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To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (48655)3/14/2002 12:33:30 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
WorldCom Says Big Loan to CEO May Have Spurred SEC's Inquiry

By SHAWN YOUNG
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Updated March 14, 2002

WorldCom Inc. Chief Executive Bernard Ebbers might wish he hadn't borrowed $340 million from his now-scrutinized telecom company.

WorldCom said the IOU, started in 2000, was in WorldCom's best interest. "The very essence of why Mr. Ebbers was granted a loan was to protect shareholder value," said Brad Burns, a spokesman for the company, which is based in Clinton, Miss. He said Mr. Ebbers couldn't be reached with a request for an interview.

But the Securities and Exchange Commission, which has listed the loan as one of the subjects of its wide-ranging inquiry into the No. 2 long-distance carrier's finances, doesn't always see such loans this way.

Go to Questioning the Books

"A large loan to a senior executive epitomizes concerns about conflict of interest and breach of fiduciary duty," said former SEC enforcement official Seth Taube, who is now chairman of securities litigation and business crimes at the New Jersey law firm McCarter & English LLP.

Indeed, the loan is one of the triggers that helped the SEC set off on its current inquiry, some accounting experts believe. The SEC also is looking into a wide range of accounting issues and sales practices that include how WorldCom accounted for the value of some of the 60 companies it bought over the years and how it accounted for bills owed by customers. The agency also is looking into the company's sales practices, sales commissions and contracts with customers.

WorldCom and Mr. Ebbers's rationale for the loan: It was necessary to avoid forcing him to sell some of his WorldCom stock to pay debts he incurred while buying the stock. The brash Mr. Ebbers, who took WorldCom from obscurity to the height of New Economy stardom, has been praised for believing so strongly in his company that he borrowed money to buy more stock. But he faced a crisis as WorldCom's share price began to falter two years ago and he was subject to a margin call -- a demand that he put up more collateral for the loans he used to buy the shares. The company came to Mr. Ebbers's rescue to avoid the stigma associated with a chief executive's bailing out of his own stock.

Margin calls can be disastrous for any investor, and Mr. Ebbers is selling personal property to begin repaying the company.

"One thing the SEC looks for in any accounting fraud or case is what might be the motive for someone to commit wrongdoing," said Carr Conway, a former SEC enforcement official who is now senior forensic accountant at Dickerson Financial Investigation Group in Denver. The SEC could view the loan and the circumstances surrounding it as "entirely sufficient motive for him to do some bad things."

Even if no wrongdoing occurs, loans to top executives create a predicament for companies, said Robin Ferracone of SCA Consulting, a unit of William M. Mercer Companies LLC.

"The dangerous territory companies get into when they engage in these things is accusations that they have a motive to inflate the stock," Ms. Ferracone said. "Companies get themselves into difficult situations when they make these kinds of loans."

The suggestion that Mr. Ebbers was trying to avert a personal financial mess is raised in a pending shareholder class-action lawsuit, which was filed in 2000 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Jackson Division. Mr. Burns said the company categorically denies the allegations in the suit, which claims the company misrepresented its finances in an effort to keep its stock price high while it was trying to use stock to buy Sprint Corp.

One of the central claims in the suit is that WorldCom continued to list bills it should have known it couldn't collect as assets. The suit alleges that the company kept millions of dollars in uncollectible bills on its books in the category for receivables, which are payments that are pending: It continued to classify some debts as receivables from 1997 until the third quarter of 2000 after some companies that owed the money had filed for bankruptcy.

The SEC has requested extensive information about a $685 million charge WorldCom took in the third quarter of 2000 that was related to uncollectible debts. Companies are required to write off uncollectible debt as soon as they identify it, said Robert Willens, a tax and accounting analyst at Lehman Brothers. But identifying it "is more or less of a judgment call" and a matter of common sense, he said. Still, he said, there are certain obvious triggers and a bankruptcy filing is one of them.

The SEC could be looking at whether WorldCom missed some of those triggers and kept classifying some revenue it couldn't collect as pending, according to the accounting experts.

