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Strategies & Market Trends : The New Economy and its Winners -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Wizard who wrote (12691)7/12/2002 6:20:19 PM
From: Bill Harmond  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 57684
 
Thanks for the insights, Wiz. I'm with BofA/SF. Better have a Plan B in case.

Probably Scottrade! I'd miss the conferences. I learned a lot at them during the past 10 years.



To: Wizard who wrote (12691)7/13/2002 12:07:49 AM
From: Bill Harmond  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 57684
 
Here's a bar chart of the Morgan Stanley High Tech Index relative to the S&P 500.

Today it closed above the 50-day for the first time since January, and also notice the ADX and MACD crossovers.

stockcharts.com



To: Wizard who wrote (12691)7/15/2002 12:47:42 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 57684
 
New Divide: Those Who Sold and Everyone Else

By LESLIE KAUFMAN and JOHN SCHWARTZ
The New York Times
July 14, 2002

At the height of the market boom in May 2000, Robert L. Barron oversaw the sale of Chromatis Networks, an optical communications company where he was chief executive, to Lucent Technologies in a stock deal initially valued at $4.75 billion.

But Lucent, which shut down Chromatis's entire operations a year later, was even then losing investor confidence: its share price tanked soon after the Chromatis sale. A dazed Mr. Barron continued to hold on to his stock, whose value was said to be $150 million at that time. He described the bumpy downhill ride: "I said, `No way would it go below 40,' and then I said, `No way would it go below 30,' and then I said, `No way would it go below 20,' and then I said, `No way it'll go below 10.' " Now, he added with a rueful chuckle, "it's $1.70." It closed on Friday at $2.56.

Yet Mr. Barron is neither bitter nor destitute. He is already running another high-tech start-up and says, philosophically: "Other companies did not even do an I.P.O. I am thankful."

Many of the companies whose shares are now plunging fastest, whether from accounting scandals or the bursting of the Internet and technology bubbles, were until recently voracious acquirers of other companies. Tyco International, Vivendi Universal and JDS Uniphase, among others, were all in there buying.

Investors everywhere are pondering their losses as the stock market continues its slide, with the Standard & Poor's 500 index last week hitting its lowest level since 1997. But perhaps none are doing so as intensely as big shareholders in businesses that were acquired with stock.

Those who held on to the bitter end, whether because they were legally required to do so or through denial, were badly burned. And they have included some of the wealthiest names in business. The Bronfman family, which swapped Universal shares for Vivendi shares in a friendly takeover, expressed outrage privately as it lost $2 billion on its stake. The shares, only part of the family's wealth, are still worth about $1 billion. Ted Turner has watched in dismay as his stake in AOL Time Warner has plunged 75 percent from last August, when it was worth about $7 billion.

Yet despite the attention given to these celebrity losers, most entrepreneurs and executives seem to have found a middle ground: not as wealthy as they had hoped, but still cushioned by the fact that they sold their businesses not far from the top of the market.

True, some former stakeholders, particularly those who held significant positions in the merged entities, were forced by regulations to hold stock through the downturn. But many others were free to follow the standard advice of financial advisers and traded at least some of their new shares for cash or protected themselves by placing "collars" on their shares — investment tools that limit both the upside potential and the downside risk.

Frank Dzubeck, president of Communications Network Architects, an analysis and consulting firm, said he has heard some sob stories, but "I don't know of many people who are eating dog food."

This overview from former owners is not comprehensive. Thousands of companies were snapped up in the last five years. Tyco gobbled up 137 companies from 1997 to 2001 and Vivendi Universal bought 59 in 2001, according to Thomson Financial. Many of the acquired companies were foreign-owned, as the corporations rushed to extend their global reach. Other deals were done in cash with no stock trading hands.

But among those interviewed, the planning provided enough protection that many said their biggest frustration was watching businesses that had been carefully cultivated, sometimes over generations, dismantled or misused by new owners. Many also expressed sympathy with former employees and colleagues who have been dismissed or were unable to cash in their stock soon enough.

