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To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (46973)1/24/2002 12:26:08 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 65232
 
Tech Gets Fed, Post Earnings Lift...

cbs.marketwatch.com

I loaded up on more RBAK yesterday just at the right time...
Now its starting to MOoooooooove back up.....=)

Let's see if this holds...It was way oversold and I like its prospects...as we break through this resistance level, next stop $5.75.

Regards,

Scott



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (46973)1/24/2002 12:47:54 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
Calling Inquiries a Distraction, Enron Chief Quits Under Pressure

By JIM YARDLEY and JOHN SCHWARTZ
The New York Times
Thursday January 24 09:22 AM EST

HOUSTON — Kenneth L. Lay resigned on Wednesday evening as chairman and chief executive of the Enron Corporation (NYSE:ENE - news) under pressure from outside creditors.

Mr. Lay, 59, suggested in a statement that he had decided to resign "in cooperation" with the court-appointed creditors committee that is overseeing the bankruptcy proceedings. He said the various federal inquiries into Enron's collapse were too large a distraction as he tried to resuscitate the company he has led since 1986.

"I want to see Enron survive, and for that to happen we need someone at the helm who can focus 100 percent of his efforts on reorganizing the company and preserving value for our creditors and hard-working employees," he said in a statement released by the company.

"Unfortunately," he added, "with the multiple inquiries and investigations that currently require much of my time, it is becoming increasingly difficult to concentrate fully on what is most important to Enron's stakeholders."

Mr. Lay will remain on Enron's board. The creditors committee is searching for a specialist in reorganizing companies to join Enron and serve as acting chief executive as soon as possible.

Thomas A. Roberts, a lawyer for Enron in New York, said that Mr. Lay had been discussing the possibility of resigning since early December. Mr. Roberts said that a representative of the creditors committee had called him Tuesday night. "The creditors committee really thinks Ken should think about stepping down as an officer and employee of the company," he said.

Mr. Roberts then called Mr. Lay at his home about 10 p.m. Tuesday. "I passed that along and said, `We probably need to think about this.' We talked about it awhile, and he said he was going to get something to eat and talked with his wife," Mr. Roberts said.

The two men talked again the next morning; Mr. Lay said that he would convene a conference call among the directors later that morning. Mr. Roberts was included in that call.

During the call, Mr. Lay gave a synopsis. "He said the time had come for him to resign as an officer of the company so that somebody could get in there and work on rebuilding it because his time was going to have to be dedicated to all of these investigations that were taking place," Mr. Roberts said.

Mr. Roberts said that it was very important that Mr. Lay was staying on as a board member because "he will continue to be available to advise the company."

The resignation of Mr. Lay comes after a string of recent revelations that have raised questions about the conduct of Enron's top executives, including Mr. Lay himself. Disclosures by Congressional investigators have shown that Mr. Lay helped create and oversee some of the financial arrangements that helped lead to Enron's collapse.

In August, he was warned in a private memorandum from a company vice president that Enron's accounting practices could bring down the company.

Yet even as he was selling his own shares of Enron stock in September and October, he was reassuring employees that the company would rebound and encouraging them to buy. His lawyer has said Mr. Lay was selling not because of lack of confidence in Enron but because he faced margin calls as investments in his personal portfolio declined in value.

Mr. Lay will now face scrutiny for his role in Enron's collapse from federal investigators and Congressional committees. On the day he resigned, the company that he had once helped develop into the nation's largest energy trader was instead a half-empty tower in which two floors were secured by federal agents.

A White House spokeswoman, Jeanie Mamo, said, "This doesn't change the president's focus, which is on the ongoing criminal investigation and on the policy reviews to protect people's pensions."

Mr. Lay had been a popular leader as Enron grew the last 15 years into an energy giant that he transformed, Cinderella style, from an unglamorous gas pipeline company. He was considered by peers as a man of big ideas, a crusader for free markets and a risk taker in the Texas wildcatter tradition. But while he was busy befriending the nation's most powerful politicians, erecting one of the tallest buildings in Houston and pledging $100 million to put Enron's logo on the city's new ballpark, the little things were turning out to be Mr. Lay's big problems.

One after another, disclosures spilled out of his company in recent months: off-balance-sheet partnerships had hidden billions in debt; years of Enron's reported profits had been exaggerated. The stock price, once at more than $90 a share, tumbled to less than a dollar. A flood of lawsuits resulted as retirement systems, shareholders, former employees and others said that Enron's failure to disclose its accounting flaws amounted to a violation.

"He fell on his sword," said John Olson, an energy industry analyst here who was a lone skeptic about Enron when the company was flying high. "It was probably the right thing to do. Given the climate of opinion in Houston, and where the company is in attempted recovery, this is probably in the best interests of everybody."

Mr. Lay hoped at first that he could avoid filing for bankruptcy when he entered into merger talks with Dynegy, his Houston rival. But that deal fell apart, spawning more lawsuits and hard feelings, and leaving Enron with little choice but to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. On Dec. 3, the company laid off more than 4,000 workers and was vilified in the hometown where he was once thought to be a mayoral candidate.

There is no question that Enron employees did benefit over the years when the stock price soared, as did Mr. Lay. He has collected more than $300 million since 1989, mostly through exercising stock options.

