The Hidden Meaning of Beijing's White Paper
Summary
Last week, Beijing exploded a rhetorical bombshell: threatening the
use of force if Taiwan indefinitely refuses to negotiate on
reunification with China. Washington split into two schools; one
declared that the new statement meant nothing while the other
worried about imminent invasion. Neither is correct. Indeed,
China's new statement has less to do with Taiwan than it does with
Beijing's ongoing attempt to re-define today's unipolar world into
a multi-polar one. While Washington worries about bilateral ties,
China is attempting to contain the United States on a global scale,
through classic balance-of-power politics.
Analysis
Last Monday, China exploded a rhetorical bombshell that still
echoes. In an 11,000 word White Paper on Taiwan, Beijing's Foreign
Ministry stated that Taipei's indefinite refusal to negotiate
reunification would force Beijing to "adopt all drastic measures
possible, including the use of force."
Washington immediately split into two schools of thought. One
viewed the White Paper with a yawn, as nothing more than a warmed-
over restatement of policy. Beijing has always maintained that
Taiwan is part of China. Force has always been an option. Taiwan
holds elections next month; and it was during the previous 1996
elections that Beijing hurled missiles into the Taiwan Strait to
dampen sentiments for outright independence. The other school of
sensed a seismic shift. Beijing had long threatened violence in the
event of Taiwan declaring independence; now force could be used
merely for refusing to sit at the bargaining table.
In fact, the White Paper is a significant but entirely tactical
move in a much larger strategic game - one that has comparatively
little to do with Taiwan. Why do U.S.-Chinese relations
consistently progress forward one step - and then fall back
another? The two governments are pursuing entirely different
agendas. The Clinton administration is trying to build stable,
bilateral ties with Beijing only to be frustrated by the fact that
Beijing is attempting to rein in American behavior. The White Paper
is Beijing's version of classic, balance-of-power politics.
Consider very recent history, from the Chinese point of view. In
1999, four events sank relations between Beijing and Washington to
rock bottom. On May 7, 1999 - in the midst of the Kosovo conflict -
a U.S. B-2 bomber struck the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Scandal
over Chinese espionage in America indicated that the U.S. political
atmosphere was turning poisonous. Beijing's attempt to fortify its
regime against internal critics triggered intolerable criticism on
human rights from Washington. And a worsening economy prompted
Beijing to care progressively less about what Washington thought.
Relations sank to a historic low.
Viewed from Beijing, the United States was not only powerful - the
world was unipolar the moment the Soviet Union collapsed - but now
dangerously unpredictable. To control American behavior, China
needed to turn the world into a multi-polar one. Indeed, this
appears to have been China's strategy all along.
Too weak to serve as a counterweight, China cast about for help.
The obvious partner was Russia and in the summer of 1999, events
suggested that the Russians might want an alliance. But building a
coalition was neither simple nor straightforward. Each nation
proved more interested in extracting concessions than challenging
the American balance of power. Indeed, China's view of Washington
was overly complex, believing that various factions - the military,
Congress, the Clinton administration - could be played off against
one another.
As 1999 turned into the year 2000, China's efforts were further
complicated by two extreme - and opposing - views in Beijing. One
held that the policies of Deng Xiaoping were correct and that the
economic crisis was a mere bump in the road. The other held that
Deng's policies had failed and threatened to destabilize China. One
argued for intensifying reform and engagement with the United
States. The other responded by strengthening the traditional
institutions of party, army and security apparatus, calling for
disengagement, insularity and confrontation. President Jiang Zemin
balanced precariously in the middle.
The Clinton administration recognized two risks. Not only was the
anti-American faction in Beijing growing stronger, but Beijing and
Moscow were growing closer than any time since the Sino-Soviet rift
of the 1960s. With the rise of Vladimir Putin, now Russia's acting
president, Moscow there was little leverage in Moscow. So
Washington focused on Beijing. This was what Beijing wanted. In any
three-player game, the goal is to become the swing player who can
alternately bridge the other two, extract concessions and make
certain that neither allies with the other.