Those who are happiest now, of course, are those who had the luck or foresight to sell all their stock early. There are not many to be found, but those who could be tracked down were more than willing to talk — and sometimes to crow. In April 1999, at the height of the Internet bubble, Mark Cuban sold Broadcast.com, a high-speed Internet communications start-up he founded, to Yahoo for a spectacular $5.7 billion in stock, with $1.2 billion going to Mr. Cuban himself. In the years since, Yahoo shares spiked to $250 but then tumbled down. They trade today at less than $14 a share, having lost more than 80 percent of their value since the purchase. But that hardly bothers Mr. Cuban, now the owner of the Dallas Mavericks.

"I hedged 100 percent of my stock the day I could," he wrote cheerfully by e-mail, "and since then have shorted more and have made a bunch of money."

Mr. Cuban's willingness to sell everything so quickly and then, in essence, bet against something he had created is quite unusual, financial advisers to wealthy families say. Depending on how the deal is put together, major owners can be legally obligated to hold on to the stock for an extended period. Owners can also show the same lack of judgment as other investors: they hold on too long because a stock has paid off before, or because they cannot bear to sell something that they have poured their hearts into.

"When you're part of it, and you believe in it, you've got your life into it, and your time, you just don't want to believe that the bottom is going to fall out," Mr. Barron explained.

In addition, the tax incentives to hang on are strong. "As long as you hold stock, you defer the capital gains tax," said Tom Zanecchia, a tax specialist who is president of Wealth Management Consultants. "It allows people to spread the tax hit over time as they sell shares."

Yet even among entrepreneurs who did not sell their stocks swiftly, many retained a substantial financial cushion because the prices they received for their companies were so inflated. John E. Messervey, president of the National Family Business Council, in Lake Forest, Ill., who advises wealthy families, said that before 2002, clients were acknowledging that they received "double and triple the value of their companies over a few years earlier."

For many, selling a company provided the cash to start new businesses. Dr. Amaresh Mahapatra sold his optical components company, the Ramar Corporation, to JDS Uniphase for an undisclosed amount in stock and cash in October 1999. JDS was trading above $25 at the time, later spiked to $153 and now hovers around $3.

"The timing was just right," said Dr. Mahapatra, whose financial adviser helped him protect against a slide in the stock. "It produced liquidity for me at just the right time and has allowed me to do other things." He has started a new venture to build next-generation technology to convert data into a light stream.

But even former owners who retained their sudden fortunes have often been unable to protect their former companies or their co-workers. Some 60 percent of Ramar's work force has been laid off by JDS in the last six months, Dr. Mahapatra said.

Watching helplessly as former colleagues take a financial beating after a deal is common. Selina Lo was a vice president at Alteon Websystems, which was bought by Nortel Networks in July 2000 for $7.3 billion in stock. Because she had already been at the company for several years, she garnered a considerable chunk of stock — and, she said, sold about half of it before the market plunge, creating a nice financial cushion. (The other half, she said, is "significantly underwater." Nortel stock which traded at about $80 at the time of the sale, is now less than $2.)

Other Alteon employees who had not been with the company long enough for their shares to be vested were left with options that plummeted in value. "Some people didn't really get their stock converted in time to take advantage of the good market," she said. "That's the biggest regret I have — that not everybody could take advantage of the market when we sold the company."

Sad reflection turns to rage, however, when the acquirer's stock is suffering because of something more than bad luck. Even in 1999, when Tyco International was growing swiftly, many in the Hixon family were not pleased when that conglomerate bought AMP Inc., an electronics manufacturing company, based in Harrisburg, Pa., that had been in the family for 50 years. As the co-founders and second-largest shareholders, they had hoped for an open auction.

Instead, the board agreed to sell AMP in a stock swap valued at $11.3 billion, which left the Hixon family with a reported stake of $320 million. That is not a pauper's sum, and even today, with Tyco stock down more than 75 percent from its high last December, the Hixons are not exactly staking out a stoop on skid row. And Pascal Levensohn, whose financial management firm represents the family, said the Hixons have "taken prudent steps to protect their investment."