In Texas, he was first known as a friend and supporter of former President George Bush. But when George W. Bush ran for president in 2000, Mr. Lay gained a national reputation as one of the "pioneers," the top fund-raisers who gave more than $100,000 to Mr. Bush's presidential campaign. In all, Enron along with Mr. Lay have given more than $600,000 to Mr. Bush's political campaigns dating back to his first failed run for Congress in West Texas.

Enron did not limit its contributions to Mr. Bush. The company has made donations to nearly two-thirds of the members of Congress and much of the Republican establishment in Texas.



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (46973)1/25/2002 3:32:48 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
What Did Ken Lay Know on Aug. 20?

JANUARY 24, 2002
NEWS ANALYSIS
BusinessWeek Online

In an interview with BW Online that day, Enron's then-CEO said: "There are no accounting issues...no previously unknown problem issues." Probers think he may have had reason to think otherwise

On Aug. 20, 2001, Kenneth L. Lay was absolutely upbeat about Enron's prospects. Although Jeffrey K. Skilling had abruptly resigned as Enron's president and CEO less than a week before, Lay insisted that the company's slate was clean. "There are absolutely no problems that had anything to do with Jeff's departure," Lay, who had just reassumed the CEO job, told BusinessWeek Dallas Correspondent Stephanie Anderson Forest that day. "There are no accounting issues, no trading issues, no reserve issues, no previously unknown problem issues.... There is no other shoe to fall."

Two months later, Enron's finances began to unravel. By December, the company was in bankruptcy, and on Jan. 23, Lay resigned under pressure from Enron's creditors. But what federal investigators want to know is: Did Lay know more than he was admitting on Aug. 20 -- and were his statements to BusinessWeek Online an act of securities fraud?

THE FAMOUS MEMO. Investigators in Congress and at the Securities & Exchange Commission have uncovered a chronology they believe suggests Lay should have known of Enron's massive accounting problems before that interview. Enron Vice-President Sherron S. Watkins' now-famous memo to Lay -- asking, "Has Enron become a risky place to work?" and pointing out that "Enron has been very aggressive in its accounting" -- was written and dropped off for Lay to review on Aug. 15, according to congressional investigators and Watkins' lawyer. By Aug. 20, Lay had scheduled a meeting with Watkins to discuss her concerns, according to her lawyer, Philip Hilder of Houston. Documents obtained by congressional investigators back up that date.

If Lay knew of the problems and had good reason to view them as substantial, any public statements denying those problems could be deemed false and misleading corporate disclosures. That would be a potential civil or even criminal violation of federal securities laws. "If it appears in BusinessWeek or on its Web site, he's as vulnerable for that as if he put it out in a company news release," says a former top SEC lawyer. The interview with Lay was posted on the Web site on Aug. 24, 2001.

Lay's statements are now a matter of interest to the SEC, which has acknowledged it is investigating the company. BusinessWeek has provided the agency with the published transcript of the interview from its Web site. Enron is also under investigation by the Justice Dept., the Internal Revenue Service, the Labor Dept., two Cabinet-level task forces, and 10 congressional committees.

Lay's attorney, Earl J. Silbert of the Washington firm Piper Marbury Rudnick & Wolfe, declined to speak on the record about Lay's knowledge of Watkins' allegations at the time of the interview.

A MATTER OF TIMING. The evidence starts with Watkins' memo, in which she told Lay: "I am incredibly nervous that we will implode in a wave of accounting scandals." Although Watkins' letter was unsigned, she soon identified herself and met with Lay for one hour on Aug. 22.

The question for investigators is: Had Lay read Watkins' memo detailing questionable transactions and aggressive accounting in Enron's now-controversial trading partnerships by the time he got on the phone with BusinessWeek's Forest -- between noon and 1 p.m. on Aug. 20 -- and issued his "no other shoe" statements?

Watkins says her meeting with Lay was scheduled by Aug. 20, according to Hilder, her lawyer. Further, on the 20th, Watkins told a friend at Enron's auditing firm, Arthur Andersen, about the coming meeting. According to an Aug. 21 memo by James A. Hecker, a Houston-based Andersen partner, Watkins called Hecker on Aug. 20 to discuss her concerns about Enron's accounting. In a memo he wrote about the conversation, Hecker said: "Sherron told me she was concerned enough about these issues that she was going to discuss them with Ken Lay, Enron's Chairman, on Wednesday, August 22, 2001."

ANONYMOUS DROP BOX. What's unclear is how much Lay knew of Watkins' concerns when he spoke to BusinessWeek Online. Hilder, the lawyer, says Watkins had delivered only the first page of what became a seven-page memo at that point. That page contains Watkins' most explosive allegations, while the ensuing six pages are detailed backup. Further, she delivered the memo to a "drop box" Lay had provided for employees to express their concerns anonymously in the wake of CEO Skilling's resignation. Hilder could not say whether Watkins called her memo to Lay's or his staff's attention when she scheduled her meeting with him.

A bigger question may be whether Lay had sufficient reason to believe Watkins' charges were credible. He's likely to argue that the charges were unsubstantiated and that his knowledge of the company supported his statement that Enron "is probably in the strongest and best shape that it has ever been in."

