The Geopolitical Price of War
2000 GMT, 011002
By George Friedman
Summary
If the United States wants to fight an effective military campaign in Afghanistan, an alliance with Russia is essential. But cooperation will come with a price. Moscow will increase its influence in Central Asia and may resurrect its domination of the Caucasus. No matter how the anti-terror campaign ends, the biggest winner will not be the United States, but Russia.
Analysis
In World War II, American strategy depended on the Soviet Union breaking the back of the Wehrmacht. The United States, through lend-lease, provided the Soviets with weapons, supplies and technology. This was not only a good move but also an indispensable one, since it was essential to American war aims. Nevertheless, the inevitable consequence was that the Soviets, greatly strengthened by U.S. assistance, became America's rival.
Late in the Cold War, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The United States, having had its own strength sapped in Vietnam partly because of Soviet assistance to the North Vietnamese, saw an opportunity to return the favor. By arming the Afghan resistance fighters, the United States not only trapped the Soviets in an unwinnable war but also helped create the general crisis of confidence in the Soviet Union that led to its collapse.
There was a price to be paid here as well. Although American support to the Afghan resistance was logical and necessary, given the time and circumstances, the assistance that was provided helped lay the groundwork for the current crisis.
In short, the manner in which each war is fought and concluded lays the groundwork for the next conflict. There are no wars to end all wars. Conflict and warfare are a permanent part of the human condition. It is far more useful to think of war as a single, inseparable thread running throughout the fabric of human history rather than as separate, disconnected episodes. The thread that led to Sept. 11 ultimately can be traced to the 1980s and long before.
What defines the future is the alliances we form, the aid we demand, the promises we will make and, most important, the actual price we have to pay for the things we must have. All sides in every conflict must confront the fact that there is always a price.
Such a price always strengthens someone who has the potential to become your future enemy, or it drives away someone who had been your friend. The war that began on Sept. 11, like every war, will change the world in profound and not wholly unpredictable ways.
The biggest winner in this war, it appears today, will not be the United States but Russia. The geography of Afghanistan makes Russia indispensable to the United States. Unless America gets lucky and manages to locate and capture or kill Osama bin Laden very quickly -- an event that would trigger the collapse of the Taliban government -- Washington will have to fight an extended war in Afghanistan.
There are only two bases from which to operate. One is Pakistan, highly unstable and capable of turning on the United States should certain factions gain control. The other base comprises the three independent republics lining Afghanistan's northern border: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. It would be very difficult to mount an effective military campaign without this Central Asian base, even with only special forces, light infantry and airborne troops.
Although Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are independent, there is no question that they exist within Russia's sphere of influence. Economic and military realities created a natural dependency institutionalized by years of Czarist and Soviet rule.
In many ways, these countries are not happy about their dependency, but it is there, and it is very real. Without getting into the complex politics of the region, the simple fact is that it is far away from the United States and getting there will require the active cooperation of Russia. Add to this the fact that the Northern Alliance, the best-organized resistance to the Taliban, has been underwritten by Russia for years, and it is easy to see the depth and breadth of what Washington needs from Moscow.
One of the inevitable consequences of this war will be a massive increase in Russia's influence in Central Asia. The United States, in fact, is going to insist on it. In all of these countries, but particularly in Tajikistan, pro-Taliban and anti-American forces are both substantial and indigenous. The ultimate nightmare for the United States would be creating a complex of support bases for troops operating in Afghanistan, only to have them attacked, blocked or even overrun by pro-Taliban elements.
The United States is going to be stretched thin under any circumstances as it will be projecting force over extreme distances to fight a land-locked war. If ensuring the security of the mission's forces becomes exceedingly difficult, this could undermine the mission itself by diverting troops from Afghanistan.
Washington therefore is going to have to rely on Russia to maintain the stability of these countries and the security of the forces. Russia is not going to force itself on Central Asia against American will. It will be done at the request of and to the relief of the United States. If the United States is to wage this war, then Russia is indispensable. The net result will be a reassertion of the Russian sphere of influence, with active U.S. support, in a region that earlier broke away from the former Soviet Union.
