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To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (47431)2/5/2002 6:57:51 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
jw: You could have written this...

Message 17017589

I'm wondering whether you're posting under multiple aliases....lol.

Regards,

Scott



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (47431)2/5/2002 9:24:03 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 65232
 
Department of Energy's FY 2003 Budget Request to Congress

mbe.doe.gov



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (47431)2/6/2002 5:07:20 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
Can UBS Tame Enron's Wild Traders?

That's the key question facing the Swiss bank as it prepares to take over the Texas company's energy-trading business

FEBRUARY 6, 2002
NEWS ANALYSIS
BusinessWeek.com

Back in November, Dynegy (DYN ) had what sounded like a great idea: Buy Enron's flagship trading business in natural gas and electricity, and immediately become the dominant force in those markets. Dynegy fled when Enron started to collapse under an avalanche of scandal. Now, Zurich (Switzerland)-based UBS Warburg (UBS ) is making the same bet, albeit for a lot less money.

The question now: Will the conservative bank be able to impose Swiss order on the rogue Texas company's traders? On one level, the deal doesn't seem completely farfetched. Enron's gas and electricity trading actually seems to have made money. Other bankers who checked it out estimate the trading operations racked up $3 billion in pretax profits over the past two years (see BW, 2/11/02, "Enron: How Good an Energy Trader?").

Still, UBS had good reason to go for a deal that gave it 67% of future pretax profits for a pledge only to pay the salaries of 625 Enron employees. Obviously, the Enron name is mud, and getting people to trade with the company will be difficult enough. But managing Enron's swaggering traders -- its core asset -- could turn out to be even harder.

CULTURE CLASH. Enron may be on its last legs, but its masters-of-the-universe culture lives on, say insiders. "Even after going down in flames, a lot of these people have undiminished confidence in their ability," says a former Enron trader who asked not to be named. Competitors doubt that people who earned as much as $1 million a year in the freewheeling, high-risk Enron culture will be grateful to become a small piece of UBS's massive fixed-income business.

Although many have signed contracts with UBS that prevent them from leaving Enron for an undisclosed period, "they're all exploring their options," says one banker privately. Indeed, some traders are talking about trying to buy the trading unit back from UBS after it gets going again. UBS says it's not worried about rogue traders. "We're confident in the people we have hired," says Michael Hutchins, global co-head of credit fixed income at UBS Warburg.

For the scheme to work, however, UBS must persuade Enron's traders to accept its risk-management practices. And that will be tough: One reason Enron's traders made so much is that they took big risks. Analysts estimate that Enron was willing to put as much as $66 million at risk on a trade, vs. $12.2 million at Dynegy or $16 million at Duke Energy. UBS Warburg is willing to put up to $131 million at risk in all of its deals with a single trading partner, but insiders says its energy traders won't be allowed to risk "anything like that" on a single trade. UBS'ers abide by tighter controls than at Enron.

"SMOOTHING ELEMENT." UBS officials insist that they have no rosy delusions about the investment. That's partly because they had been researching the energy-trading business for more than a year as a way of diversifying the bank's trading income. "Earnings in the energy-trading business do not depend on developments in the capital markets, so they could work as a smoothing element," says UBS President Peter A. Wuffli.

That's in fact what motivated UBS to send a small team down to Houston when Enron put the business up for sale after the bankruptcy filing. Even after federal antitrust authorities give the final go-ahead, the Swiss bank says it plans to take things slowly. "We don't know how quickly this is going to start up," says UBS CEO John Costas. "We'd be happy in the first year if this business is half as big as it had been historically."

Still, anything associated with Enron is arguably fraught with risk at any price. "It's not clear how successful UBS is going to be," says Jeff Dietert, an analyst at investment bank Simmons & Co. in Houston. "And I think UBS knows that. That's why it wasn't willing to pay anything up front."

