To: jbe who wrote (15253 ) 11/10/1999 5:07:00 PM From: George Papadopoulos Read Replies (4) | Respond to of 17770
gas masks, fuel air explosives, the Russian Waco in the making????? Why the West Should Care About Chechnya By Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former national security adviser. He is author, most recently, of "The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives" (Basic Books, 1997). The international community will have a chance to do something about Russia's genocidal policies in Chechnya next week, when the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe meets in Istanbul. After weeks of standing by and watching, it's time for action. Central European intelligence sources have provided some ominous details on Russia's plans to destroy Chechnya. Its first phase has involved a deliberate massive bombardment of Chechen settlements, designed to force all noncombatants out of the territory. This has been followed by a progressive military envelopment of the resisting Chechens meant to push them into urban or semiurban concentrations. Unlike the earlier war, this time the Russians have no intention of engaging in costly street fighting against the entrenched and determined Chechens. Instead, their plan is to use new weapons to launch devastating attacks from a safe distance. Using a combination of explosives and chemical agents, they will aim to wipe out the thousands of Chechen fighters squeezed by Russian pressure into compressed urban ruins. There have been reports that gas masks have already been distributed to the Russian troops. Among the new weapons will be so-called fuel air explosives, which blanket targeted terrain with a flammable vapor cover and, following a massive explosion, precipitate a lethal vacuum. Even deeply dug-in Chechens will be exterminated. The cumulative result of this strategy will be the killing of most fighting-age Chechen males. So far the Clinton administration has been callously passive, while international reaction has been muted, even though a Russian success in the war would have wide and negative consequences. On the domestic front, a Russian military victory would encourage Moscow's neoimperial aspirations while increasing the appeal of the worst elements of the Russian political elite. It would be a nasty setback for Russian politics. More broadly, the conflict could destabilize the Southern Caucasus. The Northern Caucasus is already a mess, but the flow of refugees and the associated instability is likely to spread to Georgia. A military success in Chechnya is likely to tempt the Moscow hard-liners either to subdue or to eliminate Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, thereby also subordinating his nation. The fear of such an outcome was palpable when I visited Tbilisi last month. This would be bad news for the U.S. A subordinated Georgia would give Russia direct access to Armenia, already Moscow's dependency, thereby cutting off Azerbaijan (as well as Central Asia) from the West while giving Moscow political control over the Baku-Supsa pipeline. The passivity of the West is especially baffling, particularly after Kosovo and East Timor. Perhaps the West is simply unaware that Russia's failure to provide the promised postwar economic assistance is the main reason for the internal mess in Chechnya and for extremism's appeal among some Chechens. Many of the moderates have been driven to align with extremists out of desperation and the Kremlin's refusal to negotiate with them. This conflict is historically deep-rooted. Neither Russian nor Orthodox, the Chechens have been resisting subjugation for more than 120 years. Russia's current campaign against the Chechens is reminiscent of Stalin's decision in 1944 to destroy the entire people by deporting them to Central Asia. What should be done? To start with, the U.S. should not fall for Russia's entreaty that "we are allies against Osama Bin Laden." Reminiscent of the earlier Russian pitch that "Yeltsin, like Lincoln, is saving the union," which the Clinton administration swallowed hook, line and sinker, this is a marginal issue intended as a distraction. Terrorism is neither the central geopolitical nor moral challenge involved here. Russia must be made aware that its policy threatens stability in the region and is incompatible with America's and Europe's shared interests and values. A hold should be put on further financial aid. The West should explicitly address the moral dimensions of Russia's conduct. Russian democrats, who oppose the war, are isolated, and their argument that the war is damaging to Russia's real long-term interests is being undermined by the West's seeming indifference. Washington also should propose a joint effort involving the U.S., Russia and the European Union to develop a regional economic-development plan for the Northern Caucasus, under U.N. or other international auspices. The key is to offer at least the outlines of a alternative solution to escalating and regionally destructive conflict. Such an initiative could put aside the issue of sovereignty and focus on the urgent need to generate among the region's peoples some degree of shared economic growth. Russia's anxiety over its own status would be somewhat appeased by its inclusion in any such joint initiative. The three states of the Southern Caucasus might also be engaged in some fashion. Even though the situation in Chechnya is worse than the one in Kosovo before NATO intervened, a NATO-type action is not in the cards. Chechnya is more like East Timor, where concentrated international pressure convinced Indonesia that its interests were better served by a peaceful settlement. The OSCE meeting would be the appropriate place to register the international community's outrage and to launch the needed steps to engage the U.N. in halting the final phase of Russia's genocide of Chechnya.