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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Secret_Agent_Man who wrote (1134)	9/23/2001 10:53:28 PM
From: Secret_Agent_Man	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

Special forces set to lead seizure of a temporary base in Afghanistan By Andrew Marshall 24 September 2001 Special forces troops would be the tip of the spear of any US and British attack on Afghanistan but Washington seems to be preparing for a large intervention that goes well beyond the use of cruise missiles and small packets of troops on lonely hillsides. US forces usually make contingency preparations for even small operations and there may be other attacks after any assault on Afghanistan. Even so, there are some indications that this could be a large assault, perhaps involving the temporary seizure of a base within the country. The aim would be to capture or kill suspects; permanently disrupt hostile organisations – and send a signal to other nations. US and British special forces would lead any operation to find, arrest or kill those in Afghanistan that America holds responsible for the attacks on New York and Washington. There have been reports over the weekend that special forces are already operating inside Afghanistan and in neighbouring countries. Much of this needs to be taken with a pinch of salt. But it seems certain that the initial elements – mainly for reconnaissance – will have gone in a few days before the assaults. Reports in the US say that a Special Operations Command Centre has already been set up in the region. The special forces units are likely to include the US Army's Green Berets, Rangers, US Navy Seals and the British SAS, though American forces would make up the bulk. The first task will be to locate the targets. US Army Blackhawk MH-60K helicopters will be used to track suspects. So will unmanned aerial vehicles such as America's Predator. The US Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, confirmed that an unmanned American spy plane had been lost over Afghanistan on Saturday. Along with the Predator, the US will probably be using Global Hawk, a high-level unmanned aerial vehicle, the EC-135 Rivet Joint signals intelligence platform, and the E-8D Joint "Stars" battlefield aircraft. These are used to produce very accurate pictures of ground activity. If they can, the special forces will capture or kill the suspects but they will also be able to report details of their locations – if they can find them. Massive US air bombardment can follow, led by cruise missiles. US forces aim to destroy any capability of local forces to hit back, hitting at airfields, communications links and what little infrastructure remains. There are civilian-military airports in Kabul, Kandahar and Jalalabad, as well as Taliban bases, but the targets are individuals who have prepared very deep shelters. Air strikes alone will not necessarily dent any organisation in Afghanistan. Only a large ground operation can do that and it would require tens of thousands of troops. If the US wants to mount a more protracted campaign it is likely to need more facilities, closer to the operation. Though it can use bases in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and, perhaps, Pakistan for rear operations, it is likely to try to seize a base within Afghanistan itself – perhaps within the area controlled by the opposition Northern Alliance. There are disused Soviet airfields that could be converted. A more protracted ground operation would go beyond the use of special forces and include other rapid-reaction airborne units. America's XVIII Airborne Corps includes the 82nd Airborne Division; the heliborne 101st Airborne Division; the mechanised 3rd Infantry Division, and the 10th Mountain Division. The 82nd Airborne alone includes 14,000 troops, with one Ready brigade that can move very swiftly. Apache attack helicopters could be brought in by C-17 jumbo cargo planes if the US secures a base within Afghanistan. Britain, meanwhile, has elements of the Royal Marines already in Oman on exercise, and could use the Parachute Regiment. There are plenty of indications that a more protracted assault is on the cards. The Pentagon has called up 5,172 more members of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, bringing to 10,303 the number called to active duty. The total may be five or six times that number, however. Many will have specialist communications and technical skills, or medical expertise. Search and rescue aircraft will be based in Uzbekistan, in an indication that the US expects that its soldiers and airmen may be shot down. The Washington Times reported that America's Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) had set up a unit to deal with prisoners of war and those missing in action. Mr Rumsfeld said: "We are trying to get ourselves arranged in the world, with our forces in places could be useful in the event the President decides to use them. The President has not narrowed this down to a man or a country. What you will see evolve ... probably over a period of years, is a coalition that will not be exactly the same with respect to every activity that the US or another country might undertake." news.independent.co.uk

To: Secret_Agent_Man who wrote (1134)	9/23/2001 10:58:11 PM
From: Jill	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 281500

Thanx for that. Brilliant piece. (EOM)

To: Secret_Agent_Man who wrote (1134)	9/23/2001 11:43:35 PM
From: SirRealist	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 281500

