Mitchell Report, continued:
>>Security, however, is the key GOI concern. The GOI maintains that the PLO has breached its
solemn commitments by continuing the use of violence in the pursuit of political objectives. "Israel's
principal concern in the peace process has been security. This issue is of overriding importance...
[S]ecurity is not something on which Israel will bargain or compromise. The failure of the
Palestinian side to comply with both the letter and spirit of the security provisions in the various
agreements has long been a source of disturbance in Israel."21
According to the GOI, the Palestinian failure takes several forms: institutionalized anti-Israel,
anti-Jewish incitement; the release from detention of terrorists; the failure to control illegal
weapons; and the actual conduct of violent operations, ranging from the insertion of riflemen into
demonstrations to terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians. The GOI maintains that the PLO has
explicitly violated its renunciation of terrorism and other acts of violence,22 thereby significantly
eroding trust between the parties. The GOI perceives "a thread, implied but nonetheless clear, that
runs throughout the Palestinian submissions. It is that Palestinian violence against Israel and Israelis
is somehow explicable, understandable, legitimate."23
END THE VIOLENCE
For Israelis and Palestinians alike the experience of the past several months has been intensely
personal. Through relationships of kinship, friendship, religion, community and profession, virtually
everyone in both societies has a link to someone who has been killed or seriously injured in the
recent violence. We were touched by their stories. During our last visit to the region, we met with
the families of Palestinian and Israeli victims. These individual accounts of grief were heart-rending
and indescribably sad. Israeli and Palestinian families used virtually the same words to describe
their grief.
When the widow of a murdered Israeli physician — a man of peace whose practice included the
treatment of Arab patients — tells us that it seems that Palestinians are interested in killing Jews for
the sake of killing Jews, Palestinians should take notice. When the parents of a Palestinian child
killed while in his bed by an errant .50 caliber bullet draw similar conclusions about the respect
accorded by Israelis to Palestinian lives, Israelis need to listen. When we see the shattered bodies
of children we know it is time for adults to stop the violence.
With widespread violence, both sides have resorted to portrayals of the other in hostile
stereotypes. This cycle cannot be easily broken. Without considerable determination and
readiness to compromise, the rebuilding of trust will be impossible.
Cessation of Violence: Since 1991, the parties have consistently committed themselves, in all
their agreements, to the path of nonviolence. They did so most recently in the two Sharm
el-Sheikh summits of September 1999 and October 2000. To stop the violence now, the PA and
GOI need not "reinvent the wheel." Rather, they should take immediate steps to end the violence,
reaffirm their mutual commitments, and resume negotiations.
Resumption of Security Cooperation: Palestinian security officials told us that it would take
some time — perhaps several weeks - for the PA to reassert full control over armed elements
nominally under its command and to exert decisive influence over other armed elements operating
in Palestinian areas. Israeli security officials have not disputed these assertions. What is important
is that the PA make an all-out effort to enforce a complete cessation of violence and that it be
clearly seen by the GOI as doing so. The GOI must likewise exercise a 100 percent effort to
ensure that potential friction points, where Palestinians come into contact with armed Israelis, do
not become stages for renewed hostilities.
The collapse of security cooperation in early October reflected the belief by each party that the
other had committed itself to a violent course of action. If the parties wish to attain the standard of
100 percent effort to prevent violence, the immediate resumption of security cooperation is
mandatory.
We acknowledge the reluctance of the PA to be seen as facilitating the work of Israeli security
services absent an explicit political context (i.e., meaningful negotiations) and under the threat of
Israeli settlement expansion. Indeed, security cooperation cannot be sustained without such
negotiations and with ongoing actions seen as prejudicing the outcome of negotiations. However,
violence is much more likely to continue without security cooperation. Moreover, without effective
security cooperation, the parties will continue to regard all acts of violence as officially sanctioned.
In order to overcome the current deadlock, the parties should consider how best to revitalize
security cooperation. We commend current efforts to that end. Effective cooperation depends on
recreating and sustaining an atmosphere of confidence and good personal relations. It is for the
parties themselves to undertake the main burden of day-to-day cooperation, but they should
remain open to engaging the assistance of others in facilitating that work. Such outside assistance
should be by mutual consent, should not threaten good bilateral working arrangements, and should
not act as a tribunal or interpose between the parties. There was good security cooperation until
last year that benefited from the good offices of the U.S. (acknowledged by both sides as useful),
and was also supported indirectly by security projects and assistance from the European Union.
The role of outside assistance should be that of creating the appropriate framework, sustaining
goodwill on both sides, and removing friction where possible. That framework must be seen to be
contributing to the safety and welfare of both communities if there is to be acceptance by those
communities of these efforts.
REBUILD CONFIDENCE
The historic handshake between Chairman Arafat and the late Prime Minister Rabin at the White
House in September 1993 symbolized the expectation of both parties that the door to the peaceful
resolution of differences had been opened. Despite the current violence and mutual loss of trust,
both communities have repeatedly expressed a desire for peace. Channeling this desire into
substantive progress has proved difficult. The restoration of trust is essential, and the parties
should take affirmative steps to this end. Given the high level of hostility and mistrust, the timing
and sequence of these steps are obviously crucial. This can be decided only by the parties. We
urge them to begin the process of decision immediately.
Terrorism: In the September 1999 Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, the parties pledged to take
action against "any threat or act of terrorism, violence or incitement." Although all three categories
of hostilities are reprehensible, it was no accident that "terrorism" was placed at the top of the list.
Terrorism involves the deliberate killing and injuring of randomly selected noncombatants for
political ends. It seeks to promote a political outcome by spreading terror and demoralization
throughout a population. It is immoral and ultimately self-defeating. We condemn it and we urge
that the parties coordinate their security efforts to eliminate it.
In its official submissions and briefings, the GOI has accused the PA of supporting terrorism by
releasing incarcerated terrorists, by allowing PA security personnel to abet, and in some cases to
conduct terrorist operations, and by terminating security cooperation with the GOI The PA
vigorously denies the accusations. But Israelis hold the view that the PA's leadership has made no
real effort over the past seven months to prevent anti-Israeli terrorism. The belief is, in and of itself,
a major obstacle to the rebuilding of confidence.
We believe that the PA has a responsibility to help rebuild confidence by making clear to both
communities that terrorism is reprehensible and unacceptable, and by taking all measures to
prevent terrorist operations and to punish perpetrators. This effort should include immediate steps
to apprehend and incarcerate terrorists operating within the PA's jurisdiction.
Settlements: The GOI also has a responsibility to help rebuild confidence. A cessation of
Palestinian-Israeli violence will be particularly hard to sustain unless the GOI freezes all settlement
construction activity. The GOI should also give careful consideration to whether settlements that
are focal points for substantial friction are valuable bargaining chips for future negotiations or
provocations likely to preclude the onset of productive talks.
The issue is, of course, controversial. Many Israelis will regard our recommendation as a
statement of the obvious, and will support it. Many will oppose it. But settlement activities must
not be allowed to undermine the restoration of calm and the resumption of negotiations.
During the half-century of its existence, Israel has had the strong support of the United States. In
international forums, the U.S. has at times cast the only vote on Israel's behalf. Yet, even in such a
close relationship there are some differences. Prominent among those differences is the U.S.
Government's long-standing opposition to the GOI's policies and practices regarding settlements.
As the then-Secretary of State, James A. Baker, III, commented on May 22, 1991:
Every time I have gone to Israel in connection with the peace process, on each of my
four trips, I have been met with the announcement of new settlement activity. This
does violate United States policy. It's the first thing that Arabs — Arab
Governments, the first thing that the Palestinians in the territories — whose situation
is really quite desperate — the first thing they raise when we talk to them. I don't
think there is any bigger obstacle to peace than the settlement activity that continues
not only unabated but at an enhanced pace.24
The policy described by Secretary Baker, on behalf of the Administration of President George H.
W. Bush, has been, in essence, the policy of every American administration over the past quarter
century.25
Most other countries, including Turkey, Norway, and those of the European Union, have also
been critical of Israeli settlement activity, in accordance with their views that such settlements are
illegal under international law and not in compliance with previous agreements.
On each of our two visits to the region there were Israeli announcements regarding expansion of
settlements, and it was almost always the first issue raised by Palestinians with whom we met.
During our last visit, we observed the impact of 6,400 settlers on 140,000 Palestinians in
Hebron26 and 6,500 settlers on over 1,100,000 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.27 The GOI
describes its policy as prohibiting new settlements but permitting expansion of exiting settlements
to accommodate "natural growth." Palestinians contend that there is no distinction between "new"
and "expanded" settlements; and that, except for a brief freeze during the tenure of Prime Minister
Yitzak Rabin, there has been a continuing, aggressive effort by Israel to increase the number and
size of settlements.
The subject has been widely discussed within Israel. The Ha’aretz English Language Edition
editorial of April 10, 2001 stated:
A government which seeks to argue that its goal is to reach a solution to the conflict
with the Palestinians through peaceful means, and is trying at this stage to bring an
end to the violence and terrorism, must announce an end to construction in the
settlements.28
The circumstances in the region are much changed from those which existed nearly 20 years ago.
Yet, President Reagan's words remain relevant: "The immediate adoption of a settlements freeze
by Israel, more than any other action, could create the confidence needed..."
Beyond the obvious confidence-building qualities of a settlement freeze, we note that many of the
confrontations during this conflict have occurred at points where Palestinians, settlers, and security
forces protecting the settlers, meet. Keeping both the peace and these friction points will be very
difficult.
Reducing Tension: We were told by both Palestinians and Israelis that emotions generated by
the many recent deaths and funerals have fueled additional confrontations, and, in effect,
maintained the cycle of violence. We cannot urge one side or the other to refrain from
demonstrations. But both sides must make clear that violent demonstrations will not be tolerated.
We can and do urge that both sides exhibit a greater respect for human life when demonstrators
confront security personnel. In addition, a renewed effort to stop the violence might feature, for a
limited time, a "cooling off" period during which public demonstrations at or near friction points will
be discouraged in order to break the cycle of violence. To the extent that demonstrations continue,
we urge that demonstrators and security personnel keep their distance from one another to reduce
the potential for lethal confrontation.
Actions and Responses: Members of the Committee staff witnessed an incident involving stone
throwing in Ramallah from the perspectives, on the ground, of both sides. The people confronting
one another were mostly young men. The absence of senior leadership on the IDF side was
striking. Likewise, the absence of responsible security and other officials counseling restraint on
the Palestinian side was obvious.
Concerning such confrontations, the GOI takes the position that "Israel is engaged in an armed
conflict short of war. This is not a civilian disturbance or a demonstration or a riot. It is
characterized by live-fire attacks on a significant scale [emphasis added] ... [T]he attacks are
carried out by a well-armed and organized militia..."29 Yet, the GOI acknowledges that of some
9,000 "attacks" by Palestinians against Israelis, "some 2,700 [about 30 percent] involved the use
of automatic weapons, rifles, hand guns, grenades, [and] explosives of other kinds."30
Thus, for the first three months of the current uprising, most incidents did not involve Palestinian
use of firearms and explosives. B’Tselem reported that, "according to IDF figures, 73 percent of
the incidents [from September 29 to December 2, 2000] did not include Palestinian gunfire.
Despite this, it was in these incidents that most of the Palestinians [were] killed and wounded. .
."31 Altogether, nearly 500 people were killed and over 10,000 injured over the past seven
months; the overwhelming majority in both categories were Palestinian. Many of these deaths
were avoidable, as were many Israeli deaths.
Israel's characterization of the conflict, as noted above, is overly broad, for it does not adequately
describe the variety of incidents reported since late September 2000. Moreover, by thus defining
the conflict, the IDF has suspended its policy of mandating investigations by the Department of
Military Police Investigations whenever a Palestinian in the territories dies at the hands of an IDF
soldier in an incident not involving terrorism. In the words of the GOI, "Where Israel considers
that there is reason to investigate particular incidents, it does so, although, given the circumstances
of armed conflict, it does not do so routinely."32 We believe, however, that by abandoning the
blanket "armed conflict short of war" characterization and by re-instituting mandatory military
police investigations, the GOI could help mitigate deadly violence and help rebuild mutual
confidence. Notwithstanding the danger posed by stone-throwers, an effort should be made to
differentiate between terrorism and protests.
Controversy has arisen between the parties over what Israel calls the "targeting of individual
enemy combatants."33 The PLO describes these actions as "extra-judicial executions,"34 and
claims that Israel has engaged in an "assassination policy" that is "in clear violation of Article 32 of
the Fourth Geneva Convention... ."35 The GOI states that, "whatever action Israel has taken has
been taken firmly within the bounds of the relevant and accepted principles relating to the conduct
of hostilities."36
With respect to demonstrations, the GOI has acknowledged "that individual instances of excessive
response may have occurred. To a soldier or a unit coming under Palestinian attack, the equation
is not that of the Israeli army versus some stone throwing Palestinian protesters. It is a personal
equation."37
We understand this concern, particularly since rocks can maim or even kill. It is no easy matter for
a few young soldiers, confronted by large numbers of hostile demonstrators, to make fine legal
distinctions on the spot. Still, this "personal equation" must fit within an organizational ethic; in this
case, The Ethical Code of the Israel Defense Forces, which states, in part:
The sanctity of human life in the eyes of the IDF servicemen will find expression in all
of their actions, in deliberate and meticulous planning, in safe and intelligent training
and in proper execution of their mission. In evaluating the risk to self and others, they
will use the appropriate standards and will exercise constant care to limit injury to life
to the extent required to accomplish the mission.38
Those required to respect the IDF ethical code are largely draftees, as the IDF is a conscript
force. Active duty enlisted personnel, noncommissioned officers and junior officers — the
categories most likely to be present at friction points -- are young, often teenagers. Unless more
senior career personnel or reservists are stationed at friction points, no IDF personnel present in
these sensitive areas have experience to draw upon from previous violent Israeli-Palestinian
confrontations. We think it is essential, especially in the context of restoring confidence by
minimizing deadly confrontations, that the IDF deploy more senior, experienced soldiers to these
sensitive points.
There were incidents where IDF soldiers have used lethal force, including live ammunition and
modified metal-cored rubber rounds, against unarmed demonstrators throwing stones.39 The IDF
should adopt crowd-control tactics that minimize the potential for deaths and casualties,
withdrawing metal-cored rubber rounds from general use and using instead rubber baton rounds
without metal cores.
We are deeply concerned about the public safety implications of exchanges of fire between
populated areas, in particular between Israeli settlements and neighboring Palestinian villages.
Palestinian gunmen have directed small arms fire at Israeli settlements and at nearby IDF positions
from within or adjacent to civilian dwellings in Palestinian areas, thus endangering innocent, Israeli
and Palestinian civilians alike. We condemn the positioning of gunmen within or near civilian
dwellings. The IDF often responds to such gunfire with heavy caliber weapons, sometimes
resulting in deaths and injuries to innocent Palestinians. An IDF officer told us at the Ministry of
Defense on March 23, 2001 that, "When shooting comes from a building we respond, and
sometimes there are innocent people in the building." Obviously, innocent people are injured and
killed during exchanges of this nature. We urge that such provocations cease and that the IDF
exercise maximum restraint in its responses if they do occur. Inappropriate or excessive uses of
force often lead to escalation.
We are aware of IDF sensitivities about these subjects. More than once we were asked: "What
about Palestinian rules of engagement? What about a Palestinian code of ethics for their military
personnel?" These are valid questions.
On the Palestinian side there are disturbing ambiguities in the basic areas of responsibility and
accountability. The lack of control exercised by the PA over its own security personnel and armed
elements affiliated with the PA leadership is very troubling. We urge the PA to take all necessary
steps to establish a clear and unchallenged chain of command for armed personnel operating under
its authority. We recommend that the PA institute and enforce effective standards of conduct and
accountability, both within the uniformed ranks and between the police and the civilian political
leadership to which it reports.
Incitement: In their submissions and briefings to the Committee, both sides expressed concerns
about hateful language and images emanating from the other, citing numerous examples of hostile
sectarian and ethnic rhetoric in the Palestinian and Israeli media, in school curricula and in
statements by religious leaders, politicians and others.
