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Non-Tech : Deflation -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Maurice Winn who wrote (73)7/26/2001 11:01:14 PM
From: JF Quinnelly  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 621
 
. My big problem is that .... my buying power has imploded...

I think that's true with a lot of people, which is why I'm not sure that cutting rates will have it's desired effect. It may be the old "pushing on a string" problem: the Fed can lower rates, but it can't guarantee anyone can or will borrow.

One area that is going gangbusters is real estate re-finance. People are taking advantage of the lower rates to refinance their mortgages- and this will put extra cash in their pockets.



To: Maurice Winn who wrote (73)11/21/2001 11:09:21 PM
From: Jon Koplik  Respond to of 621
 
WSJ article -- Auto Industry / Price Pressure / Economists Debate Deflation

November 21, 2001

Auto Industry Faces Effects of Price Pressure
As Economists Debate Possibility of Deflation

By NORIHIKO SHIROUZU and JON E. HILSENRATH
Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

DETROIT -- Economists are debating whether the U.S. is headed for deflation --
broadly declining prices that, if they got out of hand, could worsen into a spiral of
vanishing profit margins and postponed purchases.

There's nothing academic about this debate for Beth Ardisana. She runs a firm
called ASG Renaissance that provides contract labor to Ford Motor Co. Ms.
Ardisana and her managers have had to inform about 150 workers that their wages
will drop 7% across the board. The cut is a response to a mandate from Ford that
all firms providing it with contract labor reduce their billing rates by 7%, to help the
money-losing auto maker conserve cash.

It is the first outright wage cut Ms. Ardisana has had to resort to in her 14 years in
business. Her Dearborn, Mich., company's profit margins sank to "dismal points"
even though the firm also cut executives' pay, she says.

Deflation or no, the auto industry is facing intense price pressure, and this has
begun to ripple out to related firms and workers. For now, the ripples seem
confined to certain sectors of the economy. But the repercussions of lower prices in
the auto industry illustrate the economic dangers that can arise when a hugely
important business must operate with an acute lack of pricing power.

Figuring in the zero-percent financing that U.S. auto
makers offered to move vehicles after the terror
attack, the companies faced an effective 4.7% drop
in the prices they got for their cars in October. For
light trucks, it was a 1.3% slide. That helped push
the U.S. producer price index, which measures the
prices charged by manufacturers, down 1.6% in
October, for its biggest monthly drop on record. The
consumer price index, which measures the prices
paid by individuals, also declined in October, by
0.3%.

It's trends like this that raise the deflation specter.
Industrial-commodity prices have sunk to their
lowest levels in more than 15 years. Prices of
imported clothing have been falling consistently for
nearly a decade, and TV sets for two decades. "I've
spent my whole career looking under every rock for the next wave of inflation, and
I've run out of rocks," says Stephen Roach, an economist with Morgan Stanley.
"We're going to get a lot closer to deflation than people think."

The price weakness, however, has been concentrated in manufactured goods, such
as cars and computers, that are fully exposed to the intensifying competitive winds
of the global economy. Prices for services -- a much bigger part of the U.S.
economy -- are still rising. Partly for that reason, many economists are far from
ready to declare that the entire $10 trillion U.S. economy is heading for a
deflationary spiral, a pernicious decline in prices that policy-makers would have a
hard time bringing to a halt.

To become a real worry, economists say,
price declines would have to extend to
assets that are the underpinnings of family
wealth, such as homes and stocks. Home
prices have continued to rise, albeit more
slowly, this year. Stocks are down from the
spring of 2000 but have rebounded in
recent weeks.

Another comfort is that consumers don't
appear to be taking on a deflationary
mindset. Instead of postponing purchases,
on the logic that things will keep getting
cheaper, they have splurged on low-cost
cars and kept shopping at discount stores.

The kind of deflationary quagmire an
economy can tumble into is illustrated by
Japan. There, productivity gains don't play
a key role in driving prices lower. Instead, prolonged recession does. In this virulent
version of deflation, price declines become widespread and entrenched, squeezing
profit margins. Companies with large debts find them harder to pay off, because
their debts are fixed, but their revenues are falling. Financial institutions become
stuck with mounting levels of bad loans. And consumers hold on to their cash,
concerned about their outlook for their own incomes and waiting for prices to fall
even further.

The U.S. had its own spell of this in the Great Depression. Between 1929 and 1933,
consumer prices collapsed by an average of 7% per year.