But Lay's later actions indicate he did take Watkins' concerns seriously: He sent her memo to Enron's general counsel, who asked Enron's Houston law firm, Vinson & Elkins, to review the partnership transactions. That review was carefully circumscribed: V&E's report said Enron and the law firm "decided that our initial approach would not involve the second guessing of [Andersen's] accounting advice...there would be no detailed analysis of each and every transaction."

"IN HIS HEAD"? And V&E itself had previously issued legal clearance for many of the Enron partnerships. Under those conditions, V&E concluded on Oct. 15 that Watkins' allegations "do not, in our judgment, warrant a further widespread investigation by independent counsel and auditors."

That sequence of events may strengthen the investigators' case. The BusinessWeek Online interview was conducted after Watkins had delivered her memo but before V&E's report. If Lay had read the memo, "The knowledge was in his head, but he didn't have the benefit of someone having assured him [the Watkins charges] didn't matter," says a source familiar with the federal investigations.

And Lay's categorical statement to BusinessWeek Online -- "no accounting issues, no trading issues, no reserve issues, no previously unknown problem issues" -- may have dug the legal hole a little deeper. That statement hits on most of the areas that have since tripped Enron into massive earnings restatements and bankruptcy.

By speaking so strongly, Lay himself appeared to be aware of those risks. "If there's anything material and we're not reporting it, we'd be breaking the law," he told BusinessWeek's Forest. "We don't break the law." Now, SEC and Justice Dept. investigators will be probing these statements.

__________________________________
By Mike McNamee, with Wendy Zellner and Stephanie Anderson Forest in Dallas, and Laura Cohn in Washington
Edited by Douglas Harbrecht

businessweek.com



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (46973)1/25/2002 5:48:31 PM
From: Sully-  Read Replies (5) | Respond to of 65232
 
Pittsburgh's goin' to the Super Bowl................ I've got a feeling!

Got some friends in town for the AFC Championship Game. We've been close since grade school & have stayed in touch through thick & thin. They've lived in Texas for 20+ yrs. We make a point of visiting each other whenever opportunity allows.

It's already been wild & crazy since they arrived Wednesday. From here on into the game on Sunday, it looks to be more of the same. PARTY!!

Hope everyone has a great weekend!

Don't forget to root for the Steelers on Sunday :-)

Ö¿Ö



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (46973)1/25/2002 7:34:48 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 65232
 
Some folks think 'the big scandal' hasn't even been exposed yet...

Message 16963257

<<...It would be the height of naivete for anyone to believe that Ken Lay would allow Andrew Fastow to profit so dramatically from his managing partner's position in the LJM partnerships, without having a much greater, if undisclosed, windfall arranged for himself. He'd do it for the sake of his ego if nothing else. What Arthur Anderson and the Enron accountants were so diligently destroying was the record of hidden positions that Lay and others held in the off-shore partnerships, where they've netted hundreds of millions in untraceable, untaxed profits.

This is the big scandal, and unfortunately it is the part of the story which is most likely to get swept under the rug because it implicates too much of the elite of Wall Street in the fleecing of America by its corrupt elites. There are so many dirty hands, and the corruption is spread so far throughout the cultures of Houston, Washington and New York that we will never be allowed to learn the truth...>>



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (46973)1/28/2002 6:20:38 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
All-American Flameout

By David Ignatius
Washington Post Columnist
Sunday, January 27, 2002; Page B07

PARIS -- If Enron were a Japanese bank, rather than an American energy company, Kenneth Lay might have held on as chief executive for another decade. Instead, Lay was pushed out Wednesday -- vaporized in the firestorm surrounding Enron's collapse.

Seen from abroad, what's striking about the Enron scandal isn't simply the duplicity of the company's executives and auditors but the speed of its collapse. Enron went from Master of the Universe to bankruptcy in a few weeks. That sort of instant demise simply doesn't happen most places -- especially not to politically powerful people like Ken Lay.

In a perverse way, Enron actually illustrates what makes American capitalism work so well: the possibility that even the mightiest company can suffer a total, devastating flameout. Lay and his former Enron colleagues, along with their see-no-evil auditors at Arthur Andersen, can now look forward to that particular American version of hell in which they will be tormented for eternity by lawyers.

The human dimension of the Enron disaster was reinforced by Friday's news that the company's former vice chairman, Clifford Baxter, was found shot dead, an apparent suicide. That was a reminder that Enron truly has elements of a Greek tragedy, in which hubris brings men and women to a tragic fate.

Enron seduced its board of directors, accountants, investment bankers, politicians, securities analysts and millions of investors with its false and inflated financial statements. But it couldn't sustain the deception forever. A year ago, a "short-seller" named Jim Chanos -- one of those vultures of American capitalism who bet on a stock's decline -- finally began to force out the truth.

It's as American a tale as "The Great Gatsby." Yes, the United States is the land of opportunity, where it's possible to make millions overnight. But it's also a country where hundreds of businesses go bust every day. The bankruptcy laws allow the debris to be cleared away quickly, so that the assets of a failed company can be purchased by a new owner and put to good use.