We call on the parties to renew their formal commitments to foster mutual understanding and
tolerance and to abstain from incitement and hostile propaganda. We condemn hate language and
incitement in all its forms. We suggest that the parties be particularly cautious about using words in
a manner that suggests collective responsibility.
Economic and Social Impact of Violence: Further restrictions on the movement of people and
goods have been imposed by Israel on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These closures take
three forms: those which restrict movement between the Palestinian areas and Israel; those
(including curfews) which restrict movement within the Palestinian areas; and those which restrict
movement from the Palestinian areas to foreign countries. These measures have disrupted the lives
of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians; they have increased Palestinian unemployment to an
estimated 40 percent, in part by preventing some 140,000 Palestinians from working in Israel; and
have stripped away about one-third of the Palestinian gross domestic product. Moreover, the
transfer of tax and customs duty revenues owed to the PA by Israel has been suspended, leading
to a serious fiscal crisis in the PA.
Of particular concern to the PA has been the destruction by Israeli security forces and settlers of
tens of thousands of olive and fruit trees and other agricultural property. The closures have had
other adverse effects, such as preventing civilians from access to urgent medical treatment and
preventing students from attending school.
The GOI maintains that these measures were taken in order to protect Israeli citizens from
terrorism. Palestinians characterize these measures as "collective punishment." The GOI denies the
allegation:
Israel has not taken measures that have had an economic impact simply for the sake
of taking such measures or for reasons of harming the Palestinian economy. The
measures have been taken for reasons of security. Thus, for example, the closure of
the Palestinian territories was taken in order to prevent, or at least minimize the risks
of, terrorist attacks. ... The Palestinian leadership has made no attempt to control this
activity and bring it to an end.40
Moreover, the GOI points out that violence in the last quarter of 2000 cost the Israeli economy
$1.2 billion (USD), and that the loss continues at a rate of approximately $150 million (USD) per
month.41
We acknowledge Israel's security concerns. We believe, however, that the GOI should lift
closures, transfer to the PA all revenues owed, and permit Palestinians who have been employed
in Israel to return to their jobs. Closure policies play into the hands of extremists seeking to
expand their constituencies and thereby contribute to escalation. The PA should resume
cooperation with Israeli security agencies to ensure that Palestinian workers employed within
Israel are fully vetted and free of connections to terrorists and terrorist organizations.
International development assistance has from the start been an integral part of the peace process,
with an aim to strengthen the socio-economic foundations for peace. This assistance today is more
important than ever. We urge the international community to sustain the development agenda of
the peace process.
Holy Places: It is particularly regrettable that places such as the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif
in Jerusalem, Joseph's Tomb in Nablus, and Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem have been the scenes of
violence, death and injury. These are places of peace, prayer and reflection which must be
accessible to all believers.
Places deemed holy by Muslims, Jews, and Christians merit respect, protection and preservation.
Agreements previously reached by the parties regarding holy places must be upheld. The GOI and
the PA should create a joint initiative to defuse the sectarian aspect of their political dispute by
preserving and protecting such places. Efforts to develop inter-faith dialogue should be
encouraged.
International Force: One of the most controversial subjects raised during our inquiry was the
issue of deploying an international force to the Palestinian areas. The PA is strongly in favor of
having such a force to protect Palestinian civilians and their property from the IDF and from
settlers. The GOI is just as adamantly opposed to an "international protection force," believing that
it would prove unresponsive to Israeli security concerns and interfere with bilateral negotiations to
settle the conflict.
We believe that to be effective such a force would need the support of both parties. We note that
international forces deployed in this region have been or are in a position to fulfill their mandates
and make a positive contribution only when they were deployed with the consent of all of the
parties involved.
During our visit to Hebron, we were briefed by personnel of the Temporary International Presence
in Hebron (TIPH), a presence to which both parties have agreed. The TIPH is charged with
observing an explosive situation and writing reports on their observations. If the parties agree, as a
confidence-building measure, to draw upon TIPH personnel to help them manage other friction
points, we hope that TIPH contributors could accommodate such a request.<<
Continued, next post. |