If the SEC finds that WorldCom violated accounting rules, it can take a wide range of actions, depending upon the seriousness of the violations, including levying fines, bringing fraud suits against executives, forcing the company to restate financial reports and change its accounting practices. The SEC can also bar company officials from serving as officers or directors of public companies.

The SEC has declined to comment on any aspect of its inquiry into WorldCom.

The shareholder suit also claims that WorldCom continued to claim as pending revenue money it had reason to believe it couldn't collect because customers were disputing the charges or had canceled the accounts.

Mr. Burns said the company denies all the allegations in the suit.

The company said it has completed an internal investigation into misdeeds by some sales agents that led them to collect duplicate commissions. The company said the employees cheated the company out of $4 million, but their actions didn't have the effect of inflating revenue.

Write to Shawn Young at shawn.young@wsj.com



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (48655)3/14/2002 12:47:44 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
Is Arthur Andersen's Number Up?

Most Experts Say Yes, but CEO Says Firm Will Survive
By Steven Pearlstein
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, March 14, 2002; Page E01

It's beginning to look real bleak for Arthur Andersen.

With each passing day, the collapse of what was once the prestige firm of the accounting profession appears increasingly inevitable.

It's not just that several dozen clients have already announced they are taking their business elsewhere -- it's also that hundreds of others are reported by competitors to be quietly shopping around as well.

Key partners, meanwhile, have reportedly begun serious discussions about jumping to rival firms -- a recognition of the fact that their equity in the firm is almost sure to be wiped out and that, going forward, they are likely to make more money working somewhere else.

And hopes for selling the firm dim as other firms conclude there is no way to wind up with the valuable parts of the Andersen franchise -- the clients and the experienced practice teams -- without also running the risk of inheriting the liabilities that might be owed to the shareholders, creditors and employees of bankrupt clients. Just yesterday, Ernst & Young and Deloitte & Touche announced they had ended discussion about possible combinations with the global Andersen organization.

Andersen chief executive Joseph F. Berardino also rejected a sale or merger late yesterday. "We have absolutely no interest in going there," he said at a Chicago news conference, according to Bloomberg News. "We feel very confident we can get through this."

If all that weren't enough, Andersen also faces the possibility of criminal indictment in connection with document shredding in the Enron case. A conviction would put Andersen out of the auditing business unless it receives a waiver from the Securities and Exchange Commission.

"I hate to say it, but this is a sinking ship," said Itzhak Sharav, an accounting professor at Columbia University. "If you are a big public company, you don't want to be associated with an auditor with such a terrible name, whether it is deserved or not."

"I'd say the odds are 3 to 1 against survival," said Andrew Bailey, an accounting expert at the University of Illinois.

Even Paul A. Volcker, the former Federal Reserve chairman brought in to reform and rescue Andersen, now speaks in the tentative voice. "I'm sorry to see it unraveling as fast as it has," he said this week. "At this point, it sure looks like an uphill climb."

Adam Pritchard, an expert in corporate and securities law at the University of Michigan, spells out the conundrum this way:

The only way for Andersen to survive, either as an independent entity or merged with another firm, is to put the company through bankruptcy -- a process set up precisely to make it possible for an orderly separation of Andersen's assets from what could be $1 billion or more in claims from Enron creditors, shareholders and employees. While bankruptcy may be orderly, however, it is rarely swift, leaving Andersen vulnerable to months if not years more of client and staff defections.

"I don't see an easy way out of this," said Pritchard. "There's a very good chance now that Andersen will simply disappear."

Indeed, reports of Andersen's demise are so widespread that a debate is now in full swing on the question of whether that's the best outcome for the economy at large.

"I don't want to see a Big Five go to a Big Four because I don't think the country would be well served," Rep. John J. LaFalce (D-N.Y.) said at a House hearing yesterday. "You'd have some real problems in the marketplace because you wouldn't have the competition."

J. Michael Cook, who retired after 15 years as chairman of Deloitte & Touche, said that even with Andersen the industry is too highly concentrated. For most Fortune 500 companies, he noted, the reality is that there are only three with enough experience in a particular industry to bid on the business. And the competition might be reduced even further if one of the three also did work for an arch rival, for instance Coca-Cola, and Pepsi were to insist their accountants not work for the other.