This Schumpeterian process of "creative destruction" seems heartless to many non-Americans. But it allows U.S. markets to "clear," as prices fall to a level where someone is willing to buy. That makes life miserable for the individual losers, but it allows the economy as a whole to move on.

Now, compare the Enron fireball with the frozen wasteland that is the Japanese banking system. The root problem appears to be the same in both cases: Japanese banks, like Enron, have long made a practice of hiding their financial problems in off-book accounts.

With Enron, the trick was to hide debts and losses in what were known as "Related Party" entities. These were the so-called "LJM" partnerships run by the company's chief financial officer, Andrew Fastow. When Enron was finally forced on Nov. 8 to disclose these hidden debts, it had to restate its earnings for the previous 4 3/4 years and slash its reported earnings by nearly $600 million. Less than a month later, the company had filed for bankruptcy.

Japanese banks have used similar financial chicanery. When the Bubble Economy burst a dozen years ago, loans that had been collateralized by inflated real estate and stock became uncollectable. Rather than writing down these bad loans promptly, as they should have, many Japanese banks tried to avoid embarrassment by shifting them to what amounted to "Related Party" entities.

The scandal in Japan is that this isn't a scandal. The government extended a $60 billion bailout in 1999, but banks are still hiding their uncollectable loans in off-book accounts -- and the government and the public are still going along with the farce. The fear seems to be that some banks would be driven into bankruptcy if they admitted the seriousness of their problems.

Because in Japan no individual bank or politician wants to accept the shame of failure, the system as a whole remains crippled.

Similar problems of facing up to disaster afflict European companies, too. French magistrates have been investigating financial swindles involving the formerly state-owned oil company Elf Acquitaine for eight years, but appeals are still continuing in the case, and some of the magistrates are giving up in disgust. Some French banks, too, have succeeded in burying their bad loans and financial mistakes.

It's comical to see American politicians racing around now expressing their indignation over the Enron scandal. Isn't this the same gang of politicians that accepted huge campaign contributions from Enron? And more to the point, aren't some of the pols the ones who sabotaged the former Securities and Exchange Commission chairman Arthur Levitt when he tried to clean up the accounting profession?

What worries me is that in its haste to make amends, Congress may pass new laws that make U.S. financial markets less flexible and resilient. Sunlight really is the best disinfectant. If the Enron case shows anything, it's that American markets themselves provide brutal discipline -- once the lies are exposed and the facts are on the table.

© 2002 The Washington Post Company



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (46973)1/28/2002 7:04:47 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
Enron and Andersen is no fairy tale

By Jeff Randall

(Filed: 27/01/2002)

HERE'S this week's quiz. Alan Greenspan, the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, called it "aggressive", a leading US Congressman said it was "skullduggery", and a senior Republican party strategist summed it up as "hocus-pocus". To what were they referring?

Mafia money-laundering, perhaps? Robert Mugabe's electioneering style? Sinn Fein propaganda? Nope, none of the above. They were describing Andersen's auditing at Enron, the collapsed energy group, which overpuffed its profits by nearly $600m before running out of gas.

Having failed to add up the numbers properly, some of Andersen's key personnel appear to have opted for a quick career change: moving out of auditing and into the confetti business. Mountains of Enron documents have been shredded, leaving investigators struggling to work out how a black hole in the company's accounts could have been concealed for so long.

Until Friday's suspected suicide of Clifford Baxter, attention had focused largely on David Duncan, the Andersen accountant who headed the Enron audit. He cut a pathetic figure before the US congressional inquiry, electing to stay silent rather than rebut the metaphorical charge that he'd been at the wheel of his firm's getaway car after Enron had robbed the bank.

But suggestions by Andersen that Duncan was a sole trader in the bungled cover-up unravelled when other executives at the accountancy group testified that more of its employees destroyed documents than had previously been disclosed.

Like other Washington scandals (Watergate, Iran-Contra, Lewinsky), it's the drip drip drip that's so damaging, as evidence emerges of cash-for-favours, corporate chicanery and regulatory complacence.

Republican pollster Bill McInturff warns: "Enron is a much bigger story than anyone in Washington realises." He should know: he advises Jeb Bush, the governor of Florida and brother of the president.

As details are prised out by a three-pronged probe from Congress, the FBI and media newshounds, Enron's bewildered shareholders will want to know this: precisely how much money did the company and Kenneth Lay, its former chairman and chief executive, give to the Bush election campaign? What did they get in return? And did Enron executives know the game was up before they unloaded a bucketful of shares while ordinary staff were unable to sell theirs?

At the very least, Enron was a home for dogs that didn't bark. Andersen, which operated hand-in-glove with Enron's top brass, failed to protect shareholders' interests. Enron's bosses ignored warnings from a whistleblower. Enron non-executive directors, who should have checked management excesses, were caught napping.

And over on Capitol Hill, business-friendly politicians were so delighted with Enron's largesse, they wouldn't hear anything bad about it.

And what of Lord Wakeham, the former Tory cabinet minister who is an Enron director and sits on its audit committee? Perhaps he was too busy ticking off naughty journalists (he's chairman of the Press Complaints Commission) to notice that when a share price goes from $85 to below $1 in less than a year, slashing the company's value by $80bn, the stock market is trying to tell you something.