Some industry insiders doubt that Enron's traders will prove to be exceptional under the new rules. But UBS isn't about to change its own way of doing business. "Entering into energy trading does not mean extending our appetite for risk," says Wuffli. Swiss family Enron? Don't bet the chalet on it.
_____________________________

By Emily Thornton in New York, David Fairlamb in Zurich, and Stephanie Anderson Forest in Dallas
Edited by Julia Lichtblau



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (47431)2/6/2002 5:43:14 AM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 65232
 
Enron Executives Wanted a Lawyer Fired For Approach to Partnership Negotiations

By TOM HAMBURGER and JOHN EMSHWILLER
Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Updated February 6, 2002 12:01 a.m. EST

WASHINGTON -- Enron Corp. executives tried to get one of the company's in-house lawyers fired in 2000 after their boss expressed unhappiness with the way the lawyer was negotiating with a partnership in which the boss had an interest, congressional investigators said.

The disclosure underlined the conflicts of interest that apparently existed with outside partnerships set up and run by some Enron executives. For Enron, which is now in bankruptcy proceedings, the partnerships allowed the Houston energy-trading company to enhance its profits and to move debt off its books. But the partnerships also were used by some senior Enron executives to enrich themselves, according to an internal company report released this weekend.

The investigators' statements came as several congressional committees pushed forward with probes into Enron's collapse. A House and Senate panel each voted to issue subpoenas to force appearances by Kenneth Lay, Enron's former chairman and chief executive. Meanwhile, the head of Arthur Andersen, Enron's former auditor, was aggressively questioned before a House panel and outlined additional steps the accounting firm is taking to restore its reputation.

At issue in the case involving the Enron lawyer was one of the outside partnerships known as LJM2. Enron attorney Joel Ephros was negotiating with attorneys for LJM2 from the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis in 2000, when he received an expletive-laced angry voice mail about his handling of the negotiation from Enron's Chief Financial Officer, Andrew Fastow, according to an account given to congressional investigators. Mr. Fastow at the time ran and had an ownership interest in LJM2, which eventually earned him substantial profits.

Later, in the fall of 2000, two of Mr. Fastow's subordinates, Ben Glisan Jr. and Michael Kopper, approached Mr. Ephros's boss to accuse the lawyer of being unresponsive and incompetent and to urge his dismissal. The boss, Jordan Mintz, general counsel of Enron Global Finance, had just started his new job and said he wasn't prepared to make any personnel moves, so he declined. Informed of the decision, Mr. Fastow didn't object. Mr. Mintz later decided to keep Mr. Ephros on staff and praised his performance.

The attempt to fire Mr. Ephros will be aired at a hearing Thursday before the House Energy and Commerce Committee's oversight panel, Billy Tauzin, chairman of the full committee, said in an interview. The Louisiana Republican offered the episode as an example of what he called a corrupt culture within Enron as it sought to inflate revenue and conceal losses using entities such as LJM2.

"They literally became sham operations," said Mr. Tauzin, who is leading the most aggressive probe of nearly a dozen now being conducted on Capitol Hill into Enron. "One purpose was to fool investors into believing that debt had moved, that risk had moved. And the other purpose was to create phony income. This is an old game. This is nothing new. This is insider theft."

Mr. Mintz will be a chief witness at Thursday's hearing and is expected to detail his recollections about the effort made to muzzle Mr. Ephros. A spokesman for Mr. Fastow declined to comment. A lawyer for Mr. Glisan didn't return a call for comment. Mr. Ephros and Mr. Kopper couldn't be reached. Mr. Tauzin said he expects Messrs. Fastow and Kopper to invoke their Fifth Amendment rights against possible self-incrimination to avoid testifying at Thursday's hearing.

The Ephros episode is an example of a problem addressed cryptically in the internal report by a special committee of Enron's board that was released last weekend. Mr. Fastow "was in a position to exert great pressure and influence. … We have been told of instances in which he used that pressure to try to obtain better terms for LJM," the report said. "Simply put, there was little of the separation and independence required to enable Enron employees to negotiate effectively against LJM2."

