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To: American Spirit who wrote (171478)8/15/2001 9:08:14 AM
From: Neocon  Respond to of 769670
 
Deinstitutionalization and the Homeless Mentally Ill

A Brief History of Deinstitutionalization
For more than half of this century, the state hospitals fulfilled the function for society of keeping the mentally ill out of sight and thus out of mind. Moreover, the controls and structure provided by the state hospitals, as well as the granting of almost total asylum, may have been necessary for many of the long-term mentally ill before the advent of modern psychoactive medications. Unfortunately, the ways in which state hospitals achieved this structure and asylum led to everyday abuses that have left scars on the mental health professions as well as the patients.

The stage was set for deinstitutionalization by the periodic public outcries about these deplorable conditions, documented by journalists such as Albert Deutsch (1948); mental health professionals and their organizational leaders also expressed growing concern. These concerns led ultimately to the formation of the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health in 1955 and its recommendations for community alternatives to state hospitals, published in 1961 as a widely read book, Action for Mental Health.

When the new psychoactive medications appeared (Brill and Patton 1957; Kris 1971), along with a new philosophy of social treatment (Greenblatt 1977), the great majority of the chronic psychotic population was left in a state hospital environment that was clearly unnecessary and even inappropriate for them, though, as noted above, it met many needs. Still other factors came into play. First was a conviction that mental patients receive better and more humanitarian treatment in the community than in state hospitals far removed from home. This belief was a philosophical keystone in the origins of the community mental health movement. Another powerful motivating force was concern about the civil rights of psychiatric patients; the system then employed of commitment and institutionalization in many ways deprived them of their civil rights. Not the least of the motivating factors was financial. State governments wished to shift some of the fiscal burden for these patients to federal and local governments--that is, to federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Medicaid and local law enforcement agencies and emergency health and mental health services (Borus 1981; Goldman et al. 1983).

The process of deinstitutionalization was considerably accelerated by two significant federal developments in 1963. First, categorical Aid to the Disabled (ATD) became available to the mentally ill, which made them eligible for the first time for federal financial support in the community. Second, the community mental health centers legislation was passed.

With ATD, psychiatric patients and mental health professionals acting on their behalf now had access to federal grants-in-aid, in some states supplemented by state funds, which enabled patients to support themselves or be supported either at home or in such facilities as board-and-care homes or old hotels at comparatively little cost to the state. Although the amount of money available to patients under ATD was not a princely sum, it was sufficient to maintain a low standard of living in the community. Thus the states, even those that provided generous ATD supplements, found it cost far less to maintain patients in the community than in the hospital. (ATD is now called Supplemental Security Income and is administered by the Social Security Administration.)

The second significant federal development of 1963 was the passage of the Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act, amended in 1965 to provide grants for the initial costs of staffing the newly constructed centers. This legislation was a strong incentive to the development of community programs with the potential to treat people whose main recourse previously had been the state hospital. It is important to note, however, that although rehabilitative services and pre-care and aftercare services were among the services eligible for funding, an agency did not have to offer them in order to qualify for funding as a comprehensive community mental health center.

Also contributing to deinstitutionalization were sweeping changes in the commitment laws of the various states. In California, for instance, the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act of 1968 provided further impetus for the movement of patients out of hospitals. Behind this legislation was a concern for the civil rights of the psychiatric patient, much of it from civil rights groups and individuals outside the mental health profession. The act made the involuntary commitment of psychiatric patients a much more complex process, and it became difficult to hold psychiatric patients indefinitely against their will in mental hospitals. Thus the initial stage of what had formerly been the career of the long-term hospitalized patient--namely, an involuntary, indefinite commitment--became a thing of the past (Lamb et al. 1981.)

Some clearly recognized that while many abuses need to be corrected, this legislation went too far in the other direction and no longer safeguarded the welfare of the patients. (For instance, Richard Levy, M.D., of San Mateo, California, argued this point long and vigorously.) But these were voices in the wilderness. We have still not found a way to help some mental health lawyers and patients' rights advocates see that they have contributed heavily to the problem of homelessness--that patients' rights to freedom are not synonymous with releasing them to the streets where they cannot take care of themselves, are too disorganized or fearful to avail themselves of what help is available, and are easy prey for every predator.

