s if the United States undermined the ABM treaty.

* On Nov. 5, again amid massive publicity, Russia received the
first of 11 strategic bombers from Ukraine in exchange for writing
off its $285 million natural gas debt. Eight of the 11 bombers will
be supersonic TU-160 Blackjack bombers. The other three will be
refitted TU-95 Bear bombers. Both are able to fire nuclear-tipped
cruise missiles. Since Russia currently has only six TU-160s, the
deal with Ukraine represents a substantial strategic boost.

* Prime Minister Vladimir Putin had previously announced massive
increases in defense spending. Last week, Col. Gen. Anatoly Sitnov,
chief of armaments, announced that up to 28 percent of all money
invested in weapons procurement would go toward modernizing
strategic nuclear forces.

* The Kremlin ordered U.S. Ambassador James Collins, who was
supposed to visit a secured Russian military site known as
Kraznoyarsk-26 for the inauguration of a U.S. financed business
center, not to bring his top science advisor. It also told him he
could not inspect any other U.S.-Russian projects at the site. The
ambassador cancelled the meeting. Later, Energy Secretary Bill
Richardson, at a meeting in Denver attended by Russian Atomic
Energy Minister Yevgeny Adamov, protested Russian restrictions in
such strong terms that Adamov walked out of the room.

This is interesting stuff to be happening on the 10th anniversary
of the fall of the Berlin Wall. To understand what is going on, it
is useful to consider some things said by Hungarian Prime Minister
Viktor Orban in an interview with the Canadian newspaper Globe and
Mail. Orban said Hungary needed nuclear weapons based on its
territory, because of "uncertainties about the future of Russia."
Francois Leblennec, a NATO spokesman, agreed that Hungary could, in
principle, deploy nuclear missiles, but that the current strategic
balance in Europe made the action unnecessary. The Russian Foreign
Ministry blew up at Orban's comments, calling them a "direct
violation of the Russia-NATO Founding Act, in which NATO countries
confirmed they had no intentions, plans or causes to deploy weapons
in the territories of new members."

Lurking in Orban's statement is the real starting point for
understanding what is going on here. Orban said Ukraine should
never become part of Russia, since that would threaten Hungarian
national security and therefore NATO. The Russians blew up not only
at the thought of NATO nuclear weapons in Hungary, but also because
Orban was intruding into what Russia regards as its sphere of
influence, the former Soviet Union. Orban tried to downplay his
statements later as a comment made in the context of a discussion
of Canadian nuclear policy and having no practical significance.

From the Russian point of view, the statement seemed to be fraught
with practical significance. Orban had linked the Ukranian question
with the nuclear question. NATO seemed to be joining in this. Both
said, given the current military and political situation, there was
no need for nuclear weapons to be based in Hungary. Orban, however,
made it clear that in Hungary's mind the need for nuclear weapons
shifted if Ukraine changed its neutral stance. If Ukraine fell
completely into the Russian sphere of influence, and Russian forces
once again deployed in the Carpathians, Hungary would not be able
to defend itself by conventional means. At that point Hungary would
require nuclear weapons.

Ukraine is critical to Russian national security. A hostile Ukraine
threatens the southern flank of Belarus and Russia. On the other
hand, Ukraine is economically dependent on Russia, particularly as
a source of energy and as a market for Ukrainian manufactured goods
that cannot compete on the European market. For its part, Russia
needs Ukrainian agriculture. The two economies intertwine deeply.
There is a deep economic fit between Ukraine and Russia that
predates the Russian revolution. There is also real and deep anti-
Russian sentiment in Ukraine. There is a deep tension between what
Ukrainians want to see happen and what economic and geopolitical
realities will make happen. The transfer of bombers to Russia in
order to pay off energy debts symbolizes this interdependence. They
are being pulled closer together on a number of levels. Hungary
sees this and is worried, worried to the point of speaking of
nuclear weaponry.

Three levels exist to this process of Russian reassertion. First,
there is public opinion in Russia. The Russians are tired of being
treated as a banana republic by the United States. Standing toe to
toe with America on nuclear issues is good politics in Russia.
Upsetting the United States is even better politics. Therefore,
Russia will not allow the United States to change a treaty that is
in place, such as the ABM treaty, without its permission. Second,
Russia has substantial strategic assets and the technological
capability for producing more. It retains few levers in its
relationship with the United States. This is a very real one. Last
week's exercise was designed to remind the United States that the
current status of the nuclear equation is neither fixed nor
entirely dependent on the United States. Russia is as capable as
America is of upping the temperature.

Third, and most important, Russia is in the process of reclaiming
its empire. This process will take a generation at least. Orban's
statement symbolized what Russia sees as American meddling inside
its sphere of influence. The Russians do not believe that Orban
said what he did without U.S. permission. U.S. support for the
Baltics as well as U.S. meddling in the Caucasus, Central Asia and,
most important strategically, Ukraine has practical implications
for Russian expansion. By using the ABM treaty as a basis for
reopening the nuclear relationship between Russia and the United
States, Russia will force the United States to think seriously
about the consequences of pressing Russia too far, particularly in
preventing it from reasserting its sphere of influence.

Responding to the Russian statement on its ABM tests, U.S. Defense
Secretary William Cohen said, "I'm not sure what point they were
trying to make." The point is simple. Russia is a great power with
a massive nuclear arsenal and serious regional interests. If the
United States chooses to disregard its treaties with the Russians
and to meddle inside of Russia's sphere of influence, the United
States will find the Russians can still pose a threat on the
strategic nuclear level. The risks of U.S. activities inside the
former Soviet Union will rise prohibitively.

In short, if the United States wants a new ABM treaty, it had
better ask Moscow and be prepared to pay a high price. Included in
that price will be abandoning any thought of deploying nuclear
weapons in Hungary or Poland, or of further NATO expansion. Most
important, Russia expects to exercise its influence in the former
Soviet Union without American meddling.

From 1992-1995, there was a window of opportunity in which the
United States could have moved directly into the Baltics, Ukraine
or the Caucasus and created a framework for containing Russian
power. For better or worse, it chose instead to focus on relations
with Moscow, assuming that if Russia were pro-Western, everything
else would follow. It was a decent assumption, save for the fact
that the means for keeping Russia pro-Western -- namely, prosperity
-- never happened; nor could it have happened.

The United States is now in a position in which relations with
Moscow are deteriorating daily, but relations with the rest of the
former Soviet Union have not taken on forms that could help
countries like Ukraine resist Russian pressure indefinitely. As
Russia returns to a more traditional foreign policy, it reminds the
United States that it has nuclear teeth. Therefore, the United
States had better take those teeth into account in its dealings in
areas such as Lithuania, Georgia or Kazakstan.

Russia is back in the great power game. It may not be a superpower,
able to project its forces globally, but it is the preeminent power
in the former Soviet Union. It may not be economically healthy, but
it has a massive nuclear force and a very respectable conventional
force, more than enough for asserting power along its frontiers.
The United States has a strategic decision to make. Will it
challenge Russia's sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union
or will it cede the region to Moscow?

Russia's nuclear saber rattling was an attempt to remind the United
States of the risks of intrusion. What is not clear is whether the
United States is, at this point, capable of disengaging from the
region. Russia cannot bear U.S. intrusion and the United States
will find it difficult to disengage -- an interesting and dangerous
problem for the millennium.

(c) 1999, Stratfor, Inc.
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