Silicon Investor (SI) -- The First Internet Community

STOCKTALK

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor. We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community. If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.

Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: FaultLine who wrote (28206)	5/4/2002 10:10:41 AM
From: JohnM	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

Thanks for the long post on the Schelling FA article, Ken. I'm on the run this morning (Saturday) but have printed it out and will take a careful look this afternoon. Looks interesting.

To: FaultLine who wrote (28206)	5/4/2002 2:41:29 PM
From: JohnM	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

Some thoughts on the Schelling FA article on the Kyoto Treaty. 1. The Clinton administration did not put it before the Senate for ratification. Strange. Three possible explanations and it's quite possible all are correct. First, they did not because they stood no chance of getting the requisite 60 votes (cloture issues) and did not wish to spend the political capital and government time in a lost cause. Second, they only, cynically, wished to have the issue to use against the reps in the 00 elections. And, third, there were fairly serious divisions within the administration about political issues surrounding the treaty which could never be resolved sufficiently to go public with it. 2. Schelling makes the point that the Kyoto Protocol (as he calls it) "should not be a partisan issue." One, of course, has to agree, but environmental issues are, unfortunately, highly politicized. And I'm certain Schelling is more than aware of that. So why the comment? I'm not certain. But about the politics. It's my impression that the Bush campaign money largely comes from industries/companies who are strongly opposed to environmental concerns. That accounts for part of it. As for the Clinton/Gore folk, I think, but don't know, that it's more of a mix. Certainly they have a lot of the environmental movement contributing but as a result of their attempts to move the dems to the center of the political spectrum and their 8 years in power, they were getting contributions from some of the same folk as the Bush folk. Just that this latter group had much less clout with the Clinton-Gore folk because their money was less essential. 3. On the three concerns of the Bush folk, they strike me as misplaced. a. How to get developing countries on board? Best I can tell from this text, the way to do so is for the developed countries to do something first. b. The uncertainty of climate change and its impact, Schelling obviously thinks little of this concern by noting that whatever the case, any US administration needs to put serious money into research. c. Voluntarism. This is the usual business groups approach. We'll do it if you just keep the govt out. Generally, it doesn't get done. Unless the profit matrix shifts. That's not a moral judgment; rather a systemic one. That is the judgment that it won't get done. 4. On the voluntarism score, I particularly liked Schelling's comments that that made the least sense within nations and was simply the only way matters could happen internationally (no global enforcement agency). Ken, I have yet to read the full text of the article in the hard copy (yes, I did buy one) so all this is drawn from your post. As for Rumsfeld, I read it, found it much more interesting than I had anticipated.

To: FaultLine who wrote (28206)	5/6/2002 4:25:53 AM
From: Doc Bones	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