Enron has all the ingredients of a Hollywood blockbuster: fear, greed, money, power, politics and now death. The only missing element is sex. If that turns up, the movie's title will write itself: Getting Layed.

telegraph.co.uk



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (46973)1/28/2002 7:44:56 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
NEA: Old Money, New Technology

By Brendan Barrett,
Washington Techway Staff Writer
The Washington Post
Friday, January 18, 2002

It would be easy to walk past the two aging, adjoining brownstones on the 1100 block of St. Paul Street in Baltimore and never know that the place has any connection with Silicon Valley, billions of dollars and some of the nation's most prominent technology companies.

A small brass plaque next to the front door of 1119 simply says "New Enterprise Associates." Most passers-by probably don't even know it is a venture capital firm, let alone the second largest in the nation.

The old, established look of NEA's Baltimore office - both inside and out - suggests this venture firm is quite different from many others that sprang up in the region during the past few years. And in many respects, it is.

NEA was no exception to the venture capital fallout in 2001. Twenty-one of its portfolio companies, or 10 percent of its active investments, didn't survive the year. Though it largely avoided dot-coms, the firm invested heavily in telecom equipment companies, a sector that has taken a heavy beating.

But, to the envy of many struggling venture firms, NEA not only continues to make investments in a down market, but it is positioning itself to pounce on new opportunities when the economy improves. The 24-year-old venture powerhouse has added four partners and an associate to its East Coast offices during the past several months and now has 23 active partners in Baltimore, Reston and Silicon Valley. They will help invest NEA 10, the largest startup fund in U.S. history, which was closed in September 2000, at $2.3 billion.

"Now is the time to build infrastructure before the next set of opportunities emerge," says Managing General Partner Peter Barris. "We're building it for what we envision is a very bright future."

Where will all that money be invested? In the late 1990s, about 90 percent of NEA's money went to information technology companies.

Today, the firm is increasing investments in the life-sciences sector, and roughly one-third of NEA 10 is expected to go to health care companies. The remaining two-thirds will go to IT companies, but Barris says NEA will focus less on the communications sector and more on enterprise and security software companies.

"We think the enterprise software sector will emerge sooner than the communications sector," he says. One exception: NEA remains bullish on wireless.

Today, NEA has 176 active portfolio companies - 126 information technology startups and 50 medical/life sciences investments. Though the firm doesn't have specific investment quotas, Barris expects the investment pace in 2002 will be pretty similar to 2001, when, excluding follow-on investments, NEA invested $260 million in 27 new portfolio companies.

Make no mistake: NEA is a national venture firm that happens to be located in Baltimore; it is not a Baltimore or even a mid-Atlantic-centric firm. With a bi-coastal presence since its founding - its West Coast office is on the renowned Sand Hill Road in Silicon Valley - NEA has invested in hundreds of startups nationwide.

Still, NEA partners stress their commitment to the mid-Atlantic. Co-founder Chuck Newhall notes that while 20 percent of the firm's investment dollars go to mid-Atlantic companies, less than 1 percent of the money the firm raises comes from the region.

"We are probably the biggest capital importer of anyone in the history of the mid-Atlantic, and nobody understands that," Newhall complains. "The Sun papers, which is basically a communist propaganda sheet … used to say, 'NEA gets all its money from Maryland and sticks it in California.'"

It's no surprise NEA has been in hiring frenzy during the past several months - the firm simply needs more partners to invest that $2.3 billion fund.

Biotech entrepreneur James Barrett, the former CEO of three NEA-funded companies, joined in September as a full-time partner and is expected to boost the firm's search for promising drug delivery and discovery investments. "A number of relatively later-stage deals are being priced attractively for us, and some of the clinical risk is already out of the project," he says.

Last month, Barrett, who most recently was CEO of Sensors for Medicine and Science in Germantown, landed his first deal: a $20 million investment in Pharmion of Boulder, Colo.

John Sidgmore, vice chairman of WorldCom, also joined NEA in late 2001 in a part-time capacity. Sidgmore's relationship with the firm goes back about 10 years, when Barris brought him in as CEO of UUNet, a NEA-funded company that later made an initial public offering and was acquired by WorldCom. Within three years, NEA's $3.9 million investment in UUNet was worth a whopping $260 million.

NEA already has funded one startup Sidgmore brought in: Boingo Wireless, a Los Angeles company launched by the founder of Earthlink. Sidgmore is on Earthlink's board.

Joining NEA this month were George Stamas, who retired as vice chairman of the board at Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown on Jan. 1, and Harry Weller, formerly of FBR Technology Venture Partners.

Like Sidgmore, Stamas will be working part time for NEA, bringing in deals from his wide network of contacts. Weller will be working full time, specializing in information technology deals. The firm also hired a consultant this summer, Chris Shen, a medical doctor who has already received a number of patents and will return to the Baltimore office as a principal after he finishes his MBA at Stanford.

But it doesn't necessarily take a track record such as Sidgmore's or Barrett's to become a partner at NEA. Newhall says an associate can become a general partner after bringing the firm $100 million in profits.

The firm's impressive list of partners already include one Nobel Laureate and a Fortune magazine columnist, and Stanford MBA graduates narrowly outnumber Harvard MBAs, 4-3.