Taking the contrary view, Harvard Business School professor Krishna G. Palepu said the loss of competition is probably overstated. By creating a uniform system of auditing, with rigid rules and little difference between one firm and the next, the accounting industry has effectively turned auditing into a commodity business, he argued. "And in a commodity business, three firms can produce as much competition as eight."

In other industries, the collapse of a major firm would almost certainly provide an opportunity for one or more second-tier firms to take a run at the big time. But that's never happened in the modern accounting industry and, according to industry executives, is unlikely to happen now.

Bill Travis, managing partner at McGladry & Pullen, one of the leading second-tier firms, argues that the market for Fortune 1000 audits provides enough revenue to support three players with the experience, international presence and sheer number of bodies demanded by clients. That's why his firm will remain focused on companies in the "middle market," where clients require very different skills that firms such as his provide.

"We're not even trying to become one of the Big Five," agreed Ed Nusbaum, chief executive of Grant Thornton, a second-tier player with 17,000 employees worldwide. "Everything we do is geared toward the middle market."

One other second-tier player, Chicago-based BDO Seidman, has made a run at the big time but with only limited success. The problem, explained Lee Graul, head of its public company practice, is that Wall Street analysts and investment bankers tend to frown on companies that don't have a Big Five seal-of-approval on their financial statements.

Ironically, one reason Wall Street prefers the biggest accounting firms, said Graul, is that they are thought to have the "deepest pockets," with the biggest insurance policies, in case things go wrong and shareholders want someone to sue. With Andersen, that belief may now have been shattered.

In addition to competition issues, a number of leading critics of the accounting industry -- including Volcker and former SEC chairman Arthur Levitt Jr. -- warn that the collapse of Andersen may scotch the best opportunity in decades to clean up problems that are widespread in the accounting profession.

Their argument is that if Andersen can be "reformed" along the lines outlined by Volcker -- without the temptation to cut corners on audits to win lucrative consulting contracts -- it will create a tough, quality auditing firm sought after by corporations now eager to allay shareholder anxieties.

In the resulting competition, other firms would eventually be forced to emulate the "new Andersen," in the process enhancing auditor independence and audit quality across an industry where questionable practices and audit failures have not been limited to Andersen.

"My purpose is not to save Andersen but to finally bring some reform to an industry that has resisted it for decades," said Volcker. "Maybe its a romantic notion, but I thought it was worth a try."

But skeptics wonder whether, even with Volcker's help, a firm as tarnished as Andersen can suddenly brand itself as the guarantor of financial reliability -- and whether such a tough-minded firm would suddenly become a market leader.

"The fundamental problem has never been with the auditing firms -- its with corporate America," said Arthur Bowman, publisher of a widely read accounting industry newsletter. "Up till now they've gotten the kind of audits they wanted. And there is no reason to believe their preferences have changed."

A number of top corporate executives have stepped forward in recent days to defend themselves and their accountants. Lawrence J. Ellison, chief executive of Oracle Corp., said yesterday that his company would stick with Andersen despite what he termed the "mob rule" that demands punishment for thousands of Andersen employees for the still-unproven mistakes of a few "rogue" colleagues in the Houston office.

But harsh as it may seem, industry's critics say such punishments are the only way to change accounting industry behavior.

"I think it will be good for the system if Andersen fails," said one executive who serves on several Fortune 500 boards. "It will reestablish the simple but important truth that auditors should work for the shareholders, not the management."

Sarah Teslik, executive director of the Council of Institutional Investors, agreed. "It is important that [Andersen] suffers major consequences in order to change the way the average auditor reacts when asked to check off on something he knows is wrong."

Staff writer Jackie Spinner contributed to this report.

© 2002 The Washington Post Company



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (48655)3/14/2002 1:38:26 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
Time to groom an heir to Alan Greenspan...

economist.com



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (48655)3/14/2002 4:12:53 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 65232
 
Andersen Skids...

washingtonpost.com

and fresh off the AP wires...

Andersen is now indicted -- DOJ accuses Andersen of obstructing justice.



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (48655)3/14/2002 10:55:51 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 65232
 
The Profitless Recovery

If the recession's almost over, why are CEOs so anxious and investors so confused? One word: earnings.

By Justin Fox
FORTUNE
Monday, March 18, 2002

The recession of 2001 was supposed to be nasty. You remember, we said so on the cover of FORTUNE in October, and so did a lot of other halfway-reputable people. But guess what: It may already be over. That's what the economic data are saying. It's also the opinion of virtually every economic forecaster out there, including Alan Greenspan. If the economists are right, the recession will not have been nasty at all. Just short. With only one quarter of negative growth (-1.3% in the third quarter), you could even argue it wasn't a recession, which is generally (although not officially) understood to be two straight quarters of GDP contraction.

But try telling that to the folks running America's corporations, who are as gloomy as the forecasters are cheery. Though it's up from the record lows of autumn, FORTUNE's Business Confidence Index (compiled from a monthly poll of financial executives) is still mired deep in recessionary territory. "We are not seeing any improvement,'' says John Dillon, CEO of International Paper and chairman of the Business Roundtable. Clearly the melancholy in executive suites is shared by investors. Since the post-September rebound petered out in January, the stock market can't seem to string two good days together.

What accounts for these parallel universes? One entirely plausible explanation is that the economic forecasters are wrong, and the recovery of late 2001 and early 2002 will turn out to have been a false start, to be followed by an even sharper downturn. That has happened before: Most post-World War II recessions have featured a quarter of growth sandwiched between periods of contraction. Heaven knows there's no shortage of potential dangers that could bring on such a double dip--from a Japan on the verge of depression to an overvalued U.S. dollar, which presumably has to collapse one of these days, to lots and lots of scary terrorists whom nobody has been able to track down yet. Add to that the standard disclaimer: Bad stuff can happen. Good stuff can happen. Nobody, and certainly not the economists of Wall Street or even the Federal Reserve, can reliably predict what is to come.

But what's remarkable about the current state of affairs is that the sanguine economists as well as the downbeat CEOs and investors could all be right. We may well be in the early stages of a recovery, but one that doesn't do much for profits or stock prices.

The disconnect between economic growth on the one hand and business and investing success on the other was striking enough last year. The economy actually grew in 2001, albeit at a pokey 1.2% pace. Corporate profits, meanwhile, plummeted 21% from mid-2000 to the end of September (complete fourth-quarter profit data aren't out yet). The S&P 500, which began sliding in mid-2000, sank another 13% in 2001. Corporate America, and those who invest in it, took a beating.

The economy as a whole escaped such punishment because--well, because of lots of things. Two of the more compelling explanations are these: First, the remaking of the mortgage market by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac after the savings and loan collapse of the 1980s seems to have banished credit crunches from the housing picture. Home loans at ever lower interest rates have been readily available during the slowdown--which has both stimulated the economically significant housing market and freed up huge amounts of cash for consumer spending through mortgage refinancings. Second, in what could be a long-term development of epochal significance, productivity growth, which usually sags during a recession, continued at a strong pace through 2001 (see The Productivity Miracle Is For Real).

Why, then, were times so rough for corporations? The defaults of countless telecom upstarts and a certain energy trading giant sent the risk premiums charged to all but the safest and soundest corporate borrowers to near-record levels. Which means that, unlike people buying or refinancing houses, most corporations haven't been able to enjoy the full benefit of the lowest interest rates in a generation. And while rising productivity should be good news for profits, it's hard to make much money when the prices you can charge are dropping even faster. The producer price index slid 2.6% in 2001, its sharpest annual decline in 50 years--the result, according to International Paper's Dillon, of overcapacity brought on by global competition, the strong dollar, and, believe it or not, increased productivity.

Then there's the simple but harsh truth that the profit expectations built up during the remarkable 1990s boom (corporate earnings almost doubled between 1992 and 1997) were ridiculously high. The mid-1990s uptick in productivity growth appears initially to have flowed directly to the corporate bottom line--possibly because workers hadn't figured out that they'd become more productive and ought to be getting higher wages. "That's not a sustainable long-term phenomenon," says Lehman Brothers economist Ethan Harris. "You can't have profits rising relative to income." And sure enough, since 1997 employee compensation has outpaced profits. Over time, profits simply can't grow faster than the economy.