The developing countries are indeed unlikely to join fully in restricting their production of carbon dioxide and other Greenhouse gases. I would like to see them be more cooperative, but this article in the Times explains their position quite well, and it's not unreasonable IMO. They say that a convention exists for this type of global environmental project, and it is that the wealthy countries act first, or at least foot the bill. Further, this convention was actually written into the 1992 treaty on global warming, signed by 41, and unanimously ratified by the Senate. The closest precedent is the mostly successful 1987 treaty on Ozone depletion from chlorofluorocarbons, in which China and India were granted a 10 year grace period compared to the industrialized nations. Doc June 16, 2001 New York Times Impasse on Gases: Who Moves First? By ANDREW C. REVKIN In recent days, President Bush has repeatedly said a major reason for his rejection of a proposed agreement to stem global warming is that it would require industrialized countries to cut heat-trapping gas emissions while exempting developing countries from similar obligations. His view — shared by the Senate in a 95-to-0 vote on a 1997 resolution — is that rapidly growing countries like China and India are poised to pass industrialized countries in output of these gases, and so everyone must move to solve the problem. Many experts in international environmental law and policy agree that, in the long run, this is true. But they note that insistence on binding commitments by all countries at the same time runs counter to a principle that has shaped almost every other recent environmental treaty: cleanups should be started by prosperous countries because they created the bulk of the problem and have the money and technology to fix it. A prime example, the experts say, is the 1987 Montreal Protocol to curb substances that deplete the ozone layer, negotiated during the Reagan administration. That agreement, which has largely stemmed releases of damaging chlorofluorocarbons, applied first to industrial powers, with China and India being granted a grace period of 10 years. But the most relevant agreement is the first climate treaty, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which was signed in 1992 by Mr. Bush's father and approved unanimously by the Senate. The Kyoto Protocol was negotiated in 1997 after it became clear that the 1992 treaty, which called for voluntary efforts to cut emissions, was not working. The 1992 agreement includes several statements specifying that the first steps toward limiting warming should be taken by the industrial powers that stoked the atmosphere with the vast majority of its existing concentrations of long-lived greenhouse gases, mainly carbon dioxide. Dr. Lawrence Susskind, a professor of urban and environmental planning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the author of "Environmental Diplomacy" (Oxford University Press, 1995), said: "The convention came into force and is now part of international law. We signed it, we ratified it." "There's nothing in the Kyoto Protocol that is inconsistent with that convention," Dr. Susskind added. Mr. Bush's position has intensified a longstanding deadlock over who does what and when. Government officials involved in climate talks through the years said Mr. Bush's position on participation by developing countries was not markedly different from that of previous administrations — just more bluntly stated. The main American complaint, they said, is that developing countries, negotiating as a bloc, have for more than a decade rejected almost any treaty language that would commit them to even undefined emissions limits far in the future. A consistent frustration for American negotiators, one official said, is that countries like Saudi Arabia and China refuse commitments just as steadfastly as the poorest of the poor. "We're not saying Burkina Faso has to sign up to this right now," said the American official, who spoke only on the condition of anonymity. "But the major emitters, if we want this to be credible scientifically and environmentally, have to sign on." Some countries are starting to complain that Mr. Bush's insistence on simultaneous actions is undermining the existing climate treaty. At a briefing on Thursday in Beijing, Sun Yuxi, a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry, strongly criticized the American stance. "China can't accept any attempt to violate the principles of the convention and eliminate the protocol," Mr. Sun said. "It is totally groundless to refuse the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol on the excuse that developing countries such as China have not shouldered their responsibility." There are a few optimists among those involved in the climate talks who see a middle ground that could put the Bush administration and the most developed of the developing countries under the same tent. They point to a treaty controlling harmful organic chemicals that was signed in April by the Bush administration. The treaty calls for rich and poor countries to move in concert, but it requires industrialized countries to provide the money and technology to help the cleanup in the developing world. But the pessimists point to basic differences between the Kyoto pact and the chemical ban and other successful environmental treaties. Experts say most of the previous treaties applied to chemicals that were produced by a limited number of companies and could be replaced by other, less harmful substances without high costs. Or, as in the case of the climate convention, they relied on voluntarism and good will. In contrast, the Kyoto agreement, by proposing firm, enforceable limits on carbon dioxide, emitted mainly by burning fossil fuels, would affect nearly every enterprise powered by coal or oil — meaning almost every aspect of modern life. As a result, Mr. Bush's insistence that the United States will not act until China and India commit to some steps essentially guarantees that the agreement is dead, experts say. Robert A. Reinstein — who wrote and negotiated many parts of the 1992 climate treaty during the first Bush administration — said there was no chance of getting poorer countries to pursue emissions cuts as long as the established economic powers delayed cutting their own. "If I were a developing country," Mr. Reinstein said, "I'd just sit there and say `Show us what you're actually doing with your own emissions and what you're delivering on in your existing commitments and we'll feel a little more comfortable sitting down at the table.' "

To: FaultLine who wrote (28206)	5/8/2002 7:45:37 PM
From: FaultLine	Respond to of 281500