Their top-notch reputation in the venture community is evident, partly because when NEA invests, others join the party.

"It is absolutely an advantage for NEA to lead the first round," says Wenli Yu, CEO of Seneca Networks, a Rockville optical networking equipment company in NEA's portfolio. "People know they do their homework, so a lot of smaller VCs become interested in jumping in on the investment." Yu says 10 local venture capitalists expressed interest in investing in Seneca's first round in early 2000 after they learned NEA was leading the deal.

Similarly, Gordon Saussy, CEO of Megisto Systems, a Germantown wireless equipment provider, says that when Norwest Venture Partners, a Silicon Valley venture capital firm, decided to fund his company in 2001, it was with strings attached. "They very much wanted to have a blue-chip East Coast firm [participate in the deal]," he says. "They said, 'We want NEA,' and it was very clear that part of our mission was to get NEA on board."

Even entrepreneurs whose companies didn't make it have decent things to say about NEA. "My feelings toward NEA are not negative," says Shaun Amini, former CEO of Eyecast, an NEA-funded Herndon company that shut down in May 2001. He says the venture capitalists who invested in Eyecast lost all their money. "It was a very challenging time, and I was pleasantly surprised by their support," he says.

In fact, it's hard to find anyone who will say anything critical about the firm, though two of NEA's former partners declined to be interviewed, including Art Marks, who was voted out last summer after longstanding differences with the partnership.

NEA traces its roots to the summer of 1977, when Frank Bonsal, an investment banker at Alex. Brown, began talking with Newhall, a young analyst from T. Rowe Price, about starting a venture fund. "I knew a lot about the venture business because my father had been in it from around 1945 on," says Newhall.

Bonsal says T. Rowe Price was willing to back them, but required that they bring on an additional partner with venture capital experience. They soon added Dick Kramlich as the third co-founder, a venture investor in San Francisco who had worked with Arthur Rock for about 10 years. Rock was one of the founding fathers of Silicon Valley venture capital. He funded Fairchild Semiconductor, one of the first companies to make transistors for computers, and then funded a company named Intel. Among Rock's other major investments was Apple Computer.

After going without pay for a year, NEA's founders closed their first fund at $16.4 million in 1978. The fund's two lead investors were the Deere family - of John Deere tractors - and T. Rowe Price, which chipped in $1 million.

Newhall says investors who funded NEA 1 and the organizations those people created account for about 70 percent of the money in NEA 10. Some of the money in NEA 1 came from people in the insurance industry, who subsequently left to form the "fund of funds" business, which are funds that invest in multiple venture firms.

One of those people, says Newhall, was Ray Held, who invested for the account of AT&T and formed Abbott Capital. From AT&T and Abbott, NEA ultimately brought on these investors for its funds: all of the Baby Bells, Lucent Technologies, Calpers - the California Public Employees Retirement System and an Abbott client - and JP Morgan, which managed AT&T's money. "Ray Held and his lineal descendants accounted for $700 million to $800 million in NEA 10," says Newhall.

But the environment for investing in startups in the late 1970s and 1980s was quite different than today. "People in Baltimore didn't really know what venture capital was all about," notes Bonsal.

Newhall says there were about three venture firms in the region at that time - Greater Washington Investors, which was really a real estate firm; Bro Ventures, which hadn't made an investment in more than 25 years; and Data Science Ventures, in Princeton, N.J.

Frank Adams, a fellow Baltimore venture capitalist who founded Grotech Capital in 1984, says NEA was really the "only game in town" until Grotech formed, and NEA even played a role in Grotech's creation. According to Adams, Frank Bonsal not only introduced him to Ed Sager, who later became Grotech's other co-founder, but also to Newhall, who "very much became a mentor to me."

NEA was clearly the experienced venture firm on the block: When Grotech raised its first $12 million fund in 1984, NEA was closing its third fund at $126 million. Though Adams and Newhall co-founded the Mid-Atlantic Venture Association in 1986, Adams gives Newhall all the credit. "It was very much Chuck's idea," he says.

But the 1980s weren't exactly like the 1990s in terms of technology deals: NEA's first co-investment with Grotech, in 1984, was in a women's clothing company, Joshua Slocum. NEA even had a partner at the time, Ray Bank, who specialized in retail deals. Bank, who has an office at Grotech, declined to be interviewed.

Newhall considers NEA 3, a $126 million fund closed in 1984, the firm's least successful, mainly because the initial public offering and merger-and-acquisition markets had slowed down considerably in the mid-to-late '80s, leaving portfolio companies without an exit strategy for a long period. He says NEA 3 had about a 6 percent internal rate of return, a measurement that considers investment returns over a period of time. Historically, venture capital has an IRR of 20 percent to 25 percent, about double the return of large cap stocks.

The Internet boom of the late 1990s was a prosperous time for venture capitalists, and NEA was no exception. Topping its list of blockbusters was an investment in Juniper Networks, a top 25 IPO in 1999, which skyrocketed from $34 a share to $340 a share in its first six months on the market. The firm's $3 million investment in Juniper in 1996 produced a return of more than 500 times the investment three years later, by far NEA's most financially successful deal.