Still, they are plenty furious about what remains of their Tyco stake. "They are angry and disappointed," Mr. Levensohn said. "The board of Tyco has significantly diminished the value of the company while purporting to pursue a value maximization strategy. Every long-term shareholder has reason to feel betrayed."

As for Mr. Barron, the former chief executive of Chromatis, the experience of riding the boom and the bust has left him "full of mixed feelings."

"The human tendency is to look at people who got more and feel jealous," he said. "The correct perspective is to look at the people who got less" and feel grateful.

There was much disappointment, he said, among his former co-workers — not just financial, but also "the idea of having worked hard on a particular product and seeing that product not get deployed." Many of them, he has heard, "are less likely to go to a start-up company again."

But, he said, he and former colleagues are comforted by the fact that their story is not unique. Moreover, half the company's employees are in Israel, he said, and "I can't believe they would be worried or discouraged about the Lucent stock price — they're probably worried about whether their children are at the wrong bus stop."

nytimes.com



To: Wizard who wrote (12691)7/15/2002 10:14:50 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 57684
 
Robertson Stephens Is Closed Down By FleetBoston as Buyout Talks Die

By SUSANNE CRAIG and JOHN HECHINGER
Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

On June 20, just hours after the management-led team at Robertson Stephens reached an agreement in principle to buy the struggling investment-banking firm from parent FleetBoston Financial Corp., John Conlin left a mass voice mail for the staff.

"An agreement is in place," Robertson's chief executive officer said, said people who heard the message. "But I've been down this road before and I want to caution you that until the deal is done, there is no deal."

Late Thursday night, after weeks of frustrating negotiations between the two parties, Mr. Conlin's words rang true as the talks to salvage the most important deal in Robertson's 33-year history fell apart, and FleetBoston said it would shut down the boutique investment bank.

In the end, the tentative arrangement fell apart as the two sides continued to bicker over numerous, often small issues that the Robertson management team felt added too many costs, making it financially unattractive for them to do a deal, said people familiar with the matter.

The decision by FleetBoston to shut down the San Francisco firm leaves 900 people out of work and closes the door on one of the country's most storied brokerage houses. At its peak Robertson took some of the country's best-known technology firms public, including Sun Microsystems Inc. and E*Trade Group Inc. It was one of four investment boutiques in the so-called HARM group that dominated tech underwriting: Hambrecht & Quist Inc., Alex. Brown & Sons Inc., Robertson and Montgomery Securities Inc. While banks have gobbled up all these firms, Robertson managed more than any other to hang on to its own identity.

And on Friday afternoon, as Mr. Conlin stood on the firm's San Francisco trading floor for the last time and tearfully told employees of the bank's decision to shutter Robertson, he placed the blame squarely at FleetBoston's feet. "Fleet entered into this process without discussing it with us and we have been playing catch up every since," he told employees, said people at the gathering. "This is not a company that had to be shut down." A Robertson spokeswoman didn't return calls requesting comment.

In a statement, FleetBoston Chief Financial Officer Eugene McQuade said only that the two parties "were unable to structure an agreement" and the bank decided that shutting down was now "in the best interests of our shareholders." A spokesman declined to elaborate.

The dramatic ending caps more than three years of often bitter relations between Robertson, one of the greatest beneficiaries, and in turn victims, of the technology boom, and FleetBoston, the No. 7 U.S. bank. FleetBoston, like many big banks, took a flier on a technology-driven investment bank by getting into high-risk businesses that appeared to be growing faster than banking but has since been burned. Amid last year's tech meltdown, Robertson's revenue plunged 71% and it lost $61 million, compared with the prior year's $216 million profit. In April, acknowledging it could become a takeover target if it doesn't turn around its results, FleetBoston announced it would refocus on its core commercial and retail banking operations. By putting its Robertson Stephens unit up for sale, Fleet hoped to signal its serious shift in direction.

The bank was under pressure to make a decision about whether to pull the plug on Robertson before it reports second-quarter earnings Monday. The bank said it would book a gain of about $300 million in the quarter from the sale of its student-loan servicing business, which will help offset its loss on the shutting of Robertson. Gerard Cassidy, an analyst at RBC Capital Markets, said he expected the bank to take a pretax write-down of more than $600 million related to Robertson Stephens.

Scott Black, president of Delphi Management, a Boston money manager that owns 222,000 FleetBoston shares, said FleetBoston would have little hope of profiting by holding onto Robertson and hoping for a rebound in technology, especially when larger players dominate underwriting "If this is just pouring good money after bad, it's the right thing to do," Mr. Black said of the bank's decision.

Although there was initial talk that a foreign or smaller domestic buyer might snap up Robertson, no serious bids materialized. This left FleetBoston on a solo track negotiating with a management team at Robertson, led by Mr. Colin, President Todd Carter and former CEO Mike McCaffrey, a group with which FleetBoston shares a rather stormy history.

Fleet assumed control of Robertson when it acquired neighboring BankBoston in 1999. A year earlier, BankBoston, then led by FleetBoston's current Chief Executive, Charles K. Gifford, bought Robertson Stephens in 1998 for $400 million plus a bonus pool of $400 million to be paid over four years. Many investors said the price was too rich, but bank executives argue that figure amounted to about $550 million, when adjusting for taxes and payments over time.

While culture clashes often ensue when commercial banks merge with securities firms, for a short time it looked as if the relationship between Robertson and FleetBoston would succeed.

Robertson's revenue jumped 66% in 2000 to $1.6 billion, turbo-charging FleetBoston's growth. Profit more than doubled, to $218 million. And, on a personal level, many at Robertson at first felt hopeful about FleetBoston and its then-CEO, Terrence Murray, a fellow deal maker who built FleetBoston into a powerhouse through dozens of acquisitions. In an early meeting, Mr. Murray delighted Robertson partners when he referred to clients by their ticker symbols, sounding more like a hot-shot securities analyst than a button-down banker.

The honeymoon was short-lived. In early 2001 FleetBoston asked for and received the resignations of both Robertson's CEO and chief financial officer following a high-profile pay flap where FleetBoston accused senior Robertson management of paying themselves more than $70 million than had been agreed upon.

This episode set the tone for the rocky sale talks that followed a year later, said people familiar with the matter. FleetBoston, said people familiar with the matter, didn't even discuss its plans with Robertson to sell the unit until the night before it was announced in April, a move that these people say enraged certain executives at the boutique.

After failed talks with a handful of firms to sell Robertson, FleetBoston entered into exclusive discussions with the management-led team. Robertson offered FleetBoston about $100 million in exchange for the 77% of the firm it owns (employees own the remainder). This wouldn't be cash, however; rather, Robertson staff would give up $100 million in compensation they were owed. While some employees took issue with how the equity would be distributed, in particular the amount of equity that would go to senior managers such as Mr. Conlin and Mr. Carter, these discussions took a backseat to the negotiations with FleetBoston.

FleetBoston, said one person involved in the talks, continued to find new expenses that added to the deal's price tag, for instance how much it would cost to reassign Robertson's information-technology contracts.

A big sticking point, said another person close to the negotiations: How much liability each side would take on related to regulatory investigations into how initial public offerings at Robertson and elsewhere were sold during the Internet boom.

A person familiar with the matter said FleetBoston concluded that a sale to management or a shutdown would cost the company about the same amount. The company didn't want to shoulder too many additional costs in a sale or investors would conclude it hadn't made a clean break with Robertson -- part of its recent shift to a lower-risk strategy.

"It really is the end of an era," says Sandy Robertson, who along with Paul Stephens founded the firm.

________________________________
Write to Susanne Craig at susanne.craig@wsj.com and John Hechinger at john.hechinger@wsj.com