To: TigerPaw who wrote (7822 ) 10/15/1999 11:34:00 AM From: Zoltan! Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 769670
>>So instead of capitalizing on our lead we are going to let the rest of the countries that want nukes catch up. Actually, that's what signing the treaty would have accomplished. Examine the effect of the arms control treaties we have signed - we adhere and the others cheat. And this treaty didn't ever meet minimal criteria - it was unverifiable. October 15, 1999 The Grand Delusion It sure sounds like Bill Clinton wants to make a campaign 2000 issue out of the defeat of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. At his remarkably partisan news conference yesterday, he said that the message Republicans had sent with the vote was that they want to "build this big old wall and tell our neighbors to go take a hike." In fact, the story of how and why this treaty lost is a bit more complicated than that, and we commend Paul Gigot's account of the defeat in the column nearby. But if indeed it is the intention of the Clinton-Gore White House to make national security an issue for the next 12 months, then we owe them nothing but thanks. With a 51-48 vote against the treaty along party lines and every GOP contender weighing in against it, this abstruse treaty (its defeat blamed even for the coup in Pakistan, discussed in the editorial below) offers an excellent opportunity to discover where our major parties stand on national defense. Indeed, we'll begin the debate here in one of modern liberalism's holiest shrines--arms control. Wednesday's vote on the test-ban treaty is most significantly seen as a flat rejection of the long-dominant theory of arms control. In rejecting the treaty, the Senate also rejected the hitherto sacrosanct notion that arms-control agreements actually work as they've been marketed to the American people. This is a mind-set that has been more dangerous to international security than any Saddam Hussein or Osama bin Laden. The history of arms control is in fact a history of failure. Arms-control agreements have more often been a reason for inaction (which may be why they are so popular among generals). There is no better example than the 1972 ABM Treaty, which has ensured that the U.S. remains without defense of any sort against ballistic missile attack. Without the impediment of the treaty, it's hard to imagine that any American leader could have taken the position that we ought not defend the U.S. homeland against possible attack by a North Korea or a Saddam Hussein. We'd be protected today. A few days before representatives of the 170 signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty met in 1995 to review the treaty, we published an article detailing the treaty's shortcomings. Titled "A Nuclear Treaty That Breeds Weapons," it was written by Albert Wolhstetter and Gregory S. Jones. There is ample evidence that arms-control agreements have done more to spread arms than to suppress them. The late defense strategist Albert Wohlstetter detailed this point brilliantly in a 1995 article on these pages on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. He explained how that treaty would have the effect of disarming nations that already had nuclear weapons while making it possible for states that didn't have them to acquire them. One of Mr. Wohlstetter's students, former Reagan Defense official Richard Perle, examined the dangers and unintended consequences of arms control in a long paper that was summarized on this page last week; it described how the Soviets had cheated on such agreements in the past and how more recently Saddam had used inspection procedures to learn how to better hide his weapons. The only undeniably successful nonproliferation effort of recent decades was achieved without a treaty: That was Israel's 1981 bombing of the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq. Virtually the whole world condemned Israel at the time. We are most certainly not recommending military action as a universal solution, but in this instance the fact that Saddam didn't use nuclear weapons during the Gulf War clearly saved a great many American lives. Contrast this approach with the Clinton Administration's talk-till-you-drop policy toward North Korea. The North Koreans receive fuel and food from us, and in return they are able to divert resources into missiles directed toward us and our allies. The American soldiers in some future conflict in Northeast Asia might not fare as well as their compatriots in Desert Storm. Asked at his news conference yesterday if he couldn't acknowledge the possibility that his opponents had acted in good faith, Mr. Clinton offered little more response than that many of the Republicans didn't know the subject. This comment, speaking of good faith, doesn't do much credit to a public opposition that included six former defense secretaries, four former CIA directors (including two Clinton appointees), four former national security advisers, three former energy secretaries and three former directors of the national nuclear laboratories. The three current heads of the national labs--Sandia, Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos--were highly skeptical, giving only very conditional assent to the treaty. Any one of these individuals would be a fine participant in any campaign debate that the President wants on national security. And the voters will settle the matter next November. With the arms-control delusion now badly cracked, there's a better chance that the next Administration will can get down to the business of implementing policies that have a more realistic chance of enhancing the security of the nation and the world.interactive.wsj.com