A similar process will be underway in the Caucasus. The United States had been highly critical of Russia's war in Chechnya, a predominantly Muslim region of Russia that is fighting for full independence. Moscow draws the line at allowing any part of the Russian Federation to become independent. The Russians have claimed for a while that the Chechens are supported by bin Laden, but the United States paid no attention.
Not only is the status of Chechnya at stake but also that of the entire Caucasus. Russia has no hope of finally ending the insurrection in Chechnya until it has isolated the area from its sources of supply. In other words, Russia cannot win in Chechnya unless it dominates the Caucasus as a whole, including Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Some of these countries like Armenia are already heavily pro-Russian. Others, like Georgia, are bending under Russian weight. But given the current circumstances, Russia is certainly in a position to demand from the United States that, in return for fighting terrorism in Afghanistan, Moscow should be permitted to fight terrorism in Chechnya.
And if Washington needs to build an international coalition to fight the Afghans, surely it cannot object to the Russians building a regional coalition under a doctrine similar to that announced by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell: if you aren't with Russia, you are against Russia.
The return of Russian power to Central Asia will be a natural outcome of the situation on the ground. The return of Russia to the Caucasus will not be so natural. The United States does not need this in order to achieve its mission. But it is a contemporaneous requirement, meaning that the United States will be expected to deliver while the war in Afghanistan is underway, and any betrayal will have dire consequences to the war effort. It is not a self-fulfilling event, but it is what might be called a self-enforcing event.
These are things that Russia will easily get out of the conflict. There are other elements that it wants that will not be as easy to get, since they are not essential to the U.S. mission. For example, the Russians do not want any further NATO expansion, and they absolutely do not want to see any part of the former Soviet Union included in NATO. But Moscow has no way of enforcing these desires. Once the Afghan war is over, the United States can choose to double-cross the Russians on any promises made.
Therefore, it is in Russian President Vladimir Putin's interest to create conditions that will preclude an American double-cross. There are two places of fundamental interest to Russia that will be affected. One is Ukraine, the other is the Baltic States -- Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.
All were part of the former Soviet Union and are critical to Russian strategic interests today. U.S. dependency on Russia opens a window of opportunity for Moscow to redefine its relations with these regions. Because Washington needs Moscow so much, it will take quite a bit to trigger a crisis in U.S.-Russian relations.
Ukraine and the Baltic States are absolutely aware of the role reversal that is now taking place. They have to be feeling enormously exposed at the moment. If the war lasts for years, and it might, they will be subject to slow but intense Russian pressure without an effective American counterweight. They thus might find it in their interests to negotiate their terms early, while the shift is less evident, rather than later.
For Russia, a long war is of great interest. It is important to note that the Russians, with their networks in Afghanistan still operating, have the opportunity to extend the war in various ways. The problem with coalition warfare is that everyone has their own reason to be part of the coalition.
For instance, it has been noted that Russia needs financial assistance and can expect to get more than just a few billion dollars in loans from the International Monetary Fund. The probability that the United States will be buying supplies in Russia or underwriting the costs of Russian aircraft modernization, so that Moscow can support U.S. military operations more effectively, can generate many billions of dollars in direct expenditures.
The Russians lost the Soviet Union in the mountains of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union as an institution may never be resurrected, but it appears the Russians will reclaim their lost territories in the mountains of Afghanistan once again.
The United States has no choice. It must fight the war it has been handed. It must fight it with Russian help. It must pay the Russian price. Geopolitics, like economics, leave nations with far fewer choices than their policymakers would like to think they have. The United States can't decline combat. It cannot win without Russian help. The Russian bill will be high. And, at least in part, the Afghan war will plant the seeds for the next confrontation.
George Friedman is the founder and chairman of STRATFOR. |
