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Risk Homeostasis and the Futility of Protecting People from Themselves
There is a growing body of evidence--to be presented in detail in this paper--that points to the surprising conclusion that most coercive measures intended
to increase safety either have no effect or an opposite effect. Thus for example, when the government mandates the use of automobile seat belts, fatality
rates do not decrease as expected. This counter-intuitive result is consistent across a broad range of governmental attempts to protect people from
themselves. Such lack of progress suggests that:
government regulators may be wasting their time and ours,
that they are wasting tax money, and
that other approaches are needed.
Moreover, there is evidence that more effective alternatives exist.
The earliest manifestation of risk homeostasis was among drivers. The debate began with the publication of the classic paper by Sam Peltzman, "The
Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation." In it he stated: "The main conclusion [of his paper] is that safety regulation has had no effect on the highway
death toll." He analyzed fatality data from 1947 to 1972. In 1968, Congress mandated, among other safety equipment:
seat belts
energy absorbing steering columns,
penetration resistant windshields,
dual braking systems, and
padded instrument panels.
The safety community predicted a roughly 20 percent reduction in fatality rates as a result of the huge expense of installing this equipment in millions of
cars. Yet Peltzman found none.
B. Childproof Medicine Bottle Caps
The often cited study by Viscusi found that while the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) has had the mission of improving consumer safety
in the US since 1973, "There is no evidence in the aggregative data of any beneficial effect on product safety." Specifically, he found that the CPSC’s
claim that their child proof aspirin bottle caps increase safety were based on the total number of poisonings, which indeed did decline. This, however, is
not necessarily a sign of success, since the high risk population declined, which would naturally reduce the number of poisonings, and aspirin was being
replaced by more modern pain relievers, such as Tylenol, which would also "reduce the aspirin poisoning rate."
This deceptive claim of success without taking such obvious factors into account was refuted by Viscusi, who found that:
A much more surprising result [than the general ineffectiveness of the CPSC] was the pattern displayed by poisoning rates after the
advent of safety caps. For those products covered by safety caps, there was no downward shift in poisoning rates. This ineffectiveness
appears to be attributable in part to increased parental irresponsibility, such as leaving the caps off bottles. This lulling effect in turn led
to a higher level of poisonings for related products not protected by the caps.
Here it would appear that medicine users are "consuming" the additional protection which the government mandates in more carelessness in dealing with
dangerous materials. Again the findings are consistent with the theory of risk homeostasis.
What works?
C. Rewarding Safety
Are there such methods? There is evidence that there are.
If people do maintain a set level of risk, as predicted by the theory of risk homeostasis, then if a way can be found to alter that set point, accident rates
should decline. This is in fact what happens. To return to the thermostat analogy, if one finds the house too hot with the furnace running, it would be
possible to cool it down by opening windows in every room, but it would be more sensible simply to turn down the thermostat.
When experimental programs have rewarded people for not having accidents, accident rates have gone down. Typically, such programs reward company
drivers with relatively small cash awards for accident-free driving. The benefits in reduced costs to the company far outweigh the costs in award
payments, perhaps by seven to one. Also, these programs work over time, one of which has been in effect for over thirty years without reduced
effectiveness. A review of 24 studies stated: "The major finding was that every study, without exception, found that incentives or feedback enhanced
safety and/or reduced accidents in the work place, at least in the short term. Few literature reviews find such consistent results."
Another survey of over 120 evaluations showed them to be generally more effective in enhancing safety than were technological solutions, stricter
selection of employees, disciplinary action or stress reduction programs! In addition, they are more popular, which is not surprising. A little carrot works
better than a big stick, and people like carrots better than sticks.
The government can implement such programs, not only at no cost, but at a savings to the taxpayer. For example, by offering a reduction in drivers’
licensing fees for accident free driving, accident rates would probably drop enough to more than make up for the lost license revenue.
Factories could be offered tax breaks for lower accident rates. Furthermore, we have seen that high schools could eliminate advanced driver's education
costs without increasing accident rates. This would have the additional benefit of giving schools more time to teach basic skills such as reading and math.
VII. Summary and Conclusions
The evidence supports the theory of risk homeostasis--that is, people "consume" the additional safety forced upon them in other, more risky behavior.
Therefore efforts coercively to drive down the accident rate are usually doomed to failure.
However, rewarding safe behavior does drive down accident rates, and because the government takes people’s money in so many ways, it nearly always
can reward safety by simply not taking as much.
Finally, risk homeostasis suggests that efforts to coercively drive down accident rates often merely shifts the accidents around, often injuring innocent
bystanders.
Anecdotally, I worked with a couple that had one child drown in their pool. Years later they nearly had the same accident with another child. Like they say, they seemed like good parents to me. |