But not all deflation is so troublesome. The U.S. has also had spells of deflation that
never held back economic growth. Prices fell through much of the 1920s, for
example, even as the economy boomed. It has had other periods, in 1949 and again
in 1955, when prices fell briefly but then recovered as the economy gathered
momentum. And in some industries, such as microchips, technology drove such
consistent cost improvements during the 1990s that companies like Intel Corp.
were able to push prices lower and still make record profits.

As the chip case shows, price declines can be beneficial for many, especially
consumers. In oil, every dollar decline in the price of crude has the effect of a $9
billion tax cut, says Edward Yardeni, a Deutsche Bank economist.

Price weakness so far has been "a net benefit to the economy," contends Mark
Zandi, an economist with Economy.com. "It has allowed consumers to remain in
the game."

But the auto industry shows how, if price declines go too far, they can begin to
ripple through the economy in ways that hurt some consumers as well as
producers.

Falling prices aren't new to auto executives. They've grappled for nearly five years
with declining prices for most vehicles, when these prices are adjusted for the
content and quality of the vehicles.

Until recently, the industry could cope. It saved money with measures such as
trimming travel budgets, streamlining assembly lines and squeezing suppliers for
discounts. Productivity improvements, rising volumes, technology and innovations
such as sport-utility vehicles also helped Detroit to stay ahead of the curve. As
sticker prices stagnated, consumers got better products for the same money. Sales
volumes rose in part because cars were more affordable, and manufacturers could
make profits, sometimes even record profits.

Now this virtuous circle is showing signs of breaking down. The combination of a
softening general economy, rising unemployment and problems like overcapacity
and price wars is outstripping auto makers' traditional responses.

Costlier Services

Meanwhile, the prices for many services auto makers buy keep moving up. Ford's
health-care expenses in North America for current employees and retirees have risen
an average 9% a year in the past decade, to about $704 a vehicle, estimates
Goldman Sachs analyst Gary Lapidus. He expects them to rise another 6% annually
over the next 10 years. Todd Nissen, a Ford spokesman, calls Mr. Lapidus's
projection "conservative." Ford projects a "double-digit" increase in health-care
expenses annually over the next few years, he says.

Adding to the burden are recalls for quality problems such as the Firestone-Ford
Explorer tire debacle, discounts, research into clean technology such as fuel cells,
payouts to dismissed executives and contractual raises for hourly workers
negotiated during the boom years.

The result: Even though overall sales in 2001 could match the second- or third-best
year ever, Ford and DaimlerChrysler AG are losing money, and General Motors
Corp.'s North American profit margins are razor-thin. A few years ago, U.S. auto
makers and suppliers considered sales of 15 million vehicles a good year. Now, "we
can't sustain the industry as we know it on 15 million," says Peter J. Pestillo,
chairman of Visteon Corp., a Ford supplier.

Mr. Pestillo, a former Ford vice chairman, says Visteon has told contractors who
supply it with workers that their payments will be cut by 7%. It's also looking at
possible compensation cuts for its own staff, he says.

Ford -- which had the most efficient car and truck plants in North America in 1999,
according to the consultants Harbour & Associates -- now is running in the red. Its
North American productivity, measured in labor hours per vehicle, declined in 2000,
according to Harbour, although it was still slightly better than GM's. Profits from
Ford's once-lucrative SUV franchise have taken a hit as GM, Toyota and Honda,
among others, have matched or bettered Ford's models.

At some Ford offices, lights now are being shut off automatically to conserve
electricity. Ford said earlier this year it would eliminate 4,000 to 5,000, or about
10%, of its white-collar workers in North America by year's end. It has eliminated
bonuses for top executives, halved its dividend and taken 230,000 vehicles out of its
production capacity by eliminating shifts and slowing assembly lines. That's the
equivalent of a full-sized assembly plant.

These are most likely just a prelude to much bigger restructuring moves Ford is
expected to announce in January. The plan is said to include plans to shutter some
assembly plants permanently and lay off tens of thousands of white-collar and
blue-collar workers.

Revenue Shortfall

At GM, worsening price competition in the U.S. has been on track to chop about
$600 million off the beginning-of-the-year revenue forecast. Since the terrorist
attacks, estimates of the revenue shortfall have widened by a further $300 million.
So GM is aiming to cut its $60 billion annual bill for parts in North America. After
several years of trimming those costs by 2% to 3%, GM says it now is aiming for
4% to 5% annual savings, primarily by working more closely with suppliers to find
cheaper ways of making parts. It also is thinning its white-collar ranks.

For most of the late 1990s, Detroit offset stagnant pricing mainly by leaning on
suppliers of seats, steel, rubber, electronics and brakes to drop prices for their
goods every year. According to a recent study by IRN Inc., the annual price cut
requested by major auto makers and the largest suppliers averaged 3.8% in 1997
and 5.4% in 2001.