The dimensions of the phenomenon of deinstitutionalization are revealed by the numbers. In 1955 there were 559,000 patients in state hospitals in the United States; today at any given time there are approximately 132,000 (Redick and Witkin 1983).

What Happened To The Patients
What happened to the chronically and severely mentally ill as a result of deinstitutionalization? In the initial years approximately two-thirds of discharged mental patients returned to their families (Minkoff 1978). The figure is probably closer to 50 percent in states such as California, which has a high number of persons without families (Lamb and Goertzel 1977). This discussion is limited to those aged 18 to 65, for those over 65 are a very different population with a very different set of problems.

In more recent years, there has been a growing number of mentally disabled persons in the community who have never been or have only briefly been in hospitals...Problems in identifying and locating them make it difficult to generalize about them. But we do know they of course tend to be younger and often manifest less institutional passivity than the previous generation, who had spent many years in state hospitals.


A large proportion of the chronically mentally ill--in some communities as many as a third or more of those aged 18 to 65--live in facilities such as board-and-care homes (Lamb and Goertzel 1977). These products of the private sector are not the result of careful planning and well-conceived social policy. On the contrary, they sprang up to fill the vacuum created by the rapid and usually haphazard depopulation of our state hospitals. Suddenly many thousands of former state hospital patients needed a place to live, and private entrepreneurs, both large and small, rushed in to provide it.

"Board-and-care home" is used in California to describe a variety of facilities, many of which house large numbers of psychiatric patients. These patients include both the deinstitutionalized and the new generations of chronically mentally ill. The number of residents ranges from one to more than a hundred. Board-and-care homes are unlocked and provide a shared room, three meals a day, dispensing of medications, and minimal staff supervision; for a large proportion of long-term psychiatric patients, the board-and-care home has taken over the functions of the state hospitals of providing asylum, support, structure, and medications. And for many, the alternative to the board-and-care home would be homelessness.

These is a great deal of variability in facilities such as board-and-care homes. Generally, they could and should provide a higher quality of life than they do, and services should be made more available to their residents. Services should include social and vocational rehabilitation, recreational activities, and mental health treatment. But considering the funding available, these facilities are for the most part not bad in the sense that there is no life-threatening physical neglect or other gross abuses (Dittmar and Smith 1983).

What does stand out is the significantly higher funding for similar resources for the developmentally disabled, and the resulting increased quality in terms of location of the facility, condition of repair, general atmosphere, and staffing. For instance, as of 1984 the rate paid to operators of board-and-care facilities for the developmentally disabled in California varies from a minimum of $525 a month for easily manageable residents to $840 a month for "intensive treatment." For the mentally ill there is only one rate of $476 per month, regardless of the severity of the problem and the need for intensive supervision and care; many of the better board-and-care home operators have stopped serving the mentally ill in order to take advantage of the higher rates for the developmentally disabled. Clearly this is a gross inequity.

But facilities such as board-and-care homes and single-room-occupancy (SRO) hotels, even when adequate, often do not attract and keep the homeless (Arce et al. 1983). If they do enter one of these facilities, their stay may be brief--they drift in and out, to and from the streets. Further, these facilities are not prepared to provide the structure needed by some of the chronically mentally ill, as discussed below.

This chapter is, of course, concerned with those chronically mentally ill persons who live neither with family nor in board-and-care homes nor in SRO hotels nor in nursing homes nor in their own homes and apartments. Some are homeless continuously, and some intermittently. While estimates of the extent of the problem are highly variable, and there are no reliable data,...it seems reasonable to conclude that nationwide the homeless mentally ill number in the tens of thousands, and perhaps the many tens of thousands. They live on the streets, the beaches, under bridges, in doorways. So many frequent the shelters of our cities that there is concern that the shelters are becoming mini-institutions for the chronically mentally ill, as ironic alternative to the state mental hospitals (Bassuk in press).

The Tendency to Drift
Drifter is a word that strikes a chord in all those who have contact with the chronically mentally ill--mental health professionals, families, and the patients themselves. It is especially important to examine the phenomenon of drifting in the homeless mentally ill. The tendency is probably more pronounced in the young (aged 18 to 35), though it is by no means uncommon in the older age groups. Some drifters wander from community to community seeking a geographic solution to their problems; hoping to leave their problems behind, they find they have simply brought them to a new location. Others, who drift in the same community from one living situation to another, can best be described as drifting through life: they lead lives without goals, direction, or ties other than perhaps an intermittent hostile-dependent relationship with relatives or other caretakers (Lamb 1982).