Another short-turnaround, big hit was a company called Xros (pronounced Cai-ros). NEA was part of a $20 million venture round in late 1999, and seven months later, Nortel bought Xros for $3.2 billion, netting NEA about $700 million. Newhall says that deal made one principal in the firm, Rob Coneybeer, a partner much faster than the usual 10 years. "You have to acknowledge the person who did that," he says.

Newhall says that, historically, 10 percent of NEA's investments return "an enormous amount of money," about 10 times or more of the amount invested; 30 percent earn 5 times; another 30 percent the firm "will work its tail off to recover most of what we put in" and 30 percent will lose all or most of the investment.

"At the height of the [tech] bubble, 10x [10 times the investment] seemed to be at the floor," says Barris. "We were more looking like 40x to 50x our money would be a very good return."

There were some regrets along the way.

NEA passed on an opportunity to invest in Netscape. It also decided not to invest in Ciena, the optical networking company in Linthicum, the firm's own back yard. "We were right there, and one partner we had, who was a very negative person, talked us out of it," says Newhall. "Fortunately, the son of a bitch is gone; he's no longer with us."

Though NEA had been through investment cycles before, its experience did not appear to make it less wary about the impending burst of the Internet bubble. In 2000, for example, when valuations of privately held companies were peaking, NEA poured $1.04 billion into 133 companies, an aggregate total that includes both new and follow-on investments.

The firm ranked No. 2 behind JP Morgan Partners for the amount of venture capital invested in 2000. "We were seeing investment opportunities at a pace we had never seen before," says Barris, "what we thought were quality opportunities."

Of course, not all the investments worked out so well. NEA prides itself on having avoided most of the dot-coms that burned venture capitalists in the past year and a half, but it didn't avoid all of them.

Barris says one of NEA's worst investments in the late '90s was a company called Egreetings - greeting cards over the Internet. "The business model made no sense. It had all of the buzzwords, such as 'aggregating eyeballs,' but no one could figure out exactly how to monetize it," he says. "We didn't believe in the business model, but we believed [the management team] would figure it out." Egreetings was later acquired, but NEA lost about 75 percent of its $6 million investment. "They were truly a dot-com," he says.

But heavy investments in telecom equipment companies during the Internet boom began to take a toll during the downturn.

In mid-2001, with no exit strategy in site for many of its capital-intensive telecom equipment portfolio companies, NEA raised a $150 million annex fund for NEA 8, in order to continue to support the 53 still-active companies in NEA 8. Annex funds, pejoratively known as "bail out" funds, are often viewed as a bad sign because it demonstrates that the portfolio companies are unable to issue an initial public offering, get acquired or get financing from other venture capitalists.

"We could have got by without raising an addendum fund, but we wouldn't have supported the companies to the degree we wanted," says Barris, noting that the additional investment by the limited partners was voluntary. Barris says NEA does not at this point expect to have to raise an annex fund for NEA 9, its 1999 fund, though that fund "does have some of the same characteristics of NEA 8."

NEA continues to spend a lot of time on its portfolio companies, most of which are in a holding pattern until the IPO or mergers-and-acquisition markets return to healthy levels. "When companies come up for a financing is the big determinant - do they get financed or go out of business?" says Barris. "If they are financed, we try to get them to cash flow break-even."

Of NEA's regional investments, Equalfooting (later called Equidity), Eyecast, Opion and The .Com Group didn't get additional financing in 2001, and all went out of business. Newhall's view of the Internet bubble is pretty straightforward. "I call it a drunk," he says, "and now we have a hangover."

Newhall realizes the coming years will bring a big transition, but he is preparing for it. "Frank [Bonsal] is partially retired, Dick [Kramlich] is 68 years old, and I'm 57," he says. "We're going to have some partners who are going to be stepping down, so you have to bring on the next generation.

"The founders haven't gone away, we're just working with the next generation of management," he says. And Newhall, well aware that partnerships, unlike corporations, are set up with a finite life span, is taking steps to ensure it continues for the next generation of partners. "We've always given away the bulk of the carried interest to the new people coming on board," he says. "Our firm has acted much differently than the bulk of the people in the industry. Where founders might keep 80 percent of the partnership's profits, we keep 15 or 20 percent."

Though venture firms are set up to produce a return on investment for the limited partners, the ones who actually provide the money for each fund, Newhall tends to look at the types of companies NEA has helped create as a measure of success. "You can't look at a company that necessarily produces the best return," he says about identifying the best companies NEA has funded. "The issue is what becomes of the company over the long term," he says, ticking off sectors in the high-tech industry that he says NEA has helped create - Ethernet, local area networks, high-speed data communications, human gene therapy and outpatient health care.

"All I can say is that history will show what rank we are," he adds. "And the thing that shows our rank are the companies we produce. The rest is bullshit."

washtech.com



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (46973)1/28/2002 8:04:40 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
Auditor's celebrity lawyer

By Sandra Jones
January 28, 2002
Crain's Chicago Business

Houston - A Texas lawyer who has represented sports celebrities like Scottie Pippen and stymied Playboy model Anna Nicole Smith's quest for her late husband's riches now is trying to save Andersen.