But as price pressures have intensified, the ability of many suppliers to comply
diminished, and, according to many industry executives, now is virtually gone.
Visteon's Mr. Pestillo predicts that some of his competitors will be forced to find
merger partners or dismember themselves. Many smaller suppliers, unable to cope
with price-cutting pressures, are just folding.

Meanwhile, car buyers keep applying their own pressure. Armed with detailed
dealer-invoice data -- and well aware there are multiple vehicles and brands in nearly
every segment and price range -- shoppers have more power than ever to force
down prices on all but the most desirable vehicles.

The price pressure is starting to cause a chill even for workers at auto factories that
had been generating enormous profits. At Ford's massive Michigan Truck plant, not
long ago billed as the world's most profitable car plant, some workers are still
putting in overtime building Ford Expedition and Lincoln Navigator SUVs. Not
because of soaring demand, though. The reason is that Ford has eliminated one of
three production shifts and cut 850 jobs through attrition, as sales of the current
vehicles have slid. Now, a reduced work force is building the current models and
readying a new generation for launch.

Some workers here are concerned enough to have begun tightening their belts.
"Knowing that possibly six months from now we may hit a little bump on the road,
I don't shop like I used to," says Darryl Nolen, a 35-year-old worker at the plant. He
no longer goes out and spends $700 on a pair of "gators," sleek alligator-skin shoes,
as he used to a few years ago. He and his wife used to eat out at favorite places like
Benihana and Outback Steak House three times a week or more. Now they stay
home much more often.

A Need to Adjust

And workers are racking up as much overtime as they can in order to salt money
away. Lionel Reeves, a 43-year-old single parent with two boys, says he sometimes
grabs the chance to work two shifts a day, filling in for people taking time off for
deer hunting. "I tell my boys that a lot of things we need, we are gonna get, but a lot
of things that you want, we are gonna hold off," he says. "The way the economy is
right now, some of those wants and needs gonna have to adjust."

That goes double for small subcontractors like ASG, the company run by Ms.
Ardisana. Even before the latest 7% cut, ASG, which also does business with
Chrysler, had two billing rate cuts that amounted to an about 3.5% hit on ASG
revenue over two years. To absorb them, she laid off a handful of administrative
staffers, froze merit raises this summer and asked employees to make a co-payment
on health insurance. The moves still weren't enough. "We had no buffer to absorb
more cuts" when Ford hit her with another demand, she says.

So now the blow falls more heavily on ASG employee Ellen Silverberg, who works
as a contract employee for the Ford recycling division. Ms. Silverberg, 43, has
already taken two big hits to her income this year. Indeed, she almost lost her job in
August. Her Ford bosses saved it, but she suffered a 33% wage cut as her hours
were reduced to two days a week from three. She won't starve even after the
additional 7% pay cut because her husband has a decent-paying job.

Yet, worried about the future, she now brings lunch to work and eats at a cafeteria
only once a month, if at all. She also has cut down her "impulsive spending" and will
go easy on buying gifts for this holiday season. "I'm trying to come up with more
creative gifts," she says, "that are lower in cost."

Write to Norihiko Shirouzu at norihiko.shirouzu@wsj.com and Jon E. Hilsenrath
at jon.hilsenrath@wsj.com

Copyright © 2001 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved.



To: Maurice Winn who wrote (73)11/21/2001 11:10:12 PM
From: Jon Koplik  Respond to of 621
 
More deflation stuff (from 11/19/01 WSJ).

11/19/01

Defeating Deflation

By Richard W. Rahn. Mr. Rahn, a senior fellow at the
Discovery Institute and adjunct scholar at the Cato
Institute, is the author of "The End of Money and the
Struggle for Financial Privacy."

Deflation is upon us. Put another way, the U.S.
economy is now experiencing a sustained reduction in
the general level of prices. Last month, the Producer
Price Index posted its biggest decline on record, 1.6%,
and the Consumer Price Index fell by 0.3%. All of the
major commodity price indices are down by 11% to
20% for the year. Many commodity prices are even
below where they were 10 years ago. The only
question is whether this deflation will be short-lived, or
turn into the kind of problem Japan has been
experiencing for a decade.

We normally view falling prices positively because we can buy more with our money. We have become used
to falling computer prices, and we all view this as a good thing. Computer companies, meanwhile, were able
to sustain price-cutting because they made enormous technological and productivity advances.

Other industries, such as the luxury restaurant business, have had slightly increasing prices, as their labor
costs rose more rapidly than their productivity gains. Yet as long as the price declines in some goods and
services roughly matched the price increases in other goods and services, we had overall price stability. Price
stability is desirable because it enables producers, consumers, debtors and lenders to make long-term plans.
Unanticipated inflation or deflation leads to a misallocation of resources, increased risk, and lower levels of
investment and growth.

