The official wording on the Missouri was "unconditional", but the validity of the document relied upon the authority of the Emperor thus preserving the very "condition" which was at issue for the Japanese, whose sole concern, having accepted defeat, was to preserve their symbol of divinity and honour.
TRANSLATION of Foreign Minister Shiegemitsu's credentials
TRANSLATION
H I R O H I T O,
By the Grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on the Throne occupied by the same Dynasty changeless through ages eternal,
To all who these Presents shall come, Greeting!
We do hereby authorise Mamoru Shigemitsu, Zyosanmi, First Class of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun to attach his signature by command and in behalf of Ourselves and Our Government unto the Instrument of Surrender which is required by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be signed.
In witness whereof, We have hereunto set Our signature and caused the Great Seal of the Empire to be affixed.
Given at Our Palace in Tokyo, this first day of the ninth month of the twentieth year of Syowa, being the two thousand six hundred and fifth year from the Accession of the Emperor Zinmu.
Seal of the Empire
Signed: H I R O H I T O
Countersigned: Naruhiko-o
Prime Minister
TRANSLATION of General Umezu's credentials
TRANSLATION
H I R O H I T O ,
By the Grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on the Throne occupied by the same Dynasty changeless through ages eternal,
To all who these Presents shall come, Greeting!
We do hereby authorise Yoshijiro Umezu, Zyosanmi, First Class of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun to attach his signature by command and in behalf of Ourselves and Our Government unto the Instrument of Surrender which is required by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be signed.
In witness whereof, We have hereunto set Our signature and caused the Great Seal of the Empire to be affixed.
Given at Our Palace in Tokyo, this first day of the ninth month of the twentieth year of Syowa, being the two thousand six hundred and fifth year from the Accession of the Emperor Zinmu.
Seal of the Empire
Signed: H I R O H I T O
Countersigned:
Yoshijiro Umezu, Chief of the General Staff of the Imperial Japanese Army
Soemu Toyoda, Chief of the General Staff of the Imperial Japanese Army
The key question, in any case, was not whether or not the Japanese could be brought entirely to their knees and disgraced, but whether such gratuitous taking of innocent lives could be justified in any way.
Virtually all of the American military leaders counselled against using the bombs and expressed their belief that Japan was defeated and would surrender within weeks...or days. It is well known that Truman did what he did as a political move to ensure that Russia would not try to claim joint occupation, and to establish American post-war military credentials...
As an uneducated man, Truman had a sense of the practical...not the moral.
Here is just one example of the opinions of the Americam leadership (we can go through them one by one if you like...I have not yet found one in support of dropping the bombs).
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
Washington, D.C.
Estimate of the Enemy Situation
7 July 1945
Major General Clayton Bissell
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
POLITICAL SITUATION
1. General Situation. The political situation in Japan is dominated by the progressive deterioration of the military situation. Japan's political isolation following the collapse of Germany, the loss of Okinawa, and the great and growing destruction in Japan proper by American air raids, have convinced the Japanese that victory for them is impossible. As a consequence the present government's foreign and domestic policies are dominated by a strategy of defense. Meanwhile, the internal political structure has been strengthened to meet the threat of invasion.
2. Internal Political Situation. Increasing numbers of Japanese realize that eventual defeat is inevitable and cleavages are deepening between political groups that differ regarding the best way to meet the present national emergency. The prestige of the nationalist extremist elements continues to decline, and the political center of gravity in Japan in shifting toward more moderate elements. The present Suzuki Cabinet typifies this realignment. In order that the government may not without fear of interferences arising from the increasing public depression or from divisions within Japan's ruling groups, the government is taking extraordinary measures to insure rigid control. The central government and the governments of the eight administrative regions of Japan Proper have been empowered to govern by decree; steps have been taken to coordinate the military and civilian administrations; the Japanese people are being organized in a national defense corps which will facilitate strict control; the government has been granted practically unlimited freedom to expropriate property, regulate residence and mobilize manpower. These strengthened controls will aid the government either in coping with possible invasion or in seeking a negotiated peace.
While the government appears to be ready to use its new powers to prepare the Japanese people for a last ditch fight, this fact does not in itself lessen the probability that the government is anxious for a negotiated peace. Although recent information indicates that an increasing number of Japanese feel that Japan's only hope is to end the war by political means, it is apparent that the Japanese leaders feel that they may get better terms from the Allies if they give the impression that the people are determined to fight to the last man rather than accept unconditional surrender.