So what now? The great news is that productivity is still growing nearly a percentage point faster than it did from 1970 to 1995. But because the working-age population isn't growing as robustly as it was, real GDP growth will probably remain in the 3% range, where it's been for decades, says Standard & Poor's chief economist, David Wyss. If at least a wisp of inflation remains in the air, Wyss figures that it will translate into average annual profit growth of 6%. Which ain't bad, except that CEOs and certainly investors have come to expect better.

How much better? At the end of February investors were paying $29 for every $1 of earnings generated last year by the companies of the S&P 500. If you go by the thumbnail valuation technique known as the Fed model (divide the next year's projected earnings by the yield on a ten-year Treasury note to get the "right" price), that implies that they're expecting earnings to grow 39% this year. Now there surely is room for an earnings bounceback after such a dismal 2001, and the superstars of the S&P 500 probably can be expected to outperform America's corporations as a whole. But 39% is a lot more than 6%.

What this means is that, after the pain of a punctured speculative bubble, the next blow may be the realization that profits just aren't going to grow as fast as they did in the 1990s. There's no telling how investors will react, but at 6% earnings growth and current low interest rates, the P/E of the S&P 500 should be about 22. As for whether the economy can survive profit-starved CEOs and crestfallen investors--well, it survived 2001, didn't it?

fortune.com



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (48655)3/14/2002 11:13:09 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
Some Japanese Are Hoarding Gold

By JAMES BROOKE
The New York Times
March 14, 2002

TOKYO, March 13 — While Japan has had the world's fastest- growing major stock market this year and the yen has jumped nearly 3 percent against the dollar in the last month, a small but growing number of Japanese investors are preparing for the worst and hoarding gold.

With limits looming on bank deposit insurance, banks tottering under bad debts and the government printing money in an effort to create inflation, sales of gold are expected to come close to quadrupling this quarter, compared with the period last year, according to the World Gold Council, an industry group.

"The Japanese economy is very bad," Yujiro Isoda, a 67-year-old retiree, said after he had purchased two Austrian gold schillings at a downtown gold shop here. "The accumulated bad loans are still not cleared. How can I protect my property? Buy gold, that's what I thought."

Nearby, the shop manager hovered over a display counter where gold bars were arrayed like metal pats of butter. In February, he said, his gold sales were seven times those in February last year.

Below Japan's Zenlike surface calm, a big fish is roiling the lower depths: consumer unease about the direction of the yen, the economy and the banks.

On April 1, federal insurance on time deposits, currently unlimited, is to be restricted to $75,000 for each account; that cap will be extended to all savings accounts in April 2003. At the same time, stocks of some major banks bump along at penny-stock levels because investors know that several are effectively insolvent without another multibillion-dollar bailout from the government.

On the government side, public debt has ballooned to 140 percent of gross domestic product, the highest level of any major developed economy. Now politicians and economists are pressing the Bank of Japan to print trillions of yen to allow Japan to inflate its way out of its debts. From September through February, the markets responded, devaluing the yen by 15 percent against the dollar. This month, the yen has strengthened as Japanese companies have repatriated assets to close their books for the end of the fiscal year, March 31.

But Mr. Isoda's generation acutely remembers the trauma of Japan's postwar inflation, which peaked at 115 percent in 1947.

"I have experienced World War II and survived the postwar high inflation," he said. "I know that paper money can turn into rubbish, nothing. But gold can survive any time of history."

While some may dismiss Mr. Isoda's economic views as ultraconservative, they were generally endorsed the same afternoon last week in an executive dining room at the Bank of Japan, the nation's central bank.

"There is a gold rush going on," said a high official at the bank, which is responsible for controlling the nation's money supply. "People are buying lots of gold. There is uncertainty about the banks, about deflation and, finally, about inflation. Gold is seen as the best hedge against inflation."

