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Strategies & Market Trends : Gorilla and King Portfolio Candidates -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: tekboy who wrote (36055)	12/6/2000 11:21:19 PM
From: Uncle Frank	Respond to of 54805

>> I came across this little bit of history, which is clearly a relic from GM's pre-Godzilla days... It's a shame he sold out and used the ill formulated Godzilla Game chapter to make a few bucks off trfm. A lot of the younger G&Kers spun off to apply his newest theory and lost their a$$ettes. It certainly didn't meet the low risk approach that made Geoff famous. Lindy Bill and I opted for a conservative interpretation of the Gorilla Game from the get go. uf@feetofclay.com uf

To: tekboy who wrote (36055)	12/7/2000 12:15:41 AM
From: Thomas Mercer-Hursh	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 54805

I continue to believe, therefore, that the day-to-day discussions on this thread are as important to our success as the manual itself. Words of wisdom from the reluctant convert! What the world wants is some magic formula by which the dilettante investor can safety reap high rewards short term, long term, whatever with confidence and dependability. Sorry folks, reality isn't like that. Moore's perspective, which itself is not a static formula, but rather an evolving perspective, a way of looking at things, isn't magic ... it is no more, no less, than just a way of looking at things. Like any other "way", some do it better than other, some perhaps better than the source. The real magic is a combination of a good way of seeing and this community; a particularly grand example of the whole being more than the sum of its parts.

To: tekboy who wrote (36055)	12/7/2000 12:20:59 AM
From: Mike Buckley	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 54805

Tekboy, Thanks for the link to that article. Lately I've come to appreciate by necessity rather than choice that reading stuff much later than it was printed adds perspective. An example from that article: gorillas gain enormous power, which translates into the extraordinary market caps enjoyed by the likes of Microsoft and Cisco Systems (Nasdaq: MSFT, CSCO), whose valuations have recently been as high as 18 times their revenues. That article was published in August, 1998. Both companies' stocks pushed PSRs of 25 the following year. My guess is that Cisco's got even higher in March of this year. --Mike Buckley

To: tekboy who wrote (36055)	12/7/2000 3:57:29 AM
From: Joshua Corbin	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 54805

The very success and publicity of the gorilla game strategy would eventually erode its above-average returns. Well, the TFM is out of print and TRFM has already found the remainder tables, as I mentioned before. So that kinda cuts into the audience. The new Fault Line book is aimed at managers. Then again, I saw it, Innovator's Dilemma, and Telecosm on sale at Wal-Mart a couple weeks ago. Second, I look at the PEs and other ratios of Gorillas, Kings and other tech companies -- and I don't see that Wall Street treat stocks differently due to Moore's classifications. I don't know that the average investor understands the gorilla game; the press often uses the G-word to mean simply "big cap stock." Then again, maybe I'm missing something. (Strict efficient markets theory would claim the GG is already priced into the applicable stocks) Also, unlike the 1970s Nifty Fifty glown boom, these aren't one decision stocks (if such critters even exist). There's always discontinuous innovations on the way, which means new gorilla candidates can be spotted by the persistent hunter. Got a spear? :-)

To: tekboy who wrote (36055)	12/11/2000 8:44:50 AM
From: blan	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 54805

One concern that has been raised here from time to time is that the very success and publicity of the gorilla game strategy would eventually erode its above-average returns. The response to this has generally been that such an outcome is unlikely because sticking with the strategy for a long time requires uncommon tenacity and discipline, and because identifying gorillas in real time is not a simple or mechanical task. I’d like to take the strategy/time element combination one step further. In trying to make sense of the rise and fall of the Naz and my port, which has recently put some of the dare-devil roller coaster rides my daughter loves to shame, I went back and reviewed (as much as time would allow) some of the writings of the best in the business--Buffet, Fisher, Lynch, and G. Moore (as author rather than investor). To me, after hitting the books again, the most noticeable similarity among them is this: regardless of their chosen strategy, each of the four believes in holding for the Long Haul, which means (roughly) until (1) the company falters tragically and irretrievably (a change in fundamentals), (2) the sector or company has shifted so drastically as to damage the company’s position (think buggy whips), or (3) money is needed for other purposes (such as a down payment on a home). Without fail and regardless of their strategies, Buffet, Fisher, Lynch, and GM all preach the Gospel of the Long Haul. The long haul is not the only way to play the game, but for mere mortals like myself it seems like the surest. What is uncommon among these one-in-a-million investors is (1) the shrewdness of their chosen strategies and (2) their ability to hold and hold and hold. And then hold some more . . . through, I would guess, much more in their decades of investing than we’ve seen in the last 12 to 24 months (though it would be nice if I were wrong about this last part). Their ability to stay the course may be only slightly less uncommon than their shrewdness--and the reason why their achievements are so rarely duplicated. (If I were to add a third factor, it would be an unshakeable belief in their choices after each company met their criteria, which allows them to hold with uncommon confidence.) As so clearly summarized by Tekboy, the method is only half the battle. Having settled on the G&K strategy last year because it had all the qualities I was looking for, I figure all I really need to do now is hold on for the ride, bumpy as it may be; the challenge of course is that holding on is uncommonly difficult. The uncommon quality of the work on this thread has certainly helped make that an easier, less isolating experience. Kudos and many thanks to you all. Jmho, Barry