Mr. Tauzin said that Thursday's hearing will also feature details of what he called "literally a sweetheart deal" involving another partnership. According to Mr. Tauzin and his investigators, one of the partnership deals was cut by two Enron employees who were engaged to be married, one representing Enron and one representing LJM2.

Congressional investigators said that the agreement netted huge profits for the couple, Trushar Patel, an Enron attorney, and his fiancee, Anne C. Yaeger, who worked with Mr. Fastow and later left Enron. Ms. Yaeger signed a $30 million agreement on behalf of LJM2, listing herself as an "authorized person," documents shows. Her husband signed representing Enron.

Committee spokesman Ken Johnson said investigators have learned Ms. Yaeger entered into the transaction by initially providing just $10 as a down payment, later kicking in an additional $2,913. "We believe she walked away from the deal with a profit of half a million dollars," Mr. Johnson said. "That's not a bad return for a $10 initial investment."

Messages left at the home of the couple weren't returned.

In other action, the Senate Commerce Committee and the House Financial Services Committee approved subpoenas for Mr. Lay to appear before their panels on Feb. 12 and 14, respectively. Mr. Lay had agreed to appear at hearings this week, but backed out in response to scathing criticism from Capitol Hill prompted by revelations in the Enron board's internal report. Though he will be forced to appear, he can refuse to testify by invoking the Fifth Amendment, and several senators and House members predicted he would do so. Kelly Kimberly, Mr. Lay's spokeswoman, said he and his lawyers haven't yet decided whether he will testify.

In his second appearance before the House Financial Services panel, Andersen CEO Joseph Berardino outlined new steps the accounting firm will take to restore confidence in its work, including creating offices for audit quality, ethics and compliance. Mr. Berardino came under heavy criticism from panel members for Andersen's role in the Enron affair, including a document-destruction effort undertaken by Houston-based employees, one of whom was subsequently fired. He said he was "embarrassed" by the shredding. On Andersen's role in reviewing questionable partnership transactions, which later led to Enron's collapse, he reiterated his assertion that "information was withheld" by Enron as Andersen was reviewing them.

The difficulty Mr. Berardino faces in restoring confidence in his company was made clear in Connecticut Tuesday as the state's Board of Accountancy escalated its investigation of the firm, issuing a subpoena for Enron-related documents. The state could revoke Andersen's license to practice in Connecticut and levy a fine. State Attorney General Richard Blumenthal says his staff is searching for common policies between Andersen's activities in Houston and Hartford. He added that other state attorneys general have been in contact with him and could pursue similar action.

-- Judith Miller and Russell Gold contributed to this article.

Write to Tom Hamburger at tom.hamburger@wsj.com and John Emshwiller at john.emswhiller@wsj.com



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (47431)2/6/2002 6:31:48 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
More Productivity, without More Profits?

Tech execs and economists at this year's World Economic Forum said this disturbing paradox is a rather likely scenario

businessweek.com

Were the astounding productivity gains by America's high-tech titans just another mirage of the Roaring Nineties? No way, according to the leading U.S. tech CEOs who appeared at the World Economic Forum in New York. In fact, vowed Compaq Computer Chairman Michael D. Capellas: "I don't think we've hit anywhere close to the limits of productivity growth."

So will that mean a return to the dazzling profits of the boom years? Well...not really. One of the striking themes to emerge from this year's forum was a rather disturbing paradox. Advances in technology and operating efficiency continue apace, even since the industry's financial meltdown. That should be good news for consumers and the U.S. economy in general. But "how much of the efficiency gains will you keep?" Capellas wondered. "There is some evidence that [companies such as Compaq] are producing more productivity growth for the economy than we are keeping in profits."