What Makes Greenhouse Sense? (Part 2/2) by Thomas C. Schelling From Foreign Affairs, May/June 2002 [FL: excerpts and commentary, highlighted as an aid to skimming] Hot Air --------------- FL: Schelling briefly explains that emissions trading is a popular scheme and is part of the latest Nov. 2001 version of the protocol. Emissions trading allows nations that underuse their emissions quota to sell their excess rights to any other country. But he goes on to point out the inherent flaws in the system: The problem with trading regimes is that initial quotas are negotiated to reflect what each nation can reasonably be expected to reduce. Any country that is tempted to sell part of an emissions quota will realize that the regime is continually subject to renegotiation, so selling any "excess" is tantamount to admitting it got a generous allotment the last time around. It then sets itself up for stiffer negotiation next time. And in addition, since "excess quotas" or "hot air" as he calls it, have been awarded to several developing nations as inducement to sign the Protocol, both the credits selling and the credits buying nations have a cheap safety valve to their own commitments essentially skirting the spirit of the agreements. ----------- PAST AS PROLOGUE There is remarkable consensus among economists that nations will not make sacrifices in the interest of global objectives unless they are bound by a regime that can impose penalties if they do not comply. Despite this consensus, however,there is no historical example of any regime that could impose effective penalties, at least with something of the magnitude of global warming. But there are historical precedents of regimes that lacked coercive authority but were still able to divide benefits and burdens of a magnitude perhaps comparable to the demands of a global-warming regime. -------------- FL: The Marshall Plan (est. 1948) and NATO (est. 1951) serve as unusual precedents for coordinated global action. The aid varied from 5% to 20% depending on the nation. ---------- For the first two years of the Marshall Plan, the United States divided the money itself. For the third year, it insisted that the recipient countries divide the aid among themselves. Government representatives therefore went through a processof "reciprocal multilateral scrutiny." Each government prepared extensive documentation of all aspects of its economy:its projected private and public investments, consumption, imports, exports,what it was doing about railroads and livestock herds, how it was rationing gasoline or butter, and how its living standard compared to prewar conditions.Each government team was examined and cross-examined by other government teams; it then defended itself, revised its proposals, and cross-examined other teams. More aid for one country meantless for the rest. There was no formula. Rather, each country developed "relevant criteria....Of course,the United States was demanding the countries reach agreement on aid. Today,there is no such "angel" behind green-house negotiations. Still, the Marshall Plan represents something of a precedent. ---------------- FL: Similarly, the NATO members engaged in a "burden-sharing exercise. ------------- ...it involved U.S. aid and included targets for national military participation, conscription of soldiers, investments in equipment, contributions to military infrastructure and real estate,and so on. Again, the process was one of reciprocal scrutiny and cross-examination,with high-level officials spending months negotiating...After one more year, NATO proceeded without U.S. aid—except for the contribution of U.S. military forces to NATO itself. With the possible exception of the reciprocal-trade negotiations that ultimately created the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Marshall Plan and NATO experiences are the only non-wartime precedents in which so many countries cooperated over such high economic stakes. They were not aesthetically satisfying processes: no formulae were developed, just a civilized procedure of argument. Those examples are a model for what might succeed the Kyoto Protocol if it fails or evolves into something else. Their procedure is one that the main developed nations might pursue prior to any attempt to include developing nations. NATO has been an enormous success; member nations made large contributions in money,troops, and real estate. They did it all voluntarily; there were no penalties for shortfalls in performance. --------- FL: Now a distinguishing feature becomes apparent: the difference between commitment to actions and commitment to results. ---------------- PROMISES, PROMISES One striking contrast between NATO and the Kyoto Protocol deserves emphasis:the difference between "inputs" and "outputs," or actions and results. NATO nations argued about what they should do, and commitments were made to actions. What countries actually did—raise and train troops; procure equipment, ammunition, and supplies; and deploy these assets geographically—could be observed, estimated, and compared. But results—such as how much each NATO nation's actions contributed to deterring the Warsaw Pact—could not be remotely approximated. With the Kyoto Protocol, commitments were made not to actions but to resuIts that were to be measured after a decade or more. This approach has disadvantages. An obvious one is that no one can tell, until close to the target date, which nations are on course to meet their goals.More important, nations undertaking result-based commitments are unlikely to have any reliable way of knowing what actions will be required — that is,what quantitative results will occur on what timetable for various policies....A government that commits to actions at least knows what it is committed to, and its partners also know and can observe compliance. In contrast, a government that commits to the consequences of various actions on emissions can only hope that its estimates, or guesses, are on target, and so can its partners. -------------------- FL: Schelling concludes that the wealthy nations will have to carry the water for a while. In particular, we need to fund serious research efforts to replace fossil fuels over the coming decades. The developing nations are depending on us, and others, to shoulder these responsibilities. --------------------- SPREADING THE WEALTH Eventually, to bring in the developing nations and achieve emissions reductions most economically, the proper approach is not a trading system but financial contributions from the rich countries to an institution that would help financ eenergy-efficient and decarbonized technologies in the developing world..... Such a regime will suffer the appearance of "foreign aid." But that is the form it will necessarily take. The recipients will benefit and should be required to assume commitments to emissions-reducing actions. Meanwhile, the burden on the rich countries will undoubtedly be more political than economic. Large-scale aid for reducing carbon dioxide emissions in China is economically bearable but enormously difficult to justify to the American public, or to agree on with Japan and the European Union. While European countries are lamenting the U.S. defection from theKyoto Protocol, a major U.S. unilateral initiative in research and development oriented toward phasing out fossil fuels over the next century would both produce welcome returns and display American seriousness about global warming. The greenhouse gas issue will persist through the entire century and beyond.Even though the developed nations have not succeeded in finding a collaborative way to approach the issue, it is still early.We have been at it for only a decade. But time should not be wasted gettingstarted. Global climate change may become what nuclear arms control was for the past half century. It took more than a decade to develop a concept of arms control. It is not surprising that it is taking that long time to find a way to come to consensus on an approach to the greenhouse problem.