Why do the chronically mentally ill drift? Apart from their desire to outrun their problems, their symptoms and their failures, many have great difficulty achieving closeness and intimacy. A fantasy of finding closeness elsewhere encourages them to move on. Yet all too often, if they do stumble into an intimate relationship or find themselves in a residence where there is caring and closeness and sharing, the increased anxiety they experience creates a need to run.

They drift also in search of autonomy, as a way of denying their dependency, and out of a desire for an isolated life-style. Lack of money often makes them unwelcome, and they may be evicted by family and friends. And they drift because of a reluctance to become involved in a mental health treatment program or a supportive out-of-home environment, such as a halfway house or board-and-care home, that would give them a mental patient identity and make them part of a mental health system: they do not want to see themselves as ill.

Those who move out of board-and-care homes tend to be young; they may be trying to escape the pull of dependency and may not be ready to come to terms with living in a sheltered, segregated, low-pressure environment (Lamb 1980a). If they still have goals, they may find life there extremely depressing. Or they may want more freedom to drink or to use street drugs. Those who move on are more apt to have been hospitalized during the preceding year. Some may regard leaving their comparatively static milieu as a necessary part of the process of realizing their goals--but a process that exacts its price in terms of homelessness, crises, decompensation, and hospitalizations. Once out on their own, they will more than likely stop taking their medications and after a while lose touch with Social Security and no longer be able to receive their SSI checks. They may now be too disorganized to extricate themselves from living on the streets--except by exhibiting blatantly bizarre or disruptive behavior that leads to their being taken to a hospital or to jail.

interactivist.net



To: American Spirit who wrote (171478)8/15/2001 10:48:39 AM
From: KLP  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 769670
 
Re: Deinstitutionalization and JFK...It is you who are wrong.....FYI....However, like typical liberals, you don't and won't read....You are MUCH more interested in your own misguided opinion....

mentalhelp.net

The Joint Commission defined positive mental health as: "the attitudes of the individual toward himself; the degree to which the individual realizes his potentialities through action; unification of function in the individuals personality; the individual degree of independence of social influences; how the individual sees the surrounding world; and the individual's ability to take life as it comes and master it" (Torrey, 1988). The Joint Committee performed a six year study entitled Action for Mental Health (Isaac & Armat, 1990). The report, released in 1961, recommended upgrading existing hospitals; putting limits on the number of admissions once a hospital reached its cap, with a maximum cap of one thousand per facility; more usage of general psychiatric wards; and conversion of state hospitals into centers for "the long-term and combined care of all chronic diseases including mental illness" (Isaac & Armat, 1990). It also called for the establishment of community-based treatment centers, perhaps one clinic per fifty thousand area population. However, most importantly stressed was "the concept of prevention was a chimera" (Isaac & Armat, 1990). John F. Kennedy was in the presidential office at that time and was personally interested in enacting mental health legislation, because his sister Rosemary suffered from mental retardation and mental illness, although the latter was not acknowledged at that time, primarily due to stigma. Kennedy appointed a committee to review the "Action for Mental Health" and most of the recommendations were overlooked except for the establishment of community-based treatment centers.

Kennedy misguidedly believed that primary prevention and reduction in state hospitals could be achieved through community mental health centers. In Kennedy's speech THE DREAM, he began with prevention: "Here more than in any other area, an ounce of prevention is worth more than a pound of cure. For prevention is far more desirable for all concerned. It is far more economical and it is far more likely to be successful." Kennedy fostered the belief that the major problem was the existing institutional care of patients, and, in fact, not the disease itself (Isaac & Armat, 1990).

Kennedy promised: "if we launch a brand new mental health program now, it will be possible within a decade or two to reduce the number of patients now under custodial care by 50% or more." Kennedy also promised that "reliance on the cold mercy of custodial isolation would be supplanted by the open warmth of community concern and capability" (Isaac & Armat, 1990).


The Beginning of the End
Thus was born the Community Mental Health Centers Act (CMHC Act). Since there was little, if no, scientific (or otherwise) evidence that prevention was an achievable goal, Congress concentrated on the goal of reducing hospital populations. Unfortunately, no one even thought to ask, Where will all the patients live upon discharge? This is absolutely astounding when one considers that at that time there were no government programs to finance the returning patients, yet no one asked the important question, Where will they go? Deinstitutionalization had officially begun.