The American diplomatic offensive in Beijing reached its crescendo
a week before the White Paper was released. On Feb. 17 and 18, a
high-level U.S. delegation visited Beijing, led by Deputy Secretary
of State Strobe Talbott. In tow was the vice-chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Air Force Gen. Joseph Ralston and Deputy National
Security Advisor James Steinberg. With an obvious tilt toward
security issues, it appears that the talks focused on the sale of
U.S. weapons to Taiwan, particularly new destroyers and a theater
missile defense.
The mission took place against a larger backdrop in U.S.-Chinese
relations: debates in the U.S. Congress on providing Beijing with
Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status as well strengthening security
ties with Taiwan. Finally, the U.S. State Department, on
bureaucratic auto-pilot, issued its annual human rights report on
Friday, condemning the Chinese for human rights abuses.
The White Paper is the backhanded Chinese response to Washington on
all these fronts. It rebuffs the high-level mission, endangers NTR
status - and with it membership in the World Trade Organization.
Over the weekend, Beijing released its own human rights report
entitled, "U.S. Human Rights Record in 1999," condemning the U.S.
record on human rights. About 10,000 words long, the document was
clearly prepared in anticipation of the U.S. report. Knowing what
was coming, the Chinese knew to fire back.
Across the spectrum, relations between Beijing and Washington
appear to be returning to the nadir of last summer - after the
bombing, the spy scandal and everything else. Not only has the
American strategic problem not been solved, the situation is
deteriorating. Washington appears to be scrambling to patch up the
bilateral relationship. Navy Adm. Dennis Blair, commander of U.S.
forces in the Pacific, is in Beijing. The visit was scheduled
before the release of the White Paper but the decision to proceed
indicates that the administration does not want the relationship to
falter. Indeed, President Clinton warned on Friday against linking
NTR status with the Taiwan White Paper.
There appear to be two explanations. The first is simple: the
leadership in Beijing is aware of the Clinton administration's
desperate need to salvage the U.S.-Chinese relationship. And so the
price keeps going up and up and up - from NTR to WTO status to
Taiwan. China can also manipulate American concern, particularly
about an alliance with Russia, to thin the relationship between
Washington and Taipei - just enough to snuff out ambitions for
independence. On this score, Beijing may be miscalculating. There
could be a backlash in Washington.
China's unpredictability can also be understood through a second
and complementary explanation: domestic politics. Hard-liners in
Beijing doubt the value of economic relations with the United
States. Given the state of the economy, NTR and WTO status are a
day late and a dollar short anyway. By forcing the Taiwan issue,
they can rupture economic ties and cut the ground out from under
reformers. If the United States backs off, the hard-liners can take
credit for increased leverage on Taiwan - and for controlling the
United States.
We do not expect China to invade Taiwan.
[http://www.stratfor.com/asia/commentary/0002252352.htm]
A threat toward Taiwan - imminent or not - is not trivial,
particularly given the strained deployment of U.S. forces around
the world. But a fight in the strait right now is not the core of
China's strategy.
The White Paper ultimately is not about Taiwan; it is about
positioning China relative to Russia and the United States so that
China can maximize room for maneuver and concessions from other
players. It is a classic diplomatic maneuver, well played.
The United States has two moves with which to counter. It can move
closer to the Russians. A less obvious move is to simply refuse to
play. Vastly more powerful, the United States can refuse to engage.
By doing so, it would arm Taiwan, refuse NTR status, scuttle WTO
membership - and generally behave as if China doesn't matter.
Washington would risk a Moscow-Beijing alliance, but that is likely
anyway.
Indeed, refusing to play with China - while opening to the Putin
government in Moscow - might put the United States into the coveted
swing position of the three-player game. But diplomatic nimbleness
has not been the mark of the Clinton administration. It seems
especially unlikely when everyone appears to be a lame duck.
The inattention of the administration, along with a lack of
strategic coherence, is the thing to which China is playing. It is
playing well.
(c) 2000, Stratfor, Inc. stratfor.com
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