Deflation, like inflation, upsets stability and inflicts unexpected hardships. Many producers
of commodities, as well as many high-tech and telecom companies, borrowed large
amounts of money to finance their expansion. This was done under the reasonable
expectation that the Federal Reserve would maintain stable money. The companies
expected their prices would fall no faster than their productivity increased. However, the
Fed supplied too little money, and their prices fell more rapidly than expected. As a result,
they have been less able to service their debt.

Other problems will follow. Unless deflation is quickly stopped, key assets such as real
estate will also begin to fall in price. Deflation means that debtors must pay back in more
valuable dollars than the ones they borrowed. And those who live off interest from their
savings, as do many retirees, will suffer as the rate of interest drops because of deflation.

The Federal Reserve has been increasing the money supply rapidly in recent months. If
this had been done earlier, it would have stopped the deflation. Unfortunately, the Fed
waited to start cutting interest rates until after much of the high-tech sector was in a
depression. Sensitive prices began falling many months before Sept. 11, and the Fed was
all too slow to realize its tight money policies were killing economic growth.

Theoretically, if the Fed cuts interest rates and increases the money supply, businesses
and individuals should find it easier to borrow money and service their debt, and the
economy should expand. But because the Fed waited, businesses were in a riskier
situation from the falling prices of their products, and lenders added additional risk
premiums to loans. Now, even though inter-bank interest rates have fallen, the real rate of
interest has actually risen for many less credit-worthy borrowers and consumers.

Once this process starts, the ability of the Fed to reignite the economy is limited. The recent large increase in
the supply of money has not gone into additional purchases or a rise in asset prices because people expect
prices to fall and hold their cash. This means the velocity of money (the number of times a dollar turns over
in a year) is falling. The Japanese have been in this dilemma for a decade and, though interest rates are now
virtually zero, their economy remains stagnant.

The Japanese have tried to spend their way out of the mess. The only result is that the Japanese now have a
government debt several times ours on a per-capita basis and no growth. The Keynesian crowd has argued
that the increase in debt should cause massive inflation and high interest rates. In fact, supply-side
economists correctly predicted that tight monetary policy would lead to deflation despite massive increases in
government spending and taxation.

None of us know with certainty when the economy will grow again. A plausible case can be made that the
fundamentals of the economy are strong and that as soon as the uncertainty about the war begins to abate,
the Fed's injection of money will have its desired effect. The velocity of money will increase, leading to a
quick demise of deflation and a return to strong growth. An equally plausible case can be made that the
uncertainty will remain, that the Fed will not provide enough dollars to meet world demand, and that we will
replicate Japan's extended deflation and stagnation. The Japanese themselves rapidly increased the supply of
yen during the 1990s but still did not keep up with demand. Even though the Japanese monetary base as a
percentage of gross domestic product is about double that of the U.S., they still have neither stopped
deflation nor reignited growth.

Economic policy makers in Washington are now faced with the situation for which there is no clear road
map. What should they do? Given the circumstances, the responsible and prudent policy maker ought to take
those actions that will do no harm and are almost certain to make things better.

First, the Fed needs to say explicitly that it is adopting price-level targeting again, and that it is going to look
at sensitive commodity prices as the indication of where prices are headed rather than the CPI and other
lagging indices. The Fed should look at a market basket of commodities; if prices in the basket rise above a
predetermined range, the Fed reduces the money supply and vice versa. This change would reduce
uncertainty over Fed policy and make it clear that it is going to stop the fall in prices.

Second, the Bush administration and Congress need to rapidly remove the many well-known tax, trade and
regulatory impediments to economic growth. The president should use some of his political capital to
encourage Congress to move on, for example, misguided airline and telecom regulation. He should also take
direct action through executive orders to remove counterproductive regulatory and costly reporting
impediments.

Finally, it is time for responsible economic commentators to debunk the fallacy that we can create economic
growth by increasing government spending. If government spending led to economic growth, Japan would
have boomed in the 1990s, and socialist economies would have been economic miracles rather than basket
cases. The historical evidence is overwhelming that private individuals and businesses spend and invest much
more carefully than do governments. Every dollar the government spends is sucked and coerced out of the
private sector through taxation or borrowing at considerable cost. The big increase in government spending
since Sept. 11 will only be an economic depressant, not a stimulus.

We know from Japan the devastating effects of deflation. We also know from that country what policies
won't work. Let's not make the same mistakes here.

Copyright © 2001 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved.