Interesting concept of declaring victory in the face of failure. Or weren't the terrorist bombings supposed to stop any day now.
There was no illusion that the bombings would just stop. But there is a growing consensus that the operation showed the Palestinians that the intifada is not working. Here's a recent line from a Guardian article, not a pro-Israel source I think you'll agree:
That, in microcosm, is the nub of the Palestinians' wider dilemma. They know the intifada is not working but disagree on the reasons: too much militancy say some, too little say the others.
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Before Operation Defensive Shield the Guardian kept telling us that the Palestinians thought the intifada was working and were full of steely resolve to keep it up. Now they are demanding a reformed government that will be able to protect them from the IDF:
Reform, Palestinian style
By MIRIAM SHAVIV AND MOHAMMED NAJIB
Palestinians agree with Israel and the United States that their leadership needs to be reformed - but have a far different idea of what that means.
Last weekend, United States National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice caused a storm by telling the Fox News channel that the Palestinian Authority leadership "is not the kind of leadership that can lead to the kind of Palestinian state we need."
Her conclusion was that the PA "has got to reform." The Palestinian leadership, she said, must be "democratic, transparent and non-corrupt… what we ask of every government in the world. And we are going to start demanding [that] of the Palestinian leadership."
To the casual observer, it may have seemed that some of Rice's requests, which have long been demanded by Israel as well, were about to come true. In the last month, the word "reform" has been bandied about the West Bank and Gaza by Palestinian leaders as never before.
Three weeks ago, the Palestinian Legislative Council asked the PA Chairman Yasser Arafat to reshuffle his cabinet. Since then, several prominent Palestinians have emerged with suggestions of their own, including cabinet minister Saeb Erekat, who called for increased monitoring of all the PA's institutions, and Jibril Rajoub, head of the Preventative Security Service in the West Bank, who wanted those who bear responsibility for the "national disaster" which was Operation Defensive Shield, to draw appropriate conclusions.
Matters came to a head last Friday, in the first Palestinian cabinet meeting since Arafat was released from his Mukata compound in Ramallah. After Gaza Preventative Security Service chief Muhammad Dahlan suggested reforming the PA's security services, which are considered hard to control, Minister for Parliamentary Affairs Nabil Amr again requested that the cabinet be reshuffled. He also suggested conducting local and PLC elections. When his requests were not received with enough enthusiasm, he resigned, telling reporters afterwards that "one must begin discussing a reform in the institutions of the PA… I say the change must come from within the Palestinian Authority."
At the end of the meeting, Arafat agreed to continue discussing proposals for change.
Many American and Israeli observers welcomed the developments, which they saw as a sign the Palestinian leaders were finally beginning to recognize that corruption in the PA had reached unbearable levels, and that a more accountable leadership was necessary. At the very least, it was assumed, the Palestinians were willing to start cleaning up their administration in order to guarantee American financial assistance after Israel's Operation Defensive Shield.
And yet, Palestinian leaders themselves will openly admit that these observers misunderstand the bent of their reforms. The changes, if they occur, only have one purpose: to make the battle against Israel even more efficient.
"The calls for reform by Palestinians have nothing to do with what the Israelis and the Americans are saying," Arafat adviser and PLC member Marwan Kanafani told The Jerusalem Post. The main reason for clearing up corruption and appointing a new cabinet, he says, is "to help the ability of the Palestinian people to resist and reject Israel."
The calls for reform by Rice and by Israelis were not helpful, he says, calling Israel's suggestions part of their "wicked plans" and "aggressive policies."
"They want to see someone in charge here who will listen to whatever they want," Kanafani adds. "When we talk about reform, we mean changes initiated and accepted by the Palestinian people, for the benefit of the Palestinian people, not for the benefit of the Israelis or the Americans."
Tayseer Nasrallah, a Palestinian National Council (PNC) member from Nablus, agrees.
"We are for reform that pushes the Palestinian resistance forward, not returns it back in response to US and Israeli pressure," he says. "What happened in Afghanistan should not be repeated in Palestine."
ISRAELIS and Americans who believe Palestinian "reforms" are meant to promote a more open society, are guilty of "wishful thinking," says Col. (res.) Yoni Fighel, a former military governor of Ramallah and Jenin.
"Westerners talk about reforms, meaning a move towards a Western style of governance, but Palestinians have a different thought pattern and history of rule," says Fighel, now with the International Policy Institute for Counter-terrorism at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya. "Those kind of reforms will never happen as long as Arafat is in power, because he builds on corruption in order to control people."
The sudden slew of Palestinian calls for reform is a direct result of the Operation Defensive Shield. Dissatisfaction with the leadership swelled when Palestinians realized that their leaders failed to come up with any creative responses to the military offensive. And the events highlighted the corruption in public institutions and the leadership, which often failed to serve the needs of regular Palestinians.
"Any nation that faced a crisis like us, which was threatened like we were, would need new breath in the political system," says Kanafani. "We're not against anyone in particular, but after the storm, new blood and new ideas are required." This is particularly urgent, he says, because in the coming weeks the Palestinians will face "challenges" which they must be prepared for, including the possibility of a regional peace conference.
Both Kanafani and Amr supported the idea of a new cabinet, although they were not willing to say who exactly they would like appointed - evidence of the sensitive nature of the issue. Kanafani would only say the new cabinet should contain "national figures, people with a certain credibility."
Both leaders emphasize, however, that they are not demanding a change or moderation in policy direction.
"We don't need a new program politically," says Amr. "Nobody can stop fighting to reach an independent state."
Another reform, which has been almost unanimously called for, is in the security apparatuses. The Israelis and the Americans in the past demanded that Arafat's 12 security organizations, including his police, and Preventative Security forces, be unified, because they were hard to control and to monitor when so diverse.
In the past, the Palestinians have resisted such calls, but in the last month, they discovered that their security organizations could not provide them with adequate protection in face of even a brief Israeli reoccupation. Defensive Shield also left the organizations with shattered resources.
"We need more qualified cadres that could respond to the next period," says Hazim Abu Shanab, a Fatah leader from Gaza City.
Finding a solution to this problem is relatively complicated from the Palestinians' point of view.
"We are unanimous that change ought to take place, but differ on how to do it," says Kanafani.
Dahlan has suggested combining security services into two organizations, one that would deal with internal security and one that would deal with external security.
Kanafani, however, worries this would be bad for the Palestinian people, and would prefer to see the executive branch simply enhancing the performance of each service, and making sure it sticks to its jurisdiction.
"There is no country with a unified security force," he says. "There is always police and intelligence and other forces."
ONE OF the problems with unifying the security forces is that some members of the smaller organizations, in particular, may have to be laid off, which is politically sensitive when unemployment is so high in the PA. Some of the leaders of the smaller organizations, who may find themselves effectively demoted, are also reportedly wary of such changes.
Rajoub is in a particularly sensitive position if Arafat has to choose between him and his rival, Dahlan, to head a unified security service. Rajoub lost much of his power in the last month, after the IDF captured his headquarters in Ramallah with little resistance from his forces, and Hamas claimed his forces handed over several wanted men to the Israelis. And unlike Dahlan, he was not present in the Mukata with Arafat.
One observer notes that Arafat himself might object to unifying the security forces.
"His mechanism is divide and rule. The larger the organizations, the more likely they will threaten his power base."
Two problematic areas that have been largely neglected by those calling for reform are the corruption in Palestinian institutions, and the need for presidential elections, long overdue after six years.
On the contrary, Amr and most others stress that the new cabinet must be headed by Arafat.
Perhaps as a result, there is quite a lot of scepticism even from within the PA as to whether the reformers are sincere about wanting to make the system more efficient.
Many, for example, suspect that the suggestions are a public relations ploy, designed to placate the people who are fed up with corruption.
"The names that are calling for reform inside the PA are those who should be replaced," says PNC member Nasrallah. "People are getting tired of these faces which appear in the media, but have no credibility in the Palestinian street."
PLC member and former minister of Agriculture Abdul Jawad Saleh says he even suspects that Amr's resignation was staged.
"Historically," claims Saleh, "he was against any reforms, and he was an official spokesman of the PA inside the PLC against these reforms." One Israeli observer agreed Amr was "not the cleanest" member of the PA himself, coming from "the classic, corrupt PLO." There is a chance, he agrees, that Arafat asked Amr to resign in order to placate the people.
Others in the PA accuse the politicians of promoting reform in order to settle old political scores.
Husam Khader, a PLC member and Fatah leader in Nablus who is known as an outspoken opponent of corruption in the PA, calls many of those now proposing reforms - such as Arafat adviser Muhammad Rashid - "corrupt" and "collaborators." He claims they have benefited financially from the Oslo process, and have their own interests at heart, not those of the PA.
"Those suggesting reform want the security forces to be their own bodyguards, to keep the mentality of slaves," he says.
Ironically, he predicts that any reforms that do take place will target the "nationalists" in the PA - those who, in his opinion, are genuinely interested in establishing a more democratic, well-run society.
BY SUGGESTING reforms to the cabinet, some leaders might also be expecting to increase their own power. Fighel notes that there is particular competition for Arafat's favor at the moment.
"A number of people, including Dahlan, Rashid, [PLC member] Hassan Asfour, and [Arafat aide] Nabil Abu Rudaineh were isolated with Arafat in his compound for over 30 days, and very strong ties were formed between them," he says. "People also expect that they formed a chemistry with Arafat in that period, and that they will be given jobs with particular influence.
"Now," says Fighel, "each one of those people is trying to check his position against the others."
As a sign of the uncertain balance of power, a number of commentators have commented on the emergence of a new "troika" - but the names included in this list are not consistent. Among those mentioned are Dahlan, Erekat, Abu Mazen, and Tawfik Tirawi, head of the West Bank Intelligence Service. So while they could potentially act as a balance to Arafat, and perhaps promote genuine reforms, they are more likely to compete for his approval.
Many note that the desire to reform the system in any way, even in order to make the battle against Israel more efficient, is the luxury of the business and ruling classes.
"The people's main concern is the withdrawal of occupation," says Amr.
As a result, Ghassan Khatib, director of the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, claims the media has overplayed the popular desire for reform.
Still, members of the Palestinian intelligentsia have firm ideas about what they think should be done to truly reform the system.
Khader envisions a four-step process.
First, he says, Arafat must make sure he appoints only "good, honest people" to the cabinet.
"We don't want any more collaborators and thieves," he says. "Arafat has to recognize the demands of the Palestinian people, who after a century of struggle deserve nationalist leaders."
He would then like the PA's basic law, the equivalent to a constitution, to be ratified by Arafat. Thirdly, he envisions a reform to the security branches, and lastly, elections in the local administration and the PLC.
Clearly, this last request is considered controversial. Even Kanafani, who has in the past gone to court in order to demand elections for the PLC, says he is not currently urging for full elections to be held. The significance of elections, he says, is in their repetition, and at the moment, the president has the authority to appoint a new cabinet.
Khatib, however, agrees that elections are important, because making officials accountable to the public is key to clearing up corruption.
"The people must have a say in who should go and who should remain," he says, and adds that even Arafat could stand for election.
"I believe he wants them," says Khatib. "He knows he will be reelected - he is in a very powerful situation right now."
KHADER is willing to say that Arafat should stand for election regardless of the result.
"He is a Palestinian leader, a symbol of the Palestinian struggle we respect very much, but he should run for election just like every other Palestinian," says the legislator, who is famous for proposing that the PLC declare Arafat God of the Palestinian people because he has been in power for so long.
Khatib says that it would be impossible to hold elections without Israel's cooperation, which he does not expect, but he is hopeful Arafat will call for elections anyway.
"Arafat was just released a few days ago, and has given no major speech yet, so we still have hope," he says.
For Khader, the scenario is a "utopia," and most other Palestinians, however, not to mention Israelis, doubt that any serious reforms at all will occur any time soon.
Fighel notes that there is a long history in Arab dictatorships of proposing reform whenever a crisis occurs, in order to placate the people, but then not following through. Arafat himself has followed this pattern several times.
In May 1997, the PA state comptroller completed a report - circulated but never released - that found extensive abuses in all government ministries. The government audit found that nearly half the PA's $800 million annual budget had been wasted through corruption and mismanagement.
A PLC committee then recommended that three ministers - International Cooperation Planning Minister Nabil Shaath, Civil Affairs Minister Jamil Tarifi, and Transportation Minister Ali Qawasmeh - be prosecuted for graft.
Arafat then appointed his own commission, which PA sources say uncovered more corruption. This report was never released, and none of the three reports resulted in any changes.
Amr suspects that it will be a problem getting reforms through this time as well.
"Arafat always deals with reforms carefully, especially domestic ones," he says.
But for Khader, the problem is more than caution. He believes that the current Palestinian leadership is "more afraid of democracy than of the Israeli occupation." Those at the top, he says, have what he calls "the traditional Arab mentality for leaders. They do not believe in democracy, and cannot live with a constitution."
For Khader, the future without reform is bleak.
"There will be military action against the symbols of corruption," he predictss. "It will be civil war."
jpost.com |