The buttoned-down accounting firm hired celebrated Houston trial attorney Russell "Rusty" Hardin Jr. last November after shareholders began suing executives of Houston-based Enron Corp. and its auditor Andersen for alleged violations of federal securities laws.

Mr. Hardin's job: keep Chicago-based Andersen from having to pay hundreds of millions of dollars to Enron shareholders and employees, many of whom lost their life's savings when the energy trading giant's stock collapsed late last year and the company filed for protection from creditors in Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

For the 60-year-old Mr. Hardin, who, as an eager young state prosecutor, once told a courtroom that he was "doing the Lord's work" by going after criminals, this could be the challenge of his career.

While Mr. Hardin is no expert in securities law, Andersen no doubt is counting on his familiarity with the Houston court system and the judge to bolster its case, say legal experts. Companies frequently seek out a good local trial lawyer when facing the possibility of a jury trial away from home.

Good help doesn't come cheap. Top trial attorneys charge up to $750 an hour. Andersen is also paying dozens of lawyers at New York-based Davis Polk & Wardwell for their expertise in securities law.

Davis Polk is managing a legion of both criminal and civil investigations by the Department of Justice, the Securities and Exchange Commission, state accounting boards and several committees in both houses of Congress. But it is in Houston that Andersen's financial fate will play out. An Andersen spokesman declined to comment on Mr. Hardin's role in its legal strategy.

"Andersen is hanging out there as the only one with deep pockets for people to go after," says Mr. Hardin, speaking to a small group of reporters in Houston last week. (Enron is protected from lawsuits as long as it is in Chapter 11.)

Win some, lose some

In his first test for Andersen in federal court last week, Mr. Hardin had mixed results.

He was able to keep Andersen documents in the firm's control, instead of handing them over to an independent watchdog, by reaching an agreement with the lawyers for shareholders that requires Andersen to report, among other things, what steps it is taking to recover and preserve the evidence. U.S. District Judge Melinda Harmon approved the agreement late last week.

But Mr. Hardin lost a crucial argument over whether the shareholders' lawyers could conduct depositions of key Andersen partners, including David Duncan, the Houston-based lead partner in charge of the Enron audit who was fired earlier this month for his role in destroying records. Mr. Duncan declined to speak at a congressional hearing on Thursday, invoking his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself.

Mr. Hardin, renowned for his skill at cross-examining witnesses and winning over juries, will be hard-pressed to paint Andersen as a victim against the Enron workers who lost their jobs and retirement savings and the Enron shareholders who say they've been duped by greedy executives.

But, if anyone is up to the task, Mr. Hardin is the man, say Houston lawyers who know him. "He's the best cross-examiner I've ever seen," says David Berg, a corporate lawyer who has watched Mr. Hardin work for years.

After 15 years as a prosecutor at the attorney general's office in Houston, the North Carolina native left the government to form Texas People Against Crime, a political action committee that tried to get judges who were soft on crime off the bench.

Soon after, he set up a private practice and began forging new territory by litigating civil cases for crime victims. In one such case, Mr. Hardin won $65 million from a nursing home for the family of an elderly woman who'd been molested while living there.

The affable lawyer (courtroom opponents have called him a "delightful adversary") has also defended a roster of sport celebrities, including former Chicago Bulls star Mr. Pippen when he played for the Houston Rockets, New York Yankees third-baseman Wade Boggs and Minnesota Vikings quarterback Warren Moon. In a sensational trial last year, he thwarted efforts by Ms. Smith of Playboy fame to gain half the fortune left by her late octogenarian oil-tycoon husband.

In the early days of the Whitewater scandal, Mr. Hardin assisted independent prosecutors Robert Fiske Jr. and Kenneth Starr. And he appears as the relentless prosecutor in a true-crime novel — "Daddy's Girl" by Clifford Irving — about one of Texas' most famous murder trials.

Mr. Hardin made his first public courtroom appearance for Andersen in Houston last week when the federal judge presiding over the high-stakes shareholder and employee class-action lawsuits held a hearing to determine who should have control of the potentially millions of Enron-related documents in Andersen's possession.

Southern showdown

Just minutes before Judge Harmon took her seat at the front of the warehouse-size courtroom, Mr. Hardin strolled calmly across the front of the crowded hall, surveying the three tables of attorneys, each jockeying for position as the lead attorney in the consolidated class action. (The judge has yet to name a lead plaintiff, the most lucrative client for a class-action attorney to represent.)

Arms folded authoritatively across his cool-gray suit and a pleasant smile fixed below his shaggy silver bangs, Mr. Hardin took his position, standing, above the dark-suited array of New York attorneys.

And there he remained, calmly, for well over an hour as lawyer after lawyer representing big and small shareholders, state pension funds and Enron employee retirement funds bickered over how to ensure that Andersen and Enron will comply with orders not to destroy documents.

When the grand speeches subsided, Mr. Hardin walked to the podium and told the judge in his lilting drawl that a good dose of down-home hospitality was needed in the courtroom.

Andersen "regrets what happened to shareholders" and has "no quarrel that a tremendous amount of harm has been done to these people," Mr. Hardin said. "This thing would go along a lot better if we all got along."

©2002 by Crain Communications Inc.