3. Relations with Subject Peoples. With the continued decline of Japan's military position, the Japanese will find it increasingly difficult to keep their puppet regimes under control and to secure the cooperation of subject peoples. Japanese proclamations, promises and political concessions are having diminishing influence, and mounting unrest among non-Japanese in all Japanese-controlled areas will probably oblige the Japanese to increase their repressive measures. Maintenance of peace and order, even in such long occupied territories as Korea and Manchuria, is becoming more and more difficult. Anti-Japanese activities among the Koreans are increasing, and nationalist elements in Korea are preparing for collaboration with the Allies. The state of mind of Manchuria's population, which is predominantly Chinese but also includes Korean, Mongol, and White Russian minorities, is giving the Japanese increasing concern. In Occupied China the Japanese have found it increasingly necessary to exercise direct control over civil administration and economic organization, relying less and less on the Chinese puppet administration. In Burma, the puppet troops came over to the Allied side as soon as Allied military advances made such action feasible. In Thailand, the government is already working in the Allied cause and is preparing for the day when Allied operations will render the use of Thai forces against the Japanese most useful. In French Indo-China, the Japanese have found it necessary to set aside the Vichy-appointed French colonial administration. Although in so doing, they have gained the friendship of some nationalist elements, other native groups who regard a Japanese-dominated government as a poor substitute for French colonialism would be willing to support any allied invader in whom they had trust for post-war independence.
4. Foreign Policy. Since defense by force of arms is proving less and less effective, and unconditional surrender is still unacceptable, many Japanese appear to believe that they must choose one of two solutions: (i) a deal with the Soviet Union whereby they can keep that country out of the war and possibly prolong hostilities until the Allies have grown weary of fighting; or (2) a negotiated peace. In an evident attempt to lay the groundwork for the first solution, the Japanese Government, as well as Japan's press and radio, have been exhibiting an extremely friendly attitude toward the Soviets and have been attempting to exploit every opportunity to cause dissension among the Allies, especially between the Anglo-Americans and the Russians. The Kuomintang-Chinese Communist impasse is a source of potential Allied friction and conflict which the Japanese will make every effort to utilize for their own ends. However, the Japanese leaders recognize the relative weakness of their diplomatic position vis-a'-vis the Soviet Union, and it is estimated that they now realize that they will be unable to reach a fundamental political agreement with the Soviets.
The second alternative, a negotiated peace with the Allies, is favored by an influential and probably growing group. The Japanese are showing increasing sensitivity to Allied psychological warfare. They are proclaiming their determination to fight to the death, rather than accept unconditional surrender, but at the same time they are indicating their receptivity to more "honorable" terms. If the Japanese become convinced that the Soviets are planning to enter the Pacific War, they may be expected to indicate their extreme anxiety for peace prior to that time, possibly making the overtures through the U.S.S.R. The Japanese will probably continue their efforts to make a separate peace with China, with negative results. If the Japanese become convinced that the only terms they can expect are unconditional surrender, it is quite possible that they will continue the hopeless struggle until their power of resistance is completely destroyed.
5. Possibility of Surrender : It is believed that many Japanese now consider defeat to be probable. The increasing effects of sea blockade and the cumulative devastation wrought by strategic bombing should make this realization increasingly general. The entry of the Soviet Union into the war would finally convince the Japanese of the inevitability of complete defeat. Although individual Japanese willingly sacrifice themselves in the service of the nation, it is believed that the nation as a whole is not pre- disposed toward national suicide. Rather, the Japanese have a strong concept of national survival, regardless of the fate of individuals. They would prefer national survival, even through surrender, to virtual extinction.
The Japanese believe, however, that unconditional surrender would be the equivalent of national extinction, and there are as yet no indications that they are ready to accept such terms. The ideas of foreign occupation of the Japanese home-land and foreign custody of the person of the Emperor are most revolting to the Japanese. To avoid these two conditions and to insure national survival of their institutions the Japanese may soon be willing to withdraw from all the territory they have seized on the Asiatic Continent and in southern Pacific, and probably even to agree to the independence of Korea and to the practical disarmament of their military forces. The surrender of the Japanese government might occur at any time from now until the time of the complete destruction of all Japanese power of resistance, depending upon the conditions of surrender which the Allies might accept.
Source: JD # 92672S; box 74, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Papers, Record Group 319, The National Archives, Washington, D.C. |