In 1962 the government funded Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, (APTD) an early form of SSI (Isaac & Armat, 1990). By the end of October in 1963, John F. Kennedy signed legislation for the creation of Community Mental Health Centers. This act changed the situation considerably because mentally ill individuals within the communities became eligible for federal benefits to pay for rent, food, etc. (Torrey, 1988). In May, 1964, NIMH instituted the guidelines for essential services that would be provided by the CMHCs as:

inpatient services;
partial hospitalization (hospital during the day only);
outpatient services;
emergency services; and
consultation & education services.
An optional second group of services tailored to the chronic patient would make a center more comprehensive (Isaac & Armat, 1990).
Remarkably, none of the guidelines included or mandated a coordination of services or communication between a hospital and the CMHC. This proved to have disastrous results as CMHCs were not informed of patients being released from the hospital. The released patients needed aftercare, minimally for medication and longitudinally for rehabilitation counseling, which would have included locating community resources. Also possible admissions were not diverted to CMHCs (Torrey, 1988).

Some have argued that the real force behind deinstitutionalization came from federal monies because in 1965 the government encouraged the deinstitutionalization process by introducing several programs, primarily medicaid and medicare, which would only provide benefits to patients not in state hospitals (Isaac & Armat, 1990).

In the beginning stages (early 1961) deinstitutionalization did not present much of a problem, because the first wave of patients released were highly functional and had maintained some semblance of closeness with their families, so 2/3 of this wave went to live with family members upon discharge.

The total amount of public funds spent at this time, on the mentally ill was approximately one billion dollars per year. Of that one billion, 96% was spent at state level only. The federal government paid living expenses for a relatively small number of the mentally ill through the Social Security Administration, but "local county and city assumed costs for most patients through welfare, social services, subsidized housing, jails, police and court costs" (Torrey, 1988).

In 1967 the first federally funded CMHC opened. At that time the CMHC directors mistakenly believed that by dealing with social issues such as rent inflation and civil rights, they could get to the heart or cause of mental illness (Torrey, 1988).

Psychiatry had little, if any, knowledge or understanding of community politics. All state hospitals were suspect, under scrutiny, and defined as the problem, with the CMHC being labeled as the solution. The 60's were a time of social revolution, a time when civil rights were asserted for just about everybody and everything.

An important case that had a huge effect on deinstitutionalization was the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act of 1967. "It passed in both Houses without a single dissenting vote" (Republicans saw a way to save money and Democrats saw a way to expand civil rights) and it restricted the grounds for involuntary hospitalization and its length (Isaac & Armat, 1990). So in effect, civil liberty lawyers could also be held responsible to a degree for the acceleration of deinstitutionalization.

The New York Civil Liberties Union saw involuntary commitment as the crux of the state hospital system, and believed that the elimination of commitment laws would precipitate the end of all state hospitals. The civil liberties union sired the Mental Health Law Project, whose primary goal was to "create a doctrinal abyss into which will sink the whole structure of commitment laws" (Isaac & Armat, 1990).

Serving as a catalyst, they aided in the establishment of minimum standards of treatment, including minimum staff to patient ratios. Some states achieved these court-mandated ratios by releasing patients - not by hiring staff. The lawyers helped set "the least restrictive setting" mandate, the "refusal of treatment" mandate, as well as tightened the involuntary commitment laws to "dangerousness to self or others" (Torrey, 1988).

In 1969, NIMH separated from NIH. NIMH saw itself as equal to NIH, although not as a research entity, but rather as an overseer of services (Torrey, 1988). NIMH fulfilled one of its goals of training personnel by using federal funds to begin training programs in existing schools for psychiatrists. Unfortunately they did so without stipulating that upon graduation a doctor would be required to put in one year of service, to the state, for each year of schooling funded. Since there were no provisions to prevent doctors from getting the training and going directly into private practice, that is exactly what they did (Torrey, 1988).