Why? Among the reasons cited at the conference, which ended on Feb. 4: Most corporations have access to the same cost-saving knowhow, the competitive landscape will remain ferocious, and excess production and telecom capacity will take a long time to clear away. Add to this weaker Asian currencies, which make electronics producers in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan more competitive, and you get the prospects of continued soft prices. And that will translate into weak profits.

EXPECTATIONS GAP. So for many companies, that raises the prospect of a profitless recovery. At the very least, said Morgan Stanley Chief Economist Stephen Roach, Wall Street in the years ahead will have to lower its expectations for annual profit growth from around 14% in the '90s to "maybe 8% to 9%."

Management guru Gary Hamel, chairman of consulting firm Strategos, told the panel that real profits would have been much lower had tech companies not pumped them up with needless mergers and massaged their balance sheets. The exuberance of the 1990s produced an "enormous gap between expectations and reality, and that gap was filled by pro-forma accounting and inventory shuffling," Hamel said.

What was surprising is that tech executives met these opinions without objection -- perhaps evidence of how thoroughly the Enron debacle has chastened Corporate America (see BW Online, 2/5/01, "Enron: Where Are America's CEOs?"). Capellas said the industry landed in its current fix by "creating artificial demand in the U.S. with business models that didn't make sense." Sun Microsystems President Edward J. Zander, who shared the stage with Capellas and Hamel on a panel titled "Business Strategy in a Fragile Global Economy," wistfully recalled the mood at the World Economic Forum two years ago in Davos, Switzerland, when America's tech CEOs were the Masters of the Universe. "Nasdaq was at 5000, all was well, and we were heroes then," Zander said. "Now, we're in the penalty box."

DIFFERENT SKILLS. Of course, the execs weren't saying their companies were involved in any financial chicanery. And most remain optimistic about a recovery starting to take shape later this year. Several even said they were relieved by the end of Wall Street's tech mania because they now can return to focusing on their core businesses, operating efficiencies, R&D, and long-term strategy, rather than meeting inflated investor expectations for quarterly profits and acquisitions. Coming out of the current shakeout, Zander said he figures the industry will "return to good growth, but certainly more moderate. And it probably will take a different way to manage."

To Hamel, corporate managers in the next decade will require different skills than they did in the Roaring Nineties. "A lot of factors that buoyed stocks in the 1990s -- mergers and acquisitions, the liquidity in the stock market, share buyouts -- have reached their outer limits," he said. And rather than "dealmakers and efficiency fanatics," the winning industry leaders will focus on achieving organic growth, prudent investing, and building resilient organizations that can adapt to constant change.

Capellas said buyers of technology also have learned their lessons. In the future, they'll be focusing on investments that give them a distinct edge rather than merely mimic industry trends. "If you are a CEO, the question you want to ask your chief information or technology officer is: 'How will the tech spend create unique advantages?'" he said.

LINGERING QUESTION. The new mindset, if it proves true, should point to continued strong gains in business efficiency. But given how quickly new technologies and management techniques are copied throughout industries, the question remains: Will it all translate into superior earnings remains?

Speaking on a different panel, Cisco CEO John Chambers also struck an optimistic, yet qualified, tone. He insisted that the hundreds of millions of dollars in savings his company had achieved through outsourcing and other strategies in the 1990s were real. And as entire industries begin to implement compatible information-technology architectures in the next four or five years, that will make it easier to exchange real-time data throughout the supply chain, from retailers to manufacturers to parts suppliers. "The productivity increase is just beginning," Chambers declared. "I think at Cisco, we can drive 15% growth a year for a decade."

Then somebody in the room noted that the issue is whether these efficiency gains will produce strong profits. Chambers said nothing. Flashing a grin to an economist sitting next to him, all he did was wag his head vigorously up and down, as if to say, "Help me out here."



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (47431)2/6/2002 6:54:47 AM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 65232
 
Bill Gross's New Investment Outlook...

pimco.com