An analysis from Monitor, which claims to be: "the first online journal dedicated to Indian military and strategic affairs. The MONITOR aims to provide a non-specialist audience with a centrist perspective on issues of importance to India's security." ************************************************ The Grapes of Wrath: The Middle East, Islam and the WTC Bombings** Johann Price Terrorism grows and feeds on the resentments and fear of ordinary people. If we are to succeed we must deal with the symptoms as well as the cause. We must ask ourselves, what do these terrorists want? Who do they represent? What can we do to remove the causes for this support? There has been a wide range of reactions from the Islamic world and the Middle East both on the governmental level and on the popular level to the ghastly events of September 11th. Those reactions give us an insight into the roots of the West and Israel’s conflict with segments of the Islamic world. The world for it’s own security can and must neutralise Osama Bin Laden and his ‘Islamic Front’ through the combined efforts of intelligence, law enforcement and military forces, but that will only buy us enough time to bring about an effective long-term solution. Many ordinary people in Egypt,(the US’s second largest recipient of military and economic aid), Pakistan and Algeria openly cheered the bombings. In Iran and Syria, countries traditionally identified with terrorism, there was strong governmental condemnation of the terrorists and more importantly little public sympathy for the suicide bombing. Muammar Ghadaffi of Libya, who himself has a record of using terrorism against American targets has even gone so far as to say that the US has a right to seek revenge. Osama Bin Laden and his followers and associates without doubt murderous terrorists, perhaps the most dangerous seen so far and there is also little doubt that the depth of their hatred allows them to rationalise away terrible crimes. Yet they pursue an end that deeply resonates with many Muslims throughout the world, even with those who are appalled by their means; the strategic independence of the Islamic world through the forcible militarily, politically and even cultural withdrawal of the US from the Middle East. Osama Bin Laden’s calculus is that the US is unwilling to pay this kind of price for maintaining regional hegemony. Whether or not he is right remains to be seen. When we examine this pattern of reactions and the American reaction three facts emerge; (1) The most negative reactions emerged in nations with deep socio-economic inequalities and unpopular unrepresentative Western backed governments, and in nations in direct conflict with the West and Israel. (2) Even those governments and individuals appalled by the loss of life and disgusted by this act of terrorism will quietly say that these events were a result of American policies in the region. (3) Many American commentators still seem to believe that these terrorists represent only a handful of extremists and rogue regimes and are motivated almost exclusively by hate. It is not yet widely recognised that they are a symptom rather than the disease itself. Where does this hatred and resentment come from? An overwhelming sense of civilisational decline, and more specifically the inability to maintain any measure of control over their own destinies affect many in the Muslim world. This decline and loss of control is seen as an integral part of a 200 year old struggle against a relentless and ruthless West and the litany of defeats. Many Arabs look back further with anger, pain and pride at their resistance against European Crusaders and their eventual defeat. However hard it may be to define, there is little doubt that there exists a worldwide community of Muslims who relate very closely indeed to each other. The disaffections and prejudices of Muslims at the core of the Islamic world have been transmitted to Muslims elsewhere and echoed back again by Muslims living in similar conditions, creating a feedback loop. This feedback explains why many educated and illiterate alike in a country like Pakistan feel strong animosity against Israel, a country that has done little against them directly. When Napoleon conquered Egypt in 1798 it formally marked the end of one phase in the history of the Islamic world and the start of another. Cairo was at the heart of the Islamic world, its most durable cultural, economic and political and even architectural centre after the passing of the Abbasid Caliphate, and yet the French found it sorry shape with crumbling buildings and a disorganised government, a far cry from the formidable force that had encircled and bottled in Europe for some 800 years. The 19th century saw colonial powers carve up North Africa and Egypt as the Ottoman Empire retreated from the Balkans in the face of European nationalism. Russia raced through Central Asia while Britain demolished what remained of Mughal power in the subcontinent. Sheikhdoms in the Arabian peninsula and elsewhere found themselves being referred to as 'protectorates' which meant they weren't worth the trouble of being formally absorbed into the colonial structure. Afghanistan however remained independent. Things did not improve in the 20th century. The end of World War I saw the Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate (which was widely seen as an attack on the very concept of Ummah and the prophets legacy) and the colonisation of the remainder of the Muslim world's traditional core in Palestine Syria and Iraq. The end of World War II saw many the Middle East gradually regain independence, and the beginnings of the oil boom that would transform the Arabian Peninsula. Yet all was not well; governments outside the peninsula were largely run by self-absorbed secular elites deeply influenced by a Euro-Atlantic world that was alien and inaccessible to the majority of their populations. Unfortunately most of these governments have consistently failed to meet the economic and/or political aspirations (this includes the Palestinian issue) of their peoples and have just as consistently resorted to repression when their populations have demanded or more equitable distribution of political power and resources at least greater accountability. This sense of powerlessness has been compounded by repeated defeats at the state of Israel over the question of Palestine. Because of the linkages within the Arab world and between the Arab world and the rest of the Islamic world the Intifada has continued to stoke passions. During the Cold War governments in the region drew support from both superpowers, and some populations saw dizzying changes of alliances within thirty years. Egypt for example in the last fifty years has experienced monarchy, revolutionary government, socialism, capitalism and ‘democracy’ without appreciable improvement in their personal lives or even their bargaining position vis-à-vis Israel. The result of this instability has been a deep disillusionment with the West and everything it has produced. In the back of the collective consciousness was a perhaps overly glorified memory of commercial, intellectual, military and political domination of the Islamic world, which the Islamists constantly invoke. To many hungry for hope it seems that the only thing that had not been tried was Islam and the Islamic state. The result has been a tremendous Islamic revival over the last thirty years fuelled by the tremendous socioeconomic pressures in Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and Iran and helped along with Gulf money. This political Islamism has become the focus of resistance to the status quo. The first victory was the Iranian revolution. The next was Amal and Hezbollah's success in forcing first the US peacekeeping forces and then the Israeli army out of Lebanon. The Iranian revolutionary government’s hostility to the West and memories of the energy crisis precipitated by the Arab oil boycott of 1973 convinced leaders that Islamic regimes in the Middle East had to be opposed at all costs and renewed it’s support to secular regimes and traditional monarchies. We failed to acknowledge that Revolutionary Iran’s hatred was a direct result of the unreserved US support of the Shah until the final days. The refusal by local elites to accommodate Islamists through popular or democratic movements and the use of state violence and repression only encouraged greater radicalisation of these forces. The starkest example of this has been Algeria where the military annulled the 1992 elections after the GIS achieved an overwhelming victory. The resulting civil war has cost some 100-150,000 lives. Saudi Arabia which was able to maintain stability by throwing money at it’s population has seen a precipitous increase in political dissidence drop as per capita income fell sharply in the aftermath of the Gulf War. There are persistent questions over the House of Saud’s undiminished lavish lifestyle and absolute political control, and American overwhelming influence over oil production, foreign and defence policy especially with regards to Israel. There is also a very clear understanding of how dependant these regimes are on Western and especially American support. In short their freedom to reshape their own world has been consistently frustrated by a Western world that they believe alternatively laughs at and ignores them for their poverty, backwardness and powerlessness, conditions that are prolonged by an enforced inability to fundamentally alter their realities. This impotence has expressed itself as a hatred of America, and joy when America was hit by like minded in a way that it could not possibly ignore. For a while in the 1990s it was fashionable to claim that the threat from Islamic militancy was overstated and that it’s time was past as the dominos had stopped falling. This month’s events tell us that superficial judgment was both premature and highly dangerous. A combination of factors has slowed their growth; the numerical domination of Sunnis and the difficulty that Shia revolutionary fervour has had in crossing the divide, and Western support. Militant Sunni Islam had its epiphany during the Afghan Jihad against Soviet occupation, an experience that reached it’s logical conclusion when the Taliban rolled into Kabul and declared an Islamic Emirate, a state far more radical than Sudan or even Iran in it’s rejection of the non-Islamic world. It is therefore not surprising that Osama Bin Laden chose to set up shop there. Even if the Taleban and Al-Qaeda are demolished, the underlying reasons for their existence will remain. The existing regimes are simply incapable of permanently stamping out the sentiments that created Bin Laden and unwilling to take the necessary steps to change the conditions. Given the explosive population growth seen in much of the Middle East and Pakistan, and lagging economic growth, the internal struggles within countries such Egypt and Pakistan will only grow stronger without genuinely representative governments. If the world as a whole choose to fight the war on terrorism by indefinitely supporting regimes (especially in Sunni countries) that use us as a bulwark against any sort of change we risk creating a dozen more GIAs and Al-Qaedas preceding the inevitable revolution, and possibly a Taleban afterwards to shelter yet more Al-Qaedas. We must keep in mind that if the dominos at the heart of the Sunni community start fall to Taleban style Islam that the ripples may spread much wider than in the case of Iran. What then is to be done? This is of course an exceedingly hard question. It's very difficult to convey the sort of social pressure cooker that exists today in Cairo or the West Bank. The number one need is the redistribution of economic opportunity and political power within these nations in order to create establishments representative of ordinary peoples aspirations. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are the key nations to influence, representing the financial, spiritual and historical centres of the Islamic world. This may mean the emergence of Islamic governments, but these will pose far less risk than Islamic movements born and bred in blood. The other question that has to be settled is the future status of the Palestinian State. Most Arabs are realistic enough to admit that Israel cannot be undone and the focus of their anger remains Israeli control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Realistically neither of these steps will be possible until we can find new paradigms to (a) guarantee the energy security of the industrial and developed world (b) guarantee the security of Israel in a way that Israelis themselves find credible. Copyright © Bharat Rakshak 2001 bharat-rakshak.com

To: Secret_Agent_Man who wrote (1134)	9/24/2001 1:35:48 AM
From: George Papadopoulos	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

that piece by Fisk was awesome,thank you for posting it.

To: Secret_Agent_Man who wrote (1134)	9/24/2001 9:52:28 AM
From: jlallen	Respond to of 281500

The basic premise of this article is faulty. I have not heard in Bush's statements and there is no indication from anyone else in the Administration that Bush is planning a "blind arrogant punch". To the contrary, the oppostie conclusion seems the only logical choice. How exactly with over 6,000 innocent US civilians blown and/or crushed to bits or incinerated beyond recognition would any considered retaliation be "arrogant"? Obviously the Administration is gathering its facts and carefully planning a retaliatory raid. This is as it should be. This article is a crock...... JLA