Psychiatry was at its all time low; many state hospital directors and superintendents were reviewed not by their job performance but by the number of empty beds within their respective hospitals. For this reason and others, no one wanted to work in the public sector. Between 1970-75 the number of psychiatrists willing to work in the public sector (including CMHCs) fell by 50% and were replaced by psychologists and social workers (Isaac & Armat, 1990). State hospitals began to be staffed by foreign medical graduates. New immigration laws made it less difficult for professionals from other countries to emigrate to the U.S., especially doctors. Many of the state hospitals initiated residency programs because most of the foreign medical graduates had received little or no psychiatric training within their own country (Torrey, 1988).

Numerous students "were unable to pass state licensing exams due to poor training, lack of competency and language problems" (Torrey, 1988). At least 43 states amended their medical licensing laws by 1971 so that medical students could practice in state facilities on "special state permits" (Torrey, 1988).

CMHCs Fail to Fulfill Their Promise
As deinstitutionalization rates climbed, the proportion of patients treated at CMHC for serious mental illness decreased. Ironically, CMHCs were in the same boat as state hospitals; they were forced to rely increasingly on the foreign born and trained (Isaac & Armat, 1990). It became evident that what CMHCs were doing "was counseling and crisis intervention for predictable problems of living" (Isaac & Armat, 1990). This phenomenon is known as treating the "worried well."

In 1975 relatively few CMHCs were in compliance with the first five essential services originally created by NIMH in May 1964; 50% had no beds, and little or no emergency services. Only 6% had day treatment, and almost all were poorly staffed (Torrey, 1988).

In fact, most of the CMHC staff found the serious mentally ill to be onerous and difficult to work with. The CMHC Bill was revised and passed with the same original five services plus seven more. The seven new services were:

screening of patients prior to admission to state hospitals;
follow-up care for those released from mental hospitals;
developing transitional living facilities for the mentally ill and providing specialized services for:
the child;
the elderly;
drug abusers; and
alcohol abusers (Torrey, 1988).
In 1977, the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare established a Task Force on Deinstitutionalization of the Mentally Disabled, because it had become obvious to almost everyone that CMHCs were not working and were being used for the worried well. As one senator put it, "no one discounts the pain of the worried well, but congress and taxpayers did not intentionally fund a national counseling service; it intended to fund a program to substitute for state hospitals in caring for the seriously mentally ill" (Isaac & Armat, 1990).

Based on this Task Force report the Community Support Programs (CSP) began "for one particularly vulnerable population -- adult psychiatric patients whose disabilities are severe and persistent" (Torrey, 1988). NIMH established CSPs recognizing the failures of the CMHC program, but far from acknowledging it (Isaac & Armat, 1990).

The following guidelines were set by NIMH for CSPs: "medical and mental health care; crisis stabilization in the least restrictive setting possible, with hospitalization available when other options are insufficient; psychosocial rehabilitation services; backup support to families, friends, and community members; involvement of concerned community members in planning and offering housing or work opportunities; supportive services of indefinite duration, including supportive living and working arrangements and other such services for as long as they are needed" (Torrey, 1988).

In 1979 the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI) was formed and shortly thereafter (approximately 1980) was the inception of the National Mental Health Consumers Association (NMHCA). Both consumer advocacy groups have national as well as regional offices. It is the position of this writer that the emergence of consumer-based advocacy groups was precipitated by the failure of the current mental health system, including but not limited to, the government, psychiatry, CMHCs, and other official organizations that consider themselves to be primarily dedicated to the treatment of the mentally ill.

In 1987 the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act (Public Law 100-77) was passed. This act provided the first federal funds allocated specifically for the homeless population (Levine & Rog, 1990). Under Title VI, Section 611 and 612 are particularly relevant to the mentally ill homeless.

Section 611 authorizes a non-competitive block grant program that is designed to provide an "infusion of funds to state level for five services: outreach, case management, mental health treatment, support and supervisory services in housing for homeless mentally ill persons and training for service providers" (Levine & Rog, 1990).

Section 612 authorizes a competitive block grant program where "innovative service initiatives" are emphasized. The same array of mental health services were required for each accepted program, including: outreach services in nontraditional settings; intensive, long-term case management; mental health treatment; staffing and operation of supportive living programs; and management and administrative activities (Levine & Rog, 1990).

Conclusion
In conclusion, more than three decades of deinstitutionalization policies have resulted in at least two task force reports (one in 1985 by the American Psychiatric Association and another in 1992 by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) as well as numerous books and articles addressing homelessness and the mentally ill. Although many different recommendations have been made by many people, little has been accomplished to implement these recommendations on a large scale. This may be due to several factors including waiting for the ideal to occur.

