To: Harvey Allen who wrote (49427 ) 9/16/2000 11:46:26 AM From: rudedog Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 74651 Harvey - I regard comments like yours about MSFT being able to "starve thin clients in the crib" as the "shooters on the grassy knoll" theory of how the industry developed. MSFT did nothing to slow the development and deployment of thin client technology - not on their own stacks, and not in the competing space. They basically ignored it until Citrix showed the concept was viable, and then brought out a "just good enough" product. The Citrix products are pretty good, and I have been using them for years. I have the luxury of being able to indulge myself with whatever hardware and software catches my fancy. In addition, the client base I work with (mostly financial houses) was an early adopter of thin client technology, for a number of reasons. Based on the success of those installations, CPQ and others embarked on a fairly aggressive program to expand those markets out to areas traditionally held by PCs. This was a natural for CPQ - they want to shift their revenue mix into servers anyway, they have the service and engineering skills to do a first rate job of meeting the customers' needs, and they already had the majority of that business. The results were less than earth-shaking. Even in accounts that I was very close to, users who had any general-purpose computing requirements simply did not have any interest in moving to a centralized model. And that should come as no surprise - the history of the industry over the previous 20 years (including the time when MSFT was only a minor force and folks like IBM had the "monopoly power") was to give increasing power to end users and de-centralize. The economic arguments were much weaker at that point than they are today - network capability was weak and hard to administer and maintain, PC hardware was expensive (roughly 10 times the cost of the technology it was replacing) and functionality was limited. The shift was based on a very simple proposition - end users wanted control over their experience, data, and functionality. The PC gave that to them in a way which nothing else had done. I don't think these users were somehow "brainwashed" by MSFT or that their choices were restricted - I think they really did not like giving up any of the local power they had acquired. The notion that the internet, high speed connectivity beyond the LAN, the shift of the development paradigm from the platform to the net, and the blurring of local data and services in "the cloud" spells the end of MSFT's old business model over time is certainly undisputable. I believe MSFT saw that coming a ways back, and that is what the "dot-net" initiative is all about. MSFT's business practices and so-called "monopoly power" resulted in technology going a different way than it would have if say IBM had maintained its hegemony - but the same is true of any number of technology shifts over the years. MSFT was good at riding the wave, but much less successful at changing where the wave would go. Netscape attempted to take one good idea (which they didn't even invent) and take that to market dominance based on marketing, not engineering. MSFT had a hand in their demise, but their lack of foresight on where the market would go, and the inevitable commoditization of internet infrastructure components, had a lot more to do with it. They were an early object lesson in what happens to the valuations of companies built on a faulty business case, a scenario we have seen played out many times since in areas where MSFT has no presence or impact. MSFT was just a convenient bogeyman to blame. I first bought MSFT in 1991, at a time when no one considered them a monopoly and their value surely did not reflect that. The increase in the value of that investment slowed at about the time people started to see MSFT in a monopoly position. So My sense is that MSFT's prospects will actually improve if their earnings are re-calculated as a non-monopoly, if history is any guide. Assuming they can execute on their new vision.