Some investors, particularly younger people, are also shifting into dollars and euros, he added, in part because they did not experience Japan's roller coaster of exchange rates over the last 15 years. That shift is still relatively small, but Japan's bank savings are so big — 716 trillion yen, about $5.6 trillion — that American companies say even a tiny shift would mean a lot of business. Last year, Pimco, an American fund management company, said its Japanese accounts had increased about 90 percent, to $6 billion — an increase that Pimco said it hoped to match this year.

Since last November, the surge in Japanese gold sales has contributed to a 10 percent strengthening in world gold prices. Measured in yen terms, the jump was 18 percent. In Tokyo, the trend is most pronounced at the store visited by Mr. Isoda, where clerks have sometimes helped patrons load as much as 85 pounds of gold bullion — more than $300,000 worth — into shopping bags and lug the bags down the street to their cars.

"We don't know how they keep their gold at home," said Osamu Ikeda, a spokesman for the store's parent company, Tanaka Kikinzoku Kogyo. "Maybe in a safe, maybe in a bank safe deposit box."

In the last quarter of 2001, sales of investment gold — bars and coins, as opposed to jewelry or ingots used for industrial processes — hit 690,000 troy ounces in Japan, a 54 percent jump over the period in 2000. Itsuo Toshima, regional director for Japan and Korea at the World Gold Council, forecast that sales of bars and coins would jump to 1.45 million ounces in the first three months of this year, almost four times the level of the period last year.

"It is increasing very rapidly," Mr. Toshima said.

Japan's interest in gold reverses a long trend. Gold spiked as high as $850 a troy ounce in 1980, when the second Arab oil embargo sent inflation roaring and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan caused stock markets to slump. But after those problems receded, investors around the world lost interest in gold because inflation was tamed and stock markets generated consistent gains. Gold now sells for about one-third that 1980 high — $293.60 an ounce in New York yesterday.

But with uncertainty clouding the Japanese economy, some investors see gold as a rock to cling to. Since a speculative bubble burst in 1989, stock and land prices have receded to about one-quarter of their peaks.

The most popular alternative — bank savings, which account for half of Japan's $10.5 trillion in financial assets — lost much of their appeal as interest rates shrank, recently to as little as 0.02 percent a year. On Monday, Shizuoka Bank said it would cut its interest rate for ordinary savings accounts to 0.001 percent from 0.005 percent; that move means that savers will get 1 cent in interest annually for each $1,000 on deposit.

But now the trade-off between ultralow interest and security is being shaken by the restrictions on deposit insurance and by a growing perception that some banks are insolvent. In the last year, about 50 small banks and credit unions have failed.

With the deposit insurance deadline looming, 21 percent of all time- deposit accounts over $75,000 were closed last year. Most of the money, about $200 billion, was moved into protected savings accounts, according to the Bank of Japan. Fear about the safety of banks now outweighs concern about fluctuations in the price of gold for many Japanese.

"Our customers don't care much about the gold price," said Yoshihiro Matsumoto, director of the gold section of Mitsubishi (news/quote) Material. "They just want to convert their bank account into gold."

Even if they do not bother buying and storing gold, some Japanese are still shying away from conventional savings. Bank managers sourly admit that some depositors have closed savings accounts, only to turn around and place the cash in safe deposit boxes at the same banks — or hide it at their homes.

James Terada, an American business consultant, remembers a visit he made last summer to an old classmate from his Tokyo elementary- school days: "He asked, in all seriousness, that if you stored yen bills in a jar, sealed it with wax, would the currency get moldy and spoil?" Mr. Terada said.

In a regional consumer confidence poll released last month by MasterCard International, the Japanese ranked as Asia's biggest pessimists.

Other nonpaper assets won favor in Japan this winter. At the downtown Tokyo branch of Mitsukoshi, one of the city's largest stores, jewelry sales rose 27 percent in January compared with last year, while sales of art objects rose 13 percent.

Overseas, Japan's new love affair has not gone unnoticed.

"The Japanese want something physical to put their money in," Paul Macarounis, a gold trader for NM Rothschild Australia said from Sydney. He discounted this week's run- up of the yen and Tokyo stock prices, saying Japan remained economically weak. "The reasons for buying gold are not going to go away in a hurry."

nytimes.com