The ideal is defined as wanting to have a comprehensive and coordinated mental health system that would induce and engage the homeless mentally ill to voluntarily accept treatment and appropriate living arrangements. But... we can no longer wait for this ideal system to be established.

The homeless mentally ill problem has given rise to issues ranging from legal to ethical -- the answer may lay in a simple, straightforward large-scale values clarification by asking ourselves the question, Can we as an advanced, wealthy nation afford to allow the problem to continue?

References

Isaac, Rael Jean, & Armat, Virginia C. (1990) Madness in the Streets: How Psychiatry and the Law Abandoned the Mentally Ill. New York: Free Press. Toronto. Collier Macmillan Canada.
Lahey, Benjamin B. (1992) Psychology: An Introduction. Wm. C. Brown Publishers.
Lamb, H. Richard. (1985) The Homeless Mentally Ill, A Task Force Report of the American Psychiatric Association. Washington, D.C.
Leshner, Alan I. et al. (1992) Outcasts on Main Street, Report of the Federal Task Force on Homelessness and Severe Mental Illness. Washington, D.C. U.S. Department of Health & Human Service.
Levine, Irene S. & Rog, Debra J. (1990) Mental Health Services for Homeless Mentally Ill Persons: Federal Initiatives and Current Service Trends. American Psychologist.
Torrey, Edwin Fuller. (1988) Nowhere to Go - The Tragic Odyssey of the Homeless Mentally Ill. Harper and Row.
Bibliography

Constans, Gabriel. (1991) This Is Madness: Our Failure To Provide Adequate Care For the Mentally Ill. U.S.A. Today. 120.2558: 77-78
Dennis, Deborah L., et al. (1991) A Decade of Research and Services for Homeless Mentally Ill Persons, Where Do We Stand. American Psychologist. 1129-1138.
Isaac, Rael Jean & Armat, Virginia C. (1990) Madness in the Streets: How Psychiatry and the Law Abandoned the Mentally Ill. New York: Free Press. Toronto. Collier Macmillan Canada.
Lahey, Benjamin B. (1992) Psychology: An Introduction. Wm. C. Brown Publishers.
Lamb, H. Richard. (1985) The Homeless Mentally Ill, A Task Force Report of the American Psychiatric Association. Washington, D.C.
Lamb, H. Richard. (1990) Will We save the Homeless Mentally Ill? American Journal of Psychiatry. 147:5, 649-651.
Leo, John. (1993) Distorting the Homeless Debate. U.S. News & World Report. 115.18: 27.
Leshner, Alan I. et al. (1992) Outcasts on Main Street, Report of the Federal Task Force on Homelessness and Severe Mental Illness. Washington, D.C. U.S. Department of Health & Human Service.
Levine, Irene S. & Rog, Debra J. (1990) Mental Health Services for Homeless Mentally Ill Persons: Federal Initiatives and Current Service Trends. American Psychologist. 963-968.
Marcos, Luis R., et. al. (1990) Psychiatry Takes to the Streets: The York City Initiative for the Homeless Mentally Ill. American Journal of Psychiatry. 147:11. 1557-1561
Szasz, Thomas. (1988) Homelessness and Mental Illness. U.S.A. Today. 3:23-31.
Torrey, Edwin Fuller. (1988) Homelessness and Mental Illness. U.S.A. Today. 3:26-27.
Torrey, Edwin Fuller. (1988) Nowhere to Go - The Tragic Odyssey of the Homeless Mentally Ill. Harper and Row.



APA Reference
Stubbs, Pat (1998). Broken promises:The story of deinstitutionalization. [Online]. Perspectives. Available: cmhc.com [1998, September 25].

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To: American Spirit who wrote (171478)8/15/2001 10:55:49 AM
From: KLP  Respond to of 769670
 
And yet another article for your edification AS...from the Congressional Record, and the failure of JFK's Deinstitutionalization.....

psychlaws.org

Congressional Record - Senate

Monday, July 12, 1999

106th Congress, 1st Session, 145 Cong Rec S 8295, Vol. 145, No. 97

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DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, this past Friday (July 9, 1999),The Washington Post carried an excellent op-ed piece, "Deinstitutionalization Hasn't Worked," by E. Fuller Torrey and Mary T. Zdanowicz. The authors are the president and executive director, respectively, of the Treatment Advocacy Center. They write about the continued stigma attached to mental illness. They write about barriers to treatment. Most important, they write about the aftermaths of deinstitutionalization, and the seemingly horrific effects this policy has had.

In this morning's New York Times (July 12, 1999), Fox Butterfield writes about a Department of Justice report released yesterday which states that some 283,800 inmates in the nation's jails and prisons suffer from mental illness. (This is a conservative estimate.) As Butterfield puts it, ". . . jails and prisons have become the nation's new mental hospitals."

Over the past 45 years, we have emptied state mental hospitals, but we have not provided commensurate outpatient treatment. Increasingly, individuals with mental illnesses are left to fend for themselves on the streets, where they victimize others or, more frequently, are victimized themselves. Eventually, many wind up in prison, where the likelihood of treatment is nearly as remote.

This is a cautionary tale, instructive of what is possible and also what we ought to be aware of. I was in the Harriman administration in New York in the 1950s. Early in 1955, Harriman met with his new Commissioner of Mental Hygiene, Paul Hoch, who described the development of a tranquilizer derived from rauwolfia by Dr. Nathan S. Kline at what was then known as Rockland State Hospital (it is now the Rockland Psychiatric Center) in Orangeburg. The medication had been clinically tested and appeared to be an effective treatment of many patients. Dr. Hoch recommended that it be used system wide; Harriman found the money.

That same year Congress created a Joint Commission on Mental Health and Illness with a view to formulating ``comprehensive and realistic recommendations'' in this area which was then a matter of considerable public concern. Year after year the population of mental institutions grew; year after year new facilities had to be built. Ballot measures to approve the issuance of general obligation bonds for building the facilities appeared just about every election. Or so it seemed.

The discovery of tranquilizers was adventitious. Physicians were seeking cures for disorders they were just beginning to understand. Even a limited success made it possible to believe that the incidence of this particular range of disorders, which had seemingly required persons to be confined against their will or even awareness, could be greatly reduced. The Congressional Commission submitted its report in 1961; it was seen to propose a nationwide program of deinstitutionalization.

Late in 1961 President Kennedy appointed an interagency committee to prepare legislative recommendations based on the report. I represented Secretary of Labor Arthur J. Goldberg on this committee and drafted its final submission. This included the recommendation of the National Institute of Mental Health that 2,000 "community mental health centers" (one for every 100,000 people) be built by 1980. A buoyant Presidential Message to Congress followed early in 1963. "If we apply our medical knowledge and social insights fully," President Kennedy stated, "all but a small portion of the mentally ill can eventually achieve a wholesome and a constructive social adjustment." A "concerted national attack on mental disorders [was] now possible and practical." The President signed the Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act on October 31, 1963 -- his last public bill signing ceremony. He gave me a pen.

The mental hospitals emptied out. The number of patients in state and county mental hospitals peaked in 1955 at 558,922 and has declined every year since then, to 61,722 in 1996. But we never came near to building the 2,000 community mental health centers. Only some 482 received Federal construction funds from 1963 to 1980. The next year, 1981, the program was folded into the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health block grant program, where it disappeared from view.

Even when centers were built, the results were hardly as hoped for. David Musto has noted that the planners had bet on improving national mental health "by improving the quality of general community life through expert knowledge [my emphasis], not merely by more effective treatment of the already ill." The problem was: there is no such knowledge. Nor is there. But the belief there was such knowledge took hold within sectors of the profession, which saw institutions as an unacceptable mode of social control. These activists subscribed to a redefining mode of their own, which they considered altruistic: mental patients were said to have been "labeled," and were not to be drugged. So as the Federal government turned to other matters, the mental institutions continued to release patients, essentially to fend for themselves. There was no connection made: we're quite capable of that in the public sphere. Professor Frederick F. Siegel of Cooper Union observed: ``in the great wave of moral deregulation that began in the mid-1960s, the poor and the insane were freed from the fetters of middle-class mores.'' Soon, the homeless appeared. Only to be defined as victims of an insufficient supply of affordable housing. No argument, no amount of evidence has yet affected that fixed ideological view.

I commend these two articles to my colleagues and ask that they be